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Abstract 
 
 
This  thesis  explores  the  boundaries  of  low-level  public  order  law,  drawing  on 
optimal pathways and standardizations across the four legal systems of England 
and Wales, Australia, The United States of America and Germany. The aim is to 
identify the origins of the public order frameworks, explore limits of proscribed 
behaviour  and  to  determine  whether  low-level  public  order  laws  satisfy  the 
requirement of certainty within the respective jurisdictions. The requisite mental 
elements  are  investigated  alongside  the  range  of  defences  available  to  those 
accused of such an offence.  
 
In order to fully investigate the unique synergies between protest and low-level 
public order, the study uses a comparative approach to examine the interaction 
between  the  low  level  provisions  and  constitutionally  guaranteed  rights  to  free 
expression;  including  an  examination  of  the  conceptual  analysis  of  the  wider 
frameworks within which protest and low-level public order operate. As the source 
of much contemporary protest, the impact of the War on Terror upon the nexus 
between  public  order  and  protest  will  also  be  examined  in  respect  all  of  the 
jurisdictions. 
 
It is argued that the law relating to low-level public order in all jurisdictions is, to 
some extent, based around “catch all” provisions that criminalize a broad range of 
behaviour and also allow the police and the courts a wide range of discretion 
when dealing with such offences. The various solutions in respect of structure, 
operation and judicial interpretation of the offences will be examined. This will 
highlight  standardizations  and  also  fundamental  disparities  between  the  four 
jurisdictions. 
 
Such  a  comparative  investigation  is  unique.  The  study  draws  upon  multiple 
standardizations to model the lower end of criminality across the four diverse legal 
systems, providing dynamic areas of contrast through an examination of both civil 
law and common law solutions to the treatment of low-level disorder. The efficacy 
of both codified and ad hoc arrangements to regulate disorder while guaranteeing 
the right to protest are also assessed. The thesis contributes to the understanding 
of the scope and contours of low-level public order law as well as extrapolating 
optimal solutions from the findings of this study. 
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Chapter One: 
 
Introduction 
 
Purpose of the Thesis 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct an analysis of the boundaries of low-level 
public order law as it operates within the legal systems of England and Wales, 
America,  Australia  and  Germany.  This  analysis  will  be  used  to  address 
deficiencies within the English legal system, specifically as they apply to s.5 of the 
Public  Order  Act  1986.  An  examination  will  be  undertaken  into  the  scope  of 
behaviour prohibited by low-level legislation, the required mental element and the 
certainty of such offences within the criminal law of each jurisdiction. This analysis 
will be accompanied by, and is intimately connected to, an inquiry into the way in 
which  law  relating  to  public  disorder  interacts  with  pre-existing  rights  to  free 
speech  and  peaceful  protest.  Examining  the  approaches  of  America,  Australia 
and Germany as well as the English legal system enables the study to draw upon 
multiple  standardizations  to  efficiently  model  this  aspect  of  the  lower  end  of 
criminality.  The  inquiry  will  then  project  appropriately  optimized  solutions  for 
reform to the Public Order Act. 
Background to the Research 
 
The  principal  difficulty  facing  both  legislators  and  the  judiciary  in  relation  to 
dealing with disturbances to public order of a non-serious nature can be summed 
up  by  the  famous  concurring  opinion  of  Justice  Potter  Stewart  in  Jacobellis  v 
Ohio
1 when  he  said  “I  know  it  when  I  see  it”
2.  Although  Justice  Stewart  was 
speaking in relation to hard-core pornography, the concern is exactly the same 
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1 378 US 184 (1964) 
2 “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced 
within that shorthand description, perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know 
it when I see it.” 	 ﾠ 2 
with minor disorder. Low-level misconduct is inherently subjective and lacks any 
clearly  defined  parameters.  Academic  writing  on  criminal  doctrine  has 
acknowledged the ambiguity inherent within offences that punish behaviour on the 
margins of criminality simply because it causes offence: 
 
“With conduct that is supposedly offensive one must…ask: why does the actor 
deserve censure? If the essence of the offence is merely that conduct displeases 
many people, then it is not clear the wrongdoing has occurred at all. “I don’t like it” 
should never suffice as a basis for criminalization regardless of the numbers who 
say it.” 
3 
 
The ethnographic insights of the author have directly informed the formulation of 
the research hypothesis and provide the primary motivation for undertaking this 
study. Having been employed as a former police officer and then working as a 
trainee  solicitor  within  the  English  jurisdiction,  this  practitioner  experience  has 
highlighted the breadth of the statutory provisions designed to combat the lowest 
level  of  public  disorder  and  the  amount  of  discretion  afforded  to  police  and 
prosecutors  in  determining  whether  conduct  should  be  ascribed  the  stigma  of 
criminality
4.  
 
Within  England  and  Wales  such  behaviour  is  primarily,  though  by  no  means 
exclusively
5, dealt with under the offence provided for by s.5 of the Public Order 
Act 1986
6. This creates an offence where upon inter alia a person uses words or 
behaviour which is threatening, abusive or insulting, or disorderly conduct, within 
the sight or hearing of someone who is likely to be caused harassment, alarm or 
distress. There is no requirement that any “victim” actually is harassed, alarmed 
or distressed
7 and as such the author witnessed at first hand, not only the broad 
scope of the conduct that could fall within this offence, but that relatively minor 
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3 Andrew Simester, Robert Sullivan, John Spencer and Graham Virgo, Criminal Law: Theory and 
Doctrine (4
th Edn, Hart 2010) 646   
4 A specific example of the scope afforded to individual police officers can be illustrated by the 
following anecdote. The author, employed at the time as a probationary police officer, was told by 
a colleague to arrest under s 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 anyone who swears “because its not 
very nice”.  
5 For details of the other low-level public order offences see pp 42-46; for details on the use of the 
common law power afforded to every citizen to deal with a Breach of the Peace see Chapter 
Seven. 
6 Chapter Two will fully explore the offences at the lower end of Part 1 of the Public Order Act 
1986. 
7 See, for example, Southard v DPP [2006] EWHC 3449 	 ﾠ 3 
conduct  could  be  ascribed  the  stigma  of  criminality  simply  because  either  the 
police, prosecutor or magistrate decided “I don’t like it”. Professor Smith, writing 
shortly  after  the  promulgation  of  the  1986  Act  issued  the  following  portent  in 
respect of s.5: 
 
“Because of the potential breadth of the language in which the section is drafted, it 
affords scope for injudicious policing; considerable common sense and restraint 
on the part of the police will be called for in the application of this section.” 
8 
 
The heuristic observations of the author reinforce this statement and lead to the 
supposition that the ambit of s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 is both vague and 
uncertain. When this is added to this both injudicious and arbitrary interpretation 
of the terms of s.5, one is faced with a provision that can be used to counter 
almost any conduct that an individual police officer or witness finds distasteful. 
The decision to prosecute becomes therefore something of a consensus ad idem 
between prosecutor and witness based on their mutual dislike of the conduct
9.  
 
It is also contended that the English courts are equally as complicit in that they 
have not acted as a sufficiently robust vanguard against this injudicious policing. 
Accordingly  there  is  a  need,  which  is  as  yet  unfulfilled,  to  fully  explore  the 
operation of low-level public order law, not only from a constitutional perspective, 
but also from the standpoint of criminal law theory and doctrine. Such a study is 
needed to inform developments within the jurisdiction of England and Wales, and 
requires  the  benefit  of  comparative  perspective  to  establish  the  optimal,  legal 
pathway  to  manage  low-level  disorder  and  propose  reforms  that  address  the 
perceived  weaknesses  of  the  current  state  of  the  law  in  a  manner  that  is 
constitutionally compliant.  
Introduction to the Research Hypothesis 
 
The  hypothesis  around  which  this  inquiry  is  based,  although  comparative  in 
nature,  hinges  around  the  aforementioned  dissatisfaction  with  the  lowest  level 
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8 ATH Smith, Offences against Public Order (Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) 117 
9 DPP v Orum [1989] 1 WLR 88 held that there was nothing within the terms of s 5 of the 1986 Act 
which excluded a police officer from being harassed, alarmed or distressed. 	 ﾠ 4 
English provision regulating public order, specifically s.5 of the Public Order Act 
1986. The effect of the vagueness and uncertainty in the drafting of that statute 
means that the various state actors involved in the enforcement, investigation and 
prosecution  of  the  offence  are  afforded  a  sizable  amount  of  discretion  in 
determining  whether  the  actions  of  the  alleged  offender  amount  to  being 
criminal
10. Accordingly this discretion allows for the punishment of conduct on an 
arbitrary basis, with liability assigned because an individual disapproves of the 
conduct rather than any inherent criminality
11.   
 
By  postulating  that  the  current  arrangements  for  dealing  with  low-level  public 
order  in  England  and  Wales  are  unsatisfactory,  the  thesis  seeks  to  use  a 
comparative prism to establish the optimal pathways for managing the kind of 
behaviour that inhabits the outer margins of criminality
12. The inquiry will critique 
the  operation  of  the  low-level  public  order  legal  solutions  employed  within  the 
jurisdictions of United States, Australia and Germany to establish to what extent 
there is a uniform, immutable method of dealing with low-level public disorder.  
Research Hypothesis: Challenging the Criminal Hegemony 
 
It has been stated that criminal offences “should be created only when absolutely 
necessary”
13 .  Underpinning  the  operation  of  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  are  the 
observations made by the Law Commission in respect of its review of the state of 
public order. Specifically, an assumption that the terms of the offence, requiring 
behaviour to be threatening, abusive or insulting are “…appropriate for defining 
the  limits  within  which  public  protest  may  take  place  without  incurring  serious 
criminal penalties”
14.  
 
The thesis will seek to examine the conduct that is currently dealt with by s.5 of 
the 1986 Act and contrast that with prohibited conduct from the other jurisdictions. 
This will indicate a consensus as to the extent that each jurisdiction is prepared to 
adjudge  conduct  as  being  criminal.  There  has  been  much  discussion  within 
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10 See for example the Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 
11 Simester (n 4) 7 states that indirectly, the criminal law imposes the legislature’s view and, on 
occasion, even a judge’s view of an acceptable life. It is contended that the breadth in scope of  
12 Smith (n 8) 117  
13 Per Lord Williams of Mostyn, HL Deb, vol 602, col WA 58; 18 June 1999 
14 Law Commission Report No 123/1983 Offences relating to Public Order, 46 	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criminal jurisprudence about the scope and reach of the criminal law
15. Professors 
Simester  and  Sullivan  have  identified  the  existence  of  two,  broad  criteria  that 
need to be met if the creation of an offence is to be justified
16: 
 
“There must, first, be a prima facie positive case for State regulation, in that the 
activity  at  issue  must  be  sufficiently  serious  to  warrant  intervention.  In 
general…this  requires  that  the  conduct  leads  to  significant  levels  of  harm  or 
offence being suffered by others.”
 17 
 
It will be the purpose of the first part of the thesis
18 to provide both detail and 
critique  at  the  range  of  activity  covered  by  the  various  disorderly  conduct 
provisions and establish the scope of activity sanctioned as low-level public order 
law across the jurisdictions. This first criterion, whether there is significant harm or 
offence to others, will be established by a collation and analysis of the level of 
misconduct that is criminalized across the jurisdictions.   
 
The  second  criteria,  articulated  by  Simester  and  Sullivan,  for  justifying  the 
existence of a criminal offence is described as a negative constraint
19: 
 
“It must be shown that the criminal law offers the best method of regulation, being 
preferably to alternative methods of legal control that are available to the state; 
and the practicalities must be considered of drawing up an offence in terms that 
are effective, enforceable, and meet rule of law and other concerns.” 
20 
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15 Classical liberal philosophy has long discussed the notion that conduct should only be 
criminalized if it results in harm to another. This “Harm Principle” was first articulated in John 
Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859). This principle was developed to include occasions where serious 
offence to others arose from the conduct in Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of Criminal Law 
(1984-87); vol 1, Harm to Others (1984); vol 2, Offense to Others (1985); vol 3, Harm to Self 
(1986); vol 4, Harmless Wrongdoing (1988). It is not the purpose of this thesis to analyze these 
theories. For contemporary exposition of the competing issues see, Simester (n4), Chapter 
Sixteen, The Moral Limits of Criminalization, pp 637-660; William Wilson, Criminal Law (4
th Edn, 
Longman, 2011) Chapter Two, Decision to criminalize, pp 32-48; Andrew Ashworth Principles of 
Criminal Law (6
th Edn, OUP, 2009), Chapter Two, Criminalization, pp 22-43 
16 Simester (n 4) in Chapter Sixteen provides details of the methodology behind these twin criteria 
drawing on liberal philosophy from John Stuart Mill and Joel Feinberg. Both Ashworth (n 13) and 
Wilson (n 13) broadly accept the Simester & Sullivan model so this will be the approach adopted 
within this thesis. 
17 Simester (n 4) 637 
18 Chapters Two and Three specifically deal with this. 
19 Simester (n 4) 637 
20 ibid 638 	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This constraint gives rise to two key issues that need to be addressed in respect 
of the criminalization of low-level public order. The first contention is that s.5 of the 
1986 Act, in its current form, offends against the key constitutional principle of 
certainty
21.  This  occurs  on  two  planes.  Firstly,  the  construction  of  the  offence 
provides the executive (in the form of the police and state prosecutors) with too 
much  discretion  in  relation  to  deciding  whether  the  conduct  of  the  accused  is 
criminal. The accused then has to wait for the decision by the finders of fact at 
trial as to whether, in fact the conduct was threatening, abusive or insulting and 
whether, in fact the conduct was witnessed by someone likely to be harassed, 
alarmed or distressed. This means that an accused conceivably may not know 
whether his conduct is criminal until the deliberation of the magistrates or jury.  
 
The  second  key  element,  and  fundamental  to  the  research  hypothesis  is  that, 
within the English legal system, the criminal law is the principal measure used to 
counter low-level behaviour by virtue of s.5
22. This predilection with criminalizing 
low-level  activity  is  reflected  in  the  academic  literature  on  this  subject.  Such 
writing  tends  to  focus  on  the  balancing  of  public  order  law  and  the conflicting 
rights  enumerated  within  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (ECHR) 
rather than any substantive examination of the criminal doctrine surrounding s.5
23. 
The inquiry, by utilizing a comparative methodology, will be able to examine the 
efficacy  of  the  more  regulatory  approaches  to  dealing  with  protest,  whereby 
disorder  is  managed  rather  than  criminalized.  It  is  submitted  that  protest  and 
disorder  “management”  rather  than  criminalization  may  be  the  optimal, 
constitutionally compliant pathway to overcoming the problems inherent with s.5. 
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21 The principle that laws should be stable and an individual should be able to know when he has 
committed a criminal offence is a recognized element of the rule of law. Perhaps the most 
celebrated, contemporary articulation of this can be found in Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and 
It’s virtue” (1977) 93 LQR 195  
22 It is acknowledged that the highly controversial Anti Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) regime 
introduced under s1 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provides for both civil applications in the 
magistrates court for orders, however Thornton et al states that the majority of ASBOs are made 
as a post-conviction measure. See Peter Thornton, The Law of Public Order and Protest (OUP 
2010) 393 
23 See, for example Andrew Geddis, “Free speech martyrs or unreasonable threats to social 
peace? - "Insulting" expression and section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986” [2004] PL 853; Sophie 
Turenne, “The compatibility of criminal liability with freedom of expression” [2007] Crim LR 866. 
See also Thornton (n 22) 	 ﾠ 7 
Introducing the Research Questions 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to some of the fundamental themes and 
methodological  issues  that  will  be  employed  throughout  the  forthcoming 
investigation.  As  this  inquiry  is  focusing  on  low-level  public  order  law,  both  of 
these terms will be introduced and defined. Consideration will then be given to the 
problems that exist within such a context. The comparative approach will then be 
introduced together with the rationale behind both the choice of the comparator 
systems and the operation of key constitutional frameworks.  
 
The affiliated hypotheses outlined above form the basis of the research and point 
directly to the areas of inquiry. The solutions to dealing with low-level disorder, 
specifically  s.5,  are  not  fit  for  purpose.  They  criminalize  behaviour  not  in  a 
targeted and specific manner; instead they endow the police and prosecutors with 
over-broad, interpretative powers to ascribing criminality to actions of which they 
personally disapprove. The objective of this research therefore will be to identify 
the  scope  of  the  conduct  that  is  criminalized  by  low-level  public  order  and 
juxtapose this with a critique of the approaches of other jurisdictions to establish 
the optimal pathways of prohibited activity.  
 
The thesis will also examine whether solutions from other jurisdictions will imbue 
low-level  public  order  law  with  more  certainty  and  clearer  defined  terms,  to 
eliminate the arbitrary imposition of a criminal sanction on conduct which has not 
been expressly criminalized. Alternatively, it may be that a more administrative 
approach is adopted. Such an approach would see s.5 either repealed or radically 
redrafted to curtail the proscribed conduct. The lowest level behaviour would be 
managed  by  measures  that  can  be  used  to  regulate  but  not  criminalize  the 
conduct of the individuals concerned. An examination of the different jurisdictions 
will establish what form such measures would take and how successfully they 
would manage low-level disorder. Such an approach would, if possible, overcome 
the constitutional and criminal doctrinal difficulties that currently bedevil s.5 and 
have been outlined above. The following research questions will be employed to 
test the veracity of the hypothesis and explore possible solutions for reform. 	 ﾠ 8 
1. How is the Management of Low Level Disorder Achieved Across the 
Jurisdictions? 
 
The first research question that needs to be addressed is the inherent assumption 
that all of the jurisdictions actually employ bespoke provisions for dealing with 
low-level public order. This thesis will seek to establish whether the jurisdictions 
under consideration employ the criminal law to deal with low-level public order. If 
it  is  established  that  such  legislation  does  exist,  it  will  then  be  necessary  to 
construct  a  topographical  map  of  this  legal  environment,  encompassing  the 
separate components of each offence within the different legal systems.  
 
Such offences will be need to be contextualized, therefore it will be necessary to 
introduce  the  social  and  historical  framework  underpinning  the  law  relating  to 
public  order.  Providing  this  background  will  allow  for  an  exploration  of  the 
underlying reasons for the structure and form of the respective frameworks. The 
one exception to this would be the terrorist attacks of September 11
th 2001 and 
the subsequent War on Terror, due to the relative immediacy and broader impact 
upon the respective legal systems, this phenomenon will be analyzed separately.  
The identification of the origins of the respective frameworks will then permit a full 
analysis  of  the  contours  of  the  various  low-level  public  order  provisions  within 
England, Australia, America and finally Germany. 
 
Such an analysis will allow for a comprehensive critique and evaluation of the 
various facets of low-level provisions. If it is established that criminal legislation 
does not exist, it will be necessary to identify and evaluated the legal mechanisms 
that are employed to regulate low-level disorder. At the outset, it can be confirmed 
that  England  and  Wales  has  such  a  structure,  and  this  is  evident  from  the 
traditional studies of public order law. These works, however, concern themselves 
solely  with  matters  concerning  the  English  legal  system
24 ,  with  only  the 
occasional, parenthetical reference to provisions from other jurisdictions
25. 
 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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system of England and Wales. The truncated use of the term is for the sake of brevity and not 
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definitely do not. 
25 See, for example; Richard Card, Public Order Law (Jordans 2000); For an approach which 
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The contrast across the four jurisdictions will be illustrative of the fundamental 
standardizations:  as  well  as  studying  issues  of  low-level  public  order  within 
England  and  Wales,  the  diverse  legal  systems  and  traditions  within  America, 
Australia and Germany will provide a juxtaposition of both civil law and common 
law  approaches  to  dealing  with  low-level  disorder
26.  The  four  jurisdictions  will 
provide insight into the operation of both codified and ad hoc arrangements to 
regulate  disorder  and  protest  and,  as  has  already  been  alluded  to,  there  is  a 
comparison of the effectiveness of written as opposed to unwritten constitutional 
guarantees  of  freedom  to  protest  when  set  against  low-level  public  order 
legislation. 
2. What is the Scope of the Prohibited Behaviour? 
 
In order to understand the range of behaviour that is prohibited by the disorderly 
conduct provisions across the jurisdictions, it will be necessary to analyze and 
critique  the  scope  of  the  individual  offences
27.  This  discussion  will  need  to 
consider  the  nature  of  the  prohibited  conduct  as  well  as  the  role  of  potential 
“victims”  of  the  conduct.  One  of  the  key  elements  of  the  “Feinberg  offence 
principle”, highlighted above by Simester and Sullivan is that: 
 
“Conduct is offensive when it affronts other people’s sensibilities… Causing any 
such reaction, in Feinberg’s view, constitutes prima facie grounds for invoking the 
criminal law.”
 28 
 
The restrictions and peculiarities caused by the location of the offence will also 
need to be assessed. Consideration will also be given to issues of harassment 
and  the  role  of  the  Internet.  The  special  status  of  racial  insults  and  racially 
aggravated  public  order  will  be  studied  alongside  the  provision  of  racially 
motivated disorderly conduct. By examining these provisions across all four of the 
jurisdictions  it  will  be  possible  to  establish  the  mechanisms  in  place  and  to 
critically evaluate their operation within the broader low-level paradigm. 
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27 See Chapters Three and Four  
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3. Does Low-Level Public Order Law Offend Against Certainty? 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that s.5 is an egregious piece of legislation that 
potentially offends against the requirements of certainty, it is necessary to conduct 
and  analysis  into  the  certainty  of  the  terms  used  within  low-level  public  order 
legislation  and  how  those  terms  comply  with  the  criminal  doctrine  of  certainty 
within each jurisdiction. Although a separate area of inquiry, inherently linked to 
this  will  be  an  examination  of  the  mental  culpability  required  by  the  different 
jurisdictions  in  order  to  prosecute  for  the  offence,  thereby  drawing  out 
standardizations across the diverse legal systems.  
 
An  essential  element  of  this  question  will  be  an  evaluative  comparison  of  the 
defences  to  low-level  public  order.  The  relationship  between  the  “reasonable 
excuse” defence
29 within England and Wales and the prosecution of protesters 
under s.5 of the 1986 Act will also need exploring and critiquing as this highlights 
one of the fundamental problems with s.5, namely that the defence is another 
area of uncertainty and while the accused may feel their conduct was reasonable, 
this will be determined at trial along with the other elements of the offence. Within 
the other jurisdictions, the concept of reasonableness as being a key element of 
the  actus  reus  will  be  explored  and  critiqued.  The  contrast  between  the  two 
different incorporations of the notion of “reasonableness” will form a key part of 
this inquiry. 
 
Although  reasonableness  is  part  of  the  bespoke  defence  afforded  to  s.5,  it  is 
postulated  that  reasonableness  of  activity  should  actually  be  determinative  of 
conviction. This is particularly relevant when considering the way in which protest 
is managed within the four jurisdictions. This inquiry will conduct a comprehensive 
analysis of the problems posed by the vehement protestor who, in trying to deliver 
a persuasive, and sometimes shocking message, transgresses low-level public 
order legislation. The analysis will encompass the use of legislation to manage 
public order difficulties that are created by the individual dissenter and that of the 
‘hostile  audience’.  The  interaction  of  disorderly  conduct  provisions  with 
guaranteed  rights  to  protest  embedded  within  the  jurisdictions  will  inform  the 
fundamental aim of seeking optimal solutions from the different systems 
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4. Is the Criminal Law the only way to Deal with Low-Level Public 
Order? 
 
With the relationship between low-level public order and protest being introduced, 
the final research question seeks to examine the alternatives to the deployment of 
the criminal law to deal with low-level conduct. It is significant that, even though 
the previous research questions may be able to establish a positive case for the 
criminalization of some low-level public disorder, it will also be necessary to draw 
on the solutions provided by the four jurisdictions to establish whether or not the 
criminal law is entirely suitable for dealing with low level public order in the form of 
s.5 of the 1986 Act. Simester and Sullivan have stated that, as a general principle, 
if some other form of State intervention falling short of criminalization is effective 
to regulate disorderly conduct “then that alternative should be preferred.”
30 
 
It is intended that a conceptual analysis of the legal infrastructure in which large-
scale protest is regulated throughout the jurisdictions should be undertaken. The 
nature of these regulatory frameworks will provide a “closed system” inside which 
the various low-level public order provisions can be deployed. This investigation 
will establish the key comparative standardizations in respect of the regulation of 
protests  and  how  low-level  public  order  operates  within  the  confines  of  a 
regulated  protest
31.  Drawing  the  themes  of  large-scale  protest  and  societal 
drivers together will also require an examination of the impact of the events of 
9/11 and the resultant War on Terror
32. This will determine whether there is any 
causal link between the events of 9/11 and any changes to either the framework 
for  protest  or  low-level  public  order  offences  themselves.  By  establishing  the 
management of low-level public order law within the regulatory framework, any 
proposed  reform  of  the  low-level  public  order  framework  within  England  and 
Wales can be examined not only for compatibility with criminal law theory and 
doctrine, but also alongside non-criminal, administrative models of public order 
management. 
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31 The regulation of protest and the prevention of disorderly conduct are all dealt with under the 
umbrella of the Public Order Act 1986 
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Originality of the Research 
 
The identification of these issues arising from the current form of low-level public 
order law within England and Wales, specifically, that which is located around s.5 
of the 1986 Act, inherently requires an examination of alternative solutions, both 
within  the  criminal  sphere  and  also  those  which,  as  outlined  above,  are  more 
regulatory in nature. There has been much written about the way in which s.5 
operates in respect of the various provisions of the ECHR
33 yet there has been no 
comprehensive, comparative study of the operation of low-level provisions within 
other jurisdictions. 
 
Therefore where academics have engaged in studies specifically related to low-
level public order law, the focus tends to be on the provisions as they interfere 
with  the  rights  of  protestors  and  demonstrators
34.  Such  discussions  largely 
overlook the criminal doctrine attached to the low-level offences. That is not to 
deny that there is a clash between positively guaranteed rights and public order 
law.  Indeed,  having  established  the  conceptual  edifice  relating  to  low-level 
provision,  the  inquiry  will  examine  the  legislation,  in  the  four  jurisdictions, 
designed to deal with low-level disorder that occurs within the context of a protest 
considered alongside the regular provisions of low-level public order.  
 
This analysis will determine the efficacy and appropriateness of prosecuting the 
extremist  who  propagates  offensive  (but  honestly  held)  beliefs  with  the  same 
legislative  provisions  used  to  prevent  public  urination  or  swearing.  This  cross-
jurisdictional investigation into the structure, function and operation of low-level 
public order law provides a unique perspective on the problems associated with 
s.5 of the 1986 Act coupled with the proposals for reform that arise from this 
study.  
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34See Mead (above n 33); For an American perspective see; Thomas M Place, “Offensive Speech 
and the Pennsylvania Disorderly Conduct Statute” (2003) 12 Temp Pol & Civ Rts L Rev 47; For 
the Australian jurisdiction see; Katherine Gelber, “Political speech practice in Australia: a study in 
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Methodological Parameters: Defining “Low-Level” and 
“Public Order” 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to some of the fundamental themes and 
methodological  issues  that  will  be  employed  throughout  the  forthcoming 
investigation.  As  this  inquiry  is  focusing  on  low-level  public  order  law,  both  of 
these terms will be introduced and defined. Consideration will then be given to the 
problems that exist within such a context. The comparative approach will then be 
introduced together with the rationale behind both the choice of the comparator 
systems and the operation of key constitutional frameworks.  
 
The law relating to public order is a branch of the criminal law. The boundaries of 
public  order  law  are  amorphous  and  the  definition  of  public  order  is,  itself, 
somewhat nebulous. It is stated by the Crown Prosecution Service of England 
and Wales that:  
 
“The criminal law in respect of public order offences is intended to penalize the 
use of violence and/or intimidation by individuals or groups. The principal public 
order  offences  are  contained  in  Part  1  of  the  Public  Order  Act  1986…  The 
purpose of public order law is to ensure that individual rights to freedom of speech 
and freedom of assembly are balanced against the rights of others to go about 
their daily lives unhindered.” 
35 
 
In remarkable symmetry, the US Model Penal Code (MPC) Article 250 covers riot, 
disorderly conduct and related offences. Prior to the drafting of the MPC
36 there 
was little consideration given to the lower level offences due to the relatively minor 
penalties. Nonetheless in the explanatory notes to §250 of the MPC, disorderly 
conduct and related offences are described as “a critically important area of the 
criminal justice system.”
37 The explanatory notes go on to state that one of the 
key purposes of the provision is to safeguard civil liberties by careful definition of 
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35 Crown Prosecution Service, “Public Order Offences including the Charging Standard” (Updated 
1 November 2010) available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/#Section_5 accessed 19 September 
2011 
36 The Model Penal Code was drafted in the late 1950s and promulgated in 1962. For further 
details see Paul Robinson, Markus D Dubber, “The American Model Penal Code: A Brief 
Overview”, 10 New Criminal Law Review (2007) 319, 319 
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offences  so  that  they  do  not  cover,  for  example,  arguing  with  a  policeman, 
peaceful picketing or disseminating religious or political views
38. 
 
The preamble to §250 offences within the MPC provides an explicit statement as 
to what is considered to be the role of low-level public order: 
 
“To systematize the chaotic provisions of prior law penalizing a wide variety of 
petty misbehavior under such vague headings as “disorderly conduct” or vagrancy 
To limit the discretion of the minor judiciary to impose substantial imprisonment for 
petty infractions 
… 
To minimize the overlap of disorderly conduct offenses and offenses dealt with by 
more specific provisions of the Model Code so that policies embodied in other 
offenses will not be disregarded by prosecuting the same behavior as disorderly 
conduct.” 
39 
 
Although this does not directly define what the term “public order law” means, it is 
implicit that petty offences and misbehaviour is the key mischief that low-level 
provisions are designed to counter. The MPC is explicit that it prohibits conduct 
that  is  “disorderly”,  or  causes  a  “public  nuisance”,  and  does  not  seek  to 
criminalize behaviour that is lawful but prompts others to respond in a disorderly 
manner.  Crucially,  when  drafting  the  MPC,  it  was  recognized  that  disorderly 
conduct was dealt with on an individual state level and at the time of promulgation 
there was a broad range of innumerable local ordinances that dealt with disorderly 
conduct style offences and some alignment was necessary
40. 
 
Australian academic analysis dealing with low-level public order has tended to 
focus on identifying the offences which police use to deal with both disorder and 
protests.  Douglas  encapsulates  the  Australian  perspective  on  defining  public 
order when he states: 
 
“It is clear that there are offences which have consistently loomed large in the 
police repertoire of charges. One group of offences relates to interference with 
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39 ibid para 1 
40 For details of the extent of this alignment see Chapter Two 	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police  activities…  A  second  group  of  offences  deals  with  ‘disorderly’  conduct. 
These include engaging in offensive, riotous or disorderly behaviour, and using 
insulting or indecent language.” 
41  
 
It is also identified that several provisions of the German Criminal Code deal with 
conduct  that  is  apparently  “intolerable  and  offensive”
42.  Chapter  Seven  of  the 
German Criminal Code deals with public order, although the provisions contained 
within cannot be described as being low level. The study will, therefore, need to 
examine the wider German legal system to establish which mechanisms are used 
to deal with the lowest level disorder and minor delinquency and examine the 
enhancements that a truly codified system can offer, when set alongside common 
law jurisdictions. 
Purposive and Functional Approaches to Low-Level Public Order 
 
While the definition of the term “public order” is elusive, there does at least appear 
to be consensus in respect of the broad statements of behaviour that low-level 
public order law seeks to prohibit. As there are countless offences to deal with 
such behaviour, not all public order offences will be examined. This chapter will 
consider  only  those  provisions  whose  essential  mischief  or  mischiefs  is  the 
protection of public order 
43. 
 
In examining the nature of public order law, the underlying purpose of the low-
level provisions requires consideration. If the wider criminal law is employed to 
protect members of society from “harm”, Smith states: 
 
“The interests protected by public order law are diffuse and indeterminate. Public 
order law ranges in its extent from the preservation of mere peace and tranquility 
as between rowing neighbour or preventing unreasonable street exhibitionism – 
nuisances on the outer margins of criminality… to serious outbreaks of disorder 
amounting  to  riot  (whereby)  the  constitutional  stability  of  the  country  seems 
threatened.” 
44 
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It is precisely these “nuisances on the outer margins of criminality” that provide 
cause  for  concern.  Thornton,  writing  in  respect  of  s.5  of  the  Public  Order  Act 
1986, crystalizes the commonly held perception in respect of low-level legislation: 
 
“The offence under s.5 is more widely drawn and extends the criminal law into 
areas  of  annoyance,  disturbance  and  inconvenience.  In  particular  it  covers 
behaviour  which  falls  short  of  violence…  Today  s.5  is  commonly  used  as  a 
dragnet offence to catch all types of low-level anti social behaviour.” 
45 
 
Writing at the inception of the 1986 Act, Smith argued that a need existed for such 
behaviour to be criminalized, and that the central purpose of s.5 was to protect 
people  from  being  threatened,  abused  or  insulted  whereby  the  victims  or 
witnesses of the behaviour are too weak, vulnerable or simply law abiding, to 
resort to violence in response. Smith goes on to state that the experiences of the 
victims  in  these  cases  are  such  that  it  is  “proper  for  the  criminal  law  to  take 
notice”
46. This study will seek to establish if such an approach is uniform across 
the jurisdictions and whether the other legal systems have a similar entry point for 
criminality. 
Assessing the reach of Low-Level Public Order Law 
 
Whilst  the  comparative  study  seeks  to  provide  an  overview  on  the  “important” 
case  law
47 decided  by  the  appellate  courts,  such  a  construct  is  in  many  ways 
misleading as to the nature of low-level public order law. In America, as with the 
other  jurisdictions,  because  the  punishment  for  committing  such  crimes  was 
comparatively minor, the attention paid to such offences was accordingly little. 
Nonetheless, as is pointed out in the explanatory notes within the MPC:  
 
“Offences in this category affect a large number of defendants, involve a great 
proportion of public activity and powerfully influence the view of public justice held 
by millions of people.” 
48  
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Law Journal 169, 169 
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Precisely because of the low-level nature of the offences, accurate figures as to 
the  extent  of  prosecutions  are  not  readily  available  for  the  majority  of  the 
jurisdictions
49. In 2006, Walsh conducted a study of low-level disorder cases in 
Brisbane and Townsville in Queensland, Australia. She stated: 
 
“The results of the July 2004 study suggested that the public nuisance offence 
was  being  overused  by  police,  as  well  as  being  selectively  enforced  against 
certain marginalized groups. People were being charged with the public nuisance 
offence for engaging in trivial behaviour that included having a verbal argument in 
public (generally with a neighbour or family member), drinking alcohol in public 
and even vomiting in public.” 
50 
 
Anecdotally,  it  has  been  recognized  that  disorderly  conduct  provisions  are  an 
important part of the criminal justice system in all jurisdictions
51. Some statistics 
are available in respect of the primary legislative provision within the English legal 
system (under s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986). The most up to date figures
52 
released  in  response  to  a  written  parliamentary  question  addressed  to  the 
Secretary of State for Justice
53 reveals the following total number of convictions 
within England and Wales in respect of s.5 of the 1986 Act: 
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49 “Crime statistics are provided for selected offences reported to, or becoming known to police 
and resulting in the submission of an offence/incident report in Police systems. The statistics 
exclude offences against public order, such as disorderly conduct.” 
<http://www.police.wa.gov.au/ABOUTUS/Statistics/CrimeStatistcalNotes/tabid/1212/Default.aspx> 
Although referring exclusively to crimes committed in Western Australia, the same is true of the 
other Australian States in relation to the collection of statistical data.   
50 Walsh (n 34) text to n 75 
51 In respect of Germany, see the writings of Judge Rüdiger Warnstädt, a judge of the Moabit 
Local Court (Amtsgerichte), which provide some insight into low-level public order offences; 
Rüdiger Warnstädt, Recht So, 80 Originale Strafurteile von Amtsgerichte Rüdiger Warnstädt aus 
dem Krimminalgericht Moabit (Das Neue Berlin Verlagsgesellschaft mbH 2003). Aspects of this 
book have been translated and discussed in; Steven Ross Levitt, “The Life and Times of a Local 
Court Judge in Berlin” (2009) 10 German Law Journal 169; see also chapter two, p 61 of this 
thesis. 
52 http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2010-12-20b.30917.h 
53 Taken from written statements and answers 20 December 2010, written question by Dominic 
Raab (Esher & Walton) Cons. Taken from http://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2010-12-
20b.30917.h 	 ﾠ 18 
Total Convictions under s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986
54 
 
Year          Convictions   
2000          17065 
2001          16213 
2002          16672 
2003          18400 
2004          19356 
2005          19608 
2006          21574 
2007          23971 
2008          22620 
2009          21208     
Total Convictions (2000-2009)    196687       
 
These figures provide an indication of the widespread usage of s.5 of the 1986 
Act  by  the  police.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  these  figures  only  speak  of 
convictions. There is no mention as regards the number of arrests, nor of the 
other disposals such as cautions, penalty notice for disorder and decisions to take 
no further police action. Such widespread usage is as true for each of the other 
jurisdictions as it is for the English legal system and further emphasizes the need 
for this study.  
 
The inquiry will examine those provisions that Smith would refer to as “nuisances 
on  the  outer  margins  of  criminality”.  This  means  that  legislative  provisions 
governing low-level public order potentially extend the tendrils of the criminal law 
into behaviour that is arbitrarily determined to be undesirable by the police and 
the courts. When coupled with the large number of people affected by legislation 
that has the potential to be used in a capricious or arbitrary fashion, the need for a 
detailed study into this area becomes clear.  
Introducing the Comparative Methodology 
 
Detailed academic analysis of public order offences has a tendency to fall down 
the gap between the study of criminal and public law. In addition, the peculiarly 
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54 The table shows the total number of convictions rather than the total number of proceedings. 
The figures available from the Home Office show that in a three year period at the start of the 21
st 
century there were 75,759 proceedings in the magistrates court for offence under s.5 of the 1986 
Act resulting in some 51,285 convictions. No details are available for the total number of 
proceedings from 2004. 	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constitutional  context  of  issues,  particularly  attitudes  in  respect  of  freedom  of 
expression, means the academic analysis of public order has remained rooted 
firmly within the native legal systems
55. There has been no detailed exploration of 
the operation of the provisions in comparison to other jurisdictions. The fact that 
this inquiry is focused upon the low-level aspect of public order law means that it 
is suited to a comparative study as Markensinis explains: 
 
“Looking at foreign law can bring a deeper understanding of problems… perhaps 
even unexpected ideas for solving them – but that will only happen when they 
(comparative lawyers) sharpen their focus by narrowing it.” 
56 
Methodological Reasoning and the American Jurisdiction 
 
Zweigert  and  Kötz  have  emphasized  a  paradox  when  trying  to  establish  an 
effective  and  sustainable  cross-jurisdictional  analysis.  They  highlight  a  lack  of 
systematic  writing  about  appropriate  methods  of  comparative  study.  The 
contradiction inherent in this is that it is extremely doubtful whether it is possible to 
draw up a universal methodological approach to comparative law: 
 
“A  detailed  method  cannot  be  laid  down  in  advance…  when  it  comes  to 
evaluation, to determining which of the solutions is the best, the only ultimate 
criterion  is  often  the  practical  evidence  and  the  immediate  sense  of 
appropriateness.” 
57  
 
Such an assertion does not advocate an anarchical approach to the study. The 
need for a functional, systemic analysis rather than a mere list of similarities and 
differences is clear
58. What is also clear is that the choice of legal comparators is 
crucial. Zweigert and Kötz point to an immediate and obvious choice: 
 
“Though  England  is  unquestionably  the  parent  system,  the  law  of  the  United 
States  while  staying  in  the  family  has  developed  so  distinctive  a  style  that  a 
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55 See n 6 
56 Basil Markensinis, “Comparative Law – A subject in search of an audience.” (1990) 53 MLR 1 
21  
57 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3 edn OUP 1998) 33  
58 Markensinis (n 56) 3 	 ﾠ 20 
comparatist  would  fall  into  error  if  he  drew  on  English,  to  the  exclusion  of 
American, law.” 
59 
 
The choice of America is logical for a number of reasons. First, although the US 
legal system follows the same common law tradition as its progenitor, it has an 
entirely different constitutional approach. This leads to central differences, more 
colourfully  described  as  “rampant  individualism”
60 in  respect  of  the  role  of  the 
judiciary and the protection of fundamental rights.  
 
The US Constitution is supreme, as opposed to that of England and Wales, which 
– as part of the United Kingdom – recognizes the supremacy of Parliament
61. Of 
particular relevance to this discussion is the First Amendment, which provides 
that: 
 
“Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press;  or  the  right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  petition  the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” 
62 
 
One of the key roles of the US courts is to act as an arbiter as to whether a law 
provides for an unconstitutional restriction on speech. The courts can strike down 
laws that do not comply. Freedom of association and assembly are not explicitly 
protected in the First Amendment, although the Supreme Court held, in NAACP v. 
Alabama
63, that freedom of association is a fundamental right protected within the 
scope of the First Amendment. In order to be constitutional, any low-level public 
order law will have to be First Amendment compliant.  
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59 Zweigert & Kötz (n 57) 41 
60 Ian Cram, Contested Words: Legal Restrictions on Freedom of Speech in Liberal Democracies 
(Ashgate 2006) 13 
61 For an exposition of the classic Diceyan theory of parliamentary supremacy as it operates within 
the modern British constitution see Anthony Bradley & Keith Ewing, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (14
th Edn Longman 2006) 51 
62 Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, “The Constitution of The United 
States of America” http://topics.law.cornell.edu/constitution/overview accessed on 19 September 
2011 
63 357 U.S. 449 (1958) 	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Despite the differences in constitutional make up, there are also key similarities. 
America and England are both “liberal democracies”
64 and, as such, they espouse 
respect for the democratic process and the rule of law
65. The conflict between 
low-level  public  order  and  guaranteed  freedom  of  expression  should  produce 
opportunities for comparative standardizations in this area.  
The English Jurisdiction: Something Old, Something New… 
 
As the “parent” jurisdiction, and with the research hypothesis focusing upon the 
problems  of  s.5  of  the  1986  Act,  the  legal  system  of  England  and  Wales  is 
fundamental within the study. Despite being the oldest common law system under 
consideration,  the  constitutional  arrangements  regarding  protection  for  human 
rights  within  its  domestic  law  are  relatively  new.  The  United  Kingdom  was  a 
signatory to the ECHR. The “democratic imprimatur”
66 of this international treaty, 
giving further effect to the rights contained therein, was accomplished by virtue of 
the Human Rights Act 1998
67. There is much academic and case law discussion 
on the origins of the Convention and the background to the enactment of the 1998 
Act
68. As with the above-mentioned discussion on the origin and concept of these 
rights, such themes lay outside of the scope of this study. Suffice to say that it has 
been identified that: 
 
“before the HRA came into force in England in October 2000, the UK’s common 
law constitution was based on the idea of residual liberty…people were free to do 
whatever they liked provided that they did not, at the same time, break the law.” 
69 
 
This principle can be illustrated as follows: if an individual wanted to take part in a 
demonstration, such an activity would not exist as a right, and it would only be 
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64 “According to classical liberal theory, to function effectively, liberal democracies required merely 
that the appropriate institutional mechanisms were in place (such as bicameral legislatures; 
checks and balances) and that constitutional doctrines were respected and enforced (separation 
of powers and rule of law).” quoted in Cram (n 60) 2 
65 Cram (n 60) 13 
66 MacLaine Watson v Dept. Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418 (HL)  
67 Dominic McGoldrick, “The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 In Thoery and Practice” 
(2001) 50 ICLQ 901 
68 For detailed exposition of the origins, framework and operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 
within England and Wales see: John Wadham et al, Blackstone’s Guide to The Human Rights Act 
1998 (5
th edn OUP 2009). For a more critical discussion on the continued operation of the Human 
Rights Act see: Keith Ewing, Bonfire of the Liberties: New Labour, Human Rights, and the Rule of 
Law (OUP 2010) 
69 Mead (n 33) 26 	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lawful if there was no law preventing it
70. Certainly, if the protest was likely to 
cause  an  obstruction
71,  or  lead  to  a  breach  of  the  peace
72 then  there  was  no 
requirement for the police to take account of any right to protest. Instead they 
would prevent the disorder – most likely by arresting the demonstrator - and the 
courts would be likely to rule that the protest was unlawful and uphold the legality 
of the police action.  
 
The 1998 Act incorporates a number of legal mechanisms by which the rights 
enshrined within the ECHR can be given further effect within the English legal 
system, but there are two that have particular import for this study. The first, under 
s.3  of  the  1998  Act,  provides  for  a  new  rule  of  statutory  interpretation.  This 
approach eschews a strong constitutional review role for the courts
73 and instead 
places a duty upon the judiciary, whereby primary and secondary legislation is to 
be read in a way that is compatible with Convention rights
74. Where legislation 
cannot be read in a Convention-compliant fashion, it must still be upheld, although 
judges in the High Court and above can declare the legislation incompatible
75. 
The scope of the judiciary to “recast statutes in a more Convention-compatible 
hue”
76 is  a  significant  one
77.  A  component  element  within  this  thesis  will  be 
establishing whether they have done so in relation to low-level public order law. 
 
The second fundamental change brought about the 1998 Act provides that it is 
unlawful  for  any  public  bodies  to  act  in  a  way  that  is  incompatible  with  a 
Convention  right
78.  Mead  states  that  the  term  is  defined  by  reference  to  the 
functionality
79, and whilst there has been considerable debate as to the scope of 
the term “public body” within s.6, for the purposes of low-level public order law, it 
is clear that both the police and the Courts are classed as pure public bodies for 
the purpose of liability under this section. This duty has clear implications for both 
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70 ibid 28 
71 Arrowsmith v Jenkins [1963] 2 QB 561 
72 Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218 
73 Mead (n 33) 41 
74 Human Rights Act 1998 s 3 
75 Human Rights Act 1998 s 4 
76 Mead (n 33) 44 
77 For further discussion on this see: G Marshall, “Two kinds of compatibility: more about section 3 
of the Human Rights Act 1998” [1999] PL 377 
78 Human Rights Act 1998 s 6(1) 
79 Mead (n 33) 45 	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the policing and the adjudication of cases involving protest, disorder and the right 
to free expression and this will be explored further in Chapter Five. 
 
The  right  to  freedom  of  expression  and  association  are  qualified  rights  within 
Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. This means that they can be limited by the state 
in certain circumstances provided that limitation is necessary, in furtherance of a 
legitimate  aim  and  in  accordance  with  the  law
80.  The  English  legal  system  is 
unique amongst the four jurisdictions in that it does not have a constitutionally 
Supreme  Court
81 and  while  the  appellate  courts  can  make  a  declaration  that 
legislation  is  incompatible  with  a  Convention  right,  no  English  court  can  strike 
down an incompatible law
82. 
 
The English jurisdiction is fundamental to the research to be carried out. It is the 
central hypothesis of this thesis that the English solution to low-level public order, 
in respect of s.5 of the 1986 Act, is fundamentally flawed. The other jurisdictions 
are, in essence, being introduced in order to service the research questions in 
order to confirm or disprove that hypothesis. In projecting any possible models for 
reform, it will be necessary not only to consider the impact of the legislation but 
also  the  constitutional  compatibility  of  any  measures  taking  into  account  the 
distinct legal tradition of the legal system of England and Wales. 
Australia: A Developing Rights Profile 
 
Both England and America constitutionally guarantee freedom of expression in 
one form or another. Yet in England and Wales, this was not always the case
83 
and  another  comparator,  ideally  with  no  explicit  protection  of  free  expression, 
would provide a counterpoint to the two positions outlined above. The Australian 
legal system is a liberal democracy with no established Bill of Rights and as such 
becomes the third of the triad of common law jurisdictions to be chosen as a 
comparator within this study. The incorporation of Australia, a legal system with 
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80 ECHR Art 10(2) and Art 11(2) 
81 The UK Supreme Court is only “supreme” in the sense that it is the Final Appellate Authority 
within the UK see Jack Beatson et al, Human Rights: Judicial Protection in the United Kingdom 
(Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 
82 It has argued been that, as a declaration under s 4 of the 1998 Act always leads to the 
government enacting remedial legislation, the de facto effect of the declaration of incompatibility is 
as good as a strike down power. Lord Hoffmann has stated that is merely a “technical distinction”; 
Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 MLR 159 at 159-160 
83 For further description of the pre-Human Rights Act position see; Mead (n 33) 26-29 	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even closer familial links to the English legal system than America, may seem 
methodologically problematic in that there may not be sufficient difference in the 
legal  systems.  Certainly  much  of  Australian  law  is  derived  from  English 
precedent
84 and indeed the Australian Constitution received its vires from a British 
Act of Parliament
85.  
 
The Australian jurisdiction, however, offers unique perspectives to the drawing of 
optimal  pathways.  It  is  a  federal  parliamentary  democracy,  with  a  written 
constitution
86. The Australian jurisdiction provides state based regulation of low-
level  laws,  and  as  such  resonates  with  America.  As  a  signatory  to  the 
International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights,  the  State  legislatures  of 
Australia are not bound to take account of constitutionally integrated rights. The 
High Court is the final appellate court for the Commonwealth of Australia and has 
the power to shape the common law throughout the country as well as having the 
power of judicial review in respect of Acts of Parliament
87. This hybrid constitution 
has elements of the US system and the English, providing further opportunities for 
cross-jurisdictional standardizations and the exploration of optimal solutions. 
 
The Australian legal system has no bespoke Bill of Rights within its constitutional 
framework. The absence of constitutionally guaranteed rights means that there is 
no explicit protection afforded to freedom of speech within the main instrument of 
government
88.  Instead,  the  Australian  High  Court  has  implied  a  “freedom  of 
political communication”
89 from the terms of the Constitution. It has been stated 
that this exists to protect only certain kinds of political speech
90. The essence of 
this key constitutional concept is that the courts regard the constitution as having 
established a system of representative and accountable government within the 
framework  of  a  parliamentary  democracy.  In  order  to  facilitate  representative 
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84 Douglas (n 41) 119-120 
85 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 
86 The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia was ratified via referendums held between 
the years 1898 and 1900 by citizens of the Australian States. The British Parliament then enacted 
this as a section of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900.  
87 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution s 76 
88 Adrienne Stone, “The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure” (1999) 23 MULR 668 
89 See Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 
90 Adrienne Stone, “The Australian Free Speech Experiment and Scepticism about the UK Human 
Rights Act” in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human 
Rights (OUP 2001) 391 	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government, the courts have ruled
91 that this implicitly means that the legislature 
should  not  pass  any  law  that  interferes  with  the  operation  of  the  democratic 
system
92. 
Defining the Parameters of the Study: Choosing a Civil and Codified 
Comparator 
 
There  is  an  additional  and  distinct  comparison  required,  as  these  three 
jurisdictions all come from broadly the same, Anglo-Saxon legal tradition
93. A civil, 
codified  legal  system  provides  the  final,  overarching  cross-jurisdictional 
perspective. There are a number of jurisdictions that could have fulfilled this role. 
Both  India  and  Ireland  have  their  roots  in  the  English  legal  system  but  have 
adopted a codified approach to their criminal law. Whilst they would have partially 
fulfilled  the  needs  of  the  study,  they  still  have  their  roots  in  the  common  law 
tradition.  
 
The French legal system and those countries, such as the Benelux countries (for 
example,  the  legal  system  of  the  Netherlands)  that  adopt  derivations  of  the 
Napoleonic  code  also  make  attractive  comparators  for  the  common  law 
approaches adopted in the other three jurisdictions. Tempting though it would be 
to try and incorporate numerous civil jurisdictions, this would only serve to dilute 
the quality of analysis. An essential part of the methodological requirements of the 
study are that the jurisdiction should be of a similar social and economic make up 
to the others. 
 
The German jurisdiction provides clear legal and historical differences to generate 
clear  optimal  pathways  in  contrast  to  the  other  jurisdictions.  Conversely,  any 
areas of commonality that can be established will be given added resonance due 
to the conceptual differences between the German legal institutions and method 
and those from a common law tradition. In addition the historical upheaval caused 
by the rise of National Socialism within Germany leading up to and including the 
Second World War provides the opportunity to study a jurisdiction with a unique 
historical sensitivity to the exercise of arbitrary state power. 
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91 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 
92 For further details see p 153-155 
93 Zweigert & Kötz (n 57) 41 	 ﾠ 26 
The German Legal System  
 
More than the other jurisdictions under consideration, the German legal system 
can be said to represent a different philosophy of law. Whereas England, America 
and Australia differ in institutions and constitutional arrangements, the German 
legal system is underpinned by a positivistic, doctrine driven, approach which “to 
use a simplistic description is thus deductive in nature as opposed to the more 
inductive one of common law”
94. The hierarchy of norms within the German legal 
system provides a curious paradox to this apparent doctrinal supremacy. In spite 
of (or perhaps because of) the positivistic approach adopted by the legal system, 
the concept of natural justice
95: 
 
“Permeates the law as a guiding principle of interpretation…(and) has the force of 
influencing the application of even the highest ranking legal rules at constitutional 
level.” 
96 
 
In  more  tangible  terms,  the  German  legal  system  is  based  on  a  written 
constitution. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG) is the supreme law of the land
97 
that specifies the operation of, and relationships between, the organs of the state 
and details the constitutional rights of the individual. The GG overrides any other 
form of law in Germany, with Article 5 I GG containing the right to free expression 
and Article 8 I GG providing for the right to peacefully assemble.  
 
Fundamentally,  German  law  requires  adherence  to  the  maxim  nullum  crimen, 
nulla  poena  sine  lege
98.  This  concept  of  Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip  requires  all 
criminal liability to be based on a full act of parliament and also incorporates, inter 
alia, the principle of Bestimmtheitsgebot or that of legal certainty. In addition, the 
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94 Michael Bohlander, The German Criminal Code: A Modern English Translation (Hart 2008) 2 
95 “This is based around the so called “Radbruch Formula” and states that formally valid positive 
normal law prevails over substantive concepts of justice, even if it is unjust and irrational. This 
primacy ends when there are breaches of justice of intolerable proportions, which are in turn 
defined as instances where the positive law explicitly and systematically neglects its goal of 
pursuing the aims of justice, and when the principle of equality is ignored on purpose.” Quoted in 
Bohlander (n 94) 3-4; Bohlander goes on to compare natural justice to the principles of equity 
within common law systems, acting as a safety valve as a corrective to the strict rules.  
96 Bohlander (n 94) 4 
97 It is acknowledged that international law also takes its place alongside the Grundgesetz, 
however the effect of things such as binding European law remains beyond the scope of this 
discussion.  
98 Literally meaning, “There can be no crime and no punishment without the law.” 	 ﾠ 27 
notion of Rechtsgüterschutzprinzip or the protection of legal rights is designed to 
ensure that the criminal law is not in place to enforce one or more concepts of 
morality rather to protect individual or societal interests
99. These principles are 
internalized within the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB).  
Research Methods: Towards a “Black Letter”, Doctrinal 
Approach 
 
It  is  acknowledged  that  there  are  difficulties  inherent  in  comparative  studies 
between common law and civil law jurisdictions and that, in essence this study, 
with an English legal dilemma as its basis, has not left behind the confines of one 
jurisdiction
100.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  procedure  and  trial  of  criminal 
offences,  together  with  the  range  of  decisions  that  can  be  made  within  the 
German legal system are different to the common law traditions. The role of the 
prosecution and defence and the judge at trial fulfil radically different functions to 
their adversarial counterparts. This discussion is not blind to such differences. 
But,  in  order  to  concentrate  upon  the  central  issues  of  inquiry  (the 
standardizations and the quest for optimal pathways in relation to low-level public 
order)  a  simplified,  more  harmonious  model  will  be  suggested,  although  it  is 
accepted that the fundamental approach to the criminal justice system is different 
within Germany. 
 
In respect of the underlying methodology of the comparison, the approach that is 
to be adopted within this inquiry is often colloquially referred to as a “black letter 
law” perspective. In its simplest form, this utilizes the decisions of courts and the 
language  of  the  legislation  as  the  primary  evidence  for  any  enquiry  into  the 
operation  of  the  low-level  law.  Whilst  there  will  be  historical  discussion  of  the 
drivers upon the law, this inquiry will restrict itself to the low-level legislation as it 
manifests itself within the different legal systems. Theories regarding the origins of 
rights and their applicability to low-level public order will not be pursued. Such a 
discussion  (explaining  what  the  rights  of  protest  and  free  expression  should 
encompass) would divert attention from the central question of how the rights that 
are recognized are both protected and conflicted with low-level public order law. 
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99 Nigel Foster & Satish Sule, German Legal System and Law (4
th Edn OUP 2010) 340 
100 Zweigert & Kötz (n 57) 41 	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Summary 
 
In order to answer the research questions posed herein, and ultimately to test the 
hypothesis that the solution to low-level public disorder, as found within s.5 of the 
Public Order Act 1986, the thesis will adopt the following approach. Chapter Two 
will seek to discuss the historical drivers behind public order legislations across 
the  jurisdictions  and  also  identify  the  low-level  legislation  across  the  four 
jurisdictions.  Chapter  Three  will  provide  conceptual  analysis  of  the  various 
physical elements of the provisions within respective jurisdictions. This analysis 
will  draw  upon  the  offences  highlighted  and  provide  an  analysis  of  the  key 
elements  of  the  offences  to  establish  whether  there  is  a  positive  case  for 
criminalizing such conduct.  
 
Chapter  Four  will  perform  a  three-fold  function  within  the  broader  thesis.  In 
response  to  the  issue  of  the  broadness  raised  in  the  previous  chapter,  the 
certainty  of  the  terms  used  within  low-level  public  order  legislation  will  be 
scrutinized  around  the  requirements  constitutionally  enshrined  in  each  of  the 
jurisdictions. Chapter Five will seek to develop the arguments, in respect of both 
the breadth of the prohibited conduct and the extent to which the reasonableness 
of their conduct should absolve them from criminality, in the specific example of 
the defendant who is vehemently proclaiming a deeply held belief. The role of 
protest in any analysis of s.5 is crucial.  
 
Having examined the positive case for criminalization, Chapter Six will focus upon 
the regulatory frameworks for governing protest within the different jurisdictions. 
Whether the criminal law is the most appropriate mechanism by which to deal with 
low-level public disorder is one of the key areas of inquiry for this thesis. The aim 
of Chapter Seven will be to analyze the changes to low-level public order across 
the  jurisdictions  following  the  terrorist  attacks  of  September  11
th  2001.  The 
existence  of  a  causative  relationship  between  these  attacks  and  any  related 
transmogrification of either the framework regulating protest or low-level public 
order offences themselves may provide further insight into problems outlined in 
the hypothesis and indicate appropriate pathways for reform.  
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The  concluding  chapter  of  the  thesis  contains  the  proposals  and 
recommendations detailing the way in which the law of England and Wales can 
be changed and adapted to more effectively manage the problems posed by low-
level disorder. The ultimate purpose of the research conducted within this thesis is 
to identify standardizations and optimal solutions for change amongst the different 
jurisdictions.  These  findings  will  ensure  that  the  flaws  within  s.5  can  be 
addressed.  This  will  provide  the  foundations  of  a  coherent  and  certain  legal 
framework for managing low-level disorder, whereby conduct is not criminalized 
on a capricious or arbitrary basis merely because an agent of the state finds it 
personally distasteful. 
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Chapter Two: 
 
Establishing the Contours of Low 
Level Public Order Law 
 
Introduction to Chapter Two 
 
The hypothesis being tested within this thesis is that the English solution to low-
level public order law, as embodied with s.5 of the 1986 is not fit for purpose and 
in  need  of  reform.  In  order  to  confirm  that  hypothesis  and  make  appropriate 
recommendations  for  reform,  it  is  necessary  to  investigate  the  background  to 
these provisions to understand why the framework has evolved into its current 
form. It is the purpose of this the first part of this chapter to outline some of the 
reasons behind why the enforcement mechanisms have developed in the way that 
they have. It will start by looking briefly at the unique historical, social and political 
factors  at  play  within  each  jurisdiction.  The  study  will  then  consider  the 
idiosyncrasies of the individual legal systems. A key factor not being considered at 
this juncture, although undoubtedly significant, is the impact of the terrorist attacks 
that affected America and England in the early part of the 21
st Century
1.  
 
The chapter will address the first research question by exploring how low-level 
public order is managed throughout the four jurisdictions. This investigation will 
provide  a  locus  around  which  the  legislation  can  be  examined
2 and  provide 
definition to the notion of “low-level public order”. The comparative methodology 
employed
3  requires  exposition  of  the  various  frameworks,  together  with  a 
description  of  the  historical  circumstances  surrounding  the  legislation  and  the 
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1 These attacks and the subsequent response as part of the War on Terror have seen an upsurge 
in mass protests, which in turn have impacted upon all aspects of public order law. Accordingly, 
the impact of the war on terror will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
2 The discussion as to the role of case law and the judiciary in the German criminal law is to be 
discussed later on in this chapter. For further information see Michael Bohlander, Principles of 
German Criminal Law (Hart 2009) 15 
3 See p 18-28 	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broad constitutional context in which they operate
4. This will then permit a full 
cross-jurisdictional  evaluation  of  the  solutions  employed  to  deal  with  low-level 
public order. The conclusion being worked towards is that the English approach, 
of  criminalizing  low-level  disorder  by  means  s.5  of  the  1986  Act,  is  not  fit  for 
purpose  in  the  current  form.  An  examination  of  the  approaches  of  different 
jurisdictions  will  provide  the  first  preliminary  models  for  disorder  management, 
around which the recommendations can be made. 
Characteristics of the Public Order Offences 
 
Unsurprisingly,  as  will  be  seen  throughout  this  chapter,  there  is  a  degree  of 
variance between the different jurisdictions. The approach to public order law by 
successive  governments  within  England  and  Wales  can  be  categorized  as  a 
hybrid mixture of statute
5 and common law
6 within a constantly evolving human 
rights landscape
7. All of these different legal instruments operate as a discourse 
upon the various elements of the criminal justice system and those who enforce, 
prosecute and judge low-level public order offences.  
 
As  stated  in  the  introduction,  the  statute  that  contains  the  principal  criminal 
offences dealing with public order is the Public Order Act 1986. This Act deals 
with  individual  offences  of  varying  degrees  of  seriousness
8,  the  regulation  of 
processions and assemblies
9 and offences inciting racial hatred
10. The England 
and Wales approach in respect of the lower level public order laws within the 
Public Order Act 1986 can be classified as being only partially codified
11, with 
important  elements  such  as  powers  to  deal  with  breach  of  the  peace
12 being 
ignored  by  legislators  and  other  statutory  provisions  regulating  protests  being 
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4 See p 19-27 for details on the constitutional peculiarities of each jurisdiction 
5 Principally, as discussed in the previous chapter, Public Order Act 1986 but also Criminal Justice 
Public Order Act 1994 and Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005 
6 The powers to deal with a breach of the peace will be examined in Chapter Seven; see also 
Peter Thornton et al, The Law of Public Order and Protest (OUP 2010) 254 
7 The European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
as given further effect in UK law by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998 being the principal driver 
for this phenomenon. 
8 Part 1 of the Public Order Act 1986 ss 1-8 
9 Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 ss 11-16 
10 Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 ss 17-29N 
11 For full details see Richard Card, Public Order Law (Jordans 2000) chapters 2-4 and also 
Thornton, (n 6) chapters 1-5 
12 A common law offence and the terms of which were defined in R v Howell [1982] QB 416; [1981] 
3 All ER 383; [1981] 3 WLR 501, CA. See p 258 for further details.  	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found  in  other  statutes
13.  Despite  having  the  appearance  of  coherence,  the 
corollary of having these different provisions is an inherently fragmented approach 
to the problems faced by those charged with ensuring the preservation of public 
order.  
 
The German legal system, whilst having a fully codified criminal law
14, spreads a 
variety of public order offences between the more serious Verbrechen (felonies), 
lower  level  offences  classified  as  Vergehen  (misdemeanours)  found  within  the 
Strafgesetzbuch  (Criminal  Code)
15 as  well  as  having  a  significant  number  of 
offence dealt with under the Ordnungswidrigkeiten (OWiG). The OWiG contains 
minor violations which do not count as criminal offences and which are punishable 
by a fine only
16. Classification of offences as felonies and misdemeanours was 
removed  from  English  criminal  law  and  replaced  by  the  slightly  amorphous 
categorizations of summary and indictable offences. What is noticeable within the 
German  criminal  law  is  the  existence  of  a  body  of  law  aimed  specifically  at 
regulating protest. The “Assembly Law” (Versammlungsgesetz) will be examined 
alongside the other legal mechanisms for protest in Chapter Six
17.  
 
The German position echoes the situation in the legal systems of the US and 
Australia, both of which also operate within a federal structure. Unlike the English 
approach to public order, in the other jurisdictions there has been no attempt at 
placing these low level offences into a single statute, either on a federal or state 
level.  There  have  been  moves  towards  codification  of  the  criminal  codes  in 
Australia  and  the  US
18,  but  these  have  not  been  to  the  same  extent  as  in 
Germany whereby the StGB can be said to be an inherent and conceptual part of 
the fabric of the legal system
19.  
 
The final part of this inquiry will go on to explore the current methods of legislating 
for  prohibited  behaviour,  together  with  the  approaches  of  different  jurisdictions 
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13 ss 132-138 Organized Crime and Police Act 2005, see Chapter Seven for details. 
14 See Bohlander (n 2) chapter 2 
15 The offences against Public Order can be found in the Special Section of the StGB, Chapter 
Seven, §§123-145d 
16 Bohlander (n 2) 14 
17 See Chapter Six p 217 onwards 
18 See below p 53 onwards for a discussion on the origins of the Model Penal Code and the 
variations that exist within the States. 
19 Bohlander (n 2) 5 	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when the individual transgresses what at first sight appears to be a relatively low 
threshold. This will furnish the rudimentary information as regards commonality 
and  divergence  of  approaches,  enabling  the  construction  of  an  evaluative 
commentary  that  incorporates  and  builds  upon  best  practice  throughout  the 
different jurisdictions
20. An examination will be conducted of the role of the courts 
and the influence of the interpretative duty of the individual judges within the four 
jurisdictions, drawing on these basic provisions
21. The lessons that can be drawn 
from the interpretive activity will be used to inform the evaluative commentary and 
this chapter will ultimately seek to furnish the “raw materials” in relation to the 
cross-jurisdictional analysis. 
Introducing Multiple Frameworks 
 
The historical, social and political drivers that have affected the way in which each 
jurisdiction deals with public order will now be identified. It is recognized that the 
comparative methodology
22 does demand an understanding of the reasons why a 
particular solution has been adopted; an examination will now be made of the way 
in which the development of the legislation has been shaped by events. The 20
th 
Century English experiences will be contrasted with those of the United States of 
America  and  Australia.  These  two  common  law  jurisdictions,  with  radically 
different, federal constitutions, have not engaged in a holistic review process of 
the  legislation  governing  public  order.  The  same  cannot  be  said  of  Germany, 
having endured traumatic transmutations to its constitutional order throughout the 
20
th Century. German approaches to dealing with low-level public order will be of 
great utility for the discussion, partly due to the civil, codified state of its legal 
system and partly due to the impact of historical events upon the modern German 
legal  system.  The  next  section  will  outline  the  reasons  behind  the  different 
approaches and attempt to evaluate the current models in place within the four 
different jurisdictions. 
Development of the current English framework 
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20 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (3
rd Edn, OUP 1998) 18 
21 Starting at p 36 
22 Zweigart & Kötz (n 20) 34-43 	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The existing legislative provision currently operating within England and Wales
23 
has roots in the disturbances that beset the whole of the United Kingdom in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s
24. As Thornton states: 
 
“The Public Order Act 1986, still the bedrock of the modern law came after the 
Southall riots of 1971 and the Brixton disorders of 1981, events fuelled by a blend 
of race and inner city discontent.” 
25 
 
It was not only the disorders in London that shaped the law relating to public 
order. A diverse range of events occurred, almost contemporaneously, which can 
be broken down into three broad areas, although the following list is by no means 
hierarchical or mutually exclusive. The first of these societal drivers was the public 
order disturbances connected with industrial disputes and the rise of militant trade 
unionism
26. As stated above, there was violence connected with racial tensions 
that  had  begun  to  emerge,  concentrated  around  the  inner  cities
27.  A  final, 
additional  category  is  that  of  violence  and  disorder  resulting  from  football 
matches
28. All of these drivers have generated explicit legislative responses, in 
the realms of employment law
29, equality law
30, and sports law
31, which operate 
alongside the general low-level public order provisions. Due to the very specific 
arenas in which these activities take place, the details of these areas will not be 
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23 The regime for dealing with low-level public order disturbances in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
is still based on the common law offence of Breach of the Peace.  
24 For an overview of the factors behind the social, industrial and political issues which beset the 
England and Wales in the 1970’s and 1980’s see; Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-
2000 (2
nd Edn, Penguin 2004) 319-401; For a more detailed academic discussion of the political 
factors at play during this time, see Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State: The End 
of the Postwar Era - Britain Since 1974 Vol 3 (Palgrave Macmillan 1991) 
25 Thornton (n 6) 5 
26 ATH Smith, Offences Against Public Order (Sweet & Maxwell 1987) 116; for the political aspect 
see Middlemas (n 24) 311 
27 As a result of the inner city riots in the summer of 1981 focusing upon the south London suburb 
of Brixton a government enquiry was undertaken. See Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon the Lord 
Scarman, The Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 Cmnd 8427 (1981)  
28 There have been numerous reports examining the issue of violence and disorder at sporting 
events the most significant contemporary of the Public Order Act 1986 was the Committee of 
Inquiry into Crowd Safety and Control at Sports Grounds: Final Report Cmnd 9710 (1986) by Rt 
Hon Lord Justice Popplewell. 
29 For information on the powers to deal with industrial disputes, see Simon Deakin & Gillian 
Morris, Labour Law (5
th Edn, Hart 2009) at Chapter 11 
30 See for a detailed guide on the operation of equality legislation see Karon Monaghan, Equality 
Law (OUP 2007) 
31 For a full discussion on this specialist area within the wider context of the role of the law 
regulating sport see Mark James, Sports Law (Palgrave Macmillan 2010) at Part 3, specifically 
Chapter 10, Crowd Disorder and Football Hooliganism 	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discussed  further  in  this  thesis.  The  focus  of  the  study  will  remain  upon  the 
general, low-level provisions
32.  
 
It has been suggested that the Thatcher government of the 1980s, was seeking to 
position itself as “the party of law and order”
33. This may account for the need to 
be  seen  to  be  regulating  and  improving  the  operation  of  the  criminal  justice 
system. It is no coincidence that the changes to public order law were almost 
synchronous with the changes brought in by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 (PACE).   Nonetheless, there is much academic
34 and judicial debate on the 
social  and  political  background  to  these  disturbances  both  individually  and 
collectively
35. It was, ultimately, this discourse that highlighted the deficiencies of 
the previous arrangements for dealing with disorder within a changing society. 
These  drivers  coupled  with  the  heightened  media  scrutiny,  represented 
multifarious and serious threats to order within the United Kingdom and combined 
to provide a momentum for change
36.  
 
Consequently, it was the combination of these events that led to the government 
commissioning a major review of public order law
37. This review was, by its own 
admission, principally concerned with the more serious offences within the sphere 
of major public disturbances
38. This assertion within the Law Commission Report 
No. 123 was not, of itself, surprising. Indeed, the most recent government inquiry 
into the state of public order, conducted in 2010, has focused on the policing of 
protest rather than the underlying legal framework. It was understandable that the 
government should inquire into the more serious threats to disorder. But this has 
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32 Due to the wide ranging impact of the terrorist attacks both on 9/11 and 7/7 these drivers will be 
considered separately in chapter seven  
33 Middlemas (n 25) 192 
34 For a broad ranging, socio-political discussion see Martin Kettle & Lucy Hodges, Uprising: 
Police, the People and the Riots in Britain’s cities (Macmillan 1982) 
35 Lord Scarman conducted detailed inquiries for the government into two of the most significant of 
these disturbances. For a detailed analysis of what became known as the “Red Lion Square Riots” 
see Report of an Inquiry by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Scarman, The Red Lion Square Disorders of 
15 June 1974, Cmnd. 5919 (1975).  
36 See Smith (n 27) at Chapter 1  
37 This process of review is outlined in Smith (n 27) 20-28, culminating in the Law Commission 
Report, Offences Relating to Public Order, (1983) Law Com. No. 123 
38 Law Commission Report (n 37) 2-3 	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the  unwanted  side  effect  of  shifting  focus  away  from  the  more  mundane, 
commonplace offences
39.  
 
The Law Commission report, whilst not a direct progenitor, certainly informed the 
final structure of Public Order Act 1986, an Act which one contemporary observer 
noted was “a far more sweeping reform than had initially been intended”
40. When 
considering  the  low-level  offences,  the  White  Paper  for  the  Public  Order  Bill
41 
sounded an ominous warning when addressing the proposed crime of disorderly 
conduct, stating that: 
 
“The Government recognizes that there would be justifiable objections to a wide 
extension of the criminal law which might catch conduct not deserving of criminal 
sanctions.” 
42 
 
Taking this portent into consideration, an examination will now be undertaken of 
the low-level public order offences that exist within Part 1 of the Public Order Act. 
Analysis will start with the lowest in the hierarchy of infractions in an attempt to 
map out the base contours of the offences. 
 
Section 5 of The Public Order Act 1986 
 
The public order legislation which is used primarily to deal with the lowest level 
public order offences within England and Wales, is to be found under s.5 of the 
Public Order Act 1986, which, inter alia, provides that: 
 
  “A person is guilty of an offence if he –  
uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour, 
or 
displays  any  writing,  sign  or  other  visible  representation  which  is  threatening, 
abusive or insulting. 
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39 See “Policing Public Order: An overview and review of progress against the recommendations of 
Adapting to Protest and Nurturing the British Model of Policing” report of February 2011 available 
at: http://www.hmic.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/PPR/PPR_20110209.pdf 
40 Smith (n 27) 26 
41 White Paper, Cmnd 9510 quoted in Thornton (n 6) 37 
42 ibid para 3.26 	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within  sight  or  hearing  of  a  person  likely  to  be  caused  harassment  alarm  or 
distress.”
43 
 
The actus reus of s.5 is that the conduct
44 of the accused must be within the sight 
or hearing of someone likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress
45. There 
is no need for the conduct to be directed at any particular victim but (unlike other 
more serious offences under the 1986 Act
46) the person who is likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress must actually witness the conduct, even if it is by 
CCTV
47 or on the Internet
48. The mens rea, found in s.6(4) of the 1986 Act, is that 
the accused must either intend his words or behaviour to be threatening, abusive 
or insulting or intend his conduct to be disorderly or be aware that it may be
49. 
 
The  range  of  conduct  that  is  prohibited  includes  disorderly  behaviour.  In 
Chambers & Edwards
50, it was held that whether the conduct was disorderly was 
a question of fact to be determined by the court depending on the circumstances 
of the case. It is assumed, in reaching this decision, the word disorderly is to be 
given its natural meaning
51.  The mens rea of s.5 requires proof either that the 
defendant  intended  his  conduct  to  be  threatening,  abusive  or  insulting  or 
disorderly or that he was aware that it might be so
52. Ormerod asserts that, at its 
lowest, this requires proof of an awareness of a possibility
53.  
 
The legislation provides for a defence to prove that the conduct was reasonable
54. 
Since  the  coming  into  effect  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998,  a  number  of 
prosecutions under s.5, especially those involving protestors, have been disputed 
on the grounds that the words or conduct was part of a protest
55. The accused 
protestor(s) base the reasonableness of their conduct on the guaranteed rights to 
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43 Public Order Act 1986 s 5(1) 
44 Either the words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour according to s 5(1) 
45 For further exploration of these concepts see p 81 
46 See, for example, the requirement under Public Order Act 1986 s 3(2) 
47 Rogers v DPP (1999), unreported 22 July DC as cited in David Ormerod, Smith & Hogan 
Criminal Law (12
th Edn, OUP 2008) 1075 
48 S v Crown Prosecution Service [2008] EWHC 438 (Admin) 2008 WL 924 
49 For detailed exploration of the terms of s 6(3) of the 1986 Act, see Chapter Four, p 120 
50 [1995] Crim LR 896 
51 Ormerod (n 47) 1074 
52 Public Order Act 1986 s 6(3) 
53 Ormerod (n 47) 1075 
54 Public Order Act 1986 s 5 (3)(c) 
55 See, for example Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69, [2004] Crim LR 851 	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freedom of expression
56 and freedom of assembly
57. Ormerod states that there 
have been a number of cases in which the offence under s.5 has been challenged 
in the courts as being incompatible with Article 10 of the ECHR
58. It is submitted 
that  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  The  challenges  in  the  courts  have  been 
targeted at the appropriateness of the individual conviction not at the underlying 
offence itself. The rights based challenge posed by the coming into force of the 
Human  Rights  Act  1998,  the  scope  of  the  mental  element,  together  with  an 
exploration of disorderly behaviour and the terms threatening, abusive or insulting 
will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter
59. 
 
Of great significance at the inception of the 1986 Act was the provision set down 
in  s.5(4).  This  provided  a  bespoke  power  of  arrest  to  police  officers  and  was 
initially what gave s.5 of the 1986 Act real potency
60. The provision of the power of 
arrest
61 for s.5 meant that the police should have been able to effectively deal with 
the  mischief  that  the  Act  was  designed  to  counter.  This  was  of  particular 
importance as the power of arrest could only be exercised following the issue of a 
warning to the person concerned in the disorderly conduct.  
 
The  test  as  to  whether  a  warning  has  been  given  was  laid  down  in  DPP  v 
Groom
62, a case that is an exemplar of the type of behaviour s.5 was designed to 
counter. The defendant had made racial remarks to an individual and, upon being 
overheard by a police officer, was asked to desist and apologize. The defendant 
refused  and  was  subsequently  arrested.  It  was  stated  that  the  warning  under 
s.5(4) did not require any prescribed words; all that was necessary was that it was 
clear any repetition or continuation of the conduct would amount to breaking the 
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56 The right to freedom of expression can be found Article 10 of the ECHR 
57 Freedom of Association and Assembly found under Article 11 of the ECHR 
58 Ormerod (n 48) 1076 
59 See p 72 
60 s 5(4):  A constable may arrest a person without warrant if - 
(a)  he engages in offensive conduct which a constable
60 warns him to stop, and 
(b)  he  engages  in  further  offensive  conduct  immediately  or  shortly  after  the 
warning. 
61 Prior to the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 the power to arrest was contingent as 
to whether the offence was “arrestable” or “non-arrestable” Low-level offences generally did not 
have a power of arrest; see Ed Cape, “Arresting developments: increased police powers of arrest” 
[2006] Legal Action 24 
62 [1991] Crim LR 713 DC 	 ﾠ 39	 ﾠ
law. It was for the court to reach a common sense conclusion based on whether, 
in all of the relevant circumstances, a warning had been given
63.  
 
Rights  based  criticisms  of  the  provisions  of  the  Act  would  point  out  that  the 
provision also meant that where a police officer decides that a peaceful protest 
was  within  the  ambit  of  this  Act,  the  protestor  could  be  arrested  and  their 
participation  within  that  protest  ended
64.  The  requirement  for  a  warning
65 was 
repealed
66 as part of the changes to the police powers of arrest that rendered the 
need for a specific power of arrest redundant by virtue of the Serious Organized 
Crime and Police Act 2005
67. This was one of a number of provisions within the 
2005  Act  that  would  have  ramifications  upon  the  policing  of  low-level  public 
order
68. 
 
Fixed Penalty Notices and Section 5 
 
The Law Commission report into public order offences published in 1983
69 was 
explicit  as  to  the  nature  of  conduct  that  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  was  intended  to 
counter.  This  report  viewed  behaviour  such  as  groups  of  youths  persistently 
shouting abuse or obscenities and low-level football hooliganism as the primary 
mischief that needed addressing
70. Under English criminal law, the offence would 
be classed as a minor one, as it is triable as a summary offence only
71. Upon 
conviction the maximum penalty is a fine not exceeding level 3 on the current 
scale
72. As a conviction will not result in imprisonment, this offence can be said to 
be at the bottom of the “public order” scale. By virtue of s.5(6) of the 1986 Act, this 
offence remains largely within the purview of the lower courts with only a small 
number of appeals percolating through to Divisional Courts. 
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63 ibid [714] 
64 Andrew Geddis, “Free speech martyrs or unreasonable threats to social peace? - "Insulting" 
expression and section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986” [2004] PL 853; Card (n 11) 155-157 
65 Also the definitional provision under s5(5) of the 1986 Act 
66 Serious Organized Crime and Police Act Sch. 17(2), Para 1 
67 Serious Organized Crime and Police Act s110 provided for a new power of arrest based not on 
Arrestable and Non-Arrestable Offences but on a more broadly defined criteria of ‘necessity’ 
according to s24 (4) and 24 (5) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
68 See p 242 for discussion on the case of Brian Haw and ss132-138 Serious Organized Crime 
and Police Act 
69 Law Commission Report (n 37) 
70 ibid para 5 
71 Public Order Act 1986 s 5(6) 
72 At the time of writing a level 3 fine would equate to a fine of £1000 	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In  addition  to  the  instituting  of  criminal  proceedings,  police  officers  now  have 
authority to deal with offences under s.5 of the 1986 Act by use of Fixed Penalty 
Notices.  Introduced  as  an  attempt  to  deal  with  (predominantly  alcohol  related) 
disorder,  the  recommendations  outlined  in  a  Home  Office  consultation  paper
73 
formed  the  core  of  Part  1  of  the  Criminal  Justice  and  Police  Act  2001.  The 
operation and ambit of when a notice can be issued is to be found in Part 1 of the 
2001 Act. It defines a penalty notice as: 
  
“A  notice  which  offers  the  opportunity,  by  paying  a  penalty,  to  discharge  any 
liability to be convicted of the offence to which the notice relates.” 
74  
 
The corollary of this is that by paying the fine, the recipient is discharged of liability 
for conviction of the offence that is specified on the notice. Although a record is 
kept of the issue of notices, this is not the same as a criminal conviction and 
accepting a fixed penalty notice does not require an admission of guilt
75.  
 
Eager to dispel lurid tabloid imagery of drunken youths being marched by police to 
cash points, the 2001 Act
76 allows the recipient of a notice to elect to have the 
case tried before a court
77.  In relation to public order offences the issuing of fixed 
penalty notices has not been without problems. The issue raised in case of R v 
Gore
78 illustrates the difficulties of using immediate mechanisms of disposal for 
seemingly  innocuous  offences.  In  Gore,  a  fixed  penalty  notice  was  issued  for 
disorderly conduct. It transpired that instead of the mild jostling that had occurred, 
one of the parties had sustained a broken arm. The appellants argued that further 
proceedings would be an abuse of process and that once an offence had been 
dealt with by means of any disposal, then the accused could not be prosecuted 
again.  
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73 Reducing Public Disorder: the role of fixed penalty notices, (Home Office September 2000) 
74 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 s 2(4) 
75 R v Hamer [2010] EWCA Crim 2053 
76 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 s 4(2) 
77 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 s 6 provides that there should be notes for guidance 
issued to police officers to detail the operation of the fixed penalty scheme. 
78 R v Gore; R v Maher [2009] EWCA 1424; Times, July 17, 2009 	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The appeal in Gore was rejected, and although the facts highlight the potential 
danger  of  an  incomplete  investigation  they  also  emphasize  the  efficacy  of 
employing  this  method  of  disposal.  Such  administrative  disposals  expedite  the 
management of low-level disorder, yet they do not preclude criminal sanctions in 
the event more serious offences come to light. 
 
It is illustrative of the attitude of the legislature to lower level public order offences 
that the vast majority of fixed penalty offences are regulatory in nature
79 apart 
from s.5 of the 1986 Act. Despite the reassurances, however, that a record of 
notices will be maintained, a recent request to the CPS made under the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000
80 showed that they did not have details as to how many 
fixed  penalty  notices  have  been  issued  in  respect  of  s.5.  This  is  a  disturbing 
development  pointing  to  another  potential  area  where  police  discretion  and 
summary justice could potentially lead to an increased arbitrariness in respect of 
low-level public order.  
 
It should be noted that whilst the issue of fixed penalty notices is a relatively new 
concept within English public order law, the OWiG, within the German jurisdiction, 
has long made use of Penalty Notices as a means of disposal for administrative 
offences. §65 allows for offences under the OWiG to be punishable by penalty 
notices. §66 OWiG contains the details as to what information should be carried 
on the notice and the legal force of the notice. §67 OWiG deals with the appeals 
procedure should an individual issued with a penalty notice wish to appeal the 
decision. Whilst the legal status of the respective penalty notices may differ, it is 
an important area of commonality that both jurisdictions share. What it also shows 
up is that the use of low-level public order disposals for disorderly conduct may 
well be suitable for the type of disorder originally envisaged by the framers of s.5 
within the English legal system
81, but may be less suited to those offenders who 
seek to deliberately cause offence as part of a protest. 
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79 Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 s 1 lists the offences that are “penalty offences”. The 
majority of these offences are strict liability in nature.   
80 See the following discussion; 
http://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/statistics_regarding_section_5_p?unfold=1#incoming-
49670 
81 Smith (n 27) 117 	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Section 4A of the Public Order Act: Added Intent 
 
Occupying  the  next  tier  of  low-level  public  order  offences  is  that  of  causing 
‘intentional harassment, alarm or distress’
82. The genesis of this provision lay in 
the early 1990s. From the outset, it was clear that, although the ambit of s.5 of the 
1986 Act was extremely broad, the range of activity covered was more substantial 
than the framers of the legislation had anticipated
83. Nevertheless, there was also 
a perception that the range of sentencing was not sufficiently broad enough to 
cope  with  those  offences  committed  with  malevolence,  but  lacking  threat  of 
immediate unlawful violence to shift the conduct from an offence under s.5 up to 
the more serious s.4
84.  
 
This perception was reinforced by a considerable amount of political pressure, 
coupled with the findings of the Commission for Racial Equality in 1992 and the 
Home Affairs Select Committee in 1993-94
85, to create a clause strengthening the 
law  as  it  related  to  racial  harassment.  As  Smith  asserted,  “that  undertaking 
metamorphosed  into  the  creation  of  a  more  serious  general  harassment 
offence”
86.  This  was  trumpeted  as  a  provision  that  sought  to  penalize  “the 
harassment of women, children, the elderly or the disabled”.
87 It is difficult to see 
how these claims can be supported, especially as there is no mention of any of 
these particular groups within s.4A. What the legislation does do, is to create an 
offence whereby a person who intends to (and through his conduct in fact does) 
cause harassment, alarm or distress can face a greater sanction than the non-
imprisonable offence under s.5 could offer. The introduction of s.4A of the Public 
Order Act 1986 by virtue of s.154 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994 provides that: 
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82 Public Order Act 1986 s 4A 
83 Andrew Ashworth, “Criminalising Disrespect” [1995] Crim LR 98 provides a discussion on Brown 
& Ellis, Policing Low-level disorder: Police Use of Section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 (Home 
Office Research Study No. 135, HMSO, 1994) 
84 Public Order Act 1986 s 5(6) states that a person guilty of an offence under this section will be 
liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 3, s 4(4) of the 1986 Act provides, on 
summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.  
85 Martin Wasik & Richard Taylor, Blackstones Guide to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 
1994 (OUP 1995) 98 
86 ATH Smith, “The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 – the public order elements.” 
[1995] Crim LR 19, 19 
87 ibid 19 	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“A person is guilty of an offence if, with intent to cause a person harassment, 
alarm or distress, he – 
uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour, 
or 
displays  any  writing,  sign  or  other  visible  representation  which  is  threatening, 
abusive or insulting, 
thereby causing that or another person harassment, alarm or distress.” 
88 
 
Although this offence enjoys a titular connection to s.4 of the 1986 Act, in essence 
this provision is, as has been explained above, an aggravated version of s.5, with 
significant areas of overlap between the two offences. The analysis that will be 
conducted as regards the meaning of threatening, abusive, insulting or disorderly 
behaviour and the meanings behind harassment, alarm or distress are equally as 
applicable  to  s.4A  as  they  are  to  s.5
89.  There  are,  however,  two  additional 
elements  contained  within  s.4A  that  allow  for  the  augmented  sentencing 
provisions as provided for by s.154 of the 1994 Act. Within the actus reus, the 
accused  must  actually  cause  a  person  harassment,  alarm  or  distress
90 and 
possess the mens rea of intending that his conduct would be so
91. 
 
As  with  s.5  of  the  1986  Act,  this  remains  a  summary  offence.  The  maximum 
sentence  for  this  basic  offence  under  s.4A  is  a  term  of  imprisonment  not 
exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 or both
92. The Magistrates 
Court Sentencing Guidelines also have a number of aggravating factors, such as 
a targeted, group attack or a weapon being brandished or threats being made 
against a vulnerable person, or mitigating factors, such as provocation and short 
duration of the incident. These factors are taken into account within a range of 
sentences available to the magistrates
93. The provision of imprisonment as part of 
the sentencing options for this offence gives it a status “above” many of the other 
provisions from other jurisdictions in the public order hierarchy.  
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89 See p 73 at fn 5 
90 Public Order Act 1986 s 4A(1) 
91 Writing at the time of that these provisions came into force, Wasik & Taylor (n 86) 99 state that 
“Section 4A is clearly based on the wording of s.4 (fear or provocation of violence) and s.5 
(harassment, alarm or distress). It is placed just above s.5 in the hierarchy of public order offences 
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Section 4: Threatening behaviour and a focus on immediate violence 
 
There is a final, substantive lower-level offence that operates within the corpus of 
low-level public order law. S.4 of the 1986 Act provides for the offence of using 
threatening behaviour thereby causing fear or provocation of violence. According 
to Thornton, the Law Commissioners, when reporting on the terms of the new Act, 
wanted an offence where the defendant used conduct which not only threatened a 
person directly, but where a person fears immediate unlawful violence would be 
used against him or another
94.  
 
S.4 of the 1986 Act provides: 
 
  “A person is guilty of an offence if he: 
uses towards another person threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, 
or 
distributes  or  displays  to  another  person  any  writing,  sign  or  other  visible 
representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, 
with intent to cause that person to believe that immediate, unlawful violence will 
be used against him or another by any person or to provoke the immediate use of 
unlawful violence by that person or another, or whereby that person is likely to 
believe that such violence will be used.” 
95 
 
This offence is a summary offence only with a maximum sentence of 6 months 
imprisonment  and/or  a  fine.
96 Therefore  it  is  undoubtedly  the  case  that  s.4  is 
regarded as being part of the statutory regime to deal with low-level public order.  
 
The range of behaviour covered by the actus reus includes the requirement for 
the  defendant  to  use  words  which  are  threatening,  abusive  or  insulting
97 and 
these words must either provoke immediate unlawful violence by the speaker or 
another, or that the person to whom the words are addressed
98 believes such 
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violence  will  be  used  against  him  or  another
99.  There  has  been  considerable 
academic criticism of the provisions of s.4. Ormerod indicates that the objective 
nature of the test employed to determine whether the behaviour is threatening, 
abusive or insulting creates an “extremely harsh offence”
100. Thornton has stated 
that in the years since the coming into force of the Public Order Act, s.4 of the 
1986 Act has been interpreted “very widely indeed”
101. As with the offence under 
s.5 (and unlike s.4A), the mens rea for the offence under s.4 of the 1986 Act is 
explicitly defined within s.6 of the 1986 Act. This element, and the scope of the 
prohibited behaviour will be critiqued in greater detail in throughout the thesis
102.  
It was confirmed in Atkin v DPP
103, that s.4 of the 1986 Act will require a ‘victim’, 
meaning  the  words  must  be  “used  in  the  presence  of  and  in  the  direction  of 
another  person  directly”
104.  Swanston  v  DPP
105 held  that  the  threat  to  another 
must be a direct one, although in this case it was accepted that the evidence for 
this threat can come from another (in the case of Swanston this was from an off 
duty police officer who witnessed a fracas at a pub). 
 
There are further restrictions on the scope of the defendant’s behaviour to be 
found within the actus reus of s.4. In Rothwell & Barton
106, it was affirmed that the 
violence used has to be unlawful. This means that an individual who acts in self-
defence, the defence of another or preventing a crime, will not fall within the terms 
of s.4. The Act also specifies that only the use of words or behaviour tending to 
provoke  immediate  unlawful  violence  will  attract  liability.  This  is  a  crucial 
difference between s.4 and the other two low-level English provisions.  
 
Following  a  significant  criticism  of  the  imprecise  nature  of  the  drafting  of  this 
requirement,  the  Divisional  Court,  in  Ex  parte  Siadatan
107,  focused  upon  the 
notion  of  immediacy.  Siadatan  brought  a  private  prosecution  against  the 
publishers of Penguin Books stating that the book “The Satanic Verses” contained 
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102 See p 73 for a discussion on the scope of prohibited behaviour and p 120 for a discussion of 
the mental elements. 
103 Atkin v DPP (1989) 89 Cr App R 199, DC 
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words that were abusive and insulting and likely to provoke unlawful violence. The 
Divisional Court upheld the ruling of the magistrate not to issue a warrant for the 
arrest of the author, Salman Rushdie. It was held by Watkin LJ that immediate 
violence connoted a proximity requirement of both time and causation. This meant 
that violence must result from the words/behaviour within a relatively short time 
period and without any other intervening event
108. 
 
The  decision  of  the  court  in  the  case  of  Ramos
109 threatened  to  dilute  this 
requirement,  whereby  the  Divisional  Court  held  that  the  victim  becoming 
immediately fearful that something was likely to happen “at any time”
110 satisfied 
the immediacy requirement. This decision appears to be regarded as an aberrant 
one, with Smith stating that it was not enough that the victim is immediately put in 
fear, he must be put in fear of immediate violence
111. 
 
The offences under s.4, s.4A and s.5 form the basis of the statutory response to 
low-level  public  order  issues  within  the  English  jurisdiction.  The  offence  of 
threatening behaviour, despite being the more serious of the offences, is the one 
that offers the least cause for concern due to this requirement of the words or 
behaviour needing to lead to the fear of immediate unlawful violence. The scope 
and  prohibited  behaviour  required  for  an  offence  for  all  three  offences  will  be 
examined in greater detail in the next chapter. The focus of the study will now 
move  to  the  development  of  the  public  order  framework  in  Australia,  another 
common law jurisdiction that shares much commonality with England and Wales. 
Australia: Evolution not Revolution in Public Order  
 
With the close social, political and economic links, Australia has, understandably, 
drawn heavily upon the English legal system for both their legal institutions and 
method
112.  Unlike  the  other  jurisdictions,  the  Australian  development  of  public 
order  law  provides  perhaps  the  most  piecemeal  examples  of  activity  by 
legislators. This may well be due to the fact that Australian history has little by way 
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of  the  seismic  public  disorder  disturbances  experienced  by  the  other  three 
jurisdictions
113.  
 
That does not mean that codification has not occurred in some form. As will be 
seen  with  the  United  States
114,  it  would  appear  that  whilst  operating  within  a 
federal  structure,  the  lower  level  public  order  offences  operate  on  a  regional 
canvas with each state having its own variation of a disorderly conduct offence. 
Notwithstanding  the  existence  of  independent  criminal  codes,  all  States  and 
territories in Australia make it an offence for a person to engage in disorderly 
behaviour
115 or to use offensive language in a public place
116. Again, as with the 
other jurisdictions, although to varying degrees, the process of codification within 
the criminal law has seen common law offences (such as vagrancy legislation) 
providing a base model for the low-level public order offences to emerge. 
 
Of  the  four  States  that  incorporate  disorderly  behaviour  within  a  summary 
offences statute, most have directly imported the terms of previous anti-vagrancy 
legislation
117. It is the more modern attempts at codification within the criminal law 
that  provides  closest  comparison  to  those  in  other  jurisdictions.  In  New  South 
Wales, s.4 of the Summary Offences Act 1988 provides the offence of offensive 
behaviour which states that a person must not conduct himself in an “offensive 
manner in or near, or within view or hearing from a public place or a school”. The 
1988 Victorian Act also states that a person must not use offensive language in or 
near, or within hearing from, a public place or a school
118.  
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In  the  State  of  Queensland,  it  was  the  case  of  Coleman  v  Power
119 that 
encouraged  legislators  towards  a  revision  of  the  law
120.  This  case,  and  its 
constitutional  impact,  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  Five,  where  the  rights  of 
protesters, as they coincide with the current frameworks for dealing with low-level 
public disorder will be examined and evaluated. In response to the decision in 
Coleman,  the  disorderly  conduct  provision  was  redrafted  by  the  Queensland 
legislators and now comes under Part 2 of the Summary Offences Act 2005
121. 
Somewhat unusually, there is within the Act, an explicit statement of the object of 
the offences, stating that the Act “has, as its object ensuring, as far as practicable, 
members of the public may lawfully use and pass through public places without 
interference from acts of nuisance committed by others”
122. The offence under s.6 
of the 2005 Act is the lowest level public order offence and states, in its simplest 
terms,  that  a  person  must  not  commit  a  public  nuisance  offence.  The  2005 
Queensland Act provides that a person commits a public nuisance offence if a 
person behaves in a disorderly way
123, an offensive way
124, a threatening way
125 
or a violent way
126 and the person’s behaviour interferes, or is likely to interfere 
with the peaceful passage through, or enjoyment of a public place by a member of 
the public. 
 
As  the  ‘oldest’  of  the  ‘modern’  codified  legislation,  Part  1  of  the  Summary 
Offences Act 1966 (Vic), provides a number of specific offences against public 
order
127. The more general, disorderly conduct and offensive language provision 
can be found in Part 1, Division 2 of the 1966 Act. S.17 provides for the offence of 
using obscene, indecent, threatening language and behaviour in public
128. S.17A 
provides for the offence of disorderly conduct, the offence being simply that a 
person  who  behaves  in  a  disorderly  manner  in  a  public  place  is  guilty  of  an 
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offence and liable to a penalty not exceeding 10 penalty units
129, and as such is 
broadly comparable to the punishment available under the English provision of s.5 
of the 1986 Act.  
The United States of America: Developing a state-based framework 
 
When looking at the historical evolution of the regulation of low-level public order 
within the United States, the principal drivers behind changes to the legislation are 
very different to those at play within the history of England and Wales. There is a 
history of civil disorder of a greater magnitude than anything seen within England 
and  Australia  (and  indeed  the  upheaval  encountered  by  Germany  is  scarcely 
comparable in nature). Social commentators and political scientists alike provide a 
myriad of explanations as to the root causes of the disturbances that occurred in 
the USA in Universities and inner cities within the 1960s and 1970s
130. President 
Lyndon  B.  Johnson  established  the  National  Advisory  Commission  on  Civil 
Disorders
131, in the aftermath of major, urban disorders that, in the summer of 
1967
132, led to at least 83 deaths. This Commission concluded that: 
 
“While  the  disorders  were  racial  in  character  they  were  not  inter-racial.  The 
policeman in the ghetto is a symbol, not only of law, but also of the entire system 
of law enforcement and criminal justice. As such he becomes the tangible target 
for grievances against the shortcomings throughout that system.”
 133 
 
There will be no attempt at engaging in an historical and sociological analysis of 
the underlying causes of civil unrest in England and America. The accounts of the 
riots in Brixton and Toxteth provide the closest analogy to the racial upheaval 
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experienced by the United States
134. Yet in England these disturbances led to a 
wholesale change into the way policing
135 and public order would be regulated. 
 
Unlike England and Wales, and despite leading to highly significant changes in 
other  areas  of  American  society,  the  social  upheaval
136 did  not  lead  to  any 
significant revivification of the lower levels of public order legislation at any level. It 
will  be  shown  later  on  in  this  chapter  that  most  US  low-level  public  order 
legislation is based around the Model Penal Code, which was first promulgated in 
1962
137. Indeed, many of the low level violations, have their origins in or around 
the start of the 20
th Century
138. As a parenthetical point, it should be noted that 
while disturbances in the UK have largely ceased to be around racial issues, the 
disturbances which occurred in Los Angeles following the assault upon Rodney 
King by two white police officers led to former US Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher,  producing  another  independent  commission  report  examining  a 
significant racial disturbance
139.  
 
Perhaps the most plausible explanation for this apparent legislative inertia (and 
certainly  most  accessible  for  the  criminal  lawyer)  lies  within  the  constitutional 
make  up  of  the  United  States,  whereby  the  imposition  of  criminal  liability  is 
primarily  the  responsibility  of  the  States
140.  Low-level  public  order,  by  its  very 
nature, will not be seen to threaten federal interests and as such remains within 
the purview of the state criminal codes. It is recognized that the diversity among 
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the various criminal codes
141 means that it is difficult to state “the American rule 
on any point of criminal law”
142. 
Model Penal Code & State Based Regulation 
 
The drafting of the Model Penal Code (MPC) by the American Law Institute in 
1962 was an attempt to codify the criminal law which, it was felt at the time, had 
become “chaotic and irrational”
143. It has found some degree of favour, having 
been  adopted  by  thirty-four  States  in  its  entirety,  and  virtually  all  States  have 
incorporated elements of the MPC. The partial codification of the criminal law has 
a particular relevance when considering First Amendment issues and freedom of 
expression
144.  This  is  particularly  important  when  discussing  the  nature  of  the 
defences  available  for  low-level  public  order  offences  and  this  point  will  be 
revisited  later  on  in  the  thesis
145.  The  drafting  of  the  MPC  was  crucial  for  the 
development of low-level provisions. As Samaha states: 
 
“Disorderly  conduct  crimes…are  minor  crimes  that  legislators,  judges  and 
scholars didn’t pay much attention to until the 1950’s when the MPC was drafted. 
Why the lack of attention? The punishment was minor, most of the defendants 
were poor and convictions were rarely appealed.” 
146 
 
Public order law has numerous categories of offences and regulatory ordinances 
depending on the seriousness of the behaviour. Within the English legal system, 
the serious public order offences occupy Sections 1 to 3 of the Public Order Act 
and replaced a number of common law provisions relating to riot and affray
147. 
These  provisions  relate  to  group  related  behaviour  that  causes  or  threatens 
serious violence involving multiple participants
148. The offence of Affray does not 
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141 Each of the fifty States has their own criminal code, as does the District of Columbia. The fifty-
second criminal code is the federal criminal code. 
142 Robinson & Dubber (n 137) 319 
143 ibid 321 
144 See p171 onwards 
145 There is a vast amount written about first amendment and indeed constitutional interpretation. 
For a full exposition on this area see the discussion in Chapter Four commencing at p106 
146 Joel Samaha, Criminal Law (8
th Edn, Thomson, 2005) 426 
147 Public Order Act 1986 s 9(1) abolished these and a host of other common law offences 
replacing them with their statutory progeny which can be found in ss1-3 of the 1986 Act 
148 The offence of Riot as defined in s 1 Public Order Act 1986 states that there must be a 
minimum of 12 or more persons gathered together and threatening or using unlawful violence. 
Violent Disorder, contrary to s 2 of the 1986 Act, reduces this number to 3 or more persons.  	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have any requirement that the offending behaviour be group related although the 
behaviour must cause fear for personal safety
149. In respect of the situation within 
the United States, federal law has provisions for civil disorder
150 and riot
151 both of 
which are felony offences designed to deal with large-scale public disorder. As 
such, they are significant enough to warrant a place within the United States Code 
(US Code)
152. The term “civil disorder” is defined in Title 18 of the US Code §232 
as any public disturbance involving acts of violence by assemblages of three or 
more  persons,  which  causes  an  immediate  danger  of  or  results  in  damage  or 
injury to the property or person of any other individual.  
 
In respect of the public order legislation, the MPC (and by implication the majority 
of US States), tend to include affray within the realm of the lower-level offences 
categorizing them as a misdemeanour offence. In spite of this, the treatment of 
those accused of an offence under s.3 of the 1986 Act under English law and the 
trial and punishment for the offence of affray that permeates throughout many US 
States are remarkably similar. Affray, as has already been stated, does not fall 
within the ambit of this study
153.  
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149 Public Order Act 1986 s 3 states that: ‘A person is guilty of affray if he uses or threatens 
unlawful violence towards another and his conduct is such as would cause a person of reasonable 
firmness present at the scene to fear for his personal safety.’ See also R v Davison [1992] Crim LR 
31 
150 The specific offences relating to civil disorder can be found in 18 USC § 231 and relates to the 
use of firearms, explosives, incendiary device or other technique designed to cause injury or death 
in furtherance of a civil disorder which may in anyway obstruct, delay, or adversely affect 
commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce or the conduct or 
performance of any federally protected function. Additionally, there is the offence for an individual 
who commits or attempts to commit any act to obstruct, impede, or interfere with any fireman or 
law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties incident to 
and during the commission of a civil disorder which in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or 
adversely affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce or the 
conduct or performance of any federally protected function.  
151 According to 18 USC § 2102 Riot is defined as: 
 “A public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an 
assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear and present 
danger of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person or to the person 
of any other individual or (2) a threat or threats of the commission of an act or acts of violence by 
one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons having, individually or 
collectively, the ability of immediate execution of such threat or threats, where the performance of 
the threatened act or acts of violence would constitute a clear and present danger of, or would 
result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person or to the person of any other 
individual” 
152 Most low-level public order legislation is not mentioned within the U.S. Code. The U.S. Code 
contains general and permanent laws. Most public order law is contained within the individual 
criminal codes of the States. 
153 Public Order Act 1986 s 3(7) provides that Affray is triable either way. The CPS guidance is that 
where a charge of Affray is preferred then trial at the Crown Court is the most appropriate venue. 	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In  trying  to  establish  whether  a  person  has  committed  an  offence,  the  MPC 
engages a three-tier structure. This process starts by “examining the contours of 
the  prohibited  action”
154.  Phase  two  of  the  structure  then  seeks  to  establish 
whether a justificatory defence exists. Finally, if having established the criminality 
of conduct and the unjustified nature of the conduct, the analysis then seeks to 
establish  whether  there  exists  an  excusatory  defence.  This  final  stage  of 
establishing  criminality  examines  whether  the  suspect  was  sufficiently 
blameworthy
155.  In  many  respects  this  three-stage  model  echoes  the  tripartite 
structure  (dreistufiger  Verbrechensaufbau)  of  the  German  Criminal  Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch)
156. 
 
It is unlikely that the MPC will ever operate wholly as “American criminal law”. The 
US Constitution specifically reserves authority for the imposition of criminal liability 
to individual States
157. The MPC does, however, form the base of many States 
criminal  code.  Thus,  while  it  is  not  practical  to  detail  every  disorderly  conduct 
provision  that  is  in  operation  within  the  various  States,  the  disorderly  conduct 
provision  within  the  MPC  represents  something  of  a  progenitor  offence.  The 
relevant legislation relating to public order can be found in Article 250 of the MPC. 
This provision was introduced as it was felt that public order law had received little 
by way of systematic consideration by legal professionals and academics alike
158.  
 
Article 250 of the MPC provides codification of the wide ranging, common law 
provisions which were prevalent at the time whilst safeguarding the civil liberties 
of the individual citizen and preventing an overlap with other provisions of the 
MPC
159. The low-level public order offence, within the USA, that most accurately 
equates on to s.5 of the 1986 Act is that of disorderly conduct. The offence is to 
be found within §250.2 of the MPC, which states: 
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All of this points to Affray being regarded as a ‘serious’ public order offence For further information 
see http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/#Affray 
154 Robinson & Dubber (n 137) 326 
155 Robinson & Dubber (n 137) 326 
156 See p 125, although detailed cross comparisons of the similarities between the two codified 
systems are well beyond the scope of this thesis. 
157 See n 140 
158 Model Penal Code Pt II, Art. 250, Refs and Annos. Explanatory note for Sections 250.1 – 
250.12 
159 ibid para 2 	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“A  person  is  guilty  of  disorderly  conduct  if,  with  purpose  to  cause  public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
Engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behaviour; or 
Makes unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display, or 
addresses abusive language to any person present; or 
Creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no 
legitimate purpose of the actor.” 
 
§250.2(2) of the MPC goes on to state that an offence under this section is a petty 
misdemeanour  if  the  actor’s  purpose  is  to  cause  substantial  harm  or  serious 
inconvenience, or if he persists in disorderly conduct after a reasonable warning 
or request to desist, otherwise disorderly conduct is a violation
160. 
 
There is a federal disorderly conduct provision detailed within the Code of Federal 
Regulations
161  that  prohibits  disorderly  conduct  within  the  boundaries  of  a 
National Park
162. Although it mirrors almost completely the provision laid down in 
§250.2 of the MPC, the provision does provide some instruction in respect of the 
location aspect of disorderly offences, specifically emphasizing the public nature 
of the prohibited activity
163. This in turn provides some insight into the scope of 
conduct that disorderly conduct provisions within the USA are seeking to combat.  
 
It is instructive to note that whilst the provisions of s.5 of the 1986 Act in England 
no longer require police officers to issue a warning prior to arrest, in certain States 
it is still an active ingredient of the offence. It was held in Com. v. Thompson
164, in 
the State of Pennsylvania, that the provision of the warning by police officers is 
very  much  a  key  element  of  the  offence,  with  the  defendant  carrying  on  with 
boisterous, verbal behaviour after police had attempted to defuse the situation.  
The scope of people who can issue the warning is not limited to police officers, 
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160 A violation is a ‘minor, petty crime’ the definition of which varies from state to state. N.Y Penal 
Code §10.00(3) defines a violation as an offence for which the maximum sentence cannot exceed 
fifteen days imprisonment  
161 36 CFR §2.34 
162 36 CFR § 1.2(a)(1) 
163 US v Coutchavlis, 260 F 3d 1149 (9
th Circuit 2001) 
164 Pa Super2007, 922 A2d 926 	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but it was found in Com. v Mastrangelo
165, to encompass others who are involved 
in  the  administration  of  law  or  other  governmental  functions.  Ohio  prohibits  a 
number of behaviours; in addition to the fighting or turbulent behaviour, there is 
also a prohibition on unreasonable noise, “grossly abusive” language, insulting or 
taunting  another  to  provoke  a  violent  response  and  hindering  movement  on  a 
public right of way
166.  
 
These different provisions are classed as minor misdemeanours
167 but, as with 
the MPC, they increase in magnitude if the offender persists in his conduct after a 
reasonable  warning
168.  They  also  escalate  if  the  offense  is  committed  in  the 
vicinity of a school or in a school safety zone
169 or in the presence of various 
emergency  personnel  engaged  in  their  duties
170 .  The  differentiation  of  the 
seriousness of the offence being contingent on the location is common throughout 
the US jurisdiction, but unusual in respect of the other jurisdictions
171. 
 
Samaha  states  that:  “the  most  common  use  of  disorderly  conduct  statutes  is 
against fighting in public”
172. The ways in which this mischief is tackled, despite 
the above-mentioned provision of §250.2 MPC, varies within the States. Although 
not all States have directly incorporated the disorderly conduct provisions from the 
MPC, it would appear that the elements of the offence remain largely the same, 
with some minor (yet still significant) differences. In the State of New York, the 
offence of disorderly conduct is a violation (with no bespoke aggravating factors to 
change  the  grading  to  a  misdemeanour)
173.  As  well  as  having  the  behaviour 
requirements of  §250.2, there is a provision criminalizing “the disturbing of any 
lawful assembly or meeting of persons” and the “refusal to comply with a lawful 
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165 Pa 198, 414 A2d 54, 489 Pa 254 involved the defendant shouting abuse at a meter maid and 
persisted in doing so after being asked to desist, preventing her from carrying out her (lawful) 
duties 
166 Ohio Revised Code (§2917.11,2002) 
167 Misdemeanour offence varies from state to state but Mckinney’s Consolidated Penal Code 
§10.00(4) defines a misdemeanour as an offence for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment 
in excess of 15 days may be imposed but for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in 
excess of one year cannot be imposed. The guidance for punishment of minor misdemeanour is 
that it should not be dealt with by way of imprisonment where a fine or anger management order 
could deal with the infraction more effectively. 
168 Ohio Revised Code (§2917.11,2002) at para E3(a) 
169 Ohio Revised Code (§2917.11,2002) at para E3(b) 
170 Ohio Revised Code (§2917.11,2002) at para E3 (c & d) 
171 See p 88-90 for further details as regards the location of the offence 
172 Samaha (n 146) 427 
173 NY Penal Code §240.20 	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order of the police to disperse”
174. The Municipality of Chicago has enumerated 12 
different courses of conduct that will constitute disorderly conduct
175. On the other 
hand,  the  state  of  New  Mexico  has  a  smaller,  but  equally  comprehensive 
provision that states disorderly conduct will consist of: 
 
“engaging in violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or 
otherwise disorderly conduct which tends to disturb the peace; or 
maliciously disturbing, threatening or, in an insolent manner, intentionally touching 
any house occupied by any person.”
 176    
 
These provisions for disorderly conduct all adopt different ways of detailing the 
prohibited  behaviour.  This should  not  disguise  the  fact  that  they  each  seek  to 
heavily  proscribe  certain  types  of  behaviour,  including  violence  and  threats  to 
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174 NY Penal Code §240.20 (1-7) 
175  Municipal  Code  of  Chicago  8-4-010A  person  commits  disorderly  conduct  when  he 
knowingly: (a) Does any act in such unreasonable manner as to provoke, make or aid in making a 
breach of peace; or (b) Does or makes any unreasonable or offensive act, utterance, gesture or 
display which, under the circumstances, creates a clear and present danger of a breach of peace 
or imminent threat of violence; or  (c) Refuses or fails to cease and desist any peaceful conduct or 
activity likely to produce a breach of peace where there is an imminent threat of violence, and 
where the police have made all reasonable efforts to protect the otherwise peaceful conduct and 
activity, and have requested that said conduct and activity be stopped and explained the request if 
there be time; or  (d) Fails to obey a lawful order of dispersal by a person known by him to be a 
peace officer under circumstances where three or more persons are committing acts of disorderly 
conduct  in  the  immediate  vicinity,  which  acts  are  likely  to  cause  substantial  harm  or  serious 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm; or (e)  Assembles with three or more persons for the purpose 
of using force or violence to disturb the public peace; or (f)  Remains in the public way in a manner 
that  blocks  customer  access  to  a  commercial  establishment,  after  being  asked  to  clear  the 
entrance by the person in charge of such establishment. (g) Appears in any public place manifestly 
under the influence of alcohol, narcotics or other drug, not therapeutically administered, to the 
degree  that  he  may  endanger  himself  or  other  persons  or  property,  or  annoy  persons  in  his 
vicinity; or (h) Carries in a threatening or menacing manner, without authority of law, any pistol, 
revolver, dagger, razor, dangerous knife, stiletto, knuckles, slingshot, an object containing noxious 
or deleterious liquid, gas or substance or other dangerous weapon, or conceals said weapon on or 
about the person or vehicle; or (i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any 
primary or secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour before the 
school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has been concluded, provided that 
this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute; 
or (j) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within 150 feet of any church, temple, synagogue or 
other place of worship while services are being conducted and one-half hour before services are to 
be conducted and one-half hour after services have been concluded, provided that this subsection 
does  not  prohibit  the  peaceful  picketing  of  any  church,  temple,  synagogue  or  other  place  of 
worship involved in a labor dispute. (k) Either: (1) knowingly approaches another person within 
eight feet of such person, unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet 
or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such 
other person in the public way within a radius of 50 feet from any entrance door to a hospital, 
medical clinic or healthcare facility, or (2) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, 
intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with 
any person entering or leaving any hospital, medical clinic or healthcare facility. 
176 New Mexico Code § 30-20-1 	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violence. In New Mexico, the more serious offence of affray
177 is the ‘next rung up’ 
on the public order ladder. In the Texas Penal Code, there are eleven different 
ways in which the offence can be committed
178, and the next public order offence 
listed  is  that  of  riot
179.  The  next  chapter  will  conduct  a  detailed  study  of  the 
requisite prohibited behaviour within low-level public order offences
180.  
 
It is recognized, not least by those who review the provisions of the MPC
181 that 
the  constitutional  position  has  changed  significantly  since  the  drafting  and 
promulgation of the MPC in the early 1960s
182. Judicial scrutiny of statutes for 
First Amendment compliance has increased together with an intolerance of vague 
penal legislation. This, in many ways, mirrors the judicial activism of the higher 
courts in England and Wales
183. From the troika of common law jurisdictions, the 
focus will now shift on to the approach adopted by the codified criminal law that 
operates  in  Germany.  The  first  point  to  be  examined  will  involve  a  very  brief 
historical discussion detailing the legal background. An exposition of the nature of 
the  criminal  code  itself  and  then  the  specific  provisions  relating  to  the 
maintenance of public order will follow this socio-historical analysis.  
Germany: A Tumultuous History 
 
In contrast to the Australian and US experiences, the German legal system has 
encountered  significant  and  indeed  turbulent  historical  disruption  to  the 
established  constitutional  order.  The  historical  development  of  20
th  Century 
Germany, and the trauma caused by the abuse of the Weimar Constitution by 
Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party has been well catalogued. The atrocities committed 
against indigenous Germans and the dehumanizing effect of the laws passed in 
the period 1933-45 provides for a unique sensitivity to issues of free speech and 
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177 The offence of Public Affray can be found under §30-20-2 of the New Mexico Code.  
178 Texas Penal Code § 42.01 (a) (1) – (11) 
179 Riot contrary to Texas Penal Code §42.02 
180 See p 74 onwards 
181 Robinson & Dubber (n 137) 9  
182 Model Penal Code Pt II, Art 250, Refs and Annos. Explanatory note for Sections 250.1 – 
250.12 
183 For an empirical based study on the rise of Judicial Activism within the USA and specifically the 
Supreme Court see Frank B Cross & Stefanie Lindquist Measuring Judicial Activism (OUP 2009). 
See also Brice Dickson, “Judicial Activism in the House of Lords 1995-2007” in Brice Dickson, 
Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts (OUP 2007) 	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the repugnance against arbitrary exercise of authority by the executive
184. Despite 
this, the characteristics and sources of German law are not the unique product of 
the post World War Two regeneration. The current German legal system owes 
much to developments prior to the 20
th Century and has been shaped by the, 
“comprehensive  and  rapid  assimilation  of  Roman  principles  of  law”  from  the 
Middle Ages
185. Flavours of revolutionary France and the codification introduced 
throughout the 19th Century also permeate. Parenthetically, it is intriguing to note 
that  the  reunification  of  Germany  in  1990,  despite  occurring  at  a  time  of 
international upheaval, saw relatively little disturbance to the constitutional and 
legal composition of the German state
186. 
 
Whilst there may be no doubt that the turbulent recent history of Germany shaped 
the  general  legal  landscape,  it  is  the  current  legal  and  constitutional  make  up 
which shapes the criminal law and, ultimately, the way in which low-level public 
order  is  dealt  with.  The  supreme  source  of  German  law  is  The  Basic  Law 
(Grundgesetz herein after referred to as GG). According to Art 20 (3) GG all of the 
principal organs of government are subject to the provisions of the Basic Law, 
including  the  legislature
187.  In  this  respect,  the  constitution  can  be  said  to  be 
supreme and operates in much the same way as the US constitution.  
 
It is, perhaps, unsurprising that, as with the Federal Code of the USA, the German 
Criminal Code, (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) does not contain much by way of low-
level public order legislation. Those crimes within the StGB that deal with public 
order are to be found from §123 - §145 and deal with a wide range of criminality, 
ranging from burglary
188, forming terrorist organizations
189 through to the violation 
of  a  professional  qualification
190  and  misleading  the  authorities  about  the 
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184 For the (admittedly Anglophile in perspective) historical overview there are a myriad of texts 
available. See for example AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (Penguin Books 
1964), Ruth Henig, Versailles and After 1919-1933, (2
nd Edn, Routledge 1995), for a German 
perspective see Hans Mommsen, From Weimar to Auschwitz. Essays in German history (English 
translation), (Cambridge University Press 1991) 
185 Nigel Foster, & Satish Sule, German Legal System and Laws (4
th Edn, OUP 2010) 3 
186 The German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany) decided upon reunification to keep Grundgesetz, with accession under Art 23 GG 
187 Art. 20 (3) GG states that the legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the 
executive and the judiciary shall be bound by law and justice. 
188 § 123 StGB 
189 § 129a StGB 
190 § 145c StGB 	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commission of an offence
191. There is no bespoke disorderly conduct provision to 
be found within the StGB. What does exist are a number of individual offences 
that would come within the scope of either disorderly conduct provisions or would 
fall within the umbrella of those actions, which would cause harassment, alarm or 
distress as recognized in English law. These will be highlighted later on in this 
chapter  when  the  behaviour  prohibited  by  low-level  public  order  legislation  is 
examined
192. 
OWiG: The Law of Administrative Offences 
 
It  is  to  the  next  tier  of  minor  offences  that  one  must  look  when  seeking  the 
provisions governing low-level public order. German criminal doctrine has three 
tiers of offences, and the offences that regulate minor public order infractions are 
to  be  found  largely  within  the  realm  of  the  Law  on  Administrative  offences 
(Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz, OWiG)
193. These OWiG provisions do not count as 
criminal  offences  and  are  punishable  only  by  a  fine.  They  are  somewhat 
colloquially known as kleines strafrech or ‘little criminal’ offences
194. The OWiG is 
recognized as being the lowest in the tier of criminality for which imprisonment is 
not an option, even at the harshest end of the scale
195. The OWiG lays down the 
scope
196 and procedure for the punishment of minor offences and the ways in 
which the courts can enforce the financial penalties that flow from a conviction. 
 
In respect of the actual construction and interpretation of these offences it would 
appear  that  the  closest  analogy  within  the  jurisdictions  are  those  of  local 
ordinances
197 in  States  of  the  USA  or  bylaws  within  England  and  Wales.  The 
OWiG contains an internalized code that operates independently of the StGB
198, 
governing  the  fundamentals  of  punishment  and  issues  relating  to  attempts, 
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191 § 145d StGB 
192 See Chapter Three, p 71 
193 Bohlander (n 2) 27 
194 §7 OWiG holds that the fine must be a minimum of 5€ and must not exceed 1000€ unless the 
law specifies otherwise. 
195 Tatjana Hörnle, “Offensive Behavior and German Penal Law” (2002) 5 Buff Crim L Rev 255, 
271 
196 §2 OWiG provides that the terms of the act shall cover both federal and state law. 
197 A law found in the municipal code of individual States in U.S.A., which usually result in a 
violation. For example the town of Manasquan, New Jersey has issued a disorderly conduct 
ordiance in respect of offences contained under New Jersey’ criminal code under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2  
198 Bohlander (n 2) 27 	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participation,  error  and  omission
199 .  Crucially,  §10  OWiG  states  that  only 
intentional acts are punishable unless issues of negligence are explicitly stated 
within the terms of the offence. What the OWiG does not do is to make specific 
provision  for  general  principles  of  criminal  liability
200 .  Accordingly,  when 
conducting an analysis of the individual component elements of criminality within 
the  relevant  offences,  reference  will  be  made  to  the  general  principles  of 
criminality contained within the StGB where the OWiG is silent.  
 
The substantive offences can be found under Part Three OWiG. The “Verstöße 
gegen die öffentliche Ordnung” (offences against public order) are detailed in the 
second section
201 and although they cover some offences that are recognizable 
from  the  other  jurisdictions,  the  approach  to  low-level  public  order  regulation 
within StGB and the OWiG framework represents something of a departure from 
the common law jurisdictions. Whilst there is no easy mapping of the provisions 
from  the  other  jurisdictions,  it  can  be  stated  with  some  confidence  that  the 
following  offences  have  relevance  in  terms  of  the  regulation  of  low-level 
behaviour. 
 
As a prelude to considering the nature of the operation of the substantive public 
order  offence,  perhaps  the  most  illuminating  element  of  the  OWiG  and  its 
application  can  be  found  in  §47  OWiG  where,  inter  alia,  it  states  that  the 
prosecution  of  the  relevant  offence  is  at  the  reasonable  discretion  of  the 
prosecuting authority
202. This regulatory provision is designed to allow the filtering 
of those situations by the prosecuting agencies on such occasions as prosecution. 
A similar (although not identical) provision exists in relation to the power of arrest 
within England. Within the codes of practice provided to augment the PACE
203 
regime, there is clear direction to police officers that arrest (for any offence) is 
discretionary. §47 OWiG provides a clear statement to all those involved in the 
prosecutorial process of the discretionary nature of these offences. 
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199 §8-16 OWiG 
200 Bohlander (n 2) 27 
201 Specifically §116 – 123 OWiG 
202 §47(1) OwiG Verfolgung von Ordnungswidrigkeiten 
203 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 24 deals with the power of arrest and specifically 
s24(5) PACE which incorporates a necessity test in relation to the arrest 	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The bespoke disorderly conduct provision, Belästigung der Allgemeinheit, is to be 
found under §118 OWiG and states: 
 
“An administrative offense shall be deemed to have been committed by anyone 
who engages in a grossly improper activity, which resulting in the endangerment 
of or disruption to the general public or interferes with public order.” 
 
The  term  “grob  ungehörige  handlung”  (grossly  improper  act)  has  no  further 
clarification within the OWiG. According to the commentary on the OWiG, it would 
appear that the notion of a grossly improper act equates to:  
 
“An  action  that,  from  an  objective  viewpoint,  ignores  that  minimum  of  norms 
(rules), without which even a society that is open to new developments cannot 
do.” 
204  
 
Göhler describes this provision as a “Gummiparagraph”, or “catch all” regulation 
and as such, this would seem to be in line with the view of the legislation in other 
jurisdictions
205.  This  provision  has  gained  some  notoriety  in  respect  of  the  so-
called  “Nacktläufer”
206 .  Dr  Peter  Niehenke  was  convicted  by  the  OLG  in 
Karlsruhe
207 of  an  offence  under  §118  and  fined  €1500  for  running  naked 
throughout the city of Freiburg. Another example, which indicates the potential 
breadth of the regulation, transpired when the proprietors of a particularly graphic 
laser-quest style facility were prosecuted under the terms of §118.  
 
In addition to operating within the OWiG in the form of §118, there are a number 
of  Polizeiverordnung
208 (police  ordinances)  made  by  each  Bundeslaender
209 
which,  although  primarily  designed  to  prohibit  environmentally  harmful 
behaviour
210(gegen  umweltschädliches  Verhalten)
211 also  encompass  some  low 
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204 Erich Göhler, Franz Gürtler & Helmut Seitz, Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten – OWiG, (15
th 
Edn, Beck Legal Publishing, 2009), §118, 4 
205 ibid 4 
206 Literally means the “Naked Runner” 
207 Ss 2 75/02 23 44 Js 12955/01 OWiG - AK 106/0 
208 These are actually Polizeiliche Umweltschutz-Verordnung (Police Environmental Regulations 
passed under §10(1) Police Act 1992 
209 These are the Federal States which exist within the Federal Republic of Germany 
210 Such as inter alia the offences offering Schutz gegen Lärmbelästigung (Protection against 
noise), regulation of Abspritzen und Abwaschen von Fahrzeugen (hosing and washing of 
vehicles), Taubenfütterungsverbot (ban on feeding pigeons) 	 ﾠ 62	 ﾠ
level disorderly conduct provisions, inter alia, a prohibition on aggressive begging 
or the use of children in begging
212, public urination
213, consuming alcohol where 
the effects are likely to harass third parties
214 and the dropping of litter
215. These 
ordinances are significant in so far as they place the regulation of public order 
squarely within the realm of minor infractions not worthy of criminalization. The 
other jurisdictions clearly have disorderly conduct at the lower end of criminality; in 
Germany it is not within the criminal sphere at all. 
 
The OWiG does provide for a number of ancillary offences that would potentially 
occupy  the  same  orbit  as  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  in  England.  The  first  of  these, 
provided  for  by  §116  OWiG,  is  that  of  Öffentliche  Aufforderung  zu 
Ordnungswidrigkeiten
216 which states that it is unlawful to make a public invitation 
or representation to commit any OWiG offence
217, through the use of writings, 
recordings, pictures or anything held in any form of data storage or in transmitted 
form. The punishment for this offence is by a fine, the maximum amount being 
determined with reference to the maximum fine available for the offence that the 
defendant was encouraging others to commit
218.  
 
In relation to the Criminal Code, §111 StGB provides for the offence of public 
incitement to the commission of an unlawful act. §111(1) states that any person 
who incites such an act shall be held liable as an abettor (anstifung). The need for 
§116 OWiG becomes apparent when §14(1) OWiG is taken into account. This 
provision displaces any division between principal and secondary offenders and 
as such there is a need for a bespoke administrative offence. Another provision, 
and one that is evocative of other low-level public order provisions in the other 
jurisdictions (apart perhaps from the English legal system), is that of Unzulässiger 
Lärm. This can be found in §117 OWiG and provides for the offence of illegal and 
avoidable  noise.  This  offence  is  committed  by  anyone  who  generates  noise 
without authorization to a level that is considered unacceptable or avoidable under 
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211 Cities of Heidenheim and Voehrenbach and the association of local associations in Lower 
Saxony (amongst others) have what appear to be “model” regulations  
212 Polizeiverordnung der Stadt Heidenheim §18 (2) 
213 Polizeiverordnung der Stadt Heidenheim §18 (3) 
214 Polizeiverordnung der Stadt Heidenheim §18 (4) 
215 Polizeiverordnung der Stadt Heidenheim §18 (6) 
216 §116 OWiG 
217 §116(1) OWiG 
218 §116(2) OWiG 	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the  circumstances,  and  which  results  in  disruption  to  the  general  public  or 
neighbourhood or damage to public health. The punishment is a fine unless the 
prohibited noise can be prosecuted under other legislation
219.  
 
It has been noted that this provision requires the production of considerable noise 
and the central mischief behind such a violation is to address a lack of concern for 
the  general  public
220.  This  provision  of  the  OWiG  echoes  the  provision  found 
within §250.1(b) of the MPC that provides for the offence of disorderly conduct 
encompassing  unreasonable  noise.  It  is  likely  that  within  England  this  would 
possibly come within the remit of s.5 only if the noise was threatening, abusive or 
insulting and had the potential to cause harassment alarm or distress. The mere 
playing of loud music would more likely be dealt with by means of the bespoke 
Noise Act 1996
221 or potentially through a range of civil remedies such as Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders
222. 
 
The other offences within the second section of the third part of the OWiG relate 
to prostitution and the keeping of dangerous animals. The more serious public 
order  offences  are  to  be  found  within  StGB.  The  offence  of  riot 
(Landfriedensbruch)  provides  for  prosecution  of  both  principal  and  secondary 
participants  who  either  engage  in  acts  of  violence  or  threaten  to  persons  to 
commit acts that are committed by a crowd of people who have joined forces in a 
manner that endangers public safety
223.  
Beleidigung & low-level public order 
 
One final provision, which falls slightly outside the scope of this discussion, is the 
misdemeanour  offence  (Vergehen)  found  under  §185  StGB  of  Beleidigung 
(Insult)
224. This provision sits within the Chapter 14 offences of Libel and Slander: 
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219 §117(2) OWiG 
220 Hörnle (n 195) 272-273  
221 The Noise Act 1996 provides for a summary offence of failing to desist from making excessive 
noise after having being served with a warning notice. In addition to the level 3 fine, it is likely that 
persistent offenders will be subject to Anti Social Behaviour Orders as per the terms of s 1 Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998 
222 Thornton (n 6) 392 
223 §125 StGB 
224 Curiously, it is the writings of Judge Rüdiger Warnstädt, a judge of the Moabit Local Court 
(Amtsgerichte), which provide insight into the public order application of this offence see; Rüdiger 
Warnstädt, Recht So, 80 Originale Strafurteile von Amtsgerichte Rüdiger Warnstädt aus dem 	 ﾠ 64	 ﾠ
 
“An insult shall be punishable with imprisonment of not more than one year or a 
fine and, if the insult is committed by means of an assault, with imprisonment of 
not more than two years or a fine.” 
225  
 
This relatively low-level offence, would at first sight, appear to sit alongside the 
offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act. In an exemplar prosecution under §185 StGB, 
a defendant was involved in a parking dispute with traffic wardens
226. When the 
police attended, one of the officers was referred to as a “Turk”. The court held that 
such a statement constituted a misdemeanour because it was meant as a “put 
down.” Similarly, when a police officer referred to a taxi driver of French/African 
heritage  as  being  a  “tramp”,  this  too  was  considered  to  be  an  insult  that  was 
designed to undermine the victim’s personal honour
227. 
 
§185 StGB, when set alongside the English provisions, would, in all likelihood, be 
classed as coming within the umbrella of low-level public order law. The attitude 
towards §185 StGB means that, within the German legal system, the offence is 
more analogous to a battery: 
 
“No  person  would  consider  the  offence  of  battery  to  be  unusual.  In  a  battery 
offense, the victim is hit and feels pain…pain can be caused physically and this is 
the battery. Pain can also be caused by emotional torment and this is the German 
crime of insult. Insult hurt the feelings or emotional well being of the victim just as 
much as a kick or hit would.”
228  
 
The Federal Constitutional Court has held that the “protective purpose” of §185 
StGB is “personal honour”
229 and given the unique historical events that occurred 
from 1932-45, it is understandable that such an offence has remained within the 
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Krimminalgericht Moabit (Das Neue Berlin Verlagsgesellschaft mbH 2003). Aspects of this book 
have been translated and discussed in; Steven Ross Levitt, “The Life and Times of a Local Court 
Judge in Berlin” (2009) 10 German Law Journal 169 
225 §185 StGB 
226 Levitt (n 224) 190 
227 Levitt (n 224) 191 
228 Levitt (n 224) 191 
229 BVerfGE 54, 148 [153] as quoted in Levitt (n 224) above n 191 	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German Criminal Code
230. Nonetheless §185 remains something of a paradox – 
an  offence  that  has  all  the  characteristics  of  a  public  order  offence  yet  is 
something more akin to an offence against the person. 
Addressing the First Research Question 
 
The hypothesis being tested is that the English method of dealing with low-level 
public  disorder  is  unsatisfactory  and  that  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  criminalizes  too 
broad  a  range  of  conduct.  This  broadness  permits  criminalization  that  is  often 
based on an individual dislike of the conduct by the police or prosecutor. In order 
to test this hypothesis, the first research question sought to examine the current 
framework in order to effectively critique the current methods of managing low-
level disorder. This chapter both explains the origins of the current framework and 
also  provides  a  working  definition  of  the  contours  of  low-level  public  order  by 
exploring the legislation within each of the four jurisdictions. 
Understanding the Origins of the Existing Frameworks 
 
Within England and Wales, the catalyst for change came about as a result of 
social and political upheaval within the 1970s and early part of the 1980s. Both 
the Public Order Act and PACE were consonant with the political leitmotiv of their 
time. Both attempted to codify areas of law that were made up of diverse common 
law and statutory provisions, and both have, despite the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, survived the scrutiny of the Courts. In respect of the Public Order 
Act,  individual  convictions  and  aspects  of  the  legislation  may  have  been  re-
examined and reinterpreted, but as will be seen throughout the following chapters, 
the basic structure for dealing with low-level public order remains largely unaltered 
from the promulgation of the 1986 Act. 
 
Examining the historical drivers within the other jurisdictions illustrates the diverse 
nature  of  these  frameworks.  Although  there  were  numerous  historical  drivers, 
arguably the biggest influence upon low-level public order law within the United 
States was the drafting of the Model Penal Code (MPC) in 1962. The MPC was 
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the first time that any meaningful attention had been paid to low-level public order 
offences in the context of the US legal system. The Australian jurisdiction had little 
by way of significant historical or legal drivers to reform the management of public 
order law and the situation was anomalous with regard to the other jurisdictions. 
In respect of German law, the rise of National Socialism from 1932-1945 resulted 
in the drafting of the German post-war constitution to ensure that all provisions 
were  compliant  with  the  terms  of  the  Basic  Law.  It  was  also  noted  that  the 
reunification  of  Germany  did  not  significantly  affect  the  operation  of  low-level 
disorderly conduct provisions. 
Providing definition to the notion of “Low-Level Public Order” 
 
The second part of the chapter, following consideration of these historical drivers, 
explored  the  contours  of  the  lowest  level  public  order  offences  within  the  four 
jurisdictions. The resultant conceptual edifice is crucial in respect of answering the 
first research question and provides definition to the somewhat amorphous term 
of “low-level public order law” 
 
It  was  established  that  the  English  legal  system  has  the  three  key  provisions 
found under s.5, s.4A and s.4 of the Public Order Act 1986. The provisions under 
s.5  have  been  described  as  “one  of  the  mainstays  of  public  order  policing  in 
England  and  Wales”
231.  Although  the  lowest  on  the  public  order  scale,  it  is 
contended  that  it  is  also  the  most  widely  drawn  of  the  three  provisions.  The 
conduct does not need to be directed at someone nor does anyone need to be 
offended by the conduct. This is a key distinction to draw between s.5 and the 
other offences within the 1986 Act. Conviction under both s.4A and s.4 requires 
proof that the threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour directly affected another 
person. The breadth of behaviour covered and the problems with the certainty of 
the proscribed behaviour will be covered in the next chapter
232. 
 
Australian  solutions  to  low-level  public  order  remain  relatively  unmoved  by 
historical or political events. There is no overarching federal “Public Order Act” 
and States, whilst having a wide variety of statutory provisions, all follow broadly 
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similar models to each other. Indeed, Australian and English provisions for dealing 
with low-level public order are broadly similar to each other, and as shall be seen 
later on in the thesis, suffer from the same difficulties in terms of certainty and the 
amount of discretion afforded to police officers in the prosecution of this offence. 
What distinguishes the Australian legislation from proclivities in any of the other 
jurisdictions is that the focal point of the prohibited activity is much more on the 
prohibited activity being in a public place.  
 
In respect of the US States, §250.2 MPC has provided the base for many States 
disorderly  conduct  provisions.  Each  state  has  its  own  variant  of  the  disorderly 
conduct provision, although most States generally conform to the MPC exemplar. 
Of  those  different  manifestations  some,  such  as  those  found  within  the 
Municipality of Chicago, consist of an enumerated list of twelve different types of 
behaviour, described by the Illinois Appeal Court as “one of the most charming 
grab bags of criminal prohibitions ever assembled”
233. Other States, such as New 
Mexico and Wisconsin define the offence in more general terms
234.  
 
The German solution to low-level public order is to treat it as an administrative 
matter, both by means of the low level, §118 offence within the OWiG, and the 
various city based Polizeiverordnung. The case of the Nacktläufer is illustrative of 
the  type  of  low-level  behaviour  which  §118  is  designed  to  deal  with.  Other 
offences, such as excess noise
235 are dealt with elsewhere in the OWiG and the 
emphasis is upon limiting the environmental (in the broad sense) impact of the 
behaviour rather than assigning criminal liability. 
 
The  operation  of  the  misdemeanour  offence  under  §185  StGB  provides  an 
example of an offence that is concentrated upon an individual victim rather than a 
catch all provision. At first sight, an offence designed to protect feelings seems to 
be wholly within the realm of low-level public order. Yet it is included within a 
group of offences that would be more at home next to the tort of libel and slander 
within  English  law.  It  is  also  viewed  (by  at  least  one  member  of  the  German 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
233 Landry v Daley, 1968 280 FSupp 968 (ND Ill) at 969 
234 Wisconsin Criminal Code 2003, §947.01 
235 §117 OWiG 	 ﾠ 68	 ﾠ
judiciary) as being the verbal counterpart of the offence of battery, highlighting the 
more focused nature of its operation.  
Conclusion 
 
The creation of the foundational edifice across the four jurisdictions leads on to 
the  establishment  of  a  fundamental  premise.  Specifically,  each  of  these 
jurisdictions has some form of legislation for dealing with low-level public disorder 
in one form or another. England and Australia have these provisions operating as 
summary  offences,  although  still  functioning  within  the  regular  criminal  law. 
Germany operates in stark contrast to this and places the administration of low-
level public order into the OWiG, an administrative code that is not criminal in 
nature. The US solution is, as is to be expected given the wide number of States, 
a variable one. Some States have disorderly conduct as a misdemeanour offence. 
In others, such as New York, the lowest grade of disorderly conduct is classed as 
a violation, another form of administrative offence. Accordingly, there appears to 
be no consensus across the jurisdictions as to where exactly these legislative 
provisions operate, other than broadly accepting they operate within the lowest 
environs of criminality. 
 
One  key  area  of  commonality  is  the  acknowledgement  within  all  of  the 
jurisdictions under consideration that these low-level provisions are designed to 
cover a broad variety of activity. Expressions such as “catch all”, “glorious grab 
bag of criminal prohibitions”, or “gummiparagraph” all serve to highlight that the 
scope of these provisions are open to wide interpretation by both the police and 
the courts. Therefore, having provided definition to the concept of “low-level public 
order”  and  explored  what  offences  fall  within  such  a  conceptual  term,  next 
research question will look in detail at the type of behaviour that is covered by 
these  provisions  across  the  jurisdictions.  Such  an  examination  will  establish 
whether this intentionally designed broadness is mirrored in the actual application 
of  low-level  offences.  Such  findings  will  provide  a  key  cross-jurisdiction 
perspective on the central hypothesis that s.5 criminalizes too broad a range of 
behaviour and is in need of reform. 
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Chapter Three: 
 
The Behavioural Scope of Low-Level 
Public Order 
 
Introduction to Chapter Three 
 
The previous chapter establishes that there exists an identifiable framework for 
dealing  with  low-level  public  order  within  the  respective  fora.  It  has  also  been 
identified that these provisions are broadly drafted “catch all” provisions. A key 
element of the research hypothesis, however, is that s.5 of the 1986 Act within 
England and Wales is too broad in the scope of conduct that receives the stigma 
of criminality. It is the purpose of this chapter to undertake a conceptual analysis 
of the actus reus precepts of the various disorderly conduct provisions. Such an 
analysis,  within  a  comparative  context,  will  draw  out  the  optimal  pathways  of 
behaviour proscribed within the jurisdictions and will directly address the second 
of the enumerated research questions designed to determine the scope of the 
conduct which is prohibited
1.  
 
It is indicative of the issues within the England and Wales that there is more case 
law and indeed more academic comment on the lower reaches of public order 
than in the other three jurisdictions. That there is more material available when the 
legislation  is  analyzed  from  a  rights  based  perspective  is  revealing  of  the 
academic approaches adopted by scholars within the English legal system
2 and 
may,  of  itself,  provide  an  illuminating  contribution  to  the  metanarrative
3.  In 
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attempting to fathom the operation of s.5, a fundamental part of the inquiry is to 
examine the behaviour that the statutory provision is trying to prevent.  
 
In relation to offences under s.5 the legislation adopts a two-tier approach: first 
that the conduct that is prohibited must be threatening, abusive or insulting
4. Once 
it has been established that the conduct has met this threshold, the second stage 
of analysis is for the finders of fact at trial to then establish whether it is likely to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress. The Crown Prosecution Service charging 
standards  in  relation  to  the  range  of  behaviour  which  s.5  is  expected  to 
encompass states that:  
 
“S.5 should be used in cases which amount to less serious incidents of anti-social 
behaviour. Where violence has been used, it is not normally appropriate to charge 
an offence under s.5.” 
5 
 
There is no requirement for a victim, and the CPS notes on charging state that it is 
not necessary to prove any feeling of insecurity, in an apprehensive sense, on the 
part of a member of the public
6; the behaviour merely has to occur within the sight 
or hearing of someone. No apprehension of violence is necessary, merely that the 
conduct must be likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress
7. Although not the 
principal focus of this chapter, the offence under s.4 of the 1986 Act shares many 
of the prohibited elements common to s.5. The terms threatening, abusive and 
insulting are elements common to all of the offences under s.4, s.4A and s.5, 
although most of the analysis is focused on the offence of disorderly conduct. 
 
In addition to the extensive consideration given to the English system, the chapter 
will examine the approaches of the other jurisdictions. It has been suggested that 
the various state-based provisions of Australia bear similarity to those provisions 
under the s.5 of the 1986 Act. Given the low-level nature of the OWiG offence 
within the German legal system, there is something of a paucity of information, 
however,  what  evidence  there  is  of  low-level  behaviour  will  be  examined  to 
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assess  how  §118  OWiG  comports  within  the  general  scheme  of  prohibited 
conduct. As far as it is relevant, the terms of §185 StGB will also be examined, 
especially with respect to the insulting nature of the prohibited conduct which, like 
that of s.5 of the 1986 Act, is not defined within the statute. 
 
Many US States have chosen to adopt the actus reus and mens rea of the Model 
Penal  Code
8.  §250.2  limits  the  conduct  that  qualifies  as  actus  reus  to  three 
distinct types of behaviour. The principal mischief that the provision is designed to 
counter is that of fighting in public. It has been stated that fighting is the most 
common  activity  that  the  disorderly  conduct  provision  is  deployed  to  counter
9. 
§250.2  also  prohibits  the  creation  of  a  “hazardous  or  physically  offensive 
condition”.  The  actus  reus  as  laid  down  within  §250.2  also  forbids  making 
unreasonable  noise  or  using  abusive  language.  This  conduct  element  brings 
disorderly conduct potentially into conflict with the First Amendment guarantee of 
free speech. This will be the subject of much analysis and critique within later 
chapters
10.  
The Terminology of Prohibited Behaviour 
 
The first aspect of the lower level offences under the Public Order Act 1986 is that 
the accused must engage in conduct that is threatening, abusive or insulting. This 
is a uniform requirement across the jurisdictions as it is present in provisions from 
Australia and USA. There is also a German requirement that the activity should be 
“severely improper”
11 and is, “that, which ignores that minimum of norms without 
which even a progressive society cannot function”
12. S.5 of the Public Order Act 
1986 goes on to require that this behaviour must be performed “within the sight or 
hearing of someone who is likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress”. In 
Holloway  v  DPP
13,  the  court  held  that  while  it  was  not  necessary  for  the 
prosecution to call a witness who could say that he or she saw the prohibited 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8 Joel Samaha, Criminal Law (8
th edn Thomson, 2005) 428 
9 ibid 427 
10 See Chapter Five onwards 
11 “Grob ungehörige Handlung” as defined in Erich Göhler, Franz Gürtler & Helmut Seitz, Gesetz 
über Ordnungswidrigkeiten – OWiG, (15
th Edn, Beck Legal Publishing, 2009, 4 
12 ibid 4 
13 [2004] All ER (D) 278 (Oct); [2004] EWHC 2621 	 ﾠ 72	 ﾠ
conduct, the conduct must occur within the sight or hearing of someone actually 
present at the scene. 
 
The facts of Holloway are rather unusual but do serve to illustrate the scope of the 
conduct against which s.5 is now being deployed. The defendant was arrested in 
woods  overlooking  a  comprehensive  school  playing  field.  He  had,  in  his 
possession, a digital video camera and tripod. Upon examining the video camera, 
the police found images of the appellant, naked, with the schoolchildren in the 
background  playing  sport.  The  court  decided  that  it  was  not  sufficient  for  the 
prosecution to establish that someone might have come across the appellant and 
might have seen what he was doing. The offence required that some person must 
have  actually  seen  the  insulting  or  abusive  words  or  behaviour.  It  is,  though, 
incumbent upon the prosecution to provide sufficient evidence to enable the court 
to draw the inference, having regard to the criminal standard, that the conduct in 
which the accused was engaged was clearly audible or visible to people who were 
in the vicinity at the relevant time
14. The case of Masterson v Holder
15, involved 
two  men  kissing  on  Oxford  Street  in  London  at  2am.  Glidewell  LJ  held  that 
whenever there are persons present who might be insulted by the behaviour, then 
an offence will be committed notwithstanding that those committing the offence 
may  not  intend  such  insult,  or  indeed  be  aware  that  there  is  anyone  else 
present
16.  
 
The decisions in Holloway and Masterson echo throughout the other jurisdictions. 
The requirement of a victim, or at least someone to be present, appear to be an 
established element of any offence of disorderly conduct whether explicit in the 
statutory provision or not. The provisions within various States of The US have 
been tested by litigation and a number of State ordinances differ in respect of 
what effect the behaviour of the individual might have
17. In People v Ellis
18, the 
defendant was shouting abuse at owners of a hardware store while tearing down 
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Christmas  decorations.  It  was  held  that  in  order  for  the  offence  of  disorderly 
conduct to be made out there must be some connection between the behaviour of 
the defendant and a risk to public order. In this case the conviction was upheld 
due to the reaction of the owner of the store. This requirement was subsequently 
reaffirmed in People v Tingle
19, whereby the conviction for disorderly conduct was 
overturned. The defendant, part of a large group witnessing an armed robbery, 
shouted “5-O,” indicating that police were approaching. The appeal court judge, 
Wolfson  J,  held  that  there  was  no  evidence  provided  by  the  police  that  the 
conduct of the defendant had done anything to threaten public order.  
 
In  respect  of  the  various  Australian  authorities,  this  requirement  of  behaviour 
possessing some form of public element is equally well enumerated within the 
case law. The unreported case of Spence v Loguch
20 emphasizes that: 
 
“what matters is that the defendant’s behaviour had the potential to annoy and 
there  must  be  evidence  to  support  the  conclusion  that  a  relevant  ‘reasonable 
person’ might have been expected to be present when the relevant behaviour 
occurred.” 
21  
 
The situation is similar when one considers the German offence of Belästigung 
der  Allgemeinheit
22.  As  well  as  activity  that  is  “severely  improper”,  this  activity 
needs  to  be  capable  of  causing  a  nuisance  to  the  general  public.  This  is  an 
objective test with reference to the minimum norms of behaviour
23. It covers low-
level behaviour such as urinating in the street, minor scuffles, causing interference 
to  the  screening  of  a  film  and  making  inappropriate  calls  to  the  emergency 
services
24. Clearly, within §118 OWiG, there is a broad scope of behaviour, but in 
common with all of the other jurisdictions (except under s.5 in England), there is 
still the requirement that the behaviour has a public element. 
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Threatening, Abusive or Insulting? 
 
The  principle  established  in  Brutus  v  Cozens
25 is  the  lead  authority  that  the 
English courts now use to decide whether words are insulting. The defendant was 
an anti-apartheid protestor who stepped onto the court of a doubles tennis match 
at  the  Wimbledon  tennis  championship  in  1971.  He  distributed  leaflets  to  the 
crowd and sat on the court blowing a whistle. The prosecution stated that this 
behaviour was insulting to the spectators. At first instance, the justices found that 
this behaviour was not, in fact, insulting. The final appeal to the House of Lords 
determined  that  the  question  of  whether  words  or  behaviour  are  threatening, 
abusive or insulting was to be a question of fact and not a question of law
26. The 
words themselves are to be given their ordinary English meaning and also be 
judged according to the impact that the conduct would have on the reasonable 
man  or  woman
27.  Similarly,  it  was  held  in  R  (on  the  application  of  DPP)  v 
Humphrey
28,  that  abusive  was  to  be  ascribed  the  normal,  dictionary  meaning, 
unfettered by any additional statutory boundary. The range of activity held to have 
been  threatening,  abusive  or  insulting  includes  swearing,
29 engaging  in  the 
conduct of a “Peeping Tom”
30 and calling a police horse “gay”
31. 
 
The criterion of threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour was taken from the 
progenitor offence under s.5 of the Public Order Act 1936
32. As such, many of the 
cases on interpreting these three terms pre-date the inception of the 1986 Act. It 
has also been noted that, “this is important because what might objectively have 
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25 [1972] 2 All ER 1297, HL 
26 The outcome of the case was that their Lordships allowed the appeal. They stated behaviour 
that affronted others, or evidenced disrespect for their rights “so as to give rise to resentment or 
protest, was not necessarily insulting within s.5. (of the 1936 Act)” It was held that the word should 
be given its ordinary meaning, and whether behaviour had been "insulting" was a question of fact 
for the original magistrates to determine 
27 ibid [1303] 
28 R (on the application of DPP) v Humphrey [2005] EWHC 822 (Admin) 
29 Southard v DPP [2006] EWHC 3449 (Admin) 
30 Vigon v DPP (1998) 162 JP 115 DC 
31 Daily Telegraph, 12 July 2005, “Arrest for ‘gay’ horse jibe is absurd says Tatchell” 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4196447/Arrest-for-gay-horse-jibe-is-absurd-says-
Tatchell.html accessed on 1 June 2011 
32 Public Order Act 1936 s 5 made it an offence for a person, in any public place or at any public 
meeting: 
(a) to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour; or 
(b) to distribute or display any writing, sign or visible representation which was threatening, 
abusive or insulting; 
with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be 
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been  threatening,  abusive  or  insulting  in  1939  may  not  be  so  in  2009”
33.  The 
obverse  is  also  true.  What  is  clear  is  that  under  s.5,  the  test  for  insulting  is 
whether an “ordinary person” would find the words insulting. It is irrelevant that a 
person is particularly predisposed to find the words insulting.
34 It has been noted 
that:  
 
“Whether or not the speaker knows that such persons will hear the words appears 
to be immaterial as far as this ingredient of the ss.5, 4 and 4A.” 
35  
 
It was held in Lewis v DPP
36, that words and visible representations could also be 
abusive or insulting despite being truthful. The defendant was standing outside an 
abortion clinic with a placard showing an aborted foetus in a pool of blood with a 
caption stating “21 Weeks Abortion”. The Divisional Court held that given all of the 
circumstances,  the  behaviour  was  both  insulting  and  abusive
37.  This  holistic 
approach  to  the  defendant’s  conduct  is  something  common  to  the  other 
jurisdictions. In the US case of Howard v City of Roanoke
38, it was held that the 
defendant's  entire  course  of  conduct,  irrespective  of  the  contents  of  his 
utterances,  at  a  city-council  meeting  was  sufficiently  insulting  to  support  the 
conviction for disorderly conduct. 
 
Within the context of §185 StGB, the term “Beleidigung” (insult) is much more 
closely regulated than under English law. Whilst it is not defined within §185, there 
are  specific  limits  placed  on  both  the  meaning  and  application  of  the  offence. 
There is a requirement that the expression has a defamatory context and that the 
insult is directed at someone, who is subsequently offended by the statement. 
Therefore, the meaning of insult is a mixture of an objective assessment of all of 
the circumstances and the subjective intention of the defendant. As is the case in 
the English case of Lewis, §192 StGB holds that the truth of the statement shall 
not necessarily be a barrier to the prosecution of the offence when a particularly 
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33 Thornton (n 7) 31 
34 This echoes the position of the wider criminal law in that one must ‘take the victim as they find 
them’ See, for example R v Blaue [1975] 61 Cr App R 271 
35 Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Text, Cases and Materials on Public Law and Human Rights 
(3
rd Edn, Routledge 2011) 
36 Lewis v DPP (1995) Unreported case, DC; in Richard Card, Public Order Law, (Jordans 2000) 
122 
37 Card (n 36) 122 
38 51 Va App 36, 654 SE2d 322 (2007) 	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derogatory tone is used. It is unlikely, on the individual facts of the case of Lewis, 
that  a  prosecution  would  have  succeeded  under  §185  and,  indeed,  would  not 
have been permitted unless the insult had been directed at a particular individual 
and that individual had complained to the police
39.  
 
In Australia, the notion of what behaviour may be considered offensive has been 
revisited  on  a  number  of  occasions.  Up  until  2004  it  was  almost  universally 
accepted by the Australian judiciary
40 that the fact of many people objecting to a 
particular  opinion  does  not  make  it  ‘offensive’  in  the  context  of  the  statutory 
provisions
41. It was held in Gebert v Innoncenzi
42, that whether words are insulting 
is to be decided objectively rather than on any intent of the speaker. It follows, 
therefore, that in Australia, as with England, the context of the behaviour is every 
bit as important as the actual behaviour itself
43. This method of interpretation is 
not dissimilar to the Brutus v Cozens approach adopted by the English courts as 
seen above.  
 
There is not a standardized approach in respect of the Australian and English 
notions  of  insulting  behaviour.  The  Australian  position  is  that  words  cannot 
constitute an insult unless they relate to a person or persons present when the 
words are delivered
44. In Lendrum v Campbell
45, when the leader of a New South 
Wales paramilitary organization insulted the Premier of New South Wales, Jack 
Lang, within a public debate, the court held that this was not an offence, given that 
Lang was not present when the words were uttered. This reasoning seems to 
imply that the Australian approach is designed to stop one party from insulting 
another  party  whereby  a  breach  of  the  peace  might  occur.  This  small  but 
significant  difference  means  that  the  Australian  legislation  is  very  different  in 
scope to s.5 of the 1986 Act, which makes no mention of breach of the peace. 
 
The question of whether behaviour is threatening, abusive or insulting in Australia 
and England is largely determined with reference to an objective test. Accordingly, 
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40 Worcester v Smith [1951] VLR 316 
41 Douglas (n 3) 79 
42 [1946] SASR 172 
43 Sully v Loguch (Unreported, NSWSC, Scully J, 12 Nov 1991) at 3; in Douglas (n 3) 81 
44 Douglas (n 3) 85 
45 (1932) 32 SR (NSW) 499 	 ﾠ 77	 ﾠ
the statutes provide only a skeletal outline of the type of behaviour that constitutes 
prohibited  activity.  By  way  of  illustration,  the  decision  in  People  v  Pearson
46, 
determined in the state of New York, saw the defendants convicted of disorderly 
conduct for acting as lookouts for a pickpocket
47. It was held that where a statute 
provides  a  specified  list  of  acts,  the  commission  of  one  of  those  acts  is  an 
essential element of the offence. In a disorderly conduct statute, where there is a 
list of prohibited conduct, that list will be a closed one. 
 
The New York Penal Code lists seven different proscribed activities by which the 
offence  of  disorderly  conduct  can  be  committed.  This  is  not  atypical  of  other 
States
48, and is in keeping with §250.2 of the MPC
49. It was held in People v 
Perkins
50,  that  even  variations  of  these  will  not  be  sufficient  to  make  out  the 
offence if at least one of the elements listed within the statute is not present. This 
contrasts sharply with the situation in England, Australia and German whereby the 
prohibited conduct is given a much less comprehensive definition, allowing both 
police and prosecutors more flexibility.  
 
When  examining  the  scope  of  conduct,  there  is  a  further  limit  upon  disorderly 
conduct within a US context. W.L. v State
51 held that the conduct of the defendant 
had to include more than pure speech for it to be punishable, even if the speech is 
abusive or offensive. This outright protection afforded by the First Amendment is a 
key  difference  to  the  other  jurisdictions.  The  undoubted  influence  of  First 
Amendment  jurisprudence  upon  disorderly  conduct  statutes  is  significant
52 and 
will be further explored in chapters four and five of this thesis. It is sufficient at this 
point to note that the First Amendment places significant limitations upon the type 
of  words  and  expression  that  can  be  proscribed  within  disorderly  conduct 
provisions.   
 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
46 188 Misc 744 69 NYS2d 242 (Spec Sess 1947) 
47 The offence has now been downgraded from a misdemeanour in the state of New York and is 
now a violation contrary to §240.20 NY Penal Code. The decision of the Court in People v Pearson 
is still held to be good law. 
48 See, for example, Ohio Revised Code (§2917.11,2002) 
49 §250.2 (1) MPC actually has a matrix of six different types of proscribed courses of conduct  
50 150 Misc 2d 543, 576 NYS.2d 750 (App Term 1990) 
51 769 So 2d 1132 (Fla Dist Ct App 3d Dist 2000) 
52 See Chapter Five  	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Having broadly established the standard by which the requisite insulting behaviour 
is determined across the jurisdictions, this chapter will now examine the second 
stage of test the for the offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act, the requirement that 
the prohibited behaviour should cause harassment, alarm or distress. Once this 
requirement is deconstructed, the discussion will then seek to critically evaluate 
the extent to which the other jurisdictions impose similar regulation.   
Harassment, Alarm or Distress 
 
Offensive  conduct  is  often  mentioned  within  the  legislation  in  the  other  three 
jurisdictions. Peculiar to the English Public Order Act 1986 is the requirement that 
the offensive conduct iteratively has the potential to cause harassment, alarm or 
distress. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the case law to fathom the 
appropriate interpretations placed upon these words by the courts. In Chambers v 
DPP
53,  two  defendants  were  convicted  under  s.5  of  harassing  a  surveyor  by 
disrupting the beam on his theodolite. The prosecution for conduct that, “caused 
‘inconvenience and annoyance’ illustrates the potential breadth of this term.”
54 As 
with the term disorderly conduct mentioned above, whether a person is likely to be 
caused  harassment,  alarm  or  distress  is,  ultimately,  to  be  determined  by  the 
finders of fact in a trial and will inevitably pivot on the individual circumstances of 
the case.  
 
The decision in Chambers is illustrative of the manner in which public order law 
has developed within England and Wales. If one brings disorderly conduct into 
consideration, there are four, presumably distinct, categories of reaction that the 
threatening,  insulting  or  abusive  behaviour  may  engender  within  anyone  in 
hearing or sight. One approach suggested
55 is that the terms should not be read 
disjunctively. In R(R) v DPP
56, the Divisional Court said of “distress”: 
 
“It is part of a trio of words, harassment, alarm or distress. They are expressed as 
alternatives,  but  in  combination  they  give  a  sense  of  the  mischief  which  the 
section  is  aimed  at  preventing…  The  statute  does  not  attempt  to  define  the 
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54 Card (n 36) 136 
55 Thornton (n 7) 40 
56 [2006] EWHC 1375 	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degree (of distress) required. It does not have to be grave but nor should the 
requirement be trivialized.”
57 
Public Disturbance: The American Dimension 
 
No  other  legal  system  has  this  requirement  for  the  conduct  to  either  actually 
cause harassment, alarm or distress or be likely to do so
58. In the US, it was held 
in  Startzell  v  City  of  Philadelphia
59,  that  the  clear  focus  of  the  law  relating  to 
disorderly conduct is whether a person’s words or acts cause or unjustifiably risk a 
public  disturbance
60.  In  addition,  the  so-called  ‘fighting  words’  doctrine  as  first 
established in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire
61 can be implied in the actus reus of 
disorderly conduct. As will be further discussed in chapter five
62, the US Supreme 
Court held in Chaplinsky that insulting or fighting words were those, which by their 
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. The 
test laid down in Chaplinsky, and affirmed in City of Garfield Heights v Yaro
63, was 
an  objective  one  as  to  whether  the  words  used  would  reasonably  incite  the 
average person to retaliate
64. 
 
As with the Australian provisions
65, in spite of establishing what would appear to 
be an objective test in relation to the scope of the prohibited conduct, it is also 
clear that the circumstances or context of the relevant act or conduct will also play 
a significant part in the court deciding that the behaviour is a threat to public order 
as  was  held  in  City  of  Minneapolis  v  Lynch
66 and  also  City  of  Fort  Scott  v 
Arbuckle
67.  
 
From a German perspective, when considering the offence under §118 OWiG
68, 
the position is very similar to that outlined in respect of the US position. Göhler 
points out in his commentary to the OWiG that the prohibited action must interfere 
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58 As per Public Order Act 1986 s 5(1) 
59 Pa CA 3 (Pa) 2008, 533 F 3d 183 
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61 315 U.S.568 (1942) 
62 See p 171-180 
63 1999 WL 1084255 (Ohio App 8 Dist) 
64 ibid [4] 
65 Gebert v Innoncenzi [1946] SASR 172 
66 392 NW 2d 700 (Minn Ct App 1986) 
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with  the  set  of  written  and  unwritten  norms  that  are  essential  for  an  orderly 
functioning society
69. Yet again, those norms will be heavily dependent upon the 
context of the action and will, accordingly, vary as the individual facts of the case 
vary. 
Expanding the scope of the Conduct: Internet & Stalking 
Issues 
 
In  relation  to  s.4A  of  the  1986  Act  within  England  and  Wales,  the  prohibited 
conduct must not only be likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress, but must 
actually cause a person to be so affected. The case of S v DPP
70, illustrates that 
there must be some form of causal nexus between the conduct of the accused 
and the effect it has upon the “victim”. The appellant, (S) was an animal rights 
activist, protesting at a laboratory during which time he took a digital photograph 
of a security guard. S then transferred this image to the protestor’s website, and 
added an offensive cartoon style message on the photograph with accompanying 
text  which  falsely  implied  that  the  security  guard  had  previous  convictions  for 
violence offences. The security guard did not view the material until some five 
months later when he suffered harassment, alarm or distress. S was arrested, 
charged  and  subsequently  convicted  under  s.4A  of  the  1986  Act.  The 
Administrative Court found that, but for the actions of the appellant in this case, 
the security guard would not have suffered harassment, alarm or distress, and as 
such the intervening acts of the police officers, in showing the victim the offending 
picture, had not broken the chain of causation. By examining the issue of breaking 
the chain of causation, S v DPP crystallizes the issues in relation to the delay 
between  the  display  of  an  image  and  the  suffering  of  harassment,  alarm  or 
distress by the victim 
  
Perhaps more critical for the wider research question, S v DPP demonstrates the 
chameleon-like ability of the Public Order Act 1986 to deal with situations that 
must  have  been  outside  the  contemplation  of  the  original  framers  of  the 
legislation. The Internet and related technological developments have placed a 
singular pressure upon judicial interpretation of certain statutes. In the judgment 
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the Divisional Court endorsed the views of the District Judge who, at first instance, 
stated that,  
 
“Any person who posts material on the Internet puts that material within the public 
ambit, and this was the event which caused the eventual harassment, alarm or 
distress.”
71 
 
Examining the issue of causation, Chappell v DPP
72, pre-dated the enactment of 
s.4A of the 1986 Act and instead relied on a prosecution under s.5 of the 1986 
Act. In Chappell, the female complainant had received a number of letters through 
the post, which the court found were threatening and abusive. At first instance, 
Chappell was convicted under s.5(1) of the 1986 Act which provides, inter alia that 
a person will commit an offence if he uses threatening, abusive or insulting words 
within the sight or hearing of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or 
distress.  The  Divisional  Court  allowed  the  subsequent  appeal  by  way  of  case 
stated. The Court held that the words, sent within an envelope, was not a display 
of  words  within  the  terms  of  s.5(1)(b)  and  the  fact  that  the  letter  was  opened 
without Chappell being present meant that his words or behaviour was not being 
used within the hearing or sight of the complainant
73.  
 
Therefore,  while  the  courts  in  Chappell
74 and  S  v  DPP
75 reached  different 
conclusions, they did so because of the different requirements in respect of the 
chain  of  causation.  Maurice  Kay  LJ,  in  S
76 stated  that  there  is  a  significant 
difference  between  s.5  and  s.4A  of  the  1986  Act:  s.5  specifically  required  the 
display of threatening, abusive or insulting material to be “within the hearing or 
sight” of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress. His Lordship 
was moved to speculate, perhaps somewhat optimistically: 
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“That the removal of the “sight and sound” requirement was conditioned by an 
appreciation  of  the  problems  created  by  the  posting  of  offensive  material  on 
websites.” 
77 
 
It may be that the finding of the court in S v DPP can be viewed as providing a 
foundation for future internet-related public order cases. In the judgment, the court 
provides a hypothetical analogue to illustrate the way in which the law should 
apply.  The  example  given  is  of  “a  pervert”  who  posts  an  altered  image  of  an 
identifiable woman on to a website, “falsely representing her in circumstances of 
indecency”
78. Police, as the result of an unrelated investigation, then discover this 
image and show it to the woman. Providing that the accused had the requisite 
intent (and, as a result of putting the image into the public ambit, the woman 
suffers  profound  distress)  their  Lordships  suggested  that  the  person  could  be 
convicted under s.4A of the 1986 Act. Walker J augments the line of reasoning 
postulating that the posting of material on the Internet with the necessary intent 
would in all likelihood result in an individual being guilty of an offence even if the 
person had simply been told of the image, rather than being shown the image as 
happened in this case
79. 
     
Speaking on the issue of causation, in S v DPP, Counsel for the appellant sought 
to raise an additional question in relation to the question of intent. In terms of s.4A 
of the 1986 Act, intention to cause harassment as specified in s.4A(1) appears to 
limit  the  scope  of  the  offence  to  a  purposive  intention
80 rather  than  a  wider 
intention based upon the likely risk perceived by the accused. Maurice Kay LJ 
stated  that  there  were  insuperable  procedural  difficulties  that  prohibited  the 
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80 The law surrounding intention and the meaning of purposive (or direct) intent as opposed to the 
wider definition of intent has amassed a considerable amount of case law. The starting point is R v 
Mohan [1975] All ER 193 which held that intent should be regarded as being the accused’s 
purpose. R v Hancock [1986] A.C. 455 HL, R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 (CA (Crim Div)) and R 
v Woollin [1998] 4 All ER 103, HL all discussed the wider concept of intent as coming from the 
foresight of the result of consequences being a ‘virtual certainty’. For further discussion on this 
highly involved and contentious area of criminal law see Cathleen Kaveny, “Inferring intention from 
foresight” (2004) 120 LQR 81; and for conceptual issues with the definitional framework 
surrounding intent see Alan Norrie “Between orthodox subjectivism and moral contextualism: 
intention and the consultation paper” [2006] Crim LR 486; Also see David Ormerod, Smith & 
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consideration  of  such  a  question
81 and  even  if  the  appellant  had  managed  to 
surmount  the  procedural  difficulties,  the  intention  of  the  appellant  would  be 
inferred due to the evidence of the taking of the photograph, the surrounding text 
and the placing of it on a freely accessible website
82. 
 
The issues arising in S and Chappell are peculiar to the English iteration of low-
level public order and reemphasize the ‘catch-all’ nature of the offence. The MPC 
has incorporated a specific offence within Article 250 of Harassment. The Code 
states:  
 
  “A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another he: 
Makes a telephone call without the purpose of legitimate communication; or 
 
Insults,  taunts  or  challenges  another  in  a  manner  likely  to  provoke  violent  or 
disorderly response; or 
Makes  repeated  communications  anonymously  or  at  extremely  inconvenient 
hours or in offensively coarse language; or  
 
Subjects another to offensive touching; or 
 
Engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no legitimate purpose of 
the actor.” 
83 
 
This provision was designed to deal with “disorderly, anti-social or environmentally 
destructive behaviour that occurs in non-public areas”
84. This provision can be 
compared with the provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which 
provides that a person must not pursue a course of conduct which amounts to 
harassment  of  another
85  and  which  he  knows  amounts  to  harassment  of 
another
86. The purpose of the 1997 Act was prompted by media concerns about 
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81 Specifically, this was not an issue that the District Judge at first instance had been asked to 
concentrate upon and no application had been made to remit the case to the District Judge for 
amendment. 
82 [2008] EWHC 438 (Admin) [7] 
83 §250.4 MPC 
84 Uniform Laws Annotated, Model Penal Code (Refs and Annos) Part II Definition of Specific 
Crimes, §250.4 at 1 
85 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s 1(1)(a) 
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stalking  and  is  designed  to  address  persistent  harassment  by  an  obsessive 
individual
87.  
 
§250.4 is designed to be broader ranging. It was held in Rosiak v Melvin, a case 
that involved the continued harassment of the victim by her ex-husband
88, that the 
statute  was  broad  enough  to  cover  obsessive  behaviour  following  relationship 
breakdowns and any subsequent domestic violence. As with the 1997 Act, there 
are  some  elements  (such  as  §250.4(3)  requirement  of  making  repeated 
anonymous communications) that require a course of conduct
89. State v. Berka
90, 
involved a protracted dispute between the victim and the new partner of his ex-
wife. The court held that it was sufficient to have purposeful conduct designed to 
harass by subjecting the victim to a threat. This criteria, approved in Pazienza v 
Camarata
91, means that the scope of §250.4 is broader than the offence under 
1997 (although broadly designed to counter the same mischief) but more focused 
than an offence under either s.4A or s.5 of the 1986 Act.   
 
The offences under §250.4, and indeed under s.1 of the 1997 Act, illustrate the 
way in which low-level public order can bleed into more serious offences. There is 
a  good  deal  of  overlap  between  this  type  of  offence  and  the  more  sinister 
phenomenon of stalking. Within Australia
92 and Germany the scope of both of the 
offences mentioned above would lie within the sphere of the wider criminal law. In 
terms of the StGB, the relevant offence of stalking is found under §238 StGB. The 
offence lists a series of activities that the defendant must commit, with liability 
arising  if  the  activities  seriously  infringe  the  lifestyle  of  the  victim
93 .  §238 
specifically  requires  the  victim  to  complain  about  the  stalking  unless  the 
prosecutors believe prosecution is in the public interest
94. It is not the purpose of 
this  thesis  to  embark  on  a  discussion  of  the  law  relating  to  stalking  and 
harassment
95.  What  this  section  has  served  to  illustrate  is  the  breadth  of  the 
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88 NJ Super Ch 2002, 798 A2d 156, 351 NJ Super 322 
89 702 A2d 570 Pa Super 1997 
90 211 NJ Super 717, 512 A2d 592 NJ Super L, 1986 
91 381 NJ Super 173, 885 A2d 455 NJ Super A D, 2005 
92 See for example QLD Criminal Code, Chapter 33A s 359A-359F  
93 §238 (1) StGB 
94 §238 (4) StGB 
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activity that English low-level public order legislation, particularly s.4A and s.5 of 
the 1986 Act, has been used to cover.  
The Location of the Offence: Public or Private Disorder 
 
The essential conduct elements that go to make up the prohibited conduct of the 
offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act provide a broad range of prohibited conduct. 
The inquiry will now examine one of the other key actus reus requirements of the 
offence; the locations where an offence can be committed. In constructing any 
evaluative commentary on low-level public order, one of the key desiderata will be 
establishing the range of locations where such low-level public order offences can 
be committed.  
 
S.5(2) of the 1986 Act states, inter alia, that an offence may be committed in a 
public or private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or 
behaviour are used by a person inside a dwelling and the other person is also 
inside that or another dwelling. One of the specific defences
96 states that it is a 
defence for the accused to prove he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to 
believe that the words or behaviour would be heard or seen by a person outside 
that dwelling.  
 
These twin provisions are common to s.4, s.4A and s.5 of the 1986 Act
97 and 
were  intended  to  exclude  domestic  disputes  from  the  ambit  of  the  Act
98.  In 
Chappell v DPP
99, it was stated that the offences under s.4 and s.5 of the 1986 
Act were clearly designed to have a requisite public element. Potter J went on to 
state: 
 
“Subsection (2) of each section, whilst providing that an offence may take place in 
a  public  or  private  place,  makes  clear  the  intention  to  exclude  conduct  taking 
place within a dwelling house and having its effect solely on another person within 
that dwelling or another dwelling. Thus a person yelling or gesturing to persons in 
the street from the confines of his own house might commit an offence in relation 
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to the persons in the street, but would not commit an offence vis-à-vis another 
person within his own house or a neighbouring house across the street.” 
100 
 
For the purposes of s.5(2)
101, a dwelling is defined in s.8 of the 1986 Act and 
covers any structure or part of a structure occupied as a person’s home or as any 
other  living  accommodation.  Clearly,  it  will  be  fundamental  to  engaging  the 
defence  under  s.5(3)(b)  to  establish  that  one  was  within  a  dwelling  and  it  is 
unsurprising that courts have been asked on occasions to provide guidance as to 
the proper interpretation of s.8 of the 1986 Act.  
 
In  Rukwira,  Rukwira,  Mosoke  and  Johnson  v  DPP
102,  the  defendants  became 
involved  in  a  fracas  on  the  landing  in  a  council  block  of  flats.  Access  to  this 
landing was controlled by means of an entry phone system. The Divisional Court 
held that the landing was a means of access to the living accommodation but they 
were not part of the structure that was occupied, as a person’s home, and were 
not part of the dwelling itself. Furthermore, they could not be described as other 
living accommodation because the dweller lived inward of the front door and not 
out on to the communal landing. 
 
The question of whether a communal laundry room could be described as part of 
a structure that is occupied as part of an appellant’s home was discussed in Le 
Vine v DPP
103. It was held that the laundry room was a communal room, open to a 
number of individuals within the building and while this may be only those who are 
in  the  flats  or  those  who  are  connected  with  people  who  live  in  the  flats, 
nevertheless, it is sufficient not to be classed as a dwelling even though access 
may  only  be  available  to  a  small  section  of  the  public.  Elias  LJ,  giving  the 
judgment, went on to state that the intention of the Act was clearly to exclude 
disputes  in  people’s  homes  but  not  otherwise,  and  accordingly  the  communal 
laundry was not a dwelling for the purposes of s.8 of the 1986 Act
104. 
 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
100 Ibid [89] 
101 This is equally as applicable for s 4(2) and s 4A(2) of the 1986 Act 
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The restrictions imposed by s.5(2) and s.8 would appear to be both a significant 
and wholly necessary limitation. One only has to imagine the words said in the 
privacy  of  a  dwelling  that  may  well  cause  harassment,  alarm  or  distress.  By 
limiting the scope of s.8 the courts expand the scope of the overall offence. That 
the courts are defining the parameters of the location that s.5 can be committed 
might,  at  first  sight,  appear  to  be  a  natural  development  of  legislation.  The 
omission  of  locations  such  as  communal  stairwells  and  facilities  within  shared 
accommodation  from  the  initial  drafting  of  the  bill  now  seems  somewhat 
egregious. 
 
A revealing aspect of the operation of s.5 of the 1986 Act within English law is the 
way in which it treats behaviour in a police station. A further examination of the 
authorities on the relationship between s.5(2) and s.8 leads on to the case of R v 
CF
105. In CF the accused was in police custody, and whilst in a police cell, she 
allegedly made a racially obscene remark to one of the police officers entering the 
cell. She was charged with intending to cause racially aggravated harassment, 
alarm or distress contrary to s.31(1)(b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998
106.  
 
The question on appeal was as to whether the police cell could fall within the 
category of “other living accommodation”. Moses LJ stated that the offence under 
s.4A of the 1986 Act is not limited to public places and the locations where a 
person  may  indulge  in  the  activities  prohibited  is  to  be  construed  narrowly.  A 
police cell is a place where a person is detained in custody and as such not a 
home  nor  was  it  “other  accommodation  where  a  person  lives”  even  though 
someone detained in a police cell may, from time to time, do the same things as 
they do in their own home or in the place where they live.   
 
At the start of his judgment in CF, Moses LJ bemoaned the lack of case law on 
the issue of whether a police cell could have fallen within the exception of s.4(2). It 
is  surprising  that  this  has  not  occurred  before,  given  the  often  heated  and 
confrontational nature of the police station environment. Whether the court was 
correct in stating that there was no reasonable argument to the contrary that a 
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police cell was not “other living accommodation” is somewhat questionable. The 
decision of the court might well have been different if, for example, that particular 
police cell was not being used as a place of police detention but as an overflow for 
the  prison  service  and  essentially  functioning  as  a  prison  cell.  In  such 
circumstances, it is conceivable that a prison cell would fall within the ambit of s.8 
and, as such, engages the protection from prosecution provided to dwellings. 
Location requirements within the other jurisdictions  
 
Manifestly, the location of the offence is a key requirement of disorderly conduct in 
relation to the other jurisdictions as well as being covered within the Public Order 
Act
107. Both the Model Penal Code within the USA
108 and the various disorderly 
conduct provisions within Australia tend to incorporate a specific requirement that 
the prohibited behaviour occurs in a public place
109. The positioning of disorderly 
conduct offences within the Polizeiverordnung
110 made by each Bundeslaender 
provides an inherently public dimension to the public order offences. 
 
The locational issues outlined above are by no means exclusive to the English 
public order experience. Within the other jurisdictions the location appears to be a 
feature  of  the  actus  reus,  whereas  in  England,  this  is  dealt  with  as  part  of  a 
specific  defence  under  the  1986  Act
111.  Therefore,  whilst  consideration  of  the 
other three jurisdictions may seem a lacuna from this section, it is argued that 
consideration of these elements sit more properly with the discussion on the ways 
in which to refute a low-level public order offence in Chapter Four
112.  
Cross Jurisdictional (and not only American) Graffiti 
 
In  addition  to  indulging  in  the  prohibited  conduct  which  results  in  harassment, 
alarm or distress being likely, s.5(1)(b) of the 1986 Act also makes it an offence to 
“display  any  writing,  sign  or  other  visible  representation  which  is  threatening, 
abusive or insulting”. This covers activity ranging from the writing of graffiti on the 
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wall
113 through to holding up a sign or a placard
114. This aspect of the offence is 
another throwback to the offence under s.5 of the 1936 Act but has significant 
resonance when one comes on to discuss this offence in relation to protest and 
the potential chilling effect upon freedom of expression
115.  
 
Utilizing low-level public order measures to combat graffiti is not unique to the 
English legal system. The offence of Belästigung der Allgemeinheit, under §118 
OWiG has also been used on occasions in attempting to combat graffiti artists
116. 
In this sense, it can be seen that §118 OWiG encompasses activity every bit as 
broad  as  s.5  of  the  1986  Act.    More  significant  is  the  existence  of  the  local 
ordinances  (Polizeiverordnung),  which  deal  with  graffiti  as  a  specific, 
environmental issue
117 and the use of the Anti Social Behaviour Act 2003 within 
England to punish those who chose to graffiti. In respect of disorderly conduct 
within the various States in the USA and Australia, graffiti tends to be regarded as 
a  particular  form  of  anti  social  behaviour,  with  a  close  inter-relationship  with 
artistic expression and an urban identity that lends itself to a form of community-
based restorative justice
118.  
 
It is germane to note other tangential offences and activities which could fall within 
disorderly conduct provisions, but which are dealt with by bespoke statutes. In 
Germany, §126 StGB provides for the criminal offence of breach of the public 
peace  by  threatening  to  commit  offences.  This  offence  details  a  closed  list  of 
various offences that threaten the wider public safety. There is no direct analogue 
between this specific offence and those in the other jurisdictions although either 
§116 OWiG or §126 StGB would comfortably fall within s.5 of the 1986 Act. It is 
more likely that such activity prohibited by §126 StGB would be dealt with by other 
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specific offences such as communicating a bomb hoax
119 or that of sending, by a 
public communications network, a message that is grossly offensive, indecent, 
obscene or menacing
120. In a US context, the offence of bomb hoax amongst 
most  States  is  treated  as  a  felony  offence
121 and  in  Australia  it  also  attracts 
specific  legislative  response  (as  opposed  to  a  general  criminal  provision
122). 
Therefore  while  this  offence,  and  indeed  this  activity,  comes  within  the  StGB 
provisions on public order, they do not come within the purview of this enquiry. 
Racially Aggravated Public Order 
 
It is inevitable that any examination of low-level public order is going to include 
analysis on the way in which public order intersects the issue of hate speech 
within  the  various  jurisdictions.  When  examining  racist  speech  within  a  public 
order context, in Wisconsin v Mitchell
123, the US Supreme Court has recognized 
the inherent threat to public order: 
 
“(bias inspired) conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. 
For example, according to the State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more 
likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims 
and incite community unrest…As Blackstone said long ago, it is but reasonable 
that among crimes of different natures those should be most severely punished, 
which are the most destructive of public safety and happiness.” 
124 
 
The  above  case  was  an  unsuccessful  appeal  against  the  provisions  of  a 
Wisconsin statute, which, inter alia, provided for an enhanced sentence where the 
defendant intentionally selected his victim on account of the victim’s race
125. In 
one form or another, all of the jurisdictions under discussion have legislation in 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
119 Criminal Law Act 1977 s 51 
120 Communications Act 2003 s 127 
121 Massachusetts, 269 MGL §14 
122 s. 90A(2)(c) WA Police Act 1892 
123 508 U.S. 476 (1993) 
124 ibid [487-8] (per Chief Justice Rehnquist) 
125 For a more detailed analysis of the inter-relationship between the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution and the punishment of offensive thought, see Donald Altschiller, Hate Crimes: A 
Reference Handbook (Contemporary World Issues) (2
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place that seeks to protect certain minority groups “in the face of long standing 
and disproportionate problems of prejudice related crime”
126.  
 
Dealing with a legacy: US Approaches to Hate Crimes 
 
The US legislative approach to dealing with racially aggravated offences can be 
traced back to 1964, and the creation of the federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 245 
prohibiting  intimidation,  interference  or  injury  being  used  to  discourage  an 
individual’s participation in voting, employment, or attending school. On a State 
level,  46  out  of  the  50  States
127  have  some  form  of  augmented,  penalty 
enhancement
128,  which  provides  for  an  increased  sentence  on  a  pre-existing 
offence  that  has  racially  aggravated  elements.  For  example,  §422.7  California 
Penal Code adds a potential term of imprisonment to any offences that are not 
otherwise imprisonable, where the crime committed is classed as a hate crime. In 
relation to the commission of low level public order offences, §485.10 (2) New 
York Hate Crimes Act 2000 states that when a person is convicted of a hate crime 
and the specified offence is a misdemeanour or a class C, D or E felony,  the hate 
crime shall be deemed to be one category higher than the specified offence the 
defendant committed. 
 
In  a  comprehensive  assessment  on  hate  crimes  and  their  impact  in  Australia, 
Mason
129 has identified there are a mixture of approaches that have been adopted 
by various States. Western Australia introduced an additional maximum penalty 
for  offences  committed  in  circumstances  of  racial  aggravation
130.  New  South 
Wales,  by  means  of  s.21A  Crimes  (Sentencing  Procedure)  Act  1999  reacted 
accordingly  and
131  Victoria  and  Northern  Territories  have  used  augmented 
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126 Gail Mason, “Hate Crime Laws in Australia: Are they achieving their goals?” National Judicial 
Collage of Australia, Sentencing Conference Feb 2010 accessed at 
http://njca.anu.edu.au/Professional%20Development/programs%20by%20year/2010/Sentencing%
202010/Papers/Mason.pdf at p 4 
127 Anti-Defamation League, State Hate Crime Law survey conducted in 2006.  
128 According to Mason (n 126) 5-6 there are three distinct models of Hate Crime. The Penalty 
enhancement  model  imposes  an  additional  maximum  or  minimum  penalty  on  a  pre-existing 
offence. The other models are the Sentence aggravation model which includes racial motivation as 
a factor to be considered at the time of sentencing. The final model is the creation of a specific 
crime based around prejudiced conduct and is known as the Substantive offence model.  
129 Ibid 6  
130 Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 313 
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sentencing provisions, where race is established as an aggravating factor. Where 
the court finds a racial factor it is required to take it into account when sentencing, 
but the court is not compelled to increase the sentence. 
Hate Crimes and The Augmented Section 5 
 
The English legal system, prior to the inception of the Race Relations Act 1965, 
had  no  real  effective  measures  designed  to  counter  low  level  racist  abuse
132. 
Even  the  introduction  of  the  offence  of  incitement  to  racial  hatred  did  little  to 
ameliorate the situation. It was not until the introduction of the provisions found in 
Part 3 of the Public Order Act 1986 that there was any substantial body of law 
governing  all  aspects  of  crimes  specifically  designed  to  inflame  race  relations. 
Nevertheless, there was still no legislative way of dealing with low-level abuse that 
could not realistically be said to be intended or likely to stir up racial hatred other 
than by means of s.5 or s.4A of the 1986 Act. 
 
At the same time as the US Supreme Court reached the decision in Wisconsin, 
within England and Wales, there was an increase in incidents possessing a racial 
and religious element. This upsurge led to a media-driven outcry for the law to be 
toughened up on race crimes
133. The result in England was s.31 of the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, which provided for racially aggravated public order offences
134. 
Part  2  of  the  1998  Crime  and  Disorder  Act  saw  the  introduction  of  racially 
aggravated offences which run in parallel to the basic offences of s.4, s.4A and 
s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986
135.  
 
Within the English framework, the racially aggravated element of the offence, as 
defined in s.31(1)(c), sits on top of the basic s.5 offences and provides for greater 
punishment if the racially aggravated element is made out. S.28(1)(b) of the 1998 
Act states that the offence is to be considered racially aggravated if the offence is 
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132 For a discussion on the development of the law surrounding racial offence within the English 
legal system see David Williams, “Racial incitement and public order law” [1996] Crim LR 320 
133 See Fernne Brennan, “Punishing Islamophobic hostility: are any lessons to be learned from 
racially hostile crimes” 8 (2003) J Civ Lib 28; For an overview on the subject of racially motivated 
attacks see Neil Chakraborti & Jon Garland, Hate Crime: Impact, Causes and Responses (Sage, 
2009) 
134 For a discussion on the genesis of those provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which 
relate to racially aggravated offences see Card (n 36) 158-160; see also Thornton (n 7) 74-76 
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motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial group based 
on their membership of that group. A racial group is held to mean a group of 
persons defined by reference to their race, colour, nationality/citizenship, or ethnic 
or national origins.
136 Despite the symbiotic nature of the s.31 of the 1998 Act, the 
racially aggravated offence is intended to be a public order offence in its own right 
and  not  simply  s.5  of  the  Public  Order  Act  1986  with  augmented  sentencing 
powers
137. 
 
Indeed, the recent English case law regarding racially aggravated public order 
shows an increasing willingness by the courts to broaden the ambit of behaviour 
that comes within this offence. This is in keeping with the broad pattern of the 
case law as regards the general provision under s.5. Two cases, whose appeals 
to  the  High  Court  ran  almost  concurrently,  Johnson  v  DPP
138 and  DPP  v 
Howard
139, raised the question as to what extent racial motivation should be taken 
into  account  when  considering  low  level  public  order  offences  and  situations 
where  race  may  be  a  factor,  but  not  the  significant  driving  factor,  behind  the 
hostility of an individual towards the victim. The court stated that it did not matter 
whether  the  appellant’s  behaviour  was  motivated  partly  by  racial  hostility  and 
partly by other forms of animosity or hostility
140. The effect of s.28 of the 1998 Act 
is that it is sufficient if, in using the words in question, the hostility demonstrated 
by  the  appellant  is  based  in  part  on  the  victim’s  membership  or  presumed 
membership of a racial group.  
 
One of the most significant facets of both of these cases is the extent to which the 
motivation behind the commission of the offence under s.28(1)(b) is intrinsic to the 
legislation
141. This approach is not something that sits comfortably with traditional 
criminal law doctrine
142. The approach of those either drafting or interpreting the 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
136 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 28(4) 
137 R v Bridger [2006] EWCA Crim 3169 reaffirms this. 
138 [2008] EWHC 509 (Admin); (2008) 105(10) LSG 27; Times, April 9, 2008 
139 [2008] EWHC 608 (Admin) 
140 In the case of Johnson the hostility was directed against the individual who was working as a 
traffic warden. 
141 For a criminological exposition on the motivational element of racially aggravated offences see 
David Gadd, “Aggravating racism and elusive motivation” (2009) 49(6) Brit J Criminol 755 
142 According to Jerome Hall “Hardly any part of penal law is more settled than that motive is 
irrelevant” quoted in Douglas N Husak “Motive and Criminal Liability” (1989) 8 Crim Just Ethics 3, 
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criminal law is to treat all motive, be it benign or malevolent, as being irrelevant to 
the liability of an accused for an offence (although it may well heavily influence the 
sentencing of the accused as s.82 of the 1998 Act explicitly states). The finding of 
the court in Johnson
143 provides some clarity and revivifies the necessary conduct 
required  by  s.28  of  the  1998  Act.  Where  the  defendant  has  an  amalgam  of 
motives that have an element of racial hostility, but intertwined with an enmity 
based on other extraneous factors, liability pursuant to s.28 will depend on the 
existence of some element of racial hostility directed by the accused towards the 
victim. This will even be the case where that hostility is combined with, subsidiary 
to, or diluted by other forms of hostility. 
Hate Crimes in the German Jurisdiction 
 
It is appropriate at this point to mention the German position in respect of racially 
biased  crimes.  There  is  no  bespoke  provision  within  the  StGB  or  OWiG  that 
expressly  takes  racial,  religious  or  homophobic  motivations  on  behalf  of  the 
defendant into account
144. Instead, the approach adopted by §46 StGB provides 
for  augmented  sentencing  powers,  specifically  §46(2)  StGB  states  that  when 
sentencing the court shall weigh the circumstances in favour of, and against, the 
defendant.  
 
These provisions allow for consideration to be given to the motives and aims of 
the offender. The lack of explicit provision as regards racial motivation has been 
criticized by human rights organizations
145 although, other than holding a symbolic 
significance, it is not clear what additional benefit would be gained by including 
racial motivation within §46(2) StGB when there is already a provision requiring 
sentencing to take motivation into account. Additionally, it should be noted that 
there are a number of provisions that provide for the offences of incitement to 
hatred, specifically §130(1) of the StGB, which provides that:    
 
“Whoever, in a manner capable of disturbing the public peace: 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
143 [2008] EWHC 509 (Admin) 
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Incites hatred against segments of the population or calls for violent or arbitrary 
measure against them; or 
Assaults  the  human  dignity  of  others  by  insulting,  maliciously  maligning  or 
defaming segments of the population, 
Shall be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years.” 
 
§130  goes  on  to  provide  for  offences  of  display  and  distribution  of  racially 
offensive  material
146 and  criminalizes  the  glorification  of  National  Socialism
147. 
While there may not be bespoke, augmented sentencing provisions for biased 
based crimes, there is provision within the StGB to deal with racial incitement and 
the general sentencing provisions under §46 are more than adequate to deal with 
racially aggravated public order offences within the German legal system.  Indeed, 
if one adopts the model of hate crime law proposed by Mason
148, there are clear 
grounds  for  suggesting  that  the  provisions  contained  within  the  StGB  come 
squarely within the substantive offence model
149. 
Establishing the Scope of Prohibited Conduct: The 
Second Research Question 
 
The foregoing conceptual analysis has provided the appropriate detail to augment 
the conceptual edifice that was created within Chapter Two. It has also drawn out 
some of the key issues relating to the breadth of behaviour prohibited within all of 
the legal systems under consideration. The overbroad nature of conduct permitted 
by s.5 of the 1986 Act is a central tenet of the research hypothesis. In seeking to 
establish the optimal pathways of behaviour, the inquiry has encompassed the 
variant modes of conduct that will attract liability, established the optimal impact of 
the low-level offences and furnished comparative standardizations in respect of 
racially aggravated behaviour within the orbit of a low-level public order offence. 
Fundamentally, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that s.5 is the broadest 
drafted of all of the criminal provisions and point towards the need for reform of 
the area.   
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Section 5 and the low-level paradigm shift 
 
The  various  actus  reus  provisions  of  the  respective  jurisdictions  exhibit  some 
fundamental areas of commonality. There appears to be a uniform requirement 
that  the  proscribed  conduct  has  some  impact  on  another  person.  Within  this 
requirement,  there  is  however  a  wide  latitude  of  expectations  amongst  the 
jurisdictions. The broadest of all of these requirements is found within s.5 whereby 
all  that  is  required  is  that  the  conduct  occurs  within  the  sight  or  hearing  of 
someone  who  is  likely  be  caused  harassment,  alarm  or  distress.  There  is  no 
requirement that this conduct actually does cause any of these reactions. The 
corollary of this is that individual conduct may be criminalized where there has 
been no adverse effect or harm caused. All that will be required is a belief on the 
part of the police that the conduct would be “likely” to cause harassment, alarm or 
distress
150. 
 
The lack of a victim is not without parallels and appears to make the offence 
under s.5 directly comparable to the range of behaviour that can be dealt with 
under  §118  OWiG.  This  comparison  is  only  partially  accurate.  The  infractions 
dealt  with  under  the  German  administrative  provision  are  limited  to  minor 
elements  of  anti  social  behaviour  such  as  urinating  in  the  street  and  minor 
scuffles.  If  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  was  limited  to  such  incidents  then  the  broadly 
drafted actus reus would be less of a cause for concern.
151 Academic comment at 
the inception of the Public Order Act found that offences within s.5 should be 
relatively minor ones in their ambit.
152 It will be shown later in this thesis that the 
scope of s.5 extends beyond mere anti social behaviour and into areas of protest. 
Therefore  this  chapter  cannot  be  said  to  comprehensively  answer  the  second 
research question. Nonetheless there has been a significant amount of case law 
concerning almost every aspect of the offences under s.4A and s.5 and as such 
this chapter provides a fundamental pillar of support to the hypothesis that s.5 is 
indeed overbroad and that much of the conduct prohibited could be dealt with by 
means of a non criminal, disorder management model. 
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The  Australian  legislation  is  generally  focused  towards  behaviour  in  a  public 
context  and  this  excludes  the  disorderly  provisions  from  considering  such 
phenomenon as stalking and Internet bullying
153, accordingly, victims of cyber-
bullying have little by way of legislative protection. The case of S v DPP would 
almost  certainly  not  have  fallen  within  the  ambit  of  the  Australian  provisions. 
When considering the application of S within the German jurisdiction it can be 
speculated that whilst clearly falling outside §118 OWiG, the facts of S might give 
rise to a charge under §184 StGB. 
  
The situation is more intricately balanced when looking at the US jurisdiction and 
the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. The behaviour element is much 
more  focused  on  countering  low-level  violence  and  disorder.  The  adoption,  by 
most States, of the Model Penal Code provision for disorderly conduct
154 means 
that  the  actus  reus  of  US  disorderly  conduct  provisions  is  focused  towards 
fighting, “environmentally unfriendly behaviour” such as letting off stink bombs and 
“strewing garbage”
155. The prohibition of abusive words within the actus reus is 
contingent on the understanding that courts are predisposed to exclude “mere 
speech” from disorderly conduct
156. The exclusion of “fighting words” from First 
Amendment protection means that not all words are exempt from prosecution and 
this will be explored in the following chapters. 
Consensus on Offence: Racial Aggravation and Low-Level Disorder 
 
One area of unanimity amongst the jurisdictions is the provision, in one form or 
another, of additional sanctions for low-level behaviour that is racially motivated. 
Research undertaken within the Australian jurisdiction has highlighted that mild 
anti-social  behaviour  takes  on  a  more  severe  dimension  when  it  has  a  racial 
connotation  possibly  reinforcing  feelings  of  persecution  amongst  minority 
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communities
157. Examining the respective jurisdictions, there are common threads 
linking  the  low-level  racially  aggravated  offences.  Such  provisions  seek  to 
expressly and publicly target crime that is motivated by or aggravated by prejudice 
and  they  do  this  by  imposing  heavier  penalties  to  those  available  for  non-
aggravated offences
158 or, in the case of the German legal system, considering 
racial motivation as an aggravating factor when sentencing
159. 
 
There  has  been  considerable  discussion  of  the  locational  requirement  of  the 
English  offences.  This  is  partly  because,  in  seeking  to  draw  out  the  optimal 
pathways, the English offence under s.5 has the broadest ambit of the criminal 
offences within the four jurisdictions and that the location element serves only to 
emphasize this unwarranted reach. The location of the offence is critical to the 
conceptual  basis  of  the  offence.  The  following  example  has  been  cited:  “The 
conduct of a football crowd at a football match would be considered disorderly if it 
were to be repeated in a theatre during a performance”
160.  
 
This analogy is incomplete and serves only partially to aid understanding of the 
dependency that disorderly conduct has upon the context in which it is committed. 
The situation is, in fact, a good deal more complex. It would be more accurate to 
say  that  the  conduct  of  an  individual  at  a  football  match  may  be  considered 
disorderly if that individual were to repeat his or her behaviour whilst watching a 
certain play at a theatre
161. In this offence, across all jurisdictions, the context of 
the offence is clearly of key importance to the chances of conviction. 
Conclusion 
 
The  cross-jurisdictional  ambit  of  this  chapter  illustrates  how  the  police  and 
prosecutors are predisposed to utilize low-level, disorderly conduct offences in a 
wide  variety  of  circumstances.  These  provisions  have  the  characteristics  of  a 
“dragnet offence designed to catch all types of low-level anti-social behaviour”
162. 
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157 Mason (n 126) 1-3 
158 Mason (n 126) 3 
159 §46(2) StGB 
160 Peter Tain & John Marston, Public Order Offences (Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 94 
161 Interestingly, this point is made in almost exactly the same way by Douglas (n 3) 81 
162 Thornton (n 7) 37 	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Yet Australia and Germany limit the application of these offences to situations 
where there is an overtly public dimension to the behaviour. Within The US the 
behaviour is not limited to violence, but there is a restriction on the words that can 
be prohibited by virtue of the First Amendment. In accordance with the research 
hypothesis, it is the offences at the lower level of the Public Order Act 1986 which 
cover the most significant breadth of behaviour.  
 
In respect of s.5, the requirement of a partially objective test in respect of the 
behaviour being threatening, abusive, insulting and disorderly
163 is not unusual. 
Indeed, this is an approach common to all of the jurisdictions. There is, however, 
the imposition of a second element, to be determined by the finder of fact based 
on all the circumstances.  That element requires the prohibited behaviour to have 
the potential to cause harassment, alarm or distress, and that is unique to s.5 of 
the 1986 Act. These terms cause two fundamental problems: First, they lack the 
obvious public dimension required within the other jurisdictions as was evidenced 
by the prosecution in S v DPP. Second, with the finder of fact determining the 
potential for harassment, alarm or distress, that question may not be resolved until 
the court reaches a verdict. This lack of certainty, one of the research questions 
designed to test the hypothesis of the flaws in s.5 will be examined within the next 
chapter. 
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163 In  Chambers  &  Edwards  v  DPP  [1995]  Crim  LR  896  DC,  Keene  J  stated  that  the  word 
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ultimately, a question of fact for the trial court to determine 
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Chapter Four: 
 
Certainty, Culpability and Defences 
 
Introduction to Chapter Four 
 
It is a central aspect of the research hypothesis underpinning this thesis that one 
of the fundamental flaws with s.5 of the 1986 Act is the vagueness and breadth of 
conduct  that  can  be  ascribed  the  stigma  of  criminality.  The  previous  chapter 
explored the scope of prohibited conduct is extremely broad ranging. The issue of 
vagueness leads on to a fundamental difficulty as highlighted by Robinson and 
Grall: 
 
“(A criminal code should) give citizens fair warning of what will constitute a crime, 
limit  governmental  discretion  in  determining  whether  a particular individual  has 
violated the criminal law, and provide the distinctions among degrees of harm and 
degrees of culpability that create the foundation of a fair sentencing system.”
1 
 
Although speaking about the wider criminal code, Robinson and Grall’s comments 
are particularly appropriate with regard to low-level public order. The adoption of a 
partially  objective  test,  based  on  the  circumstances  of  the  case
2,  to  establish 
whether  the  behaviour  of  the  defendant  is  threatening,  abusive  or  insulting
3 
means that the accused will have to wait until the court has decided upon this as a 
question of fact
4 before knowing definitively that his conduct has attracted criminal 
liability
5.  This  test  gives  significant  latitude  to  the  governmental  institutions 
responsible for both policing and prosecuting these offences. Such concerns have 
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1 Paul Robinson & Jane A. Grall, “Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal 
Code and Beyond” (1983) 35 Stan L Rev 681, 682 
2 see p 74 
3 Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297, HL 
4 This test is applicable within Australian as well as English Law; Roger Douglas, Dealing with 
Demonstrations (Federation Press, 2004) 81 
5 cf the approach of the court in Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 1125, [2002] to the approach in 
Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin), Chapter Seven  	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given  rise  to  the  third  research  question  underpinning  this  thesis  and  will  be 
explored herein. 
 
Considering  the  broad  range  and  potentially  unpredictable  array  of  activities 
inviting liability, the first part of this chapter will seek to examine low-level public 
order legislation set alongside the requirement for certainty within the criminal law 
of  the  various  legal  systems.    A  related  area  of  the  inquiry  is  to  conduct  a 
comparative evaluation of the various mental elements required in each of the 
jurisdictions. This will provide another of the fundamental components of liability 
for low-level public order and logically segues into an examination of the different 
approaches  to  the  defences  of  lawful  justification  or  excuse.  This  is  critical  to 
establishing the way in which a person may be relieved of liability for a low-level 
public order offence. 
An Uncertain Defence: Compounding the Problems with Section 5 
 
Pursuant to the above inquiry, it is necessary to explore the ways in which an 
accused individual can seek to defend a charge of low-level public disorder. This 
is of particular importance given the wide scope and possible uncertainty of the 
prohibited  conduct.  Such  an  examination  is  contingent  upon  the  premise  that 
there are a number of different ways in which a defendant can seek to dispute 
such a charge
6. Whilst each of the jurisdictions has slightly different procedures 
and principles, the taxonomy of these approaches remains fundamentally similar
7. 
The accused can invoke a defence either excusing or justifying the conduct or 
claiming that it was involuntary
8. In addition to these general defences the Public 
Order  Act  1986  integrates  specific  defences  within  the  various  low-level 
provisions. These defences, unique to the English low-level provisions, mandate 
that the defendant acknowledges (or at least does not dispute) the commission of 
the actus reus with the appropriate mens rea but then seeks to assert one of the 
following: either he had no reason to believe that his conduct was within the sight 
or hearing of a person who might be caused harassment, alarm or distress
9, or 
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6 This draws upon the discussions as to the nature and interplay of actus reus and mens rea as 
seen in Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (6
th Edn, OUP 2009) 84 
7 See E Colvin, “Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law.” (1990) 10 OJLS 381 for a discussion 
spanning the issues of defences at common law 
8 David Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (12
th Edn, OUP 2008) 321-379 
9 Public Order Act 1986 s 5 (3) (a) 	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that the accused was in a dwelling and had no reason to believe that his conduct 
could be heard or seen by anyone outside that or any other dwelling
10.  
 
In addition, there is another defence available; that the conduct of the accused 
was reasonable
11. The defence of reasonableness is available for all low-level 
offences within the English Public Order Act
12. It is contended that the principal 
justification for conduct (as examined by the higher courts in England and Wales) 
would fall within this final defence. The defendant would maintain that any words, 
behaviour or disorderly conduct was part of a protest and as such, was inherently 
reasonable.  The  corollary  of  this  argument  is  that  to  criminalize  the  prohibited 
conduct  would  violate  the  defendant’s  statutorily  guaranteed  rights  to  free 
expression
13.  The  attempts  by  the  respective  judiciaries  to  grapple  with  the 
inherent tension between constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and 
the regulation of low-level public order have been subject to much scrutiny and 
will be the focus of the next chapter. Often ignored in rights-based analyses of 
low-level  public  order
14 ,  the  next  stage  of  inquiry  is  to  examine  another 
constitutionally guaranteed provision, the requirement for certainty.  
Desiring Certainty in Public Order Law 
 
The principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege
15 is embedded in various 
ways within all of the jurisdictions under consideration. The principle of certainty is 
closely related to the non-retroactivity principle. As Ashworth states, “a vague law 
may operate retroactively, since no one is quite sure whether given conduct is 
within or outside the rule”
16. The English legal system has long recognized the 
principle of maximum certainty
17, but this has been given further effect by the 
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10 Public Order Act 1986 s 5 (3) (b) 
11 Public Order Act 1986 s 5 (3) (c) 
12 Public Order Act 1986 s 5 (3) (c) 
13 See p 12-14 for further details of the UK commitments under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
14 See, for example; Sophie Turenne, “The compatibility of criminal liability with freedom of 
expression” [2007] Crim LR 866 and David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest: Rights and 
Regulation in the Human Rights Act Era, (OUP 2010) 25- 57 
15 Literally translated as meaning ‘no crime, no punishment without law’ 
16 Ashworth (n 6) 64 
17 See for example Phillips v Eyre (1870) LR 6 QB 1, 23 which has an implicit statement that the 
courts will not interfere with the will of parliament and impose retrospectively where none has been 
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provisions found in Article 7 of the ECHR. Within the American legal system, the 
certainty requirement is to be found in the “fair warning” or “void for vagueness” 
principles
18.  Requirements  of  certainty  within  the  German  legal  system  are 
explicitly provided for by the principle of Rechtssicherheit and within the opening 
sections of both the OWiG and the StGB.
19  
 
Central to the research hypothesis and the resultant third research question is the 
notion that all of the jurisdictions under consideration recognize the need for not 
only certainty but also the requirement for predictability. Within the English legal 
system, Article 7 of the ECHR states, inter alia, that: 
 
“No  one  shall  be  held  guilty  of  any  criminal  offence  on  account  of  any  act  or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international 
law at the time when it was committed.”
20 
 
In  Kokkinakis  v  Greece
21,  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (ECtHR) 
elucidated that Article 7 was particularly relevant to clarity, as an offence must be 
clearly defined in law so that the individual knows he is committing an offence
22. 
Furthermore,  Gillan  v  UK  saw  criticism  of  the  granting  of  excessively  arbitrary 
powers  to  the  police
23 .  Indeed,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  wider  convention 
requirement of “prescribed by law”
24 the state has to show that the relevant piece 
of legislation satisfies a “quality of law” test. The Strasbourg Court developed this 
in the case of Sunday Times v UK
25 where it was stated: 
 
“(The  citizen)  must  be  able  to  have  an  indication  that  is  adequate  in  the 
circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case… he must be able – if 
need be with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the 
circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.”
26 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18 Ashworth (n 6) 63 citing Article I of the US Constitution; see p 112 below 
19 §1 StGB and §3 OWiG 
20 Article 7(1) ECHR 
21 Kokkinakis v Greece (1994) 17 EHRR 397 
22 ibid para [1] 
23 Gillan v UK, Application No. 4158/05, judgment 12.01.2010  
24 See, for example the provisions of Article 10(2) of the ECHR, which, inter alia, provides that a 
state can interfere with convention rights only when the limitations are prescribed by law. The 
same is true mutates mutandis of Articles 8-12 of the ECHR.   
25 (1979) 2 EHRR 245 
26 ibid para [49] 	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English Approach to Certainty: A Dishonest Perspective 
 
Difficulties surrounding the certainty of the English criminal law are by no means 
exclusive to low-level public order law. Dishonesty is a key mens rea requirement 
of the Theft Act 1968 but is only partially defined within that Act
27. The Court of 
Appeal in the case of Ghosh
28 provided a two-limbed test for dishonesty, with the 
first part comprising an objective element and the second part incorporating a 
subjective element. Critics have claimed that this test contravenes Article 7 of the 
ECHR. Despite considerable judicial activity in this area, these concerns have yet 
to be resolved
29.  
 
Comparisons with the Theft Act 1968 highlight the potential uncertainty of the low 
level provisions of the Public Order Act 1986: the actus reus elements of theft
30 
are  not  without  vituperative  criticism.  The  concept  of  “appropriation”
31 ,  in 
particular, has been given a very broad scope by the decisions in the cases of 
Gomez
32 and Hinks
33. Within low-level public order law, there is an arguably more 
potent mixture of uncertainty. The uncertainty stems from the scope of prohibited 
activity,  combined  with  the  arbitrary  powers  granted  to  police.  This  points  to 
concerns over the compatibility of s.4, s.4A and s.5 of the 1986 Act with Article 7 
of the ECHR. These concerns have not been addressed within the body of case 
law surrounding the Act
34. 
  
The  first  area  of  uncertainty  for  a  defendant  is  whether  his  conduct  will  be 
threatening,  abusive  or  insulting  and  is  determined  as  a  matter  of  fact
35. 
Additionally, whether the outcome of the behaviour is likely to cause harassment, 
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27 Theft Act 1968, s 2(1) provides for three cases where an appropriation of property belonging to 
another will not be dishonest; if the accused (i) believes in a legal right to the appropriated 
property, (ii) belief that the owner of the property would have consented to the appropriation and 
(iii) a belief that the owner of the property cannot be traced.  
28 [1982] 2 All ER 689 
29 See Alan Reed & Ben Fitzpatrick, Criminal Law (3
rd Edn, Thomson 2006) 454, fn 62 
30 Provided by s 3, s 4 and s 5 of the Theft Act 1968 respectively 
31 Theft Act 1968 s 3 
32 R v Gomez [1993] AC 442, HL, [1993] Crim LR 304. See also Simon Cooper, & Michael Allen, 
“Appropriation after Gomez” (1993) 57 J Crim Law 186 
33 R v Hinks [2000] 4 All ER 833, [2001] Crim LR 162; Stephen Shute, “Appropriation and the Law 
of Theft” [2002] Crim LR 445 
34 Theft is not the only area where there has been such criticism. The law surrounding Gross 
negligence manslaughter has attracted significant debate. See for further details Glenys Williams, 
“Duty of Care in ‘Drugs cases’: R v Evans” [2009] Crim LR 631 
35 Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297, HL 	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alarm or distress is also determined based on all of the circumstances
36. All of the 
elements of the offence with reference to the defendant’s behaviour under s.5 are 
not  definitively  established  until  the  trial.  The  concerns  of  certainty  are  not  so 
severe  in  relation  to  the  outcome  elements  of  the  offences  of  s.4  and  s.4A 
whereby a victim, or at least a witness, can attest to the results of the behaviour.  
 
The  Australian  legal  system,  despite  operating  within  a  federal,  supreme 
constitution, shares many common characteristics with that of the English legal 
system
37. It is therefore not surprising that within the Australian jurisdiction, the 
approach of the states mirrors that of England. As Douglas states: 
 
“To prove disorderly conduct, all that need be proved is the defendant intentionally 
engaged in acts which viewed objectively, constituted disorderly behaviour.” 
38  
 
Nonetheless, of all jurisdictions under consideration, it is the Australian that has 
the least dogmatic position in respect of certainty
39. The Australian criminal and 
summary codes have attempted to provide clarity and replace the common law 
provisions  with  either  fully  codified  criminal  law  or  comprehensive  statutory 
provisions
40. When examining the case of Coleman v Power
41, the Australian High 
Court made no reference to the broadness of the statutory provision
42, appearing 
to be satisfied that broad activity was an inherent aspect of these offences.  
Social Defence: Forsaking Certainty for Pragmatism 
 
The  courts  in  both  England  and  Australia  are  satisfied  that  the  objective  test 
provides sufficient certainty. The case law suggests that the courts are satisfied 
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36 Chambers v DPP [1995] Crim LR 896 DC 
37 Tony Blackshield, & George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (5
th Ed 
Federation Press 2010) chapter 1 
38 Douglas (n 4) 90 
39 Blackshield & Williams (n 38) Chapter 13  
40 See for example, Queensland Criminal Code (brought into force by Criminal Code Act 1899), 
Western Australia Criminal Code (brought into force by Criminal Code Act 1913) are both codified 
criminal structures, Victoria operates within the common law but still has a comprehensive Crimes 
Act 1958 
41 Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39, (2004) 220 CLR 1 
42 Vagrants Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931, s 7 (Q) provides for the commission of an 
offence whereby any person who in any public place or so near to any public place that any 
person who might be therein, and whether any person is therein or not, could view or hear uses 
any threatening, abusive or insulting words to any person. This case will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter five at p 155 	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that  the  ordinary  meaning  of  the  words  threatening,  abusive  or  insulting  give 
sufficient indicators to the defendant as to the full range of actions prohibited by 
such public order legislation. Furthermore, as a counter-argument to the need for 
certainty,  Ashworth  highlights  the  policy  of  social  defence
43 whereby  some 
vagueness is acceptable and even desirable in that:  
 
“It enables the police and courts to deal flexibly with new variations in misconduct 
without having to await the lumbering response of the legislature.” 
44 
 
This view would appear to be consistent with the continued deployment by the 
police and acceptance by the courts of s.5 of the 1986 Act within England. The 
view is indicative of the acquiescence of the courts within Australia to the various 
low-level provisions. Wells and Quick highlight that media and politicians remain 
comfortable with the broad ranging low-level powers as they can be deployed 
against those groups who threaten public safety
45.  
 
The  concerns  that  broad  ranging  low-level  offences  delegate  far  too  much  de 
facto power over citizens’ lives to police officers are dismissed by social defence 
theorists
46 .  Their  response  is  that  police  disciplinary  procedures  and  the 
independence of the judiciary will ensure that appropriate checks and balances 
within the criminal justice system restrain the broad discretionary powers
47. Such 
an assertion, it is suggested, would provide scant consolation for the individual 
who has already been deprived of their liberty and provides, at best, an ex post 
facto resolution. 
 
Historically,  the  courts  have  also  afforded  leeway  to  broad  ranging  powers, 
providing they have sufficient objectivity and content neutrality. In Knuller v DPP
48, 
it was held that individuals who know their conduct is on the boundary of criminal 
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43 For a classical exposition of social defence theory see M Ancel, Social Defence (Routledge & 
Kegan Paul 1965).  
44 Ashworth (n 6) 66 
45 Celia Wells, & Oliver Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law (4
th edn Cambridge University Press 
2010) 181-189, 198-232 
46 Ashworth (n 6) 67 
47 Wells & Quick (n 46) 225-232 
48 [1973] AC 435 	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behaviour take the risk that they will be judged accordingly. As stated by Lord 
Morris: 
   
“Those who skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which will denote the 
precise spot where he will fall in.”
49  
 
Coupled with the social defence theory, the so-called ‘thin ice’ theory makes for a 
powerful refutation of the arguments requiring the imposition of a strict certainty 
requirement on public order legislation.  In the quest for an optimal pathway in 
respect  of  certainty,  the  focus  of  the  inquiry  will  shift  to  the  American  courts’ 
approach to statutes that are overly vague. 
American Certainty: The Void for Vagueness Doctrine 
 
Within the United States, Article I of the Constitution provides that no State shall 
pass  any  ex  post  facto  law
50.  The  majority  of  States  have  incorporated  this 
provision into their individual constitutions
51. This prohibition is designed to protect 
private  individuals  by  providing  fair  warning  as  to  what  the  law  prohibits  and 
restrict  arbitrary  government  action
52.  According  to  Galinsky,  a  crime  must  be 
defined with definiteness and certainty
53. This is not only a requirement of the 
courts but also is regarded as an element of due process
54.  
 
In  response,  the  US  Supreme  Court  has  developed  the  “void  for  vagueness” 
doctrine
55,  which  objectively  measures  vague  laws  by  employing  a  two-limbed 
test. A law will be invalid if it fails to give fair warning to individuals as to what the 
law  prohibits  and  allows  arbitrary  and  discriminatory  criminal  justice 
administration
56. In other words: 
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“In  substantive  criminal  law,  the  relation  between  courts  and  legislatures  is 
prescribed by three doctrines. The principle of legality… condemns judicial crime 
creation.  The  constitutional  doctrine  of  void-for-vagueness  forbids  wholesale 
legislative delegation of lawmaking authority to the courts. Finally, the rules on 
strict  construction  direct  that  judicial  resolution  of  residual  uncertainty  in  the 
meaning of penal statues be biased in favor (sic) of the accused.” 
57 
 
The  limits  of  this  test  have  been  explored  in  relation  to  low-level  public  order 
offences. In Lanzetta v New Jersey
58, the Supreme Court held: 
 
“No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the 
meaning  of  penal  statutes.  All  are  entitled  to  be  informed  what  the  state 
commands or forbids… A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an 
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at 
its  meaning  and  differ  as  to  its  application  violates  the  first  essential  of  due 
process of law.”
59 
 
The case of Kolender v Lawson
60, saw the definitive restatement of the “void for 
vagueness” doctrine. The case involved Lawson challenging a Californian statute 
that required persons who loiter or wander on the streets to identify themselves 
and account for their presence upon request from a police officer
61. The Supreme 
Court  decided  that  the  statute  was  unconstitutionally  vague  because  of  the 
amount  of  discretion  afforded  to  police  (in  the  absence  of  probable  cause  to 
arrest) in respect of whether or not to stop and question a suspect. In reaching 
this decision, the Court observed that there was a requirement that in making 
laws,  the  legislature  had  to  establish  minimal  guidelines  to  govern  law 
enforcement
62. 
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Unlike the English Courts, those in America have considered disorderly conduct 
provisions for vagueness in considerable detail
63. Ordinances that describe the 
prohibited conduct merely with reference to the word disorderly have been held to 
be unconstitutionally vague
64. In Dunn v Wilmington
65, the defendant was arrested 
on a street corner indulging in drunken behaviour and using obscene language. 
The ordinance itself, although titled “Disorderly Conduct” within the body of the 
law prohibited participation in drunken or violent conduct and using obscene or 
abusive language. The defendant challenged the Delaware State ordinance as 
being void for vagueness. The Delaware Court of Appeal rejected this challenge 
stating  that  the  ordinance  “specifically  condemned  the  enumerated  acts  set 
forth”
66.  In  Squire  v  Pace
67,  an  ordinance  that  prohibited  individuals  from 
“behaving  in  riotous  or  disorderly  manner  in  a  public  place”,  was  held  as 
unconstitutionally  vague.  The  Court  held,  inter  alia,  that  the  statute  failed  to 
specify any proscribed conduct beyond riotous or disorderly
68. 
 
The development of The Model Penal Code was an attempt to provide a codified 
“American criminal law” that is constitutionally compatible
69. It has been identified 
that many of the states have directly imported the low-level public order provisions 
into  their  criminal  codes.  In  relation  to  the  disorderly  conduct  provision  under 
§250.2, the courts have held it does provide sufficient certainty as to the limit of 
conduct
70 by  detailing  three  separate  prohibited  courses  of  conduct
71.  The 
approaches to interpreting these three courses of conduct, especially the use of 
abusive language, have been in line with the rules of strict construction
72. 
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Rechtssicherheit: Legal Certainty within the German Law 
 
Much  like  the  situation  in  America,  the  German  legal  system  has  certainty 
embedded within the very core of the Constitution. The individual requires legal 
certainty (Rechtssicherheit) in order to correspond with the requirements of the 
law
73.  The  principle  of  nullum  crimen,  nulla  poena  sine  lege  is  embodied  in 
§103(2) of ‘Basic Law’ (Grungesetz, GG). This principle is restated both in §1 
StGB  as  relates  to  the  criminal  code  and  §3  OWiG  for  the  administrative 
provisions. Bohlander elucidates this notion of Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz as follows: 
 
“it requires the law to be as precise as possible in defining the prescribed conduct, 
which is similar to the principle of fair labeling.”
74 
 
The  concept  operates  in  concert  with  the  ban  on  retrospectivity 
(Rückwirkungsverbot) and there are similarities with the approach adopted by the 
American Courts. Foster illustrates how the German system operates by means of 
a hypothetical statute. This statute penalizes, “actions that are detrimental to the 
environment”
75. Such a statute would present the individual citizen with no real 
guidance  as  to  the  scope  of  the  activity  that  would  come  within  this  law  and 
consequently  he  could  not  moderate  his  behaviour  accordingly.  The  lack  of 
specificity in the prohibition would render such a law unconstitutional
76. 
 
Unlike the American courts, the German criminal law is more comfortable with 
allowing  some  flexibility  within  the  elements  of  the  offence.  This  is  contingent 
upon such flexible terms:  
 
“Form(ing) part of the traditional criminal law norms and (that) there is a consistent 
jurisprudence on their interpretation.” 
77 
 
The decision of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) in the Tree 
Protection Statute
78 case saw the Court deciding that, due to their supervisory 
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nature, certain terms within the Administrative Offences under the OWiG would 
require  a  degree  of  interpretation  based  on  the  individual  facts  of  the  case. 
Nonetheless, the BGH went on to state that where such ordinances have broad 
terms,  they  must  be  consistently  interpreted.  This  recognizes  the  regulatory 
nature of OWiG provisions, recognition absent from the English jurisdiction owing 
to the criminal nature of the offences within the Public Order Act. 
Section 5: A Cross Jurisdictional Analysis 
 
The  requirements  for  certainty  do  not  vary  to  any  great  extent  within  the 
jurisdictions.  What  appears  to  vary  is  the  method  and  rigour  with  which  those 
requirements are imposed upon the criminal sanctions. The “void for vagueness” 
doctrine  within  the  United  States  means  that  imprecise  and  widely  drafted 
provisions  would  be  challenged  and  overturned.  The  integral  requirement  of 
Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz  within  the  OWiG  means  that  §118  can  survive  as  a 
broadly drafted administrative provision within the OWiG. 
 
From a cross-jurisdictional perspective, the chances of survival for s.5 of the 1986 
Act within the other jurisdictions would appear to be mixed. The various Australian 
public order provisions in operation within each state have not been substantively 
challenged until 2004 when, the decision in Coleman v Power
79 stopped short of 
invalidating the operative legislation
80. The lack of judicial intervention on overly 
vague public order legislation means that it is unlikely that the Australian courts 
would encounter any difficulty with the operation of s.5 of the 1986 Act.  
 
The  two  jurisdictions  with  guaranteed  requirements  for  specificity  of  conduct, 
America  and  Germany,  would  undoubtedly  prove  a  more  hostile  constitutional 
environment for s.5 of the 1986 Act. The codified nature of German law requires 
the deployment of “general terms in the definition of the elements of offences”
81, 
and  there  is  a  requirement  that  the  interpretation  of  these  terms  follows  a 
consistent line of judicial reasoning. The provisions of §118 OWiG require the 
commission of a “grossly improper act”. This has already been identified as a 
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Gummiparagraph
82 with  a  “catch  all”  purpose.  But,  both  the  declaration  of  the 
BGH
83 and the underlying principle of Rechtssicherheit combine to suggest that, if 
suddenly deposited within the legal environs of the OWIG, while the skeleton of 
s.5  of  the  1986  Act  may  survive,  the  actual  operation  of  the  Act  may  well  be 
transmogrified into something significantly more restrictive
84. 
 
The “void for vagueness” doctrine, within the American jurisdiction, would provide 
the sternest test of the certainty of the terms found within s.5. An examination of 
numerous state-based disorderly conduct provisions
85 all show enumerated lists 
of prohibited conduct far in excess of those of the English provisions. While it 
could be argued that the requirement under s.5 that the behaviour is threatening, 
abusive or insulting, satisfies the “thin ice” principle elucidated in Knuller v DPP
86, 
it is unlikely that these conditions would satisfy the American courts as to the 
certainty of behaviour. 
 
The final analysis to which s.5 has not been tested is that of the compliance with 
the English legal system requirements for certainty in light of the obligations under 
the ECHR. As has been stated neither the higher courts in England and Wales 
nor  the  ECtHR  have  been  asked  to  adjudicate  on  the  compliance  of  s.5  with 
Article 7 of the ECHR (or indeed the prescribed by law element under Article 10(2) 
or  11(2)).  In  Kokkinakis  the  Strasbourg  Court  recognized  the  need  for  some 
flexibility within the law providing there was a settled body of case law to reduce 
the  degree  of  vagueness  and  enable  the  suspect  to  receive  effective  legal 
advice
87.  
 
The “quality of law” test established in the Sunday Times case
88 was reaffirmed by 
the ECtHR in Hashman and Harrup v UK
89 a case with particular resonance as it 
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related to protestors who disrupted a fox hunt by blowing horns. They were not 
prosecuted under public order legislation; instead they were bound over to keep 
the peace on the basis that their behaviour was contra bonos mores
90; behaviour 
judged  to  be  “wrong  rather  than  right  in  the  judgment  of  the  majority  of 
contemporary citizens”
91. It was held by the ECtHR that this; 
 
“…  failed  to  describe  the  impugned  behaviour  at  all  whereas  other  provisions 
(such as conduct likely to provoke breach of the peace) are acceptable because 
they describe behaviour by reference to its effects.” 
92 
 
This test provides something of a quandary when analyzing the terms of s.5. On 
the one hand, the terms of s.5 undeniably criminalize the behaviour (which must 
be  threatening,  abusive  or  insulting)  with  reference  to  its  effects  (that  the 
behaviour is witnessed by someone who is likely to be caused harassment alarm 
or distress). The problem with the certainty of s.5 is that both the behaviour and 
the effects of that behaviour are only criminal when the finder of fact at a trial 
determines them as being criminal, leaving both the accused and the legal adviser 
uncertain as to whether their activity was criminal or not until judgment has been 
passed.  
Conclusion: An untested certainty issue 
 
When considering the certainty of s.5 from a cross-jurisdictional perspective, it is 
likely that the American legal system would be highly inimical to the broadness of 
s.5  in  its  present  form.  Only  a  clearly  enumerated  list  of  what  behaviour 
constituted  disorderly  conduct  or,  more  likely  separate  and  bespoke  criminal 
offences for each activity would bring s.5 to a standard acceptable to American 
courts. It is not only s.5 of the 1986 Act that would be challenged within the void 
for vagueness doctrine. Several of the offences within the Australian jurisdiction 
would be liable to a challenge. Whilst the German requirements of certainty are 
similar  to  those  under  the  ECHR,  the  German  legal  system  obviates  such 
difficulties by not bringing disorderly conduct within the criminal sphere. 
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The  existence  of  recalcitrant  bedfellows  in  the  Australian  jurisdiction  does  not, 
however, mitigate the uncertainty of the English offence. The lack of analysis of 
the construction of s.5 from the perspective of Article 7 of the ECHR, and taking 
into account the decision of the ECtHR in Kokkinakis
93, by the higher courts of 
England and Wales means that any assessment of compliance is speculative in 
nature. The discussion on the similarity with offences in relation to dishonesty 
provide some indication of the difficulties, however dishonesty offences have been 
held to satisfy certainty requirements because dishonesty “is but one element of a 
more comprehensive definition of the proscribed behaviour”
94. 
 
Yet the requirement that an offence must be clearly defined so that the individual 
knows he is committing an offence does not sit comfortably with the elements of 
s.5.  The  court  determines  whether  the  conduct  has  been  abusive,  insulting  or 
harassing or disorderly. The court then makes a determination as to whether the 
conduct occurred within the sight or hearing of someone who may be harassed, 
alarmed or distressed. Even having decided this, the court must then go on and 
determines whether the accused has, on balance made out that his conduct was 
reasonable. Therefore all elements of the actus reus as well as the existence of 
the  specific  defence,  is  determined  by  the  court  at  the  time  of  the  trial.  It  is 
submitted that an accused, cannot in all cases, be aware that he is committing an 
offence,  nor  can  a  legal  adviser  provide  effective  counsel.  Such  a  conclusion 
would seem to reinforce the hypothesis that one of the fundamental flaws with s.5 
of  the  1986  Act  is  an  unacceptable  level  of  uncertainty  surrounding  both  the 
prohibited conduct and the effect that such conduct is likely to result in. 
The Mental Element for Low Level Disorder 
 
Thus far, the analysis has focused upon the scope of the physical, behaviourally 
based  elements  and  the  racially  aggravated  variants  of  the  disorderly  conduct 
offence. When analyzing the elements of criminality within the offence, it has been 
identified
95, that whether the conduct is threatening, abusive or insulting is, as 
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94 Hashman and Harrup v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 241 para 39 quoted in Ashworth (n6) 65 
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mentioned  above,  considered  to  be  prohibited  behaviour
96 .  As  such  it  is 
considered to be an element of the actus reus (and indeed one could argue that 
this is explicit with reference to s.6(4) of the 1986 Act
97). It has been identified by 
one observer, “as a matter of common sense one would think that surely these 
terms connote a mental element”
98. When looking across the provisions in the 
other jurisdictions, it is clear that the conduct itself sits squarely within the actus 
reus. 
 
Consequently, having analyzed the extent and the certainty of the conduct, the 
next  logical  point  of  analysis  is  the  required  mental  element  for  the  various 
provisions. With the coming into force of the English offence, it was speculated 
that  the  mental  element  was  complicated  for  a  comparatively  minor  provision. 
There were initial concerns that this would place a greater onus on the prosecutor 
than was warranted for such a minor offence
99. The mens rea of the offence is 
explicitly stated in s.6 of the 1986 Act: 
 
“A person is guilty of an offence under section 5 only if he intends his words or 
behaviour, or the writing, sign or other visible representation, to be threatening, 
abusive or insulting, or is aware that it may be threatening, abusive or insulting or 
(as the case may be) he intends his behaviour to be or is aware that it may be 
disorderly.” 
100 
 
The essence of this element of the offence is that the accused must either have 
intention as regards his conduct, or awareness that his conduct may be viewed as 
being threatening, abusive, insulting or disorderly. It was held in DPP v Clarke
101 
that this test is entirely subjective and must be viewed in the context of the offence 
as  a  whole.  It  was  also  decided  in  Clarke  that  the  burden  of  proving  the 
appropriate intent or awareness rests fully upon the prosecution.  
 
In respect of s.5, the culpable behaviour does not need to be directed towards 
another. For all of the misgivings regarding the mental element of the offence, 
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96 Richard Card, Public Order Law (Jordans 2000) 133-8 
97 See p 121 
98 Peter Thornton et al The Law of Public Order and Protest (OUP 2010) 30 
99 ATH Smith Offences against Public Order (Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) 122  
100 Public Order Act 1986, s 6(4)(a) 
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subsequent case law has not reflected this in practice. There is little by way of 
controversial  case  law  regarding  this  issue,  especially  when  compared  to  the 
significant  discussion  on  the  physical  elements  of  the  offence
102.  The  only 
possible lacuna within the mens rea is where an individual gives no thought to his 
conduct and honestly believes there is no risk of it being threatening abusive or 
insulting, he will not commit an offence
103. This will be discussed further within the 
context of intoxicated behaviour. 
 
The mens rea requirement of an offence under s.4A of the 1986 Act is that of a 
specific  intent  to  cause  harassment,  alarm  or  distress.  Irrespective  of  any 
intoxication, it has been held in Rogers v DPP
104, that intent can be inferred where 
the  behaviour  is  in  the  context  of  a  large  crowd  expressing  their  disapproval, 
though this is not automatic and depends on the circumstances as determined by 
the appropriate finder of fact. 
 
For the more focused offence under s.4 of the 1986 Act, the mens rea takes the 
form of a two-tier approach. The first element requires that the defendant intends 
his words or behaviour to be threatening, abusive or insulting, or is aware that 
they might be
105. The offence can only be committed, however, if in addition to 
that intention or awareness, the defendant also intended that the victim should 
believe immediate unlawful violence would be used, or the defendant intended to 
provoke  such  violence.  These  are  both  measures  of  subjective  intent
106.  The 
offence can also be committed if the defendant has the requisite intent outlined in 
s.6(3), whereby the other person was likely to believe that immediate unlawful 
violence will be used or whereby it is likely that such violence will be provoked. 
These requirements allow for an objective appraisal
107.  
 
There  are  also  issues  of  criminal  procedure  arising  from  the  mens  rea 
requirement for s.4. It was held in Winn v DPP
108, that where there is a substantial 
discrepancy  between  the  information  provided  by  the  police  and  the  facts 
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103 Thornton (n 98) 47 
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subsequently found at trial, then it is likely that the conviction will not be upheld 
and an alternate offence will not be accepted. Violence is given a broad definition 
in s.8 of the 1986 Act and includes violence towards property as well as people. 
As  with  all  offences  under  the  Public  Order  Act  1986,  the  violence  must  be 
unlawful violence
109. 
 
The situation in respect of Australian low-level public order offences mirrors that of 
the English legal system. It has been identified that there is some ambiguity as to 
the exact mental state required of defendants
110. The South Australian case of 
Daire v Stone
111 held that the prosecution had to show: 
 
“…that there is a conscious and deliberate course of conduct which interferes with 
the comfort of other people such as to leave the tribunal of fact with no reasonable 
doubt  that  the  conduct  of  the  accused  person  was  intentionally  done  to  bring 
about such interference.”
112 
 
Another  South  Australian  authority,  Police  v  Pfeifer
113,  saw  discussion  of  the 
dichotomy between conduct that is intended to cause offence and conduct which 
the defendant is aware may cause offence. In Pfeifer, the defendant wore a t-shirt 
in public bearing the slogan “Too Drunk to Fuck”. The court held in this case that it 
was not necessary for the prosecution to prove knowledge that conduct was likely 
to be offensive. Instead, Doyle CJ stated that: 
 
“To convict only those who intentionally or knowingly offend will achieve a good 
deal, but does not go that extra step of requiring members of society to take care 
to ensure that they do not breach generally accepted standards of behaviour.” 
114 
 
In support of this conclusion, it was held that, on a strict interpretation of s.7 of the 
Summary  Offences  Act  1953,  there  was  no  requirement  for  defendants  to  act 
knowingly, wilfully or with intent to offend. The court presumed that by omitting the 
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mens rea requirements, the legislature was seeking to ensure that people took 
care to ensure that their activities did not offend people
115.  
Intention, the Model Penal Code & American Low-Level Public Order 
 
Robinson and Grall have identified that the majority of American jurisdictions have 
implemented  criminal  codes  that  utilize  the  general  requirements  of  culpability 
taken  from  the  Model  Penal  Code  (MPC)
116.  These  requirements  represent  a 
fundamental first step in understanding the requisite mental element for low-level 
public order. The minimum culpability requirements of the MPC are to be found in 
§2.02 and specify that a person will not be guilty of an offence unless he acted (1) 
purposely,  (2)  knowingly,  (3)  recklessly  or  (4)  negligently  with  respect  to  each 
material  element  of  the  offence
117 .  MPC  §2.02(3)  imposes  a  mens  rea 
requirement  of  recklessness  where  an  offence  element  does  not  specify  a 
particular level of culpability. This is reinforced by MPC §250.1, which creates a 
minimum mens rea requirement of purposive intent or recklessness. It has been 
pointed out that while the majority of States have adopted the four fault elements 
found in §2.02(1), only a few jurisdictions adopt a provision equivalent to §2.02(3) 
or §250.1. Thus, in the States where there is no mention of the mental element, 
the courts are left to decide upon the appropriate culpability requirement
118. 
 
The MPC holds that the primary (most blameworthy) mental element is that of 
purposive or specific intent whereby it is the conscious object of the defendant to 
engage in the conduct of that nature. Despite the misgivings of Robinson and 
Grall,  the  courts  have  held  that  in  order  to  convict  for  disorderly  conduct,  the 
mental element required is of a general intent to disturb the public peace
119. The 
Courts have not required a specific intent to engage in unlawful conduct such as 
fighting or making unreasonable noise
120. Courts have also held that intent can be 
inferred  from  the  defendant’s  conduct  and  also  from  other  such  circumstantial 
evidence
121. 
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The  case  of  Com  v  Troy
122 is  representative  of  the  confluence  of  mens  rea 
provisions  within  the  different  disorderly  conduct  statutes.  The  defendant  was 
charged  with  disorderly  conduct
123 for  mailing  ‘garbage’  to  a  landlord  whose 
tenants  had  caused  disruption  to  a  neighbourhood.  The  specific  intent 
requirement of the Pennsylvanian statute “may be met by a showing of a reckless 
disregard of the risk of public inconvenience,” annoyance, or alarm, even if the 
appellant’s intent was to send a message to a certain individual, rather than to 
cause the forbidden conduct
124. The reasoning of the Court in Troy drew on the 
case of Com. v Gilbert
125, in which it was held that the prosecution must prove 
that the defendant, by virtue of his conduct, intentionally or recklessly created risk 
or caused public inconvenience annoyance or alarm. Consequently, a male who 
entered  a  female  restroom  in  a  college  dormitory  was  held  to  have  recklessly 
created  a  risk  of  public  annoyance  even  though  there  was  only  one  person 
present
126.  
 
The notion of recklessness was further discussed in U.S. v Mather
127, in which the 
defendants, who masturbated in front of each other, were convicted under the 
federal offence of disorderly conduct within a national park area contrary to 36 
C.F.R. §2.34. The court accepted evidence that they had not intended to be seen 
and  had,  indeed,  made  a  conscious  effort  not  to  be  seen.  The  defendants 
conceded that they knew that their actions would cause public alarm if they were 
seen, yet they proceeded nonetheless. Accordingly, the court held that this was a 
“classic case of reckless behaviour”
128. 
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OWiG & The Tripartite German Approach to culpability 
 
Up to this point in the thesis, the differing elements of a criminal offence have 
been referred to by the conventional common law nomenclature of actus reus and 
mens rea. While this has been convenient shorthand, the structure of criminal 
offences  within  the  codified  environs  of  the  OWiG  (and  the  StGB)  employs  a 
different  approach.  Each  administrative  offence  has  an  offence  description 
(Tatbestand),  which  is  defined  by  reference  to  the  ‘objective  facts’  (objektiver 
Tatbestand) and ‘the subjective element’ (subjektiver Tatbestand)
129.  
 
If the two elements of the Tatbestand have been proven then, as with the StGB, 
the general element of unlawfulness will have been established (Rechtswidrigkeit) 
unless one of the justificatory elements contained within the OWiG are averred, 
such as self-defence
130 or an emergency threatening life and limb
131. Within the 
StGB,  the  next  stage  of  culpability  is  the  element  of  ‘guilt’  (Schuld).  The 
counterpart  to  Schuld  within  the  OWiG,  is  that  of  ‘responsibility’ 
(Verantwortlichkeit). 
 
The mental element of the offence of disorderly conduct
132 is to be found within 
§10 OWiG. It states that only intentional acts can be punished, unless negligence 
is  expressly  specified  within  the  provision.  In  his  commentary  to  the  OWiG, 
Göhler
133 states  that  there  must  be  an  intention  to  commit  the  act  but  that 
intention is irrelevant in respect of the grossly improper nature of that act, all that 
prosecutors are required to demonstrate is that the defendant intended to do the 
act and knew it might be so regarded. In relation to the activities of the so-called 
‘Nacktläufer’
134, the defendant stated, inter alia, that he should not be convicted, 
as he did not intend his activities to be grossly improper. He provided evidence 
that his exposure contained no sexual undertones. This assertion and held that 
the commission of the act provided the evidence of intention. This was determined 
to be grossly improper by reference to an objective standard.  
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When  dealing  with  the  administrative  offences  under  the  OWiG,  the  basic 
approach required is the same as when dealing with the offences under the StGB. 
The first point of inquiry when trying to analyze potential defences to a charge to 
an offence committed under the OWiG is to the General Provisions detailed in 
Part One of the OWiG
135. §1-7 outlines the scope of the OWiG offences dealing 
with such matters as defining misdemeanours
136, objective validity
137, temporal 
and  territorial  application
138 and  providing  that  an  act  will  be  punishable  as  a 
misdemeanor only if the law provided for the possibility of punishment before the 
act was committed
139.  
General Defences & Intoxication 
 
The general defences available within the criminal law of the three common law 
jurisdictions  with  regard  to  capacity,  such  as  insanity
140,  automatism
141 and 
infancy
142 apply equally to low-level public order offences as they do to the more 
serious counterparts. Within Germany, the OWiG states that anyone who is not 
able to comprehend the forbidden nature of the offence because of a pathological 
mental disorder due to a profound disturbance of consciousness or because of 
mental retardation or serious other mental abnormality shall be not guilty of the 
offence
143. It is for the prosecution, with the aid of medical experts, to clear up 
issues  relating  to  sanity
144.  There  is  little  by  way  of  case  law  in  any  of  the 
jurisdictions  to  indicate  how  such  defences  might  operate  in  respect  of  public 
order. Indeed, given the inherent dependence upon (expensive) medical evidence 
it is likely that the relevant authorities would not proceed with such a case.  
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The  situation  applies  equally  to  the  so-called  general  defences  in  respect  of 
necessity/duress
145, prevention of crime and self-defence. As with the capacity 
based offences, whilst there is a lack of case law on the doctrine of self defence 
operating within low-level public order, it is almost inconceivable that these two 
issues have not overlapped. Like insanity, it is suggested that this lack of litigation 
is due to police and prosecutorial discretion. 
 
One area that does impact upon low-level public order is that of intoxication. The 
words of Thornton are particularly germane when he states, “the experience of the 
courts is that a large proportion of non-protest related public order incidents are 
alcohol fuelled”
146. The area of intoxication requires a more detailed inquiry than is 
possible  herein
147.  In  relation  to  other  low-level  public  order  offences,  it  is 
sufficient to stress that intoxication does not operate (in the accepted sense of the 
word)  as  a  defence  within  the  law  of  England
148.  Just  as  in  America
149 and 
Australia
150, evidence of voluntary intoxication may lead the jury to find that the 
mens rea is negated for a crime of specific intent, but not to a charge of any other 
crime
151.  
 
Involuntary (unwitting or forced) intoxication does provide an excusatory defence 
but,  within  the  three  common  law  jurisdictions,  this  will  only  be  accepted  in  a 
narrowly drawn set of circumstances
152. Indeed, Ormerod states that, to all intents 
and purposes, intoxication is nearly always voluntary
153. Within the Public Order 
Act 1986, the distinction is even more narrowly drawn as s.6(5) is a reverse onus 
provision and requires the defendant to show his intoxication was not intentional.  
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induced intoxication or otherwise) at the time of the relevant conduct may be taken into account in 
determining whether the person had the intention to cause the specific result necessary for an 
offence of specific intent.(2) However, such evidence cannot be taken into account if the 
person:(a) had resolved before becoming intoxicated to do the relevant conduct, or (b) became 
intoxicated in order to strengthen his or her resolve to do the relevant conduct 
151 DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 443, [1976] 2 All ER 142, [1976] Crim LR 374  
152 Within England see the cases of R v Kingston [1994] 3 All ER 353 and Jeremy Horder, 
“Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity” (1993) 52 CLJ 298 quoted in Ormerod (n 8) 275 
153 Ormerod (n 8) 276 	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In the German legal system, within the StGB, intoxication falls within the remit of 
the  defence  of  insanity  or  diminished  responsibility
154 coming  under  §§20-21 
StGB.  There  is  an  additional,  stand-alone  offence  of  intoxicated  wrong  doing 
which integrates §323a StGB and the notion of committing an offence when in a 
senselessly  drunken  state  with  the  actus  reus  of  the  corresponding  offence. 
Within the OWiG there is the offence of Drunkenness (Vollrausch)
155 that has a 
similar effect to the offence §323a StGB in respect of offences within the OWiG.   
 
The provisions of s.4, s.4A and s.5 Public Order Act 1986, were designed to deal 
with obnoxious and offensive behaviour that is very often the result of intoxication. 
It would clearly be nonsensical if intoxication could impair the formulation of the 
requisite mental element. Nonetheless, the core of the mental element of s.5 is 
that the accused must either intend his conduct or be aware that his conduct may 
be  viewed  as  being  threatening,  abusive,  insulting  or  disorderly.  The 
aforementioned lacuna within the mens rea for the offences under s.4 and s.5 is 
the individual who gives no thought to his conduct and who honestly believes 
there is no risk of it being threatening abusive or insulting
156. Such an individual, in 
these circumstances, will not commit an offence. 
 
S.6(5)  of  the  1986  Act  states  that  a  person  whose  awareness  is  impaired  by 
intoxication shall be taken to be aware of that which he would be aware if not 
intoxicated. It has been observed
157 that inclusion of this provision was to ensure 
that mens rea of the offences under s.6(4) could not be construed as creating an 
offence  of  specific  intent
158.  Had  s.6(5)  not  been  included  the  accused  could 
assert  that  the  intoxication  acted  to  inhibit  or  negate  his  understanding  of  the 
nature of the conduct
159. This is one of a number of provisions within the Public 
Order Act that place the burden of proof onto the accused
160.  
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154 Bohlander (n 74) 132-135 
155 §122 OWiG 
156 Thornton (n 98) 47 
157 Card (n 96) 94 
158 For details of the difference between crimes of basic intent and crimes of specific intent see 
Ormerod (n 8) 295 
159 DPP v Majewski [1976] 2 All ER 142 HL 
160 See p 127 	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The position is slightly different in respect of s.4A of the 1986 Act. S.6 does not 
contain any mention of the mental elements for s.4A nor can the provision under 
s.6(5) be read in a way as to apply to s.4A. The mens rea provides for purposive 
intent,  rather  than  mere  recklessness.  The  nature  of  a  crime  of  specific  intent 
means  that  intoxication  could  provide  a  potential  defence.  In  this  case  the 
defendant would need to show that he was intoxicated and as a result of that 
intoxication, he could not form the necessary intent.  
 
The  offences  involving  drunkenness  will  not  be  examined  in  any  great  detail, 
largely  because  such  offenses,  although  indisputably  part  of  the  public  order 
forum,  do  not  have  the  scope  of  behaviour  and  intention  that  underpin  the 
offences under the Public Order Act
161. This analysis will now move on from the 
general  defences  provided  by  criminal  law  affecting  low-level  public  order  to 
examine the specific defences provided within the English framework.  
Justifying Disorderly Conduct: “Reasonable” Disorder 
 
Within the English legal system, the Public Order Act 1986 provides a defendant 
with a number of bespoke defences specifically relating to disorderly conduct
162. 
The defences mentioned here apply mutatis mutandis to s.5 and s.4 & s.4A of the 
1986  Act,  together  with  the  racially  aggravated  variant  offences  under  s.28-31 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 with the exception of s.5(3)(a), which is unique to 
the offence under s.5 (and the racial variants)
163. The defences, as laid down in 
the Public Order Act 1986, are both separate and distinct enough from the body of 
the main offence so as to allow for a separation of the actus reus, mens rea and 
defence  elements  of  each  offence
164.  This  is  the  most  appropriate  way  of 
conducting such an analysis, as this was the way in which Parliament intended 
the defence to operate
165.   
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161 For further details see Thornton (n 98) 94-96 
162 S 4A of the 1986 Act is taken within this as being essentially aggravated s5 therefore treated as 
fundamentally the same offence
 
163 For the sake of brevity, throughout the thesis when speaking about the defences under the 
Public Order Act, the defences will be those under s 5 of the Act.  
164 This style of analysis is very much along the lines suggested by D J Lanham, “Larsonneur 
revisited” [1976] Crim LR 276 
165 For further discussion of the evolution of the specific defences see Smith (n 99) 124 	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S.5(3)(a) of the 1986 Act provides that it is a defence for the accused to prove that 
he had no reason to believe that there was any person within hearing and sight 
who was likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress
166. S.5(3)(b) of the 
1986 Act provides, inter alia, that it is for the accused to prove that at the material 
time, he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or 
behaviour would be heard or seen by a person outside that dwelling. These are 
determined by reference to a test that is subjective in nature
167. For the purpose of 
defining a dwelling, reference can be made to s.8 of the 1986 Act which states 
that a dwelling means, “any structure or part of a structure occupied as a person’s 
home or as other living accomodation”
168. The discussion on this element of the 
defence perfectly illustrates the clumsy and overlapping nature of actus reus and 
defence elements.  
 
The most controversial of the specific defences provided within the Public Order 
Act 1986 is to be found under s.5(3)(c). This provides (in a somewhat bald and 
seemingly innocuous manner) that it is a defence for the accused to prove that his 
conduct was reasonable. It can be stated, in broad terms
169, that this defence is 
intended  to  provide  an  exemption  for  the  commission  of  the  offence  where  a 
criminal conviction is inappropriate. The logical corollary of this assertion is that 
where the accused can import a sufficiency of circumstance or even sufficiency of 
motive, then it is open to the court to excuse the guilty conduct.  
 
The very nature of the defence means that it can be said to operate ex post facto. 
Once  the  police  have  decided  that  arrest  under  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  is  a 
proportionate way in which to deal with the protest, it is then for the courts to 
decide  whether,  in  fact,  the  protest  has  reached  the  necessary  level  of 
threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour
170. If they do find this to be the case, 
the next stage – if raised by the defendant – is whether the defendant has proved 
that his conduct was reasonable.  
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166 See Holloway v DPP [2004] All ER (D) 278 
167 Holloway v DPP [2004] All ER (D) 278 
168 See Chappell v DPP (1989) 89 Cr App R 82 and the comments made in respect of the location 
of the offence.  
169 Card, (n 96) 140
 
170 In relation to the elements of prohibited behaviour under s 5(1) of the 1986 Act, it need be only 
one of the three elements (e.g. the behaviour need only be threatening, abusive or insulting).  In 
terms of the interpretation of the meaning of these phrases, see earlier discussion on the test laid 
down in Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297.
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There  are  two  fundamental  difficulties  with  this  requirement.  The  first  of  these 
problems is the lack of any form of statutory guidance: at no point in the Public 
Order  Act  1986  is  there  any  explanation  provided  by  the  legislators  as  to  the 
construction of what may or may not be viewed as reasonable. In Clarke
171, it was 
held that the question as to whether the conduct in question was reasonable can 
only be determined by objective standards of reasonableness as assessed by the 
finders of fact in any tribunal, be they magistrates or the jury
172.  
 
The defences under s.5(3)(a) and s.5(3)(b) are both judged subjectively
173. The 
nature  of  the  reverse  onus  provision  and  the  nature  of  the  assertion  being 
made
174 ensure that the courts make use of an objective test to determine the 
nature of the conduct
175. This, potentially harsh test, is mitigated by the finding of 
the court in DPP v Clarke
176. Nolan LJ stated, in respect of the required mental 
element, that: 
 
“…the question whether the defendant had the intention or awareness which is 
required  as  a  condition  of  guilt  under  section  6(4)  can  only  be  answered 
subjectively by reference to the state of mind of that defendant. The state of mind 
of a defendant must be judged in the light of the whole of the evidence (including, 
most particularly, the evidence of the defendant himself, if he chooses to give it) 
concerning his words and behaviour and the surrounding circumstances.” 
177 
 
If the English statute remains silent as to the scope of a reasonable excuse, the 
case law of the higher courts in the English legal system provide little by way of 
cast-iron guidance as to where reasonable excuse can operate. It has been held 
that  a  protestor  can  be  seen  to  have  a  reasonable  excuse  for  burning  an 
American  flag  in  front  of  a  US  Air  Force  base
178 with  passing  US  service 
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172 ibid 365 
173 Thornton (n 98) 42 citing DPP v Clarke (1992) 94 Cr App R 359 
174 Le Vine v DPP [2010] EWHC 1128 Admin, 2010 WL 1639693 
175 Brutus v Cozens [1973] A.C. 854.  
176 (1992) 94 Cr App R 359 
177 ibid [12] 
178 As in the case of Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 1125, [2002] 	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personnel
179 It  was  also  accepted  of  an  unlicensed  ice  cream  trader  who  had 
been told, incorrectly, by a police officer that his van could be seized was held by 
the Divisional Court to have a reasonable excuse when he subsequently told the 
officer “you’re not taking my fucking van”
180. These isolated decisions provide little 
by  way  of  clarity,  suggesting  that  whilst  the  courts  are  open  to  interpret 
‘reasonableness’  on  an  ad-hoc  basis,  the  suspect  will  not  know  whether  his 
actions  are  reasonable  until  the  court  reaches  its  verdict.  This  provides  clear 
difficulties  when  set  alongside  the  need  for  certainty  within  the  body  of  the 
offence, as has already been considered
181,  As will be seen, once an ECHR 
based approach to the issue of the defence under s.5(3)(c) is introduced, this 
confusion is only intensified.  
Reverse Onus Provisions and s.5(3) of the 1986 Act 
 
The second of the fundamental issues with the defences under s.5(3) concerns 
the operation of the defence. It is significant to note that all three of the defences 
enunciated in s.5(3) of the 1986 Act involve a reverse burden, specifically the 
burden of proving the defence is placed upon the accused and the appropriate 
standard of proof for such provisions is to a balance of probabilities. Therefore, 
once the prosecution has established that the defendant has a case to answer, it 
is for the defendant to make out, on a balance of probabilities, that one of the 
defences under s.5(3) applies. Placing the burden of proof on to the defendant 
has raised questions as to whether such provisions offend against Article 6(2) of 
the ECHR
182. Indeed, there is a rich case history, both domestically and at the 
ECtHR, which tracks the development of the respective courts attitudes to reverse 
onus provisions and their Convention compliance
183. 
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179 It could be argued that the notion of reasonableness can equate to the free speech 
requirements under the First Amendment of the US Constitution. For further discussion on this see 
p 171 
180 Kwasi-Poku v DPP [1993] Crim LR 705, DC
 
181 For the discussion on certainty within the body of the offence see p 108
 
182 Art. 6(2) ECHR states that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to the law 
183 For the ECtHR see Lingen v Austria (1981) 26 D&R 171, ECommHR and Salabiaku v France 
(1988) Ser A, no 141-A; 13 EHRR 379 ECtHR. For the position in England and Wales R v DPP ex. 
p. Kebeline [1999] 4 All ER 801, HL. However it is the position adopted by the House of Lords in 
Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264 that reflects the current law as it stands in relation to the Public 
Order Act 1986 and various reverse onus provisions which exist therein. 	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In Sheldrake v DPP
184, it was established that no reverse burden is placed on any 
of the essential elements of the offence. Additionally, and as has already been 
identified,  the  defences  under  s.5(3)(a)  and  (b)  are  subjective.  As  has  been 
identified: 
 
“it would be very hard for the prosecution to prove that a person believed he was 
in a dwelling or that he was not in the presence of someone likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress in the absence of presumption.”
185   
 
The reverse onus nature of the defence would seem to be perfectly adequate for 
ss.5(3)(a)  and  (b),  although  there  are  significant  issues  that  arise  when 
considering the reverse burden in respect of reasonable conduct under s.5(3)(c). 
As has been discussed above, it is accepted that certainty in the drafting of law 
does not preclude the interpretive activities of the courts. The case of SW v UK
186 
shows  that  the  ‘resultant  development’  of  an  offence  by  the  courts  must  be 
‘consistent  with  the  essence  of  the  offence’  and  such  development  must  be 
reasonably foreseeable.
187 The nature of the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence may 
encompass many distinct permutations of excuse that require interpretation by the 
court
188.  
Australian Defences: Limiting the scope of offence 
 
When  considering  the  defences  available  to  the  various  disorderly  conduct 
offences within the Australian legal system, it is worth noting at the outset of this 
discussion  that  the  underlying  perspective  of  the  courts  is  to  determine 
offensiveness or abuse by reference to the wider context of the conduct
189. This 
echoes  with  the  English  experience  following  the  case  of  Brutus  v  Cozens
190, 
where  it  has  been  the  accepted  orthodoxy  that  terms  such  as  ‘offensive’  are 
clearly a matter for the finder of fact rather than a point of law. Different States 
within Australia employ slightly different statutory measures to deal with disorderly 
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184 [2005] 1 AC 264 
185 Thornton (n 98) 42 
186[1995] 21 EHRR 363
 
187 SW v UK [1995] 21 EHRR 363 at para [35] 
188 It should be noted that the Strasbourg Court has not been asked to enquire into the German 
legal position. This is because German criminal law does not recognize reverse onus provisions. 
See Michael Bohlander, The German Criminal Code (Hart 2008) 3 
189 Worcester v Smith [1951] VLR 316 at 317 
190 [1972] 2 All ER 1297, HL  	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conduct. One significant area of commonality is that the offences are all required 
to be committed in public. This negates the need for a defence along the lines of 
s.5(3)(b) of the 1986 Act.  
 
The panoply of offences in Australia, as they exist within certain individual States, 
do incorporate defences that are, in some ways, very similar to the provisions 
under s.5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act in England. In New South Wales, for illustration, 
s.4  of  the  Summary  Offenses  Act  1988,  in  relation  to  offensive  behaviour, 
provides that it is a sufficient defence to satisfy the court that the defendant had a 
reasonable  excuse  for  conducting  himself  or  herself  in  the  manner  alleged.  In 
Conners v Craigie
191, it was held by the presiding judge that: 
 
“In  my  opinion,  reasonable  excuse  involves  both  subjective  and  objective 
considerations,  but  these  considerations  must  be  related  to  the  immediately 
prevailing circumstances in which the offensive words etc are used, just as in self-
defence or provocation the response of the accused must be related in some way 
to the actions of the victim and the particular circumstances.” 
192 
 
This  pronouncement  provides  an  illuminating  contrast  between  the  English 
approach under s.5(3)(c) and the approach of the Australian court in respect of 
reasonable excuse. This is a clear statement by the judge in this case seeking to 
limit the scope of the defence of reasonable excuse. As opposed to permitting a 
broad  range  of  situations  whereby  the  individual  can  seek  to  justify  the 
behaviour
193, Dunford J likens the defence to that of provocation, requiring an 
immediate  event  to  trigger  the  disorderly  conduct  rather  than  allowing 
consideration of wider circumstances: 
 
“Although in an appropriate case it may also be proper to look at the immediate 
surrounding  circumstances  against  the  background  of  the  defendant’s 
antecedents, prior experience and other related events, there must, in my view, 
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191 (1994) 76 A Crim R 502 
192 ibid [507] (Per Dunford J); in Douglas (n 4) 82 
193 As is the case with the English defence under s.5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act see for example Percy v 
DPP [2001] EWHC Admin 1125, [2002] 	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always be something involved in the immediate particular circumstances before 
there can be a reasonable excuse.” 
194 
 
The relationship between the behaviour of the accused and the strength of the 
contextual  support  required  under  s.5(3)(c)  of  the  1986  Act  is  a  key  area  of 
distinction between the English and Australian operation of public order law. In 
English Law, it is for the defendant to firstly assert that he thought his conduct was 
reasonable, and then prove that it was on the balance of probabilities. In Australia, 
the scope of reasonableness is considered within the actus reus element of the 
offence
195. 
Negating the Actus Reus – Defending the Offence in Australia 
 
When  examining  the  case  law  of  the  different  States,  one  is  struck  by  the 
uniformity  of  approach  adopted  by  the  courts.  In  Queensland,  the  offence  of 
Public Nuisance under s.6 of the 2005 Act states that a person must not commit a 
public nuisance offence
196. There are no explicit defences outlined within this act. 
In  such  cases  the  defendant  is  left  with  no  defence  other  than  to  dispute  the 
various elements of the offence.  
 
Issues  surrounding  the  physical  location  of  the  offence  provide  the  starkest 
contrast between Australian solutions to low-level public order and that of other 
jurisdictions. The New South Wales provision, found in the Summary Offenses Act 
1988, creates the offence of offensive behaviour. This provides that: 
 
“a person must not conduct himself in an offensive manner in or near, or within 
view or hearing from a public place or a school.” 
197  
 
S.4A  of  the  1988  Act  goes  on  to  state  that  a  person  must  not  use  offensive 
language in or near, or within hearing of, a public place or a school. In relation to 
the  Queensland  statute,  s.6(2)  then  states  that  a  person  commits  a  public 
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194 Connors v Craigie (1994) 76 A Crim R 502, 507 (Per Dunford J)  
195 Worcester v Smith [1951] VLR 316, 317 
196 The Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 6(2) states that a person commits a public nuisance 
offence if a person behaves in a disorderly way or and offensive way or a threatening way or a 
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nuisance offence if a person behaves in a disorderly way
198 or in an offensive 
way
199 or  a  threatening  way
200 or  a  violent  way
201 and  the  person’s  behaviour 
interferes, or is likely to interfere, with the peaceful passage through, or enjoyment 
of, a public place by a member of the public. There are certain American States 
that  employ  these  location-based  factors  as  a  “bolt-on”
202 but  the  provision  of 
them within the main body of the offence is unique to certain Australian States. 
 
Instead of allowing for political expression to be included within a “reasonable 
conduct” defence, the Australian approach seeks to deal with unpopular political 
speech by treating it as part of the actus reus, as opposed to acknowledging the 
criminality of the behaviour and then absolving the behaviour with subsequent 
justification. This reasoning goes back to the case of Worcester v Smith
203, which 
was concerned with a demonstration against the involvement of the United States 
in  the  Korean  War.  The  demonstration  took  place  outside  the  United  States 
Consulate in Melbourne. It was held by the court that a banner reading “Stop 
Yank  Intervention  in  Korea”  was  not  offensive.  The  court  held  that  to  be 
‘offensive’, the behaviour or writing must be such as is calculated to wound the 
feelings,  arouse  anger  or  resentment  or  disgust  or  outrage  in  the  mind  of  the 
reasonable person
204. 
 
Subsequent decisions of courts within other states have viewed with approval the 
decision of the Victorian Supreme Court in Worcester. In Ball v McIntrye, it was 
re-emphasized that behaviour could be hurtful, blameworthy or improper without 
necessarily being offensive. The essential element was that the behaviour was 
likely to provoke a strong emotional reaction
205. As with the English position, it has 
been determined that the context of the behaviour is as important as the actual 
behaviour  itself
206.  The  New  South  Wales  Supreme  Court  has  stated  that 
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offensive conduct is heavily context dependent. In Saunders v Herold 
207, Higgins 
J stated that: 
 
“Conduct and language engaged in at a football match or on a tennis or squash 
court may be acceptable or at least unremarkable, but offensive if engaged in 
during a church service or a formal social event.” 
208  
 
When drawing together the case law from the various Australian States a number 
of areas of commonality with that of the English legal system become apparent. 
The majority of State legislators did not incorporate the defences that appear in 
s.5(3)  of  the  (English)  Public  Order  Act  1986.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  clear 
emphasis  that  disorderly  conduct  is  inherently  viewed  as  occurring  in  a  public 
place (thus negating the need for the defence under s.5(3)(b)).  
 
Perhaps  of  greater  significance  for  this  discussion  is  the  approach  to 
reasonableness adopted by the Australian judiciary. The clear implication is that 
the reasonableness of the conduct of the defendant is viewed as being part of the 
actus reus of the offence and not as a specific defence. In Connors v Craigie
209, 
the  test  relating  to  the  offensiveness  of  the  conduct  was  revisited.  The 
reformulated test examines whether the reasonable person, hypothetically present 
in the circumstances of the case, would have been offended
210.  
 
This line of reasoning in respect of reasonableness has two significant differences 
to the English approach to defending low-level public order. First, it should be 
noted  that  the  acceptance  of  the  hypothetical  reasonable  person  removes  the 
need for the defence under s.5(3)(a)
211, and while this is not an overly litigated 
area, it is nonetheless a point of divergence. Perhaps of more relevance is that 
the Australian approach is clearly similar in nature to the defence under s.5(3)(c) 
but without the attendant reverse onus provision. It is the contention of this thesis 
that the English model could benefit greatly from the approach adopted within the 
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Australian  jurisdiction  because  the  offensiveness  of  the  conduct  is  for  the 
prosecution  to  prove
212 and  not,  as  in  the  English  model,  for  the  defendant  to 
disprove
213.  
Defences to Disorderly Conduct in the USA 
 
There are similarities of both form and interpretive method within Australia and 
England. As with the slight diversity between the offences, each of the States 
within  the  US  has  slight  variations  within  their  criminal  codes  in  respect  of 
defences to such a charge. More than any other jurisdiction, it is within the US 
that the overlaps between discussions of defences and elements of the offence 
itself become apparent
214. Despite this, it has been identified that for disorderly 
conduct (as it exists within all criminal codes as a statutory offence), the general 
rules of criminal law as they apply to statutory offences, also apply in respect of 
prosecutions for disorderly conduct offences
215.  
 
The examination of the defences to disorderly conduct will be conducted primarily 
in respect of the Model Penal Code (MPC). In terms of the structure, the MPC 
operates  on  three  levels
216,  not  dissimilar  to  the  StGB  and  OWiG  within  the 
German legal system. The first step is to examine the prohibited action together 
with the requisite mental element. Once the guilty act and appropriate mindset 
has  been  established,  the  MPC  then  requires  an  assessment  of  whether  a 
justificatory defence exists. Finally, if the criminality of conduct and the wrongful 
nature of the conduct (i.e. unjustified) can be shown, the model then seeks to 
assess whether there exists an excusatory defence. This will examine whether the 
individual, in actually committing the conduct, was sufficiently blameworthy
217.  
 
The disorderly conduct offence, as detailed within MPC
218, provides no specific 
defence within the model statute. That is not to say that there are no regional 
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variations  within  the  differing  States.  Wisconsin  has  adopted  a  somewhat 
unorthodox  approach  in  respect  of  dealing  with  disorderly  conduct  and  a 
defendant  is  presented  with  a  number  of  options  in  respect  of  defending  the 
charge. The offence is found in chapter 947 of the Wisconsin Criminal Code. The 
provision  seeks  to  deal  with  crimes  against  public  peace,  order  and  other 
interests. The disorderly conduct offence is found within §947.01 and it states 
 
“Whoever, in a public or private place, engages in a violent, abusive, indecent, 
profane,  boisterous,  unreasonably  loud  or  otherwise  disorderly  conduct  under 
circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance shall 
be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.” 
219 
 
There is a clear implication within §947.01 that, in fact, the defendant can commit 
the offence in either public or private. This provision has echoes of the defence 
under s.5(3)(a) of the 1986 Act
220. But it is somewhat unusual in respect of the 
statutes  in  other  States,  the  majority  of  which  require  some  element  of  public 
disorder within them. The Pennsylvania disorderly conduct statute found under 
§5503 of the Criminal Code provides an illuminating contrast to that of Wisconsin. 
It states inter alia: 
 
“A  person  is  guilty  of  disorderly  conduct  if,  with  intent  to  cause  public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behaviour;  
(2) makes unreasonable noise;  
(3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or 
(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves 
no legitimate purpose of the actor.” 
221 
 
The Pennsylvanian statute, in marked contrast to the English Public Order Act, is 
typical of the position within the majority of American States in that it does not 
incorporate a specific defence.  Instead, as with many Australian States
222, the 
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accused would dispute the key elements of the offence. With Pennsylvania, there 
are two elements that need to be made out. The first required ingredient is that 
the  offence  was  committed  in  public
223 .  The  second  element  that  needs 
establishing is that the behaviour falls within one of the four conditions. In relation 
to the second requirement the prosecution must establish that the language or 
gesture itself was obscene
224.  
 
In  determining  the  validity  of,  or  in  construing  and  applying  ordinances  that 
prohibit  the  use  of  "obscene"  language  in  public,  courts  have  specifically 
discussed the effect or application of the United States Supreme Court decisions, 
beginning  with  the  case  of  Roth  v  US
225.  This  case  focused  specifically  on 
obscenity  and  held  that  obscene  speech  was  not  within  the  ambit  of 
constitutionally  protected  speech
226.  This  theme  was  developed  in  Miller  v 
California
227 that a statute prohibiting indecent or obscene language in public was: 
 
“..unconstitutionally overbroad, since the standard "indecent or obscene" did not 
meet constitutional requirements laid down by the United States Supreme Court 
as to a state's power to prohibit obscene expression.”
 228 
The German Perspective on defending Disorderly Conduct 
 
When  considering  the  low-level  public  order  provision  Belästigung  der 
Allgemeinheit, (Disorderly Conduct) provided within §118 OWiG, it does not have 
a specific defence in the way that s.5 of the 1986 Act does, and operates in a 
markedly  similar  fashion  to  many  of  the  Australian  provisions
229.  The  accused 
must  look  instead  to  dispute  either  the  physical  or  the  mental  aspects  of  the 
offence that has been described
230. Disputing these elements of the offence are 
not,  it  should  be  noted,  defences  per  se  rather  they  are  positive  or  negative 
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elements of the Tatbestand
231. However, such an approach does still fall within 
the taxonomy of disputing a low-level public order offence.  
 
In relation to §118, unlike s.5 of the 1986 Act, the location of the offence is not 
specified and it is possible for the offence to be committed in public or private. The 
essential objektiver element of the office is that the grossly improper conduct must 
be perceivable to the general public
232. This was a key issue in the case of the 
“Nacktläufer”
233, which explored concepts, and issues of nudity within places that 
may be considered ‘private’ (such as a garden) yet are visible to members of the 
public.  
 
The Nacktläufer case also illustrated another area of objektiver Tatbestand that 
may  be  disputed  by  an  individual  seeking  to  dispute  guilt  for  a  public  order 
offence. Specifically, the accused may seek to deny that he has engaged in an 
activity that is grossly improper. As has already been stated
234, according to the 
commentary on the OWiG, it would appear that the notion of a grossly improper 
act equates to; 
 
“…an action that, from an objective viewpoint, ignores that minimum of norms 
(rules), without which even a society that is open to new developments cannot 
do.” 
235  
 
This  test,  being  objective  in  nature,  would  appear  to  leave  a  little  room  for 
manoeuvre  for  the  accused,  with  the  court  and  not  the  individual  determining 
whether the conduct was grossly indecent. There is nothing by way of case law (in 
the major appellate courts) to indicate the nature of the conduct that this could 
encompass,  although  the  question  of  certainty  once  again  arises  when 
considering an objective test in relation to the prohibited behaviour. 
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Section 5(3)(c): Reasonableness Compounding Uncertainty 
 
The  bespoke  defences  provided  under  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  have  a  number  of 
elements to them. The accused can dispute that the conduct was witnessed
236. 
The accused may claim that he was in a dwelling, the conduct was directed at 
another person within the dwelling and there was no chance that the conduct was 
seen or heard by someone outside the dwelling. The location of the offence is, 
within  the  other  three  jurisdictions,  dealt  with  as  part  of  the  actus  reus  of  the 
disorderly conduct provision.  
 
The most contentious element of defending a charge under s.5, however, is found 
under  s.5(3)(c)  whereby  it  is  for  the  defendant  to  show  that  his  conduct  was 
“reasonable”. One of the key problems faced by those who seek to rely on the 
defence of reasonable excuse is that the English Parliament declined to provide 
any  statutory  explanation  of  what  will,  or  indeed  what  will  not,  constitute  a 
reasonable excuse in respect of either offence. It is contended that the statutory 
ambiguity inherent in construction of the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence places an 
undue interpretive burden upon the courts. This has resulted in courts indulging in 
an ad-hoc limitation of acceptable excuses to the point where the essence of the 
defence may well be being compromised.
237 Furthermore, as the reasonableness 
of  conduct  would  seem  to  be  a  central  element  of  the  offence:  a  finding  of 
reasonableness by the court means that there is no criminal sanction attached to 
the  conduct
238 .  If  reasonableness  is  determinative  of  conviction  and  the 
reasonableness of the conduct is a central element of the offence then this may 
well place it beyond the boundaries of ECHR compliance in relation to the reverse 
onus nature of the defence
239.  
 
Thornton postulates that an objective assessment of reasonableness is not within 
the  defendant’s  knowledge,  and  that  it  would  be  more  logical  to  have  the 
prosecution  prove  unreasonableness  beyond  reasonable  doubt  in  all  of  the 
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circumstances
240. These are two theoretical considerations that, as stated above, 
remain  untested  in  the  higher  courts.  The  principal  issue  regarding 
reasonableness of conduct is the inter-relationship this has with specific articles of 
the ECHR. The trio of protest cases
241, Percy
242, Norwood
243 and Hammond
244, 
will be considered later on in the thesis. They further emphasize the inconsistency 
of reasoning and the lack of certainty by a defendant seeking to rely on s.5(3)(c) 
of the 1986 Act. 
 
When  considering  specific  defences  to  public  order,  the  American  position  is 
inherently  linked  to  restrictions  provided  for  by  the  First  Amendment.  These 
themes will be explored further in the context of the relationship between low-level 
public order and protest in the following chapters. Instead of allowing for political 
expression to be included within a “reasonable conduct” defence (as it is within 
England  and  Wales),  the  Australian  approaches  deal  with  unpopular  political 
speech by treating it as part of the actus reus, and as such acknowledging that it 
is determinative of conviction.  Within the OWiG in Germany,
245 disputing these 
elements of the offence are not defences and are unlike s.5(3) of the 1986 Act
246. 
 
Whereas Nacktläufer dealt with freedom of expression, the import of the case 
from the defendant’s perspective was very much focused around disputing nudity 
as a ‘grossly indecent act’ rather than on the state interference of his right to free 
expression. §118 OWiG is a broadly drafted provision that can encompass a wide 
range  of  activity.  The  provisions  of  §3  OWiG  ensure  that  a  consistent  line  of 
judicial reasoning is employed when interpreting the provision. The location of the 
offence  requires  a  public  element  and  the  reasonableness  of  the  conduct  is 
determinative of guilt, rather than a defence for the accused to prove. Additionally, 
§118 OWiG is not a criminal offence. Manifestly, it would not be appropriate to 
deal with a protest using the provisions of §118 OWiG.  
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241 A phrase coined by Mead (n 14) 224 
242 Percy v DPP [2001] EWHC 1125 (Admin) 
243 Norwood v DPP [2002] EWHC 1564 (Admin) 
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245 See p 57-65 for further details on the structure of the German offences, 
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The Third Research Question: Uncertainty and 
Vagueness 
 
One  of  the  key  elements  of  the  research  hypothesis  was  the  notion  of  the 
vagueness of s.5 and the way in which this might offend against constitutionally 
guaranteed provisions such as those found within Article 7 of the ECHR. In order 
to address the third research question (that specifically examines whether low-
level public order law offends against certainty), this chapter has three distinct but 
concomitant areas of inquiry. The first element examined was the certainty of the 
low-level offences within the four legal systems. Secondly it was necessary to 
examine the mens rea requirement of these provisions. Finally, the key area of 
defences to disorderly conduct offences was explored and critiqued. This triptych 
represents  an  inherently  interlinked  but  crucial  step  in  modeling  the  low-level 
provisions across the four jurisdictions and providing a diagnostic for s.5.  
 
The first pre-requisite of this investigation was the identification of the certainty 
requirements inherent within each of the jurisdictions. These desiderata provided 
the  platform  against  which  the  low-level  public  order  provisions  could  be 
measured. The motivations for, and indeed the attraction of, permitting broadly 
drawn public order legislation are clear. In defending the role of such provision, it 
is argued that this allows police and prosecutors sufficient latitude to deal with a 
wide variety of circumstances. At its lowest level, s.5 of the 1986 Act ascribes the 
stigma of criminality to the defendant who says something insulting whereby that 
insult is likely to cause someone (who need not be present) to be distressed. 
When  looking  across  the  jurisdictions,  it  is  contended  that  this  represents  an 
extreme  example  of  a  widely  drawn  and  uncertain  criminal  provision. 
Nonetheless,  the  English  and  Australian  legal  systems  have  not  yet  seen  a 
challenge to their individual statutes in respect of certainty. Moreover, the courts 
seem satisfied that the respective provisions specify a blend of objectively and 
readily  understandable  terms
247 which,  in  turn,  provides  the  requisite  clarity  of 
proscribed activity.  
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The German legal system accepts that within regulatory provisions, such as §118 
OWiG, there can be a degree of broadness providing the statutory provision has a 
consistent body of jurisprudence
248. The American jurisdiction requires that a list 
of  behaviour  be  enumerated  within  the  disorderly  conduct  provision  as  a 
fundamental prerequisite for such statutes to pass muster. The American Courts 
are  vigilant  in  respect  of  their  role  as  constitutional  guardians  of  overly  vague 
statutes and this extends to low-level public order statutes. This watchfulness, 
coupled with the doctrine of strict constitution
249 would appear to be an optimal 
way of ensuring certainty within low-level public order.  
 
Having  examined  the  certainty  of  public  order  legislation  within  a  comparative 
context,  the  second  area  of  inquiry  related  to  issues  of  mens  rea.  There  is  a 
degree of commonality as regards the requisite mental element from the three 
common-law jurisdictions. The mens rea requirement of a low-level public order 
offence appears to be at least awareness that their behaviour is likely to impact 
upon  the  public  order.  The  American  position,  under  MPC  §250.1,  imparts  a 
requirement of either purposive or reckless intent whereby conscious risk creation 
is the minimum level of culpability
250. The American courts have held that it is not 
necessary to analyze each element of the offence for intention. Instead all that is 
required is proof of a general awareness that the conduct was liable to cause 
public disorder in some respect
251.  
 
The American position does differ slightly from the operation, in England, of s.5 of 
the 1986 Act. The English prosecutor must show that the defendant intended that, 
or was aware that, his words were “threatening”, “abusive” and “insulting” or his 
conduct  “disorderly”  and  was  also  was  aware  his  conduct  might  cause 
“harassment”,  “alarm”  or  “distress”.  The  Australian  position  in  relation  to  the 
requisite mental state of the defendant is somewhat uncertain.
252 The decision in 
Police v Pfeifer
253, however, indicates that the Australian requirement is closely 
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249 Jeffries (n 55) 189 
250 Samaha (n 52) 427 
251 See Robinson (n 1)  
252 Douglas (n 4) 89 
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aligned to the other two common law systems by requiring an awareness of risk 
creation as the lowest level of culpability. 
 
Within the German Administrative law, the subjektiver tatbestand for §118 OWiG 
is  defined  in  §10  OWiG.  This  provides  that  only  intentional  acts  of  disorderly 
conduct  will  be  punished.  It  has  been  held  that  there  must  be  an  intention  to 
commit the action, but intention is irrelevant in respect of the grossly improper 
nature of the action
254. Accordingly under §118, prosecutors are only required to 
prove the defendant intended to do the act, not intention as to the nature of the 
conduct. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has established concerns regarding the certainty of s.5 of the 1986 
Act  within  the  criminal  law  are  valid  concerns.  Establishing  this  aspect  of  the 
hypothesis upon which the research is based, the nature of the vagueness of s.5 
can  be  truly  appreciated.  By  examining  public  order  statutes  from  alternate 
jurisdictions, it is clear that they all adopt a similar level of mental culpability; at 
least requiring an awareness that the conduct (that the defendant is engaged in) 
may be disorderly. The provisions all have elements of uncertainty as to the scope 
of the conduct, but it is s.5 that provides the most concerning levels of vagueness. 
Under  this  provision,  the  scope  and  effect  of  the  conduct  is  determined  as  a 
matter of fact, at the trial. In addition, the defendant has to introduce a reasonable 
excuse  for  his  conduct,  and  will  similarly  not  have  a  definitive  answer  as  to 
whether this defence is liable to be accepted until after deliberations by the finder 
of fact. The logical corollary of this is that, whilst there is an inevitable degree of 
latitude  afforded  to  police  and  prosecutors  in  respect  of  low-level  public  order 
across all of the relevant fora, the lowest entry point to criminality within England 
and Wales is at best blurred and at worst, dangerously uncertain in comparison to 
the other jurisdictions. 
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Chapter Five: 
 
Public Order and Guaranteed 
Freedom of Speech 
 
Introduction to Chapter Five 
 
The previous chapters have drawn together a picture of the operation of low-level 
public  order  law  within  the  four  jurisdictions  based.  The  areas  of  inquiry  were 
defined by the first three research questions. These research questions provide a 
clear  understanding  into  the  flawed  nature  of  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  with  the 
overarching  aim  of  using  these  findings  to  propose  solutions,  either  within  the 
context of reforming the criminal law surrounding low-level disorder or shifting the 
focus to a more managed approach to public order, limiting the broad discretion 
afforded  to  police  and  prosecutors.  The  discussion  will  now  assess  disorderly 
conduct within the context of protest and dissent. It is suggested that the scope of 
s.5  cannot  properly  be  appreciated  until  the  interaction  between  managing 
disorder  and  suppressing  free  speech  is  properly  explored.  This  will  in  turn 
provide a clearer picture of the full spectrum of activity covered by low-level public 
order  legislation,  providing  further  research  in  answer  to  the  second  research 
question. 
Scope of Free Speech Analysis 
 
Accordingly, this analysis will tighten the focus upon those occasions when the 
actions of a vehement protestor may fall within the ambit of low-level offences and 
the  subsequent  response  of  the  courts  within  the  respective  jurisdictions. 
Fundamental to such an inquiry is the way in which low-level public order offences 
can  be  used  to  suppress,  or  at  least  restrict,  an  individual’s  right  to  protest. 
Turenne states that: 	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“The right to freedom of expression is typically asserted when a person is charged 
with a public order offence concerning the manner of a protest and his behaviour 
during a demonstration.” 
1  
 
This statement was made in connection with English public order law, but it is 
contended  that  this  statement  can  be  examined  in  the  context  of  each  of  the 
jurisdictions  under  consideration.  The  role  of  the  courts  in  protecting  political 
protest from being suppressed by disorderly conduct statutes cannot be ignored 
in any analysis of low-level public order
2.  
 
The position of the Australian High Court is of particular significance as it is the 
only jurisdiction under consideration where there is no constitutional guarantee of 
free speech. The traditional position adopted by the Australian Courts has been to 
narrow the scope of the freedom of political speech, especially where the protest 
may give rise to the potential for disorder. One case, however, that of Coleman v 
Power
3, provides insight as to the current relationship between public order law 
and freedom of expression and how the traditional orthodoxy might be shifting
4.  
 
Research  into  the  operation  of  s.5  of  the  Public  Order  Act  1986was  initially 
conducted in the 1990’s and indicated that disorderly conduct provisions were not 
widely deployed as a means to police protest
5. The constitutional position within 
the English legal system has changed since the time of this research with the 
enactment  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  giving  further  effect  to  the  rights 
articulated in the ECHR. It has been asserted that, since the enactment of the 
1998 Act, the courts in the legal system of England and Wales are showing an 
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2 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2
nd Edn, OUP 2008) Chapter 8 
3 Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39, (2004) 220 CLR 1 
4 See John Uhr, “The Performance of Australian Legislatures in Protecting Rights’ 41-61 in 
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increasing willingness to give strong protection to a protestor engaging in political 
speech
6.  
 
A  protestor,  prosecuted  under  s.5  of  the  1986  Act,  would  seek  to  utilize  the 
defence  under  s.5(3)(c)  of  the  1986  Act  claiming  that  his  conduct  was 
reasonable
7. Mead explains that: 
 
“The specific reasonable conduct defence under both s.4A and s.5 ought to mean 
greater  protection  for  peaceful  protest.  Surely  it  must  always  be  ‘reasonable’ 
conduct peacefully to exercise a Convention right?”  
8 
 
The essence of this defence, as expressed by Mead, is that for the Courts to 
criminalize the prohibited conduct would violate the defendant’s rights in respect 
of statutorily guaranteed rights to free expression
9. This defence is given extra 
potency when considered alongside the interpretive duty of the English Courts 
under s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998
10.  
 
The impact of the Human Rights Act poses a particular challenge for the policing 
of  such  protest.  Whilst  not  straying  into  an  analysis  of  particular  methods  of 
policing, there is a need to explore the legal dimension of this dynamic with police 
officers being imbued with the same legislative guardianship role on Convention 
rights  as  the  judiciary
11.  They  are  required  to  make  decisions  regarding  free 
expression and liberty within society, but at the same time expected to remain 
mindful of their duties to keep the peace and protect the safety of themselves and 
members  of  the  public.  This  is  particularly  apposite  when  considering  the 
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7 For details of the broader operation of this defence see the previous Chapter, specifically pp 130-
133 
8 David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest (Hart 2010) 223 
9 See p 13-14 for further details of the UK commitments under the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
10 Human Rights Act, s 3 provides that primary and secondary legislation must, so far as is 
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concerns around the certainty of the legislation that has been identified as being 
central to the research hypothesis
12. 
 
An examination of the protection afforded by the courts to political debate will 
benefit  from  having  the  perspective  of  the  different  jurisdictions  and  their 
contrasting  approaches  to  protecting  such  speech.  One  leading  commentator 
asserts that the courts in the United States give particularly strong protection to 
political speech
13 by virtue of the First Amendment. A “conceptual cornerstone” of 
the U.S. Constitution
14, it provides that any legislation that interferes with freedom 
of  speech  can  be  struck  down  by  the  courts.  The  US  perspective,  therefore, 
provides perhaps the clearest and most direct restriction upon low-level public 
order legislation.  
 
Nowhere is the contrast in approaches more apparent than when examining the 
German legal system approach to regulating protest. It is at this point that the first 
divergence in approach within the jurisdictions can be identified. German Basic 
Law, Article 5 and 8 GG, regulates all aspects of protest. The statute by which this 
is accomplished is the Versammlungsgesetz
15, (VslgG).  This regulation, under 
the VslgG, is all encompassing, providing a wide range of pro-active provisions 
and  reactive  offences.  The  case  law  from  Australia  suggests  a  tendency  to 
employ obstruction offences and disorderly conduct only as a last resort, relying 
instead  on  discretion  of  the  police
16.  Meanwhile,  the  US  solution  is  to  utilize 
disorderly conduct provisions whilst the “victims” of extreme protest seek redress 
through the civil courts
17. The English approach is manifested through the Public 
Order Act 1986 with the statute providing for the regulation of individual behaviour 
alongside pro-active regulation for protest.  
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The regulatory structures governing protests provide a key framework in which 
low-level public order legislation operates and will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. This chapter will initially deal with those occasions where disorderly 
conduct and protest interweave outside such regulatory frameworks, starting with 
the Australian perspective.  
Implied Rights v Uncertain Statutes: Lessons from 
Australia 
 
Of all of the jurisdictions under consideration, Australia has the least distinctive 
body  of  law  relating  to  freedom  of  expression  and  the  protection  offered  to 
protestors charged with a public order offence
18. Australia has no bespoke Bill of 
Rights and commentators have lamented that “the general absence of a Bill of 
Rights  might  make  Australia  outstanding  but  not  necessarily  admirable”
19.  The 
absence  of  constitutionally  guaranteed  rights  means  that  there  is  no  explicit 
protection  afforded  to  freedom  of  speech  within  the  main  instrument  of 
government
20. This becomes crucial when one considers that most offences with 
which  protestors  are  charged  are  low-level  public  order  offences  defined  by 
elements that have little to do with the collective context within which the offence 
was committed
21. 
 
Commentators have suggested that the primary effect of enacting a Bill of Rights 
within  Australia  would  be  to  shift  institutional  responsibility  for  making  rights 
claims from legislatures to courts
22. In the last decade of the Twentieth Century, 
however, the case law would suggest exactly the opposite; that rights protection 
has  come  almost  exclusively  from  the  higher  courts.  The  case  of  Australian 
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21 Douglas (n 18) 30 
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Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth
23 saw the High Court imply a 
freedom of political communication from the terms of the Constitution. It has been 
stated  “this  is  a  limited  kind  of  free  speech  right,  which  exists  to  protect  only 
certain kinds of political speech”
24.  
 
The  essence  of  this  key  constitutional  concept  is  that  the  courts  look  at  the 
constitution  as  establishing  a  system  of  representative  and  accountable 
government  within  the  framework  of  a  parliamentary  democracy.  In  order  to 
facilitate representative government, the courts have ruled
25 this implicitly means 
that the legislature should not pass any law that interferes with the operation of 
the democratic system. It has been noted
26 that in the early 1990s, there were a 
number of decisions that expanded this implied protection afforded by the courts 
to speech, particularly the decision in Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times 
Ltd
27,  which  struck  down  important  federal  legislation  that  appeared  to  limit 
speech
28. 
 
The “expansive” approach to protecting speech was somewhat reigned in by the 
High  Court  by  virtue  of  the  decision  in  Lange  v  Australian  Broadcasting 
Corporation
29. In Lange, the court laid down a test by which stated that where a 
law ‘effectively burden(s) freedom of communication about government or political 
matters’,  the  law  must  be  ‘reasonably  appropriate  and  adapted  to  serve  a 
legitimate end’
30. This was developed into a two-stage test in Levy v Victoria
31, 
which looked at the nature of the restriction that the law was imposing upon the 
protestor.  The  first  question  asked  is  whether  that  restraint  had  effectively 
burdened freedom of communication in respect of government or political matters 
either in terms, operation or effect. If that is the case, then the court goes on to 
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25 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 
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27 (1994) 182 CLR 104 
28 Stone (n 24) 392 
29 (1997) 189 CLR 520 
30 ibid at 567 quoted in Stone (n 20) at fn 67 
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ask whether it was reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end, 
the fulfillment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative government
32.  
Coleman v Power: A Reluctant Paradigm Shift? 
 
The decisions in both Lange and Levy saw the court emphasizing the limits of the 
implied  protection  of  speech  with  reference  to  the  ‘text  and  structure’  of  the 
constitution
33. It was the decision of the High Court in the case of Coleman v 
Power
34 that provides an examination of the (still) current approach to freedom of 
speech and public order concerns taken by the Australian Courts
35. It also affords 
some insight as to the difficulties faced by the other common law jurisdictions 
under consideration in balancing the right to protest, the form of that protest and 
the extent to which low-level public order can, or should, be used to restrict any 
form of protest. 
 
As  previously  mentioned
36 ,  Coleman  v  Power  occurred  in  the  state  of 
Queensland. The regulation of disorderly conduct, at the time of commissioning 
the offence, was dealt with by s.7 of the Vagrants Gaming and Other Offences Act 
1931 (Q) which, so far as is relevant here, provides that: 
 
“7(1)  Any person who in any public place or so near to any public place that any 
person who might be therein, and whether any person is therein or not, 
could view or hear… 
 
(d) uses any threatening, abusive or insulting words to any person 
 
Shall  be  liable  to  a  penalty  of  $100  or  to  imprisonment  for  up  to  six 
months.” 
37 
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33 Stone (n 19) 678 
34 Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39, (2004) 220 C.L.R. 1 
35 There is considerable discussion of this case and its progenitor in the Court of Appeal, see Elisa 
Arconi, “Politics, Police and Proportionality - An opportunity to explore the Lange Test: Coleman v 
Power” (2003) 25 Sydney LR 379; See also Stone, A., (n 19) from 668 
36 See p 46 
37 This legislation has now been repealed and has been replaced by s 6 of the Summary Offences 
Act 2005 see p 47 	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Clearly within such a law, there is significant latitude already given to the judiciary 
as to how to interpret such terms as threatening, abusive or insulting. In terms of 
what behaviour may constitute insulting, citing the case of Thurley v Hayes
38, May 
J stated in his judgment that: 
 
"'Insulting'  is  a  very  large  term,  and  in  a  statement  of  this  kind  is  generally 
understood to be a word not cramped within narrow limits." 
39 
 
The power of arrest for this offence is conferred by means of s.35 of the Police 
Powers  and  Responsibilities  Act  1997  (Q)  which  so  far  as  is  relevant  here, 
provides that: 
 
“35(1)   It  is  lawful  for  a  police  officer,  without  warrant,  to  arrest  a  person  the 
police  officer  reasonably  suspects  has  committed  or  is  committing  an 
offence if it is necessary for one or more of the following reasons -  
 
to prevent the continuation or repetition of an offence or the commission of 
another offence.” 
 
The parallels with the English statutory provision under s.5 are clear. The offence 
is  a  low-level  public  order  offence
40,  the  requirement  is  for  behaviour  that 
corresponds with any of those conditions and as such mimics s.5 of the 1986 Act 
in England
41. From the date of the Act, it is possible to surmise that the draftsmen 
did not have notions of free speech uppermost in their thoughts when writing this 
piece of legislation. The prohibited conduct, specifically the use of threatening, 
abusive or insulting words, means that this is precisely the kind of dilemmatic 
choice facing the English courts.  
 
The  facts  of  Coleman  v  Power  provide  a  model  case  study  of  the  approach 
adopted  by  the  Australian  High  Court  to  a  minor  public  order  infraction  being 
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39 ibid [550] (per May J) 
40 S 7 (1) of the 1931 Act was a summary only offence 
41 cf Public Order Act 1986, s 5(1) p 31 	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rebuffed by an individual claiming protected speech. In this case the appellant 
was handing out pamphlets in Townsville, Queensland, which had the heading 
“Get to know your local corrupt type cops”. The pamphlet went on to name the 
respondent, a serving police officer as being corrupt declaring, “I got witnesses so 
kiss my arse you slimy lying bastards”. Immediately behind where the appellant 
was standing was a placard that stated, “Get to know your local corrupt type cops 
- please take one”
42. The respondent, named within the pamphlet, approached the 
appellant  and  following  a  brief  confrontation,  the  appellant  was  arrested  and 
charged, inter alia, with committing the above mentioned public order offences 
under legislation enacted by the Queensland Parliament in 1931 of using insulting 
words and distributing material containing insulting words
43.  
 
Following conviction, an appeal was lodged on the grounds that the legislation 
under  which  the  appellant  had  been  charged  and  convicted  had  infringed  the 
appellant’s  implied  constitutional  right  to  freedom  of  political  communication
44. 
The appellant contested that not only did this render his conviction void, but the 
law  under  which  he  had  been  arrested  would  also  have  to  be  considered  as 
inoperable and invalid. Had the Court accepted this, the arrest and detention by 
the police would have been unlawful as well.  
 
The seven judges in the High Court of Australia upheld the appeal by the margin 
of four to three
45. Of greater significance is that of the four who found for the 
appellant, it was only McHugh J who discussed the issue from the standpoint of 
invalidating the law due to incompatibility with the Lange test
46. McHugh J argued 
that the law was invalid because it was “not reasonably appropriate and adapted 
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43 In addition to the offence under s7, the appellant was also accused of inter alia an offence under 
s7A(1)(c) of the Vagrants Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Q) Any person: (a) who by words 
capable of being read either by sight or touch prints any threatening, abusive, or insulting words of 
or concerning any person by which the reputation of that person is likely to be injured, or by which 
the person is likely to be injured in the person’s profession or trade, or by which other persons are 
likely to be induced to shun, or avoid, or ridicule, or despise the person; or ... (c) who delivers or 
distributes in any manner whatsoever printed matter containing any such words 
44 As laid down in the Lange test above p 153-155 
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Heydon JJ dissenting). 
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for preventing breaches of the peace”
47. The other three majority judges disposed 
of the case by interpreting s.7(1)(d) of the 1931 Act as not being applicable due to 
the  training  and  temperament  of  police  officers  which  means  they  must  be 
expected to resist the sting of insults directed to them
48. In his lengthy judgment, 
McHugh J initially emphasized the difficulties facing the judiciary when trying to 
decide at what point free expression needs to be limited. He stated: 
 
“Under the Constitution, a law that, without qualification, makes it an offence to 
utter insulting words in or near a public place cannot validly apply to insulting 
words that are uttered in the course of making statements concerning political or 
governmental matters. A law that seeks to make lawful the arrest of a person on 
such  a  charge  is  as  offensive  to  the  Constitution  as  the  law  that  makes  it  an 
offence to utter insulting words in the course of making statements concerning 
political or governmental matters.” 
49 
 
He  then  went  on  to  discuss  how,  in  his  opinion,  these  issues  could  be 
satisfactorily resolved: 
 
“(That)  freedom  of  communication  always  trumps  federal,  State  and  Territorial 
powers when they conflict with the freedom.” 
50 
 
McHugh J is alone amongst his fellow judges in seeking to position the High Court 
in Australia to take a more proactive and interventionist view in respect of low-
level  public  order  laws  that  unduly  impinge  on  the  right  to  protest.  Such 
conclusions  are  the  logical  corollary  of  the  assertions  made  by  McHugh  J, 
although more litigation is needed to establish whether this is a distinct trend or an 
aberrant  decision.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  Australian  courts  do  not  have  the 
guardianship  role  of  Convention  rights  imposed  on  the  English  courts  by  the 
Human  Rights  Act  1998
51,  the  Lange  test  is  illustrative  of  the  guardianship 
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48  See  Blacksheild,  T  and  Williams  G.,  (2005)  Australian  Constitutional  Law  and  Theory 
Commentary and Materials 4th edition Sydney: Federation Press 
49 Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39, (2004) 220 CLR 1, 36 (per McHugh J) 
50 ibid at 91 (per McHugh J) 
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function having been adopted developmentally (by virtue of the case law) rather 
than a specific legislative or constitutional intent
52.  
 
There has been no significant case law on this matter in the post-Coleman legal 
landscape. The decisions of the other three majority judges provide little by way of 
a general comment on free expression. The judgments of Gummow, Hayne and 
Kirby  JJ  held  that  the  material  section  of  the  Vagrancy  Act  to  be  valid,  whilst 
concurring  with  McHugh  J  that  it  infringed  the  second  limb  of  the  Lange  test. 
Instead of invalidating the Act, they read down the legislation so it did not offend 
against the Lange Test. It is therefore not known as to whether future judgments 
will reflect the primacy of freedom of expression as espoused by McHugh J or 
whether pragmatism will reassert itself, much as it did in the judgments of his 
colleagues in this case.  
The English Position in respect of Public Order & Protest   
 
If  the  Australian  development  of  protestors’  rights  emerged  gradually  through 
case  law,  the  legal  system  of  England  and  Wales  has  been  jolted  into  action 
through legislative means. From the start of the new millennium, the English legal 
system gave further effect to the rights enunciated in the ECHR
53 by means of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The operative rights from the purpose of this inquiry are 
the Article 10 right of freedom of expression and the Article 11 right of freedom of 
association
54.  The  impact  of  this  relatively  recent  development  needs  to  be 
considered when examining the operation of the defence of reasonable excuse 
under s.5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act. Thornton
55 states that the incorporation of the 
positive right to free expression has been described as a “constitutional shift in 
English  law”
56.  With  the  previously  dominant  common  law  provisions  that  had 
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legislative intent of the state parliament see Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39 (2004) 220 C.L.R. 1, 
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53 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) 
(Cmd 8969) as scheduled by Human Rights Act 1998 
54 For the conception, gestation and birth of the Human Rights Act 1998 see John Wadham, et al, 
Blackstone’s Guide to The Human Rights Act (5
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55 Peter Thornton et al, The Law of Public Order and Protest (OUP 2010) 398 
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developed being described as “hesitant and negative”
57 the focus of analysis will 
be upon the post HRA legal landscape. Reference will be made to the English 
common  law  position  only  where  it  has  direct  relevance  to  the  current  legal 
framework governing low-level public order
58. 
 
 
Clearly, the defence of reasonable excuse has significant ramifications for those 
individuals  who  seek  (rightly  or  wrongly)  to  challenge  the  prevailing  orthodoxy 
within  society  and  the  case  law  demonstrates  that  determining  whether  the 
conduct was reasonable or not tends to engage Article 10. Article 10 of the ECHR 
states inter alia that: 
  
1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to  hold  opinions  and  to  receive  and  impart  information  and  ideas  without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers…
59 
  
2.  The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may  be  subject  to  such  formalities,  conditions,  restrictions  or  penalties  as  are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others…
60 
 
 
When discussing the human rights framework, this thesis will generally deal with 
Article  10  considerations.  Article  11  is,  nevertheless,  equally  significant  in  the 
context of protection of protest. Article 11 of the ECHR provides inter alia that: 
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to the freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.” 
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58 The common law does have a critical role to play in respect of dealing with low-level public order 
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Article 11(2) provides the qualifications that operate in much the same way as 
those found in Article 10(2). Article 11(2) does provide an explicit statement that 
the armed forces and the police can be lawfully excluded from such rights. It has 
been  stated  that  Article  11  is  the  “lex  specialis”  with  Article  10  as  the  “lex 
generalis”
61. Thornton makes the point that both articles are inherently connected 
and the ECtHR tends to read Articles 10 and 11 together. It is this approach that 
will be adopted throughout the following analysis
62.  
 
The Judicial Balancing of Protest and Public Order 
 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  terms  of  the  above  Articles  of  the  Convention,  the 
existence  of  the  defence  of  reasonable  excuse  under  s.5(3)(c)  has  clear 
ramifications  for  protesters  within  England.  Barendt  has  stated  that  the  broad 
scope of s.5 of the 1986 Act has serious implications for freedom of speech and it 
is now necessary for the courts to read s.5 and especially s.5(3)(c) in the context 
of Article 10
63. 
 
 
 
This discussion will turn to the case law to try and build a picture of how the courts 
have  managed  finding  the  balance  between  respecting  the  individual  right  to 
protest and maintaining public order. Hammond v DPP
64, presented the court with 
a fundamental and dilemmatic choice. The above-mentioned right to freedom of 
expression, which all of the jurisdictions acknowledge is integral to a free and 
democratic  society
65,  was  in  collision  with  the  extent  to  which  one  section  of 
society  can  be  allowed  to  express  those  views  that  will  insult  other  minority 
groups. This concern is amplified when such views lead to violence from those 
who may be listening to or watching the protest.  
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61 Ezelin v France (1991) 14 EHRR 362 para 35; in Thornton (n 54 above) 401 
62 Thornton (n 55 above) 401 
63 Barendt (n 2) 300 
64 Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin) 
65 Numerous judgments of the ECtHR seek to re-emphasise the importance of Art 10 and 11 
specifically Ziliberberg v Moldova App. 61821/00 May 2004 	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The Hostile Audience 
 
The problem of the so-called “hostile audience” or “heckler’s veto”
66 is one that 
raises acute difficulties when considering the balancing act. In such a case, the 
exercise  of  free  speech  causes  the  listener  to  become  agitated  and  possibly 
violent. Such a problem is not unique to the English jurisdiction and is particularly 
relevant as, in a public order arena, such an audience is as likely to be committing 
a public order offence as the speaker. The solution of the US Supreme Court, as 
shown in Forsyth County v Nationalist Movement
67, was to hold that to base a 
statutory restriction upon the reaction of a listener to the speech is not content 
neutral  and  any  measures  to  abridge  speech,  however  unpopular  it  might  be, 
would be unconstitutional.  
 
The Australian High Court
68, in Forbutt v Blake
69, held that if a potential breach of 
the peace were likely to result from the exercise of a lawful right, the remedy is: 
 
“the presence of sufficient force to prevent that result not the legal condemnation 
of those who exercised those rights.” 
70 
 
The English position is characterized by what Mead refers to as, “an unfortunate 
lack of consistency”
71. The approach of the court in respect of situations where 
the audience seeks to use violence against an inherently peaceful protest can first 
be found in Beatty v Gilbanks
72, and this states that it is the duty of the police to 
deal with those using violence rather than persons exercising their lawful right to 
protest
73.  
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67 505 US 123, 134 (1992) 
68 Based on the reasoning in R v Justices of Londonderry (1891) 28 LR Ir 440 which was, in turn 
an extension of the reasoning in Beatty v Gilbanks [1882] 9 QBD 308, (1882) 15 Cox CC 138 
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This orthodoxy held sway for nearly fifty years but was a marked contrast to the 
decision of the Divisional Court in the later case of Duncan v Jones
74. Despite 
being decided on slightly different facts
75, Jones held that a protestor could be 
convicted for doing a lawful act (i.e. protesting) if they know that doing that act 
may cause another to do an unlawful act. Mead states that the majority of cases 
since then have followed the Jones line of reasoning.
76. There is a concern that 
the definitive legal position has not been sufficiently clearly set out so as to make 
an outcome predictable to any potential protestor. The following critique of two 
significant protest cases in the post-Human Rights Act era is illustrative of the 
ambivalent position held by the courts in relation to protecting unpopular speech. 
Hammond: Relating Low-Level Disorder and Protest 
 
In Hammond, the protestor was a lay preacher, who, in order to emphasize the 
impact  of  his  preaching,  had  a  large,  double  sided  sign  with  the  words  “Stop 
Immorality”, “Stop Homosexuality”, and “Stop Lesbianism”
77, on each side. As he 
was preaching, a crowd of thirty to forty people gathered around the appellant and 
began shouting and arguing with him, clearly agitated both by the sign and by his 
preaching. At one point, someone tried to pull the sign from him and the appellant 
fell to the ground. In spite of this, he continued with his preaching whereupon a 
member of the public poured a glass of water over him. 
 
Police officers attended the scene and asked the appellant to take down his sign, 
but  the  appellant  refused.  Whilst  the  police  were  deciding  on  an  appropriate 
course of action, several members of the public approached them. These people 
expressed outrage that the appellant had not been arrested
78. The police officers 
decided that Hammond was provoking violence and he was arrested to prevent a 
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breach of the peace
79. He was subsequently charged with an offence contrary to 
s.5 of the 1986 Act.  
 
At trial, the justices decided that the words displayed on the appellant’s sign were, 
in fact, insulting and that they had caused distress to those present, indeed a 
number of people had given their names to police. It was held that the appellant 
was aware of the distress his sign was causing. The defendant maintained that 
his actions were reasonable under s.5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act, by virtue of his right 
to freedom of expression under the ECHR
80. The justices stated that since he had 
refused to stop displaying the sign when it was clearly causing such offence, the 
appellant’s behaviour was not reasonable and as such did not bring him within the 
defence laid down in s.5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act.  
 
It is, perhaps, illustrative of the thinking of the lower courts on this matter that 
rather than follow the common law position in Beatty v Gilbanks, the justices felt 
that there was a pressing social need to restrict the appellant’s right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 in order to promote tolerance towards all sections of 
society.  Additionally,  the  restriction  of  the  appellant’s  right  to  freedom  of 
expression  was  deemed  to  be  legitimate  when  balanced  against  the  threat  of 
disorder from the crowd of people reacting to the sign
81. 
 
The matter was appealed by way of case stated to the Divisional Court. May L.J. 
accepted that it was open to the magistrates to find the words and signs used by 
the appellant as falling within s.5(1)(b) of the 1986 Act. In relation to the question 
of reasonableness, in light of Article 9 and 10 of the ECHR, the court held that the 
magistrates had sufficiently considered the questions that they were obliged to in 
reaching the conclusion that the appellant’s conduct was not reasonable
82. It was 
stated  that  Convention  rights  had  to  be  brought  into  play  and  if  freedom  of 
expression was to be curtailed, this had to be done in a way that was compatible 
with  Convention  rights.  The  appellant,  upon  whom  the  burden  lay,  had  to 
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establish that his actions were reasonable and thus he could come under the 
terms of s.5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act. The Court concluded that the magistrates had 
given due consideration to the Convention rights of the appellant and that they 
reached a conclusion that the appellant’s conduct was not reasonable. Of greater 
significance,  and  arguably  the  key  finding  from  the  case  of  Hammond,  is  the 
following: 
 
“…the Human Rights Convention generally, does not, as such, provide a defence 
to the information but… that human rights considerations have to be brought into 
play in an appropriate way when the offence created by this section is looked at 
and when the facts as found by the justices are applied to it.” 
83 
 
It  is  settled  case  law  that  Convention  rights  cannot  operate  as  an  absolute 
defence to a charge under s.5 of the 1986 Act. This does highlight one of the 
fundamental problems with the broadness of the offence of disorderly conduct 
within  the  English  legal  system.  Specifically,  when  faced  with  a  protest  that 
arouses strong feelings, the practical effect of the judgment in Hammond is that 
the protestor is left with no effective way of communicating his beliefs. There is a 
potential risk of a chilling effect on speech such as this
84. More than that, it is 
submitted that such a decision leads to a lack of clarity as to when a protestor 
might be arrested and convicted. At each stage of the prosecutorial process, the 
protestor is subject to a discretionary judgment by the police, Crown Prosecutors 
and finally the finders of fact as to whether their conduct was reasonable.  
 
A  similar  dilemma  to  that  of  Hammond  was  explored  in  the  earlier  case  of 
Norwood v DPP
85. Norwood was convicted under s.31 of the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998 for the racially aggravated version of the offence under s.5 of the 1986 
Act
86. The appellant had displayed a poster, containing words in very large print 
“Islam out of Britain” and “Protect the British people”
87. There was also displayed 
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a  reproduction  of  a  photograph  of  one  of  the  twin  towers  of  the  World  Trade 
Centre  in  flames  and  a  Crescent  and  Star  surrounded  by  a  prohibition  sign. 
Norwood was a member of the British National Party and he contended that his 
actions were reasonable and as such protected by s.5(3)(c) of the 1986 Act. Auld 
LJ held in Norwood that:  
 
“in  effect  that  the  appellant’s  conduct  was  unreasonable,  having  regard  to  the 
clear legitimate aim, of which the section (section 5 Public Order Act 1986) was 
itself a necessary vehicle, to protect the rights of others and/or to prevent crime 
and disorder.” 
88 
 
A case that is the mirror image of Norwood is the very recent decision of Abdul v 
DPP
89.  The  defendant  was  part  of  a  group  of  protesters  who  had  attended  a 
parade to celebrate the homecoming of British service personnel. As part of their 
protest, they brandished placards, chanted slogans such as "British soldiers burn 
in hell", and had called the soldiers “murderers, rapists and baby-killers”
90. They 
had, in turn, been threatened and abused by members of the public. The protest 
had  been  planned  in  conjunction  with  the  local  police  and  on  the  day  the 
protestors had complied with police directions throughout. Furthermore, they had 
not been warned about their behaviour, nor been asked to desist. The protestors 
were not arrested at the time of the protest. Instead the decision to prosecute was 
not taken until months later – following the viewing of hours of video footage and 
in consultation with the Complex Trial Unit of the CPS. 
 
The court held that the words and behaviour of the protestors in Abdul crossed 
the threshold of legitimate protest. It was held that the agreement of the police in 
facilitating the protest and the conduct of the police on the day of the protests 
amounted to neither an unequivocal acceptance that the defendants would not be 
prosecuted nor an acceptance that they had been behaving lawfully. The threat of 
violence, missing from Norwood and plainly present in Hammond, emphasizes 
that  the  central  concern  of  the  courts  in  such  cases  is  focused  around  the 
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prevention of public disorder rather than enabling protestors
91. Hammond might 
have wished for the court to apply the common law rule in Beatty v Gilbanks, but it 
was the Duncan v Jones orthodoxy that prevailed. As Barendt points out, where 
the  speeches  or  general  behaviour  are  designed  to  provoke  violence  from 
opponents  then  prosecution  and  conviction  becomes  likely
92 even  where  the 
protest has initially peaceful aims
93.  
 
The decision in Abdul would have been consonant with this if the arrest had not 
been some months after the protest had occurred. That the court found the words 
used by the defendants in Abdul abusive or insulting is not surprising. Similarly, it 
is  entirely  foreseeable  that  the  conduct  was  within  the  sight  and  hearing  of 
someone who may be caused harassment, alarm or distress. The defendants had 
a point that they felt was legitimate. At trial, one of the defendants stated that his 
intention had been to raise awareness so that politicians should be questioned 
about  their  decisions
94.  Even  if  they  had  chosen  to  carry  their  message  on 
placards instead of shouting, the evidence given at trial by the police indicated 
that they would have relied on placards that the defendants were carrying
95. After 
fully  co-operating  with  the  police  and  responding  to  all  instructions  given  it  is 
difficult to see how else the defendants in Abdul could have made their protest
96. 
 
A more successful application of the defence of reasonableness can be found in 
the altogether different case of Dehal v DPP
97. The facts provide an illuminating 
analogue to those in Hammond and Norwood and further illustrate the difficulty in 
trying to predict how the English courts will manage the conflicting rights. In this 
case, the defendant, a practicing Sikh, placed a notice on a notice board within 
the temple, which he attended. The notice, inter alia, described the President of 
the Temple as a “Hypocrite President”, “a liar” and a “proud, mad dog”
98. It was 
found in the trial before Luton Magistrates, and the subsequent appeal to Luton 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
91 Thornton (n 55) 410 
92 Barendt (n 2) 303 
93 Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218 
94 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247, para 21 
95 ibid [para 20] 
96 This case will be further explored alongside the US counterpart of Snyder v Phelps 562 US 
_(2011) in Chapter Seven 
97 Dehal v DPP [2005] EWHC 2154 (Admin) 
98 ibid [para 3] (per Moses LJ) 	 ﾠ 168	 ﾠ
Crown Court, that the contents of the notice were abusive and insulting and that 
the President of the Temple had been harassed and distressed by the notice. 
Accordingly Dehal was convicted of the offence under s.4A of the Public Order 
Act 1986
99.  
 
On appeal by way of case stated, the appellant asserted that his actions were 
reasonable in so far as he believed that the contents of his poster were correct. 
Moreover, the defendant had a right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of 
the ECHR and the conviction contravened this right. The court found that there 
was no evidence of a threat to public order despite the fact that the appellant 
clearly  knew  and  intended  the  notice  to  be  offensive.  Moses  J,  stated  in 
paragraph 12 of his judgment: 
   
“However  insulting,  however  unjustified  what  the  appellant  said  about  the 
President of the Temple a criminal prosecution was unlawful as a result of section 
3 of the Human Rights Act and Article 10 unless and until it could be established 
that such a prosecution was necessary to prevent public disorder. There is no 
such finding or any justification whatever given in the case stated.”
100 
 
It would appear in this case that Moses J was using a two-stage test to protect the 
appellant’s  right  to  freedom  of  expression
101.  The  prosecution  was  required  to 
show that the prosecution was being brought with the legitimate aim of protecting 
society from violence. The prosecution then was required to demonstrate that a 
criminal  prosecution  is  the  only  method  necessary  to  achieve  that  aim
102. 
Essentially, the insulting nature of the notice was balanced against the threat to 
public order both prior to and at the time of the offence. Such a test, if universally 
applied, would undoubtedly add some certainty to such cases:  
 
“It is neither desirable nor possible to provide any universal test for that which 
goes beyond being a matter of legitimate protest, save to stress the importance of 
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providing  a  justification  for  invoking  the  criminal  law,  namely  where  there  is  a 
threat to public order.”
103 
 
The reasoning of Moses J echoes the test imposed in R v Howell
104 for dealing 
with  breach  of  the  peace.  This  emerges  as  a  potential  area  for  reform  and 
revivification of the law relating to disorder within England and Wales and will be 
discussed in detail in conjunction with group protest and low-level public order, in 
Chapter Seven
105. 
Policing, Public Order and Protests in England 
 
An  additional,  and  as  yet  largely  unexplored,  area  of  potential  inconsistency 
concerns  the  actions  of  police  officers  who  may  be  called  to  deal  with  such 
situations as outlined above. It may be possible to argue that the initial arrest of 
the appellant is potentially unlawful and offends against Article 10 of the ECHR.  
 
S.6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 so far as it is relevant states that: 
 
“It is unlawful for any public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
convention right.” 
 
The Act then goes on to define a public authority as including any person whose 
functions are of a public nature
106. In this case it is possible to argue that the 
arresting  officer  is  covered  by  the  ambit  of  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998. 
Accordingly in arresting the appellant, the police may have acted in a way that 
was incompatible with the appellant’s Article 10 ECHR Rights. This is yet another 
level of guardianship explicitly provided for in the Human Rights Act. Clearly it 
would be a courageous police officer that ignored the legitimate complaint of a 
minority  group
107 ,  citing  freedom  of  expression  and  her  or  his  role  as  a 
Convention guardian.
108.  
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In seeking an optimal pathway as regards the issue of low-level public order and 
protest, there is a temptation to merely advocate the passing of a whole raft of 
legislation  to  protect  the  interests  of  minority  groups.  This  is  also  fraught  with 
difficulties. The most obvious difficulty is the theoretical event horizon posed by 
the Human Rights Act 1998.  S.19 of the 1998 Act requires that all legislation 
conform to convention rights. As part of the consultation process into the religious 
hatred provisions to be included within the Serious Organized Crime and Police 
Act 2005, the House of Lords report highlights the balancing act upon which they 
were engaged: 
 
“it is more difficult to define the point at which a particular expression takes on 
characteristics that can reasonably be proscribed in the spirit of Article 10.2 of the 
European Convention. Trenchant and even hostile criticism of religious tenets and 
beliefs has to be accepted as part of the currency of a democratic society, and 
that is not at issue.”
109 
 
In addition to this, Card has pointed out that the ECtHR has noted that protection 
of free speech under Article 10 of the Convention extends to ideas which “offend 
shock and disturb,” a statement supported at least notionally by the judgments in 
Redmond-Bate
110 and latterly Dehal
111. In the light of this, there seems to be little 
mileage in merely calling for more proscription of speech to address the problem. 
What is clear, is that even when one introduces a rights based discourse, the 
courts still have to make a case by case decision on whether the protest falls 
within the terms of low-level public order legislation or whether it is a legitimate 
protest.  The  defence  of  reasonable  excuse  would  appear  to  offer  little  more 
protection and certainty than those jurisdictions that have no bespoke defence 
and instead rely on the accused claiming the protest was outside the scope of the 
actus reus of the offence
112. 
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USA: Tolerating Legislation and Protecting Speech 
 
Unlike the constitution of England and Australia, the US operates with a supreme 
constitution. As an overture to the discussion on the way in which the various US 
States  have  balanced  low-level  public  order  and  freedom  of  speech,  it  is 
necessary  to  discuss  the  way  in  which  the  constitutionally  guaranteed  right  to 
freedom of speech operates within that jurisdiction. The right to free speech is 
seen  as  a  central  tenet  of  the  constitutional  process  by  virtue  of  the  First 
Amendment, which states: 
 
“Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press;  or  the  right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble,  and  to  petition  the 
Government for a redress of grievances.” 
113 
 
It has been noted that; “rarely has such an apparently simple legal text produced 
so many problems of interpretation”
114. When discussing conflicts between free 
speech and the requirements of low-level public order the role of the higher courts 
becomes  crucial
115.  The  history  of  these  higher  courts  is  rich  indeed  and  too 
voluminous  to  be  considered  at  any  great  length  within  this  discussion
116.  In 
general,  the  dominant  approach  adopted  by  the  Supreme  Court  can  be 
categorized as requiring the delineation of certain categories of speech that are 
deemed to be protected according to the subject matter. In addition to content 
regulation, there are additional matrices that require examination of the physical 
location; where the speech actually occurs and the kind of regulation that is at 
issue.  Within  the  protected  categories  of  speech  there  is  also  a  hierarchy  of 
speech, whereby the content of the speech is graded according to its perceived 
desirability
117.  
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113 There is a symbiotic relationship between the First Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which inter alia requires States to acknowledge the rights articulated in the Bill of 
Rights in respect of all individuals within that State. This is known as the “Incorporation Doctrine”. 
114 Barendt (n 2) 48  
115 R Delgado, “Towards a legal realist view of the First Amendment” (2000) 113 Harv LR 778, 795 
116 For a detailed discussion see L Bollinger, and G Stone, (eds) Eternally vigilant: Free Speech in 
the Modern Era (Chicago University Press, 2002) 
117 Barnedt, (n 2) 48 	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Perversely the two most extreme ‘categories’ of speech directly affect the way in 
which protest and public order interact. Particularly strong protection is given to 
political speech
118, whilst a second inter-related class of speech that does not fall 
within the protection of the First Amendment is those words that are classed as 
“Fighting Words” as defined in the case of Chaplinsky v New Hampshire
119 as:  
 
“(Fighting words) are words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace.” 
120 
 
The harm concerned is physical harm caused by another who was provoked by 
the  speaker.  This  interpretation  of  fighting  words  highlights  the  problems 
considered by the US courts when dealing with cases such as those faced by the 
English courts in Hammond v DPP
121. There are twin dilemmas that the courts 
must address. First is whether the need for society to balance the freedom of 
expression of one individual can be set against the fact of that expression leading 
to the vilification of a section of society. Intertwined with this, and a concern of a 
more practical nature, is the issue with which police officers must deal with when 
the freedom of expression of one individual may provoke a violent reaction in 
another. 
  
An  example  of  this  can  be  found  in  Gregory  v.  City  of  Chicago
122,  where 
demonstrators  were  marching  through  a  residential  neighbourhood  protesting 
about  racial  segregation  in  schools
123.  A  number  of  onlookers  who  were  not 
involved  in  the  demonstration  and  who  opposed  the  demonstrators’  viewpoint 
became irate and disorderly. The police officers on the scene feared “impending 
civil  disorder”  and  demanded  that  the  demonstrators  disperse.  When  they 
refused, they were arrested for disorderly conduct
124.  At trial, however, the court 
held that the incident was: 
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118 Barnedt, (n 2) 48 
119 (1942) 315 US 568  
120 (1942) 315 US 568 572 
121 Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin) 
122 394 US 111 (1969) 
123 ibid [111] 
124 ibid [111] 	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“devoid of evidence that the demonstrators’ conduct was disorderly and that the 
reaction of the onlookers was not a permissible basis for finding otherwise.” 
125  
 
Black J stated that the disorderly conduct charge was based exclusively on the 
police conclusion that:  
 
“the hecklers observing the march were dangerously close to rioting and that the 
demonstrators and others were likely to be engulfed in that riot.” 
126  
 
The  contrast  between  this  decision  and  the  finding  of  the  English  court  in 
Hammond  and  Abdul  is  stark  and  reemphasizes  the  difference  in  approaches 
between the two jurisdictions
127, with the US courts favouring the rights of the 
demonstrator as well as seeking to maintain order.  
 
The protection afforded to words is illustrated by the approach of the Supreme 
Court in Cohen v California
128. In this case, a 19 year old was arrested for wearing 
a  jacket  on  which  the  words  “Fuck  the  Draft”  written.  The  disorderly  conduct 
provision  under  which  he  was  charged  prohibited  the  malicious  and  wilful 
disturbing  of  the  peace  or  quiet  of  any  neighbourhood  or  person  by  offensive 
conduct. In the judgment of Harlan J, the State was in violation of the First and 
Fourteenth  amendment  criminalizing  the  display  of  a  single,  four-letter 
expletive
129. It was held that vulgarity was simply a side effect of an exchange of 
free ideas. The State of California could not censor the citizens in order to enforce 
civility
130.  Despite  the  protection  afforded  to  speech  of  an  extreme  nature, 
legislators in America have tried to legislate for so called “Hate Speech”. Various 
states  have  tried,  at  various  times  and  with  varying  degrees  of  success,  to 
introduce legislation that seeks to criminalize more extreme and upsetting forms 
of expression
131. 
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125 ibid [111-112] 
126 ibid [120] 
127 See pp 163-171 
128 403 US 15 (1971) 
129 ibid [26] 
130 ibid [25] 
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In 1992, the city of St Paul in Minnesota had issued an ordinance that prohibited 
the  placement  of  certain  symbols  that  were  likely  to  arouse  anger,  alarm  or 
resentment  on  the  basis  of  race,  religion  or  gender.  A  teenager,  Robert  A. 
Victoria, was convicted of violating this Ordinance after having placed a burning 
cross in the yard of a black family. The subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court 
in  the  case  of  RAV  v  City  of  St  Paul
132 saw  Victoria’s  conviction,  and  the 
preceding  Ordinance  held  to  be  unconstitutional.  The  rationale  was  that  it 
criminalized  a  symbolic  expression.  O  Connor  J,  speaking  in  a  later  case  of 
Virginia  v  Black,
133 stated  that  cross  burning  was  different  to  other  forms  of 
communication as “it carries a message in an effective and dramatic manner”. 
The Supreme Court also stated that the Ordinance allowed the city to impose 
special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on “disfavored (sic) 
subjects”
134. The judgment of Scalia J in RAV v City of St Paul tended to suggest 
that the “fighting words” of Chaplinsky are not necessarily wholly invisible to the 
First Amendment and that the core of the offence was founded on governmental 
hostility  to  the  underlying  message  conveyed.  As  a  result,  the  statute  was 
adjudged to be unlawfully content based.  
 
The Supreme Court was, again, asked to examine a cross burning ordinance, this 
time  passed  by  the  Commonwealth  of  Virginia  in  the  aforementioned  case  of 
Virginia v Black
135. The statute banned cross burning with intent to intimidate a 
person  or  group  of  persons,  making  it  a  felony  offence.  On  this  occasion  the 
Supreme Court decided to distinguish the decision in RAV v City of St Paul on the 
grounds that cross burning is a particularly virulent form of intimidation that the 
State of Virginia might legitimately seek to prohibit even though this was a clear 
example of content based regulation
136. 
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132 505 US 377 (1992)  
133 123 US 1536 (2003) 
134 ibid [388] (per O’Connor, J) 
135 ibid 
136 For significant discussion on the issues behind content based regulation see Ivan Hare, 
“Method and objectivity in free speech adjudication: lessons from America” (2005) 54 ICLQ 49 	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Balancing in Action: The Case of Marcavage  
 
As  has  been  seen  throughout  this  discussion,  one  of  the  most  significant 
problems when conducting a doctrinal analysis of the battle between low-level 
public order and protest is that, with the vast majority of low-level public order 
related free speech cases, the decisions will not be made by the higher appeal 
courts. In the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Marcavage et al
137 the 
(relatively low ranking) Common Pleas court of Pennsylvania made the decision. 
Yet the case provides a direct illustration of the differences between the various 
approaches operated by the jurisdictions under discussion.  
 
The defendant in the case was the founder of a Christian fundamentalist group 
called “Repent America”. On 10
th October 2004, he and three other members of 
the group attended the “Outfest” event in Philadelphia, to preach their opposition 
to homosexuality, based on their belief that it is against the teachings of the bible. 
This was done in a noisy but peaceful fashion. The police were present during the 
protest and accordingly the defendant was arrested and charged with a number of 
offences including riot
138, ethnic intimidation
139 and disorderly conduct
140. At trial, 
the prosecution had said that the defendant and his fellow demonstrators were 
trying  to  incite  the  crowd  and  videotape  was  shown  of  the  activities  of  the 
defendant.  Following  a  viewing  of  this  tape,  Common  Pleas  Judge  Pamela 
Dembe dismissed the charges stating: 
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137 (2005) CP: 0501-0131 unreported case Delaware Daily Times 18 February 
138 Riot, 18 Pa CSA 5501: A person is guilty of riot, a felony of the third degree, if he participates 
with two or more others in a course of disorderly conduct:  
(1) with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony or  
misdemeanour;  
(2) with intent to prevent or coerce official action; or  
(3) when the actor or any other participant to the knowledge of the actor uses or plans to use a 
firearm or other deadly weapon.  
139 Ethnic Intimidation, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2710: A person commits the offence of ethnic intimidation if, 
with  malicious  intention  toward  the  actual  or  perceived  race,  colour,  religion,  national  origin, 
ancestry, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, gender or gender identity of another 
individual or group of individuals, he commits an offence under any other provision of this article or 
under Chapter 33 (relating to arson, criminal mischief and other property destruction) exclusive of 
section  3307  (relating  to  institutional  vandalism)  or  under  section  3503  (relating  to  criminal 
trespass) with respect to such individual or his or her property or with respect to one or more 
members of such group or to their property. "Malicious intention" means the intention to commit 
any act, the commission of which is a necessary element of any offence…. motivated by hatred 
toward the actual or perceived race, colour, religion or national origin, ancestry, mental or physical 
disability, sexual orientation, gender or gender identity of another individual or group of individuals. 
140 Disorderly conduct, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §5503 see p 53-60 for details of this offence. 	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“We are one of the very few countries that protect unpopular speech. And (sic) 
that means that Nazis can march in Skokie, Illinois… that means that the Klu Klux 
Klan can march where they wish to… we cannot stifle speech because we don’t 
want to hear it or we don’t want to hear it now.”
141 
 
It is clear that the views being expounded by an individual seeking to try and 
defend her or his freedom of speech are very often those views which society is 
uncomfortable in discussing. It is similarly self evident, as was noted in City of 
Houston v Hill
142, that popular, tolerant speech and kind words have little need for 
constitutional protection. It has been asserted by the Supreme Court in Cox v. 
Louisiana
143 that the true test of the right to free speech is the protection afforded 
to unpopular, unpleasant, disturbing or even despised speech.  
Obnoxious Speech & Symbols through a Germanic 
Prism 
 
As with US Constitution, all of the organs of state are governed by the supreme 
source of German law, known as Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG). According to 
Article  20(3)  GG  all  of  the  principal  organs  of  government  are  subject  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Basic  Law,  including  the  legislature
144.  In  this  respect,  the 
constitution can be said to be supreme. There are a number of articles of the 
Grundgesetz that are of key interest when examining the law relating to public 
order and therefore have to be taken into account by both the legislators drafting 
the law and the judiciary when interpreting the law, specifically Article 5 GG that 
enshrines freedom of expression and Article 8 GG, which provides for freedom of 
assembly. The Grundgesetz also lays down the underlying principles of criminal 
liability,  incorporated  into  the  StGB,  which  are  of  particular  interest  when 
considered  against  the  main  criticisms  of  public  order  legislation  in  the  UK
145. 
Article 103 GG lays down key principles with special relevance and application to 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
141 (2005) CP: 0501-0131 unreported case Delaware Daily Times 18 February 
142 482 US 451 (1987) 
143 379 US 536 (1965), 551 
144 Art. 20 (3) GG states that the legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the 
executive and the judiciary shall be bound by law and justice. 
145 See p 3-11 for details of these issues. 	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this enquiry. The concept of Gesetzlichkeitsprinzip requires all criminal liability to 
be based on a full act of parliament and also incorporates inter alia the principle of 
legal certainty (Bestimmtheitsgebot). In addition, the notion of protection of legal 
rights (Rechtsgüterschutzprinzip) is designed to ensure that the criminal law is not 
in place to enforce one or more concepts of morality, rather to protect individual or 
societal interests
146.  
 
The above principles are internalized within the Strafgesetbuch (StGB) although 
the offence under §185StGB of Insult (Beleidigung) interacts both with Article 103 
(2) GG and Article 5 (2) GG. As previously explored
147, the provision is, in many 
respects, more closely related to the genus of offences against the person rather 
than of public order
148. At first sight, the term of the statute seems somewhat 
broad in its ambit. It contains the threat of punishment for “insult” but no further 
clarification. Nonetheless, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) has held that 
the long case history surrounding the offence of Beleidigung, and the existence of 
the  appropriate  legislative  restraints  on  the  offence  being  used  capriciously, 
means that §185 does comport within Article 103(2) GG.  
 
At first sight this would appear to bear similarity to the offence under s.4A of the 
1986  Act  within  England.  However,  the  scope  of  the  English  offence  is  much 
broader. Within §185 StGB, there has to be both evidence of intent to insult and 
evidence that the individual was actually insulted. There is also some statutory 
assistance  in  determining  the  scope  of  this  offence  under  §193  StGB,  which 
provides for the defence of fair comment: 
 
“Critical opinions about scientific, artistic or commercial achievements, utterances 
made in order to exercise or protect rights or to safeguard legitimate interests, as 
well as remonstrations and reprimands by superiors to their subordinates, official 
reports or judgments by a civil servant, and similar cases shall only entail liability 
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146 Nigel Foster & Satish Sule, German Legal System and Law (4
th Edn, OUP 2010) 
340 
147 See p 63 
148 Steven Ross Levitt, “The Life and Times of a Local Court Judge in Berlin” (2009) 10 German 
Law Journal 169 	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to the extent that the existence of an insult results from the form of the utterance 
of the circumstances under which it was made.”
149  
 
Crucially, the BVerfG is attenuated to the demands of balancing the Basic Law 
through the checks imposed by §193 StGB (which also covers public interest and 
journalism), and also Article 2 (1) GG and Article 5 (2). Whilst the offence under 
§185 StGB may resemble the English provision, the balancing and constitutional 
nuancing  when  it  comes  to  applying  Beleidigung  is  more  reminiscent  of  the 
engrained constitutional discipline of the US jurisdiction.  
 
When one considers the non-criminal nature of the OWiG framework in which the 
offence  of  disorderly  conduct  operates,  freedom  of  expression  and  low-level 
public order cases tend to be sporadic rather than the norm. The German legal 
system provides for numerous offences designed to address behaviour that not 
only promotes extreme right wing ideologies but also seeks in any way to glorify 
the National Socialist past. Originating from the Versammlungsgesetz (VslgG)
150 
§86a StGB provides the offence of using unconstitutional symbols and states inter 
alia  that  whosoever  domestically  or  publically  uses,  in  a  meeting  or  in  written 
materials disseminated by him, symbols
151 prohibited by the code
152 or produces, 
stocks,  imports  or  exports  objects  which  depict  or  contain  such  symbols  for 
distribution or use in Germany or abroad shall be liable under this provision.   
Introducing the Versammlungsgesetz: A Bespoke Protest Law  
 
The terms of §86a StGB are such that it does not require a breach of the public 
peace. There is a definite link between the offence under §86a (and other criminal 
offences within the StGB) and issues of freedom of expression. Unlike the other 
jurisdictions, the administrative provision of §118 OWiG would not be deployed to 
deal with a passionate or indeed vehement protestor, and it is highly unlikely that 
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149 Translation taken from Michael Bohlander, The German Criminal Code (Hart 2008) 141 
150 German law regulating assemblies (VslgG) see below and chapter six for further details. 
151 Symbols are defined in §86a(2) as flags, insignia, uniforms and their parts, slogans and forms 
of greeting. It goes on to say that symbols which are ‘so similar to be mistaken for those named 
shall be equivalent to them’. 
152 §86 provides for the offence of dissemination of propaganda of unconstitutional organizations 
and lists such organizations as those of a political party declared unconstitutional by the BVerfGG 
or propaganda materials the contents of which are intended to further the aims of a former national 
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§185 StGB would be deployed given the requirements of Article 5 I and Article 8 I 
GG.  Instead  the  relevant  law  is  to  be  found  in  the  Assembly  Law 
(Versammlungsgesetz, VslgG). The use of a bespoke and all encompassing law 
of protest is unique amongst the four jurisdictions. The VslgG is part of the law of 
the Federal Assembly and as such operates in the same legal strata as the StGB. 
The Assembly Law is broken up into five sections. The first section, as with the 
majority of German law is the general section, the second and third sections deal 
with  the  regulation  of  meetings
153.  The  fifth  section  deals  with  specific  protest 
within Berlin. 
Criminal Offences within the VslgG 
 
The details of criminal offences that accompany the various regulatory provisions 
are  to  be  found  in  the  fourth  section  of  the  VslgG.  The  offences  regarding 
regulation of a protest that bear a remarkable similarity to those found in Part 2 of 
English Public Order Act
154 and will be considered alongside the wider discussion 
on frameworks in Chapter Six. It is the offence of causing violence at a procession 
or assembly that is most apposite for the purposes of this discussion
155:  
 
§21 VslgG  Whosoever commits acts of violence with the intention of preventing or of 
disrupting meetings or processions, which have been lawfully authorized, 
or  otherwise  threatens  their  execution,  or  threatens  with  or  causes 
disorder will be punished with imprisonment up to three years or a fine.  
 
The  VslgG  also  contains  bespoke  legislation  for  criminalizing  the  arming  of 
demonstrators  or  organizers
156.  The  English  and  Australian  jurisdictions  would 
rely on the regular criminal law to deal with offensive weapons. In America, the 
position is given an additional dimension when considering the impact of the right 
to bear arms as laid down in the Second Amendment
157.  
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153 See Chapter Six 
154 See Part 2 of the Public Order Act, especially s 11, s 13 and s 14 for details of the offences. 
155 §21 VslgG 
156 §27 VslgG. §24 VslgG deals with the offence of having an armed escort for the procession 
157 The Second Amendment states ‘A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.’ This almost runs 
counter to the VslgG regulatory principles, which prohibit the militarization of parades and 	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The  other  offences  contained  within  Part  4  VslgG  also  have  an  echo  of  the 
English provisions. These offences include encouraging or publicizing a protest 
that  has  already  been  banned
158.  §26  VslgG  imposes  criminal  liability  on  the 
organizer of the protest for continuing a public meeting or procession once it has 
been  prohibited
159 or  for  failing  to  notify  the  authorities  under  §14  VslgG,  The 
comparable  English  law  has  three  separate  offences  of  organizing
160 , 
participation
161 and incitement to join in a procession knowing that it has been 
prohibited. In English law, failure of an organizer to notify the police of a protest is 
found  under  s.11(9)  of  the  1986  Act.  All  of  these  offences  are  punishable  as 
summary only offences in English law
162.  
 
A number of the offences detailed in Part 4 of the VslgG are aimed at preventing 
the rise of paramilitary organizations. In this, there is more than an echo of The 
Public Order Act 1936, which was enacted in England in response to the fascist 
demonstrations,  organized  by  Oswald  Moseley.
163 §27  VslgG  criminalizes  the 
wearing of political uniforms at public meetings. In England this is done by means 
of  s.1  Public  Order  Act  1936.  The  punishments  for  these  offences  in  their 
respective jurisdictions both include periods of imprisonment within the range of 
sentencing options
164.  
 
In concluding this part of the discussion, there are a number of significant points 
to  be  considered.  The  focus  of  the  legislative  and,  indeed,  the  constitutional 
provisions  laid  down  in  the  GG  is  upon  ensuring  that  all  members  of  society, 
including  those  from  minority  groups  are  afforded  the  opportunity  to  protest. 
Extremist groups (specifically extreme right wing groups), however, are targeted 
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assemblies. See the case of District of Columbia v Heller 554 US 570 (2008) for the modern scope 
of the Second Amendment 
158 §23 VslgG 
159 §26(1) VslgG 
160 Public Order Act 1986, s 13 (7) 
161 Public Order Act 1986, s 13 (8) 
162 Public Order Act 1986, ss 13(11)–(13) 
163 For further details on Moseley and the Blackshirt movement of the 1930s see Robert Skidelsky, 
Oswald Moseley (Papermac Revised Edition 1990) and Martin Pugh, Hurrah for the Blackshirts! 
Fascists and Fascism in Britain between the Wars (Pimlico New Edition 2006) 
164 Public Order Act 1936, s 7 provides for conviction upon summary trial, the defendant will be 
liable to imprisonment not exceeding 3 months or a fine or both.  	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so  that  they  do  not  have  an  opportunity  to  promote  themselves  and  their 
beliefs
165.  
Curbing the scope of s.5: Suggestions for Reform 
 
This  chapter  has  shifted  the  focus  from  the  general  provisions  of  disorderly 
conduct to the specific problem posed by the passionate protestor who infringes 
the  low-level  public  order  legislation.  The  passionate  protestor  in  a  western 
democracy exposes even the most tightly drafted disorderly conduct provision to 
rigorous examination. The passionate protestor will try to shock and try to elicit a 
response which may well stray into the realms of low-level public order. Such a 
state  of  affairs  provides  a  microcosm  of  the  research  hypothesis  and  can  be 
expressed in the following terms. Assuming that the protest is not violent and not 
seeking to incite violence, the protestor would still be uncertain as to whether her 
or his conduct as part of the protest will be adjudged as coming within the terms 
of s.5. If the conduct is so adjudged then the protestor will seek to rely on the 
defence  of  reasonableness  under  s.5(3)(c)  but  again,  will  be  uncertain  as  to 
whether  this  defence  will  be  accepted.  The  final  element  of  this  paradigm  is 
whether  the  actions  of  a  non-violent  protestor  should  even  come  within  the 
contemplation  of  a  prosecutor  and  whether  an  offence  that  permits  such  a 
capricious prosecution is too broadly drafted.  
 
The English provisions require that the behaviour will be determined by reference 
to  a  test  that  is  partially  objective  in  nature.  This  test  requires  the  words 
threatening
166 ,  abusive
167  or  insulting
168  be  given  their  ordinary  dictionary 
definitions.
169 Whilst the terms threatening is relatively clear to understand, the 
term abusive is defined with reference to insulting. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines the word insulting in the following terms: “To speak or act so as to offend 
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165 See the provisions of §1(2) VslgG 
166 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines “threatening” as “Expression of intention to 
punish, hurt or harm”  
167 The OED defines “abusive” as “Using harsh words or insults” 
168 The OED defines “insulting” as “To speak or act so as to offend someone” 
169 The test, as laid down in Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297, HL at 1303 has been adopted 
by the High Court of Australia explicitly in the case of Coleman v Power [2004] HCA 39, (2004) 
220 CLR 1 at 42  	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someone”. It is suggested that this definition is highly subjective and can cover 
mere expressions of dislike
170. The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) 
has stated that: 
 
“We  expressed  concern  that  criminalizing  insulting  words  or  behaviour  would 
disproportionately stifle freedom of expression and recommended that the word 
"insulting" should be deleted from the Act.” 
171 
 
Even removing the word insulting may not alleviate all of the concerns; the word 
abusive is defined in relation to insulting and the ambiguity and scope may simply 
be transferred from insulting onto abusive. Removal of both insulting and abusive 
from s.5, leaving the offence of “threatening or disorderly behaviour”, still does not 
overcome  the  difficulties  in  respect  of  the  vagueness  of  harassment,  alarm  or 
distress. 
Section 5 and Sexual Orientation 
 
The question of whether the court in Hammond was simply utilizing s.5 of the 
1986  Act  to  deal  with  homophobic  hate  speech  may  well  provide  the  key  to 
understanding the inherent difficulty with having such a broadly drafted provision. 
The  trial  at  first  instance  occurred  in  2002,  which  means  that  the  augmented 
sentencing powers available under s.146 Criminal Justice Act 2003
172 would not 
have been available. Irrespective of this, the provisions only serve to add sexual 
orientation as an aggravating factor at sentencing and unlike the provisions under 
s.28 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, do not create an additional offence. There is a 
clear oversight in respect of homophobic harassment in the same way there was 
racially aggravated harassment before the coming into force of the 1998 Act. That 
oversight is for the legislature, not the judiciary to fill. The same legislation that 
can be used to deal with a drunk who urinates in a side street was deployed in 
Hammond to cover the legislative omission in respect of sexual orientation hate 
crime. 
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170 Contrast this with the highly regulated meaning under §184 StGB 
171 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights? (2008-9, HL 141, HC 
522) 54 
172 This provides for tougher sentences for offences motivated for or aggravated by the victims 
sexual orientation 	 ﾠ 183	 ﾠ
 
Any  discussion  of  public  order  issues  must  necessarily  be  viewed  against  a 
backdrop of the often-tense and emotive circumstances under which the offences 
are committed
173. It is recognized by observers that free speech cannot operate in 
a vacuum and that restrictions on speech will be justified when the circumstances 
of  that  speech  are  either  “inherently  inflammatory  or  it  is  likely  in  the 
circumstances to lead to violence or disorder”
174. What this has come to mean, 
however, is that debates surrounding the operation of the criminal sanctions have 
tended  to  be  rooted  firmly  within  the  sphere  of  free  speech  discourse, 
concentrating upon the occasions where public order legislation is used to combat 
protestors.  
Cross Jurisdictional Perspectives on Low-Level Disorder and Protest 
 
In respect of the Australian position, each of the majority judgments in Power that 
‘a law creating an offense for the use of insulting words in public must be limited 
to  circumstances  in  which  a  violent  response  is  either  intended  or  likely’
175. 
Through the comparative prism, this statement by McHugh, J indicates that s.5 of 
the  1986  Act,  a  provision  which  has  been  deployed  against  protestors  on 
numerous occasions, would not pass constitutional muster in Australia. Yet the 
court was dealing with the state using the criminal law to suppress a complaint 
that might more properly have been dealt with in the civil courts. There was no 
indication of a violent response to Coleman’s protest. There is no case law to 
suggest how the Court would have ruled on the facts of Hammond or Abdul
176.  
 
In Hammond, the High Court decided that it was open to Magistrates to conclude 
that  H's  conduct  was  not  reasonable  because  of  the  pressing  need  to  show 
tolerance to all sections of society and the fact that the defendant’s conduct was 
provoking violence and disorder and interfered with others' rights. In Abdul, the 
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173 For a discussion on the intense and conflict-based context that are the backdrop for many 
public order situations on a cross-jurisdictional canvas see Donatella Della Porta & Herbert Reiter, 
(eds), Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies (University 
of Minnesota Press 1998) 
174 Barendt (n 2) 269 
175 ibid 679 fn 16 
176 cf the decision with that of the English Courts in Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin) 	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protestors were engaging in a highly controversial protest that was always likely to 
provoke an outraged response. But the defendants had co-operated with police 
directions  and  had  tried  to  facilitate  peaceful  protest  in  a  way  that  even  the 
defendants in Beatty v Gilbanks had not
177. Given the facts of Abdul, despite the 
finding  of  the  court  that  the  defendants  had  overstepped  the  boundaries  of 
legitimate protest, it is difficult to project a way in which the defendants could ever 
make their point without infringing s.5 even taking into account Article 10 of the 
ECHR and the defence of reasonable conduct under s.5(3)(c).  
 
This thesis will go on to consider the case of Abdul from the perspective of post-
9/11  protest  in  Chapter  Seven.  It  has  been  established  that  the  passionate 
protestor was not in the minds of parliament when it was creating s.5 of the 1986 
Act. Instead it is aimed at countering low-level, anti social behaviour
178. It has 
been  stated  “the  starting  point  is  that  Parliament  itself  has  decided  where  the 
balance  should  be  struck  between  freedom  of  expression  and  unlawful 
conduct.”
179. In the jurisdictional ambit of England and Wales there is legislation 
prohibiting a wide variety of controversial words or behaviour
180. The low-level 
public order provisions are being used in cases where the police and the courts 
see the speech or expression as undesirable
181. 
Conclusion 
 
The  comparative  prism  provides  a  useful  evaluative  mechanism  by  which  the 
scope of s.5 can be measured in order to answer the second research question. 
An emerging pattern is that whilst different low-level provisions would operate with 
little difficulty in the English legal environment, 5 of the 1986 Act would be unlikely 
to survive the attention of the US courts. It is difficult to conclude that an American 
court would have convicted either Hammond or Abdul. The case of Marcarvage is 
illustrative of this position. The decision can be dismissed as the musings of a 
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177 See p 162 for details 
178 Geddis, (n 84) 873 
179 (HL Paper 95-II), (n108)  
180 See provisions dealt with by Crime & Disorder Act 1998, s 28; Racial Religious Hatred Act 
2006; Official Secrets Act 1911 & 1989 
181 In this case, the decisions of the court in Hammond and Abdul as opposed to Dehal 	 ﾠ 185	 ﾠ
minor court, yet there are other cases to support the basic premise that disorderly 
conduct  must  be  more  than  “pure”  speech  even  though  it  may  be  abusive  or 
offensive
182.  
 
If Hammond had directed his speech into a personal, homophobic attack then he 
might well have fallen foul of hate crime legislation It has been noted that the type 
of language required under the provisions of many US States must have a direct 
tendency to incite a violent reaction in others. The protest in the recent case of 
Goldhamer v Nagode
183 found that the element of violence was essential in any 
conviction for disorderly conduct. Clearly, the US jurisdiction and the protection 
afforded to speech within the terms of the First Amendment provides a significant 
protection to the passionate protestor  
 
Within the German jurisdiction, there is clear evidence of a different approach to 
dealing with protest and the rights of both the protestor and the audience in such 
a circumstance. The nature of the offence under §86a StGB is such that it does 
not require a breach of the public peace and criminalizes any public use of the 
prohibited  symbols  outlined  in  §86a(3).  This  is  a  recognizable,  ‘content-based’ 
restriction but focused on ensuring there is compliance with the GG. While §86a, 
and other criminal offences within the StGB, such as §185, deal with freedom of 
expression  issues,  the  administrative  provision  of  §118  OWiG  does  not.  The 
reason  for  this  is  that  the  Versammlungsgesetz  (VslgG)  covers  all  aspects  of 
protest law. The cases of Hammond and Abdul, had they occurred in the German 
jurisdiction, would have been dealt with under the provisions of VslgG rather than 
under the administrative provisions of the OWiG. It is suggested that §21 VslgG is 
unique amongst the jurisdictions and provides a model of statutory regulation of 
violence within the context of a protest. 
 
This study has analyzed and critiqued the operation of low-level provisions from 
the perspective of a single protestor. The next stage of inquiry is an evaluative 
assessment of the frameworks governing larger protests employed by the four 
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182 W L v State, 769 So 2d 1132 (Florida District Court of Appeals 3d Dist 2000) 
183 Goldhamer v Nagode ___ F3d ___ (7th Cir Sept 2, 2010)(No 09-2332) 	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legal systems. This metanarrative will illustrate the operation of low-level public 
order within the rarified atmosphere of a demonstration and further contribute to 
the  wider  discussion  regarding  the  optimal  pathways  for  low-level  public  order 
solutions.  In  doing  so,  the  discussion  will  move  from  the  diagnostic  approach 
required by the three initial research questions. Although necessary to confirm the 
hypothesis,  the  next  stage  of  the  inquiry  is  to  begin  a  study  as  to  whether 
criminalization is the appropriate method to deal with low level disorder or whether 
a  more  administrative  structure  based  around  disorder  management  would 
provide an effective alternative to criminalizing a vast swathe of conduct. 	 ﾠ 187	 ﾠ
Chapter Six: 
 
Regulating Protest: Managing 
Disorder Proactively 
 
Introduction to Chapter Six 
 
The previous chapters have focused upon the disorderly conduct provisions as 
they have operated within the sphere of regular criminal law. The last chapter 
demonstrated  how  these  provisions  have  bled  over  into  situations  whereby 
individual  protesters  were  dealt  with  using  the  low-level  public  order  offences. 
Douglas, writing about dealing with demonstrations in Australia, has stated that: 
 
“An analysis of demonstration law which did not include reference to commonly 
charged ‘demonstration offences’ would be both misleading and deficient.” 
1 
 
The obverse is also true. Any analysis of public order law that does not make 
reference to the law governing protest and the impact this has upon low-level 
public order will be equally as misleading and deficient. The recent inquest into 
the death of Ian Tomlinson at the G20 protests in London
2 highlights the way in 
which seemingly low-level public order legislation can be deployed in a situation 
that is inherently volatile.  
 
The research hypothesis has centred upon the operation of low-level public order 
law  and  that  the  main  deficiency  of  s.5  is  that  the  decision  to  criminalize  an 
individual for conduct can be based on arbitrary and personal predilections of the 
prosecutor. In assessing the reach of s.5 this chapter starts with a premise; that in 
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1 Roger Douglas Dealing with Demonstrations: The Law of Public Protest and its Enforcement 
(Federation Press 2004) 70 
2 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/04/editorial-ian-tomlinson-inquest-verdict 
accessed Monday 23rd May 2011 at 22:16 	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a “regular”
3, low-level public order theatre, irrespective of the jurisdiction, there are 
three  different  “actors”  involved.  The  first  is  the  individual  engaging  in  the 
proscribed fashion using either words or conduct. The second of the ‘public order 
actors’  is  the  recipient,  the  person  who  might  be  harassed,  fearing  unlawful 
violence or generally disturbed by the conduct
4 (of course, another key element to 
the research hypothesis is that critically, this can be missing from the offence 
under s.5). The third protagonist is the police officer(s), the executive arm of the 
State  concerned  with  ensuring  that  disorder  does  not  ensue  and  that  any 
criminality is investigated
5. 
Organized Protest: Differing Models of Low-Level Disorder 
 
When considered in the context of protest, a number of crucial changes occur to 
this model. Significantly, a fourth party becomes an active participant within the 
arena, the general public. This group may not be offended by the content of the 
protest but they also may not be interested in the cause and, more significantly, 
object to any disruption that such a protest might cause. In Austin & Saxby v 
Commissioner  of  the  Police  for  the  Metropolis
6,  the  complainant  was  not  a 
protestor, but simply a member of the public who happened to be in the centre of 
London when the Metropolitan Police instituted the now infamous “kettling” tactic. 
The  courts  have  emphasized  the  importance  of  minimizing  any  disturbance 
caused by protestors. In relation to the disruption caused by the “Climate Camp” 
protest in the case of R (Moos & McClure) v Commissioner of the Police of the 
Metropolis
7 the court held that: 
 
“The  prolongation  of  the  demonstration,  thus  blocking  the  highway  until  the 
morning, had no justification and would continue to cause serious disturbance and 
disruption to traffic and pedestrians wishing to use the highway. The police had a 
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3 “Regular” in this case means a low-level public order incident not in the context of a protest. 
4 Under Public Order Act 1986, s 5 in England, §118 OWiG in Germany, and the majority of 
provisions within the States of Australia and America, there is no direct requirement of a victim but 
the case of Holloway states that (in England) the behaviour must be conducted within the sight of 
someone who may suffer harassment, alarm or distress 
5 For a discussion on the role and behaviour of the police within an English context see David 
Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest (Hart, 2010) 18-20 
6 Austin & Saxby v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis [2007] EWCA Civ 989; [2008] 2 
WLR 415 CA 
7 R (Moos & McClure) v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 957 (Admin) 	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duty  to  clear  the  highway,  which  could  not  be  done  without  removing  the 
protestors by force if necessary.”
8 
 
This duty leads on to another deviation from the standard model outlined. Mead 
states that the policing of protest is overtly political whereas the ordinary “bobby 
on the beat” policing is not
9. This is not to say that the police in a non-protest 
scenario do not encounter hostility and conflict when engaging in ordinary low-
level public order. But it is the combination of the threat of widespread disorder 
and the intensity of feeling within demonstrations that pose unique problems for 
the  police  in  respect  of  applying  what  would  be  otherwise  routine  low-level 
provisions
10.  
 
The next change from the emerging non-protest, low-level public order model is 
that  the  “recipient”  of  the  conduct  may  well  be  a  militant,  hostile  audience, 
opposed in equal passion to the views promulgated by the protestor
11. This poses 
a problem as Barendt has identified: 
 
“The law must preserve the peace, but if it is preoccupied with that objective it will 
inevitably confer de facto censorship powers on individuals and groups who are 
determined to break up a public meeting. The fear of disruption from the hostile 
audience  may  induce  the  police  to  disperse  a  demonstration  when  the  risk  of 
violence is in fact relatively slight.” 
12  
 
The ‘hostile audience’ and the difficulties posed in dealing with such protest was 
considered  by  ECtHR  in  Plattform  ‘Ärzte  für  das  Leben’  v  Austria
13.  In  its 
judgment, the court stated that the right to counter-demonstrate should not extend 
to inhibit the exercise of the right to demonstrate and that there was a duty upon 
States  to  ensure  that  protestors  can  hold  their  demonstrations  without  fear  of 
violence from their opponents
14. This, in turn, operates as another dynamic upon 
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8 ibid [63] (per Sweeney J) 
9 Mead (n 5) 19 
10 David Waddington, Policing Public Order: Theoretical and Practical Issues (Willan 2007) 9-34 
11 See the role of the audience in Hammond v DPP [2004] EWHC 69 (Admin) 
12 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech (2
nd Edn, OUP 2008) 303 
13 Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v Austria (1991) 13 EHRR 204 
14 ibid [para 32]; in Mead (n 5) 72 	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the role of the police and their deployment of what have been shown to be broad 
ranging discretionary low-level offences
15. 
Dissent, Disorder and Regulation 
 
These preliminary points serve to highlight the significant distinctions between the 
application of low-level public order provisions within a protest and their operation 
in other contexts. It is unsurprising that the jurisdictions have chosen to adopt 
different mechanisms to regulate the way in which protest occurs. Understanding 
these different regulatory regimes is critical to understanding this aspect of the 
operation of low-level public order law. It is the purpose of this chapter to engage 
in a holistic and comparative analysis of the divergent frameworks as they operate 
within  the  different  jurisdictions.  Such  an  inquiry  is  crucial  to  appreciating  the 
context in which s.5 and, indeed, all low-level legislation is applied.  
 
Until  this  point  in  the  thesis,  the  terms  “low-level  public  order”  and  “disorderly 
conduct”  have  been  used  somewhat  interchangeably.  When  considering  the 
context of protest, it will be necessary to broaden the range of offences that fall 
within  the  umbrella  of  low-level  public  order  law
16.  In  respect  of  the  English 
perspective, focus will shift from the specific offences found within Part 1 of Public 
Order  Act  to  the  regulatory  provisions  under  Part  2  of  the  1986  Act
17.  These 
regulations  impose  requirements  upon  the  organizers  of  protests  and  impose 
criminal sanctions for non-compliance.  
 
Such sanctions may also fall within the ambit of low-level public order and will be 
examined accordingly, but perhaps of more relevance for the thesis, it may point 
towards a harmonized, regulatory approach to dealing with all disorder rather than 
merely criminalizing a broad range of conduct. In that respect such a discussion 
directly  contributes  to  the  fourth  research  question  by  introducing  non-criminal 
methods for disorder management. 
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15 See also the comments on Jones and Gilbanks at pp 159-171 
16 For a description of the range of these offences see chapter two and also see Peter Thornton 
The Law of Public Order and Protest (OUP 2010), pp 1-51 
17 Specifically the provisions under s.11-16 of the Public Order Act 1986 which require that 
protestors notify the police and permit the police to impose conditions and in some cases prohibit 
a procession and impose conditions upon assemblies. 	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The  Assembly  Law  (Versammlungsgesetz,  VslgG),  which  functions  within  the 
German legal system, has already been introduced, together with an examination 
of the operation of the criminal sanctions available to deal with individual, errant 
protestors
18 .  This  inquiry  will  seek  to  further  examine  the  VslgG  and  the 
framework it establishes for the right of protest to be exercised. An analysis of 
low-level public order and protest is impossible within the German context without 
looking  at  the  pro-active,  regulatory  framework  in  which  the  low-level  protest 
offences operate. At the other end of the spectrum is Australia, which has no 
uniform public order requirement across the States. Instead, there is a blend of 
regulatory frameworks, with one State imposing an obligation upon protestors to 
obtain  permission  to  protest
19 whilst  at  the  other  extreme,  another  State
20 
regulates  protest  entirely  by  means  of  a  voluntary  code.  This  analysis  will 
juxtapose the fully codified and regulated system for dealing with all aspects of 
protest in Germany against the ad-hoc, patchwork arrangements in Australia.  
 
In the next chapter, analytical focus will shift on to developments affecting low-
level public order that have arisen since the terrorist attacks upon New York that 
occurred  on  September  11
th  2001
21.  However,  the  US  regulation  of  protests 
significantly precedes these events and it is logical that they be discussed within 
this context. The regulatory framework for protest differs in form depending upon 
the approach of the State legislature. Nonetheless, as with other aspects of low-
level public order, the First Amendment runs through the regulation of protest. 
The first element of this was considered previously in respect of the individual 
protestor. That discussion will now be developed in respect of larger protests and 
the creation of the public order ‘environment’ in which the low-level offences will 
operate within the US. 
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18 See Chapter Five at p 179 
19 As is the case in Tasmania, see Police Offences Act 1935, s 49AB 
20 The state of Victoria has no regulation of protest see p 200 for details. 
21 See p 229 onwards 	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Regulating US Protest: Preventative rather than Punitive 
 
When examining protests within the US context, the approach that the courts take 
can be summarized as: 
 
“A  citizen’s  right  to  speak  on  matters  of  public  concern  is  more  than  self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.” 
22  
 
Broadly speaking, when the court decides that the discussion is a matter of public 
concern
23 then  the  speech  will  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  First  Amendment. 
Speech on matters of public concern may not be protected if it constitutes speech 
which  the  court  has  “accorded  no  protection,”  such  as  obscenity  or  “fighting 
words”
24. Although First Amendment protection is undoubtedly a powerful shield 
for free expression, the courts have provided a framework whereby those officials 
seeking  to  regulate  protest  can  do  so  whilst  not  offending  against  First 
Amendment  principles.  The  legislative  mechanisms  by  which  protests  can  be 
regulated  in  the  American  jurisdiction  are  down  to  the  discretion  of  individual 
Cities, Districts and States. 
 
Any concept of regulation within the US jurisdiction must first be set against the 
competing notions of content-based and content-neutral restrictions
25. The First 
Amendment is specifically directed towards Congress and the resultant legislative 
activity. The Supreme Court has held that restrictions placed by the government 
upon freedom of speech apply to all branches of the State by virtue of the due 
process  clause
26 of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment
27.  Therefore  both  State  and 
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22 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc v Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 US 749, 759 (1985) 
23 United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 US 454, 461, 466 (1995) held that a plaintiff’s 
lectures on religion were matters of public concern 
24 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 US 46 (1988) in respect of the test laid down in Chaplinsky; 
see p 171 
25 For a full discussion on this see E Kagan “Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of 
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine” (1996) 63 U Chi L Rev 413, 443 
26 Amendment XIV to the United States Constitution states inter alia at Section 1 “No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law”  
27 “For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press - which 
are protected by the 1st Amendment from abridgment by Congress - are among the fundamental 	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Federal legislators, judiciary and enforcement officers have to be mindful of any 
restrictions upon a protest.  
 
A content-based restriction places limits upon the subject matter of the protest, 
proscribing certain statements or images. Content-neutral restrictions apply to all 
protestors irrespective of the topic of their protest and usually refer to the methods 
or locations employed by all protestors. Hare gives the following example: 
 
“A  law  prohibiting  all  public  statements  on  abortion  would  be  content-based 
whereas  a  statute,  which  penalized  all  use  of  sound  amplification  equipment 
within 100 yards of a hospital, is content-neutral.”
28 
 
Content-based restrictions are given more severe judicial scrutiny than content-
neutral ones
29. Where the State wishes to restrict the content of a protest, in order 
to overcome the First Amendment hurdle, the restrictive law or provision is subject 
to strict scrutiny
30 in that it must serve a compelling State interest and be narrowly 
tailored  to  achieve  that  end
31.  The  intent  of  the  legislator  or  originator  of  the 
restriction is not relevant, nor is the fact that the restriction might be addressing a 
genuine, unrelated aim
32.  
 
Content-neutrality  is  only  part,  although  a  significant  part,  of  the  matrices  that 
courts use when examining restrictions upon protests. There are three judicial 
doctrines which are perhaps the most pertinent when examining the restrictions 
that can be placed upon the regulation of protest by police and local authorities: 
the doctrine of prior restraint, the doctrine governing licensing schemes of First 
Amendment activity and so-called “time, place and manner” restrictions
33. These 
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personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment from 
impairment by the states” Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 666 (1925)  
28 Ivan Hare, “Method and objectivity in free speech adjudication: lessons from America.” (2005) 
54 ICLQ 49, 51 
29 Regan v Time Inc 468 US 641 (1984) 
30 Elizabeth Craig, “Protecting the President from Protest: Using the Secret Service’s zone of 
protection to prosecute protestors.” (2006) 9 J Gender Race & Just. 665, 684 
31 Hare (n 28) 52 
32 Simon & Schuster, Inc v Members of New York State Crime Victims Board 502 US 105 (1991) 
33 Christopher Dunn, “Balancing the Right to Protest in the aftermath of September 11.” (2005) 40 
Harv CR-CL L Rev 327, 329 	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doctrines are well established
34, and the terrorist attacks of the 11
th September 
2001
35 have placed a new focus on the restrictions that the State may place upon 
protest.  The  fear  is  that  heightened  judicial  deference  to  “terrorism  related 
concerns” might see the judiciary fail to challenge over burdensome restrictions
36. 
 
There  exists  a  heavy  presumption  against  the  constitutional  validity  of  prior 
restraint
37. The complete banning of protest activity enjoys the highest level of 
constitutional protection and to date the US Supreme Court has never sustained a 
prior restraint
38. Carroll v Princess Anne
39 saw members of a white supremacist 
group convene a militantly racist public rally. The organizers announced that the 
rally would resume the next night. Local officials obtained an ex-parte restraining 
order  prohibiting  the  organizers  from  holding  rallies  for  10  days  which  would 
“disturb and endanger” the citizens of the county. At trial, 10 days later, the Circuit 
Court extended the earlier order for 10 months. The Maryland Court of Appeals
40 
affirmed the 10-day banning order, but held that the ban of 10 months was an 
unreasonable  period  of  time.  Upon  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court,  the  10-day 
order was set aside due to the ex-parte nature of the order given the requirements 
of the First Amendment that the opposing parties should have the opportunity to 
participate in adversarial proceedings
41.   
 
The  banning  of  protests,  whilst  constitutionally  possible  within  the  theoretical 
scope of the First Amendment, is afforded the most extreme and careful scrutiny. 
As such, it has no real established case law other than the cases where the ban 
has been overturned. Of much more utility are schemes used, on a local and 
State level, to regulate protest activity through licensing
42. These are generally 
content-neutral restrictions that are designed to ensure the effective policing. It 
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34ibid at 329 
35 See Chapter Seven 
36 Nick Suplina, “Crowd Control: The troubling mix of First Amendment Law, Political 
Demonstrations and Terrorism.” (2005) 73 Geo Wash L Rev 395, 397 
37 New York Times Co v United States, 403 US 713, 714 (1971) and also Bantam Books v 
Sullivan, 372 US 58, 70 (1963) 
38 Dunn (n 33) 330 
39 Carroll v Princess Anne, 393 US 175 (1968)  
40 Carroll 247 Md. 126, 230 A 2d 452 
41 Carroll v Princess Anne, 393 US 175 (1968), 179-185  
42 Dunn (n 33) 330 	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has been held that where any discretion exists in the issuing of a permit
43, this is 
likely to result in censorship: 
 
“If the permit scheme involves appraisal of facts, the exercise of judgment, and 
the formation of an opinion by the licensing authority, the danger of censorship 
and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great to be 
permitted.”
44  
 
Perhaps the most celebrated protest case, known as the Skokie Affair, occurred 
in  Illinois.  A  neo-Nazi  group  had  planned  a  demonstration  march  through  the 
village of Skokie, a number of whose residents were holocaust survivors. The 
Circuit  Court  of  Cook  County,  where  the  march  was  planned,  had  issued  an 
injunction prohibiting the march on the grounds that the marchers had planned to 
wear Nazi uniforms and prominently display swastikas. The group appealed and, 
in National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie
45, the Supreme Court 
overturned the injunction. The reasoning of the court in this case was that the 
imposition  of  an  injunction  violated  the  appellants’  rights  under  the  First 
Amendment  without  incorporating  any  procedural  safeguards  or  allowing  the 
injunction to be subject to immediate appellate review. The decision in Skokie, 
which is still held to be good law, serves to emphasize the protection granted to 
even the most unpopular protest from direct State censorship.  
Acceptable limitations and low-level solutions 
 
The  courts  more  readily  accept  content-neutral  “time,  place  and  manner” 
restrictions. For example, in Snyder v Phelps
46, the police directed the protestors 
to a 20 by 25-foot area behind a plastic fence, located on public land that was 
1000 feet from the church. This in no way restricted the content of the protest. 
Providing  the  restriction  is  narrowly  drawn  to  serve  a  significant  governmental 
interest and leaves ample opportunities for the protestors to communicate their 
views (i.e. satisfying the intermediate scrutiny requirements) then it is likely that 
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43 Pro-Life Cougars v Univ. of Houston, 259 F Supp 2d 575, 577-78 (SD Tex 2003) 
44 Forsyth County v The Nationalist Movement, 505 US 123, 131 (1992); in Dunn (n 32) 330 
45 National Socialist Party of America v Skokie 432 US 43 (1977) 
46 Snyder v Phelps 562 US __(2011) this case is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven in 
respect of the post 9/11 phenomenon of funeral protests. 	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(as  in  Snyder)  the  court  will  uphold  such  a  restriction
47.  Breaching  such  a 
restriction, in Maryland, will result in the individual being arrested for disorderly 
conduct
48. 
 
The  regulation  of  protest  in  the  State  of  Colorado  is  typical  of  the  approach 
adopted by the States within America. Instead of onerous conditions, within Article 
9 of the Criminal Code, there are a number of content neutral, low-level offences 
designed to prevent public disorder, such as disrupting lawful assemblies
49 which 
states that: 
 
“A person commits disrupting lawful assembly if, intending to prevent or disrupt 
any  lawful  meeting,  procession,  or  gathering,  he  significantly  obstructs  or 
interferes with the meeting, procession, or gathering by physical action, verbal 
utterance, or any other means.” 
50 
 
Within the State of Iowa, the disorderly conduct provision under §723.4 of the 
Iowa Code incorporates a similar provision
51 and the situation is echoed in the 
New York Penal Code
52. These specific provisions point more generally to an 
identifiable trend in the American regulation of protest. The First Amendment is 
the basis upon which this regulation is built. The Skokie Affair indicates that the 
courts  will  not  tolerate  state  restrictions  where  the  content  of  a  protest  is 
undesirable.  The  individual  State  legislatures  have  utilised  low-level,  content 
neutral  provisions
53 to  inhibit  interference  on  the  right  to  protest.  The  case  of 
Snyder will be discussed in the next chapter, but it highlights the nature in which 
protest is regulated. The framework deployed within the American jurisdiction is 
therefore  predicated  upon  compliance  with  the  First  Amendment.  There  is  the 
deployment by the police of regular, low-level public order provisions augmented 
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47 City Council of Los Angeles v Taxpayers for Vincent 466 US 789 (1984); in Hare (n 28) fn 15. 
48 Md CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann §10-201 Disturbing the public peace and disorderly conduct 
49 Colorado rev stat §18-9-108 
50 Subsection 2 goes on to say that Disrupting lawful assembly is a class 3 misdemeanor; except 
that, if the actor knows the meeting, procession, or gathering is a funeral, it is a class 2 
misdemeanor. 
51 Without lawful authority or color of authority, the person disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting 
of persons by conduct intended to disrupt the meeting or assembly 
52 NY Penal Code §240.20(4). 
53 Following on from Hare’s example (n 28), Colorado rev. stat §18-9-122 (2) makes an offence of 
obstructing an entrance to a medical facility. Colorado rev stat §18-9-122 (3) creates the offence of 
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where  appropriate  to  deal  with  a  specific  kind  of  protest
54.  Additionally,  an 
individual  who  suffers  emotional  distress  can  pursue  a  civil  action  against  the 
protestor
55.  
Australian Permit Based Regulation 
 
This discussion will now examine the Australian approach, where the courts are 
completely  unfettered  by  any  of  the  requirements  imposed  by  the  First 
Amendment  in  the  US.  There  are  two  fundamental  issues  that  need  to  be 
addressed at the outset. As with all of the other Australian low-level public order 
provisions, there are diverse requirements that vary within the different States. It 
is significant that these provisions remain largely unaffected by the tumult that the 
events of “The War on Terror” have caused in the English and US jurisdictions
56. 
Another  disparity  between  the  Australian  and  English  position  is  that,  despite 
different  legislative  approaches,  a  number  of  the  Australian  States  require  the 
possession of a permit. This is a subtle but significant difference from the English 
position under s.11 of the 1986 Act where the requirement is for notification not 
permission
57.  
 
Douglas
58 has identified three different types of regulatory permit systems, which 
operate in the different States and covers a range of regulatory requirements. 
Although this is not a universally recognized taxonomy, and is directed solely at 
the Australian public order framework, it nevertheless provides a useful frame of 
reference by which to navigate and evaluate the various State-based solutions. 
 
The first method of regulating protest is by means of a traditional permit system
59 
whereby  organizers  of  a  demonstration  apply  to  either  the  police  or  the  local 
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54 In the case of Colorado rev stat §18-9-122, the statute deals with the conduct of both pro and 
anti abortion campaigners. See also the finding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hill v Colorado 530 
US 703 (2000) 
55 See p 250 for further explanation as to how the use of civil actions seeking damages is a 
common approach to dealing with disputes where First Amendment violations are alleged.  
56 See chapter seven 
57 Richard Card, Public Order Law (Jordans 2000) 213 
58 Douglas (n 1) 58-69 
59 Douglas (n 1) 59-62 	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authority for permission. These systems were, historically, the dominant approach 
adopted in respect of regulating protest
60. Permits were applied and administered 
inconsistently.  Some  protests  were  banned  outright  and  some  protests  were 
refused a permit by the police despite initially receiving local authority consent
61.  
 
Only  two  States
62 retain  the  traditional  permit  framework.  It  is  the  Tasmanian 
model  that  stands  in  starkest  contrast  to  the  other  jurisdictional  approaches. 
S.49AB of the Police Offences Act 1935 makes it an offence for any person who 
is organizing or conducting a demonstration to do so without a permit. The permit 
is issued by “a senior police officer”
63 and in determining whether or not to issue 
the  permit,  the  senior  police  officer
64 may  take  account  of  the  safety  and 
convenience  of  the  public
65 ,  the  arrangements  made  for  the  safety  and 
convenience of the participants
66 and any other considerations that may appear 
relevant
67. 
 
The  most  significant  disparity  between  the  Tasmanian  legislation  and  the 
regulatory requirements of other jurisdictions is the lack of recognition of the rights 
of  the  protestors,  either  embedded  within  the  statute,  or  within  the  wider 
constitutional framework. As there is no free standing right to protest within the 
Australian constitution, those whose protest has been suppressed must rely on 
the implied freedom of political communication that the courts have derived in 
conjunction with the test laid down in Lange
68. 
 
Statistics are not available detailing either the number of permits issued or the 
number  of  prosecutions  under  s.49AB,  and  there  is  no  (Tasmanian)  Supreme 
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60 Douglas (n 1) 59 
61 L Richardson ‘Political Protest in Woollongong’ in J Mackinolty (ed) The Wasted Years: 
Australia’s Great Depression (Geo. Allen & Unwin 1982) 
62 Summary Offences Act (NT), s 74(3) 
63 Police Offences Act 1935, s 49AB(2) 
64 http://www.police.tas.gov.au/services-online/permits-for-events/demonstrations-street-
processions/ defines a senior police officer as the Commander of the nearest District Police 
headquarters 
65 Police Offences Act 1935, s 49AB(4)(a) 
66 Police Offences Act 1935, s 49AB(4)(b) 
67 Police Offences Act 1935, s 49AB(4)(c) 
68 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 	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Court or (Australian) High Court case law around this permit-based regulation
69. 
This leads to two key assumptions being drawn. Either the police do not refuse 
the issue of permits and there are no subsequent challenges or the protestors in 
Tasmania are content with this provision. Either way, given the robust attitude of 
the High Court in Coleman v Power
70, it is doubtful that this law would survive a 
challenge based on the Lange test
71. It is almost certain that courts in England, 
America and Germany would not tolerate such a discretionary approach to protest 
regulation. 
Modern Permission Systems & Informal Arrangements: Australia 
 
The second system in the taxonomy of regulative processes is that of the ‘Modern 
Permission  System’
72 employed  by  the  majority  of  Australian  States.  These 
systems encourage demonstrators to notify the relevant authorities of an intention 
to stage a particular demonstration. In return for this notification, and subject to 
following any conditions that the relevant authority may lay down, the participants 
are  given  immunity  for  what  might  otherwise  be  obstruction  offences  and  will 
escape civil liability for nuisance offences
73. The States of Queensland
74, New 
South Wales
75, South Australia
76 and Western Australia
77 all adopt variations of 
these  permission  systems  and  it  is  these  that  most  closely  echo  the  English 
provisions within Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986. 
 
Victoria,  Australian  Capital  Territories  and  Commonwealth  law  provide  a  third 
model for Australian protest regulation. Within these States, there is no regulation 
of  protest  in  statutory  form
78.  Instead,  there  is  reliance  placed  upon  informal 
negotiations  and  police  engagement  with  protestors.  In  Victoria,  protest  is 
regulated by an informal code, drafted by various interested parties and accepted 
as binding by police. Brennan, writing in 1983, highlights the focus of such a code 
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69 As of 30/04/2011 as per http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/cases_status.cgi 
70 See p 155 
71 For details on the Lange test see p 153 
72 Douglas (n 1) 62-68 
73 Douglas (n 1) 62-63 
74 Peaceful Assembly Act 1992 
75 Part 4 of the Summary Offences Act 1988  
76 Public Assemblies Act 1972 
77 Public Order in the Streets Act 1984 
78 Douglas (n 1) 68 	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being  to  enable  individuals  to  effectively  manifest  their  right  to  protest  to  the 
extent that the police should consider arresting for summary offences “with great 
discretion”
79. Douglas comments that perhaps a measure of the success of this 
partnership  approach  is  that  whilst  other  States  (notably  Queensland)  have 
contemplated removing the regulatory framework surrounding protest, successive 
Victorian governments have seen no need to legislate on this area. 
 
It  is  only  Western  Australia,  one  of  the  States  which  employs  a  modern 
permission  system,  that  goes  so  far  as  to  delineate  between  meetings  and 
processions,  although  helpfully,  unlike  the  English  counterpart,  provides  a 
definition as to what both of these terms mean
80. S.7 of the Public Order in the 
Streets Act 1984 states that the Commissioner
81 shall not refuse to grant a permit 
for  a  public  meeting  or  a  procession  unless  he  has  reasonable  grounds  for 
apprehending  serious  public  disorder  or  damage  to  property
82,  create  a  public 
nuisance
83, give rise to an obstruction too great or too prolonged
84, or place the 
safety  of  any  person  in  jeopardy
85.  This  is  different  from  the  traditional  permit 
systems.  The  emphasis  of  the  legislation  is  focused  much  more  on  enabling 
protest rather than merely permitting it. 
Authorization and Specific Immunities 
 
One common feature regarding all permission systems across the jurisdictions is 
the lack of litigation regarding police decisions to issue permits or indeed any 
aspect  of  the  regulatory  process
86.  Overall  there  seems  to  be  little  by  way  of 
judicial challenges to the Australian approach to regulation. In New South Wales, 
the case of Commissioner of Police v Rintoul
87, illustrated the approach of the 
Australian higher courts. In Rintoul, police opposed authorization for a proposed 
demonstration  outside  the  residence  of  the  Minister  for  Immigration.  This 
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79 Frank Brennan, Too Much Order with Too Little Law (Queensland University Press 1983) 78-80 
80 Public Order in Streets Act 1984, s 4(3) 
81 The statute provides that this duty can be delegated to an “Authorized Officer” 
82 Public Order in the Streets Act 1984, s 7(2)(a) 
83 Public Order in the Streets Act 1984, s 7(2)(b) 
84 Public Order in the Streets Act 1984, s 7(2)(c) 
85 Public Order in the Streets Act 1984, s 7(2)(d) 
86 A point reinforced by Douglas (n 1) 65 
87 Commissioner of Police v Rintoul [2003] NSWSC 662 	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opposition was based on intelligence that suggested the protest was to limit the 
minister’s movement and might have involved an invasion of his house
88.  
 
The relevant New South Wales legislation is to be found in Part 4 of the Summary 
Offences Act 1988. A public assembly is defined as an assembly held in a public 
place and includes a procession so held
89. The assembly will be authorized if the 
appropriate  details
90  are  sent  to  the  Commissioner  of  Police
91 .  If  the 
Commissioner does not oppose the assembly then the organizer may apply to a 
Court for an order authorizing the holding of an assembly
92. Authorization is not 
essential  and  lack  of  authorization  does  not  make  a  protest  unlawful.  Such 
authorization  only  grants  protection  from  what  would  have  been  ‘obstruction 
offences’. If a spontaneous protest does not cause an obstruction then the protest 
would appear to be lawful
93.   
 
The New South Wales Supreme Court in Rintoul refused to make a prohibition 
order. It was held, having regard to all the evidence, that there was no reason to 
anticipate a breach of the peace and that the combined interests of the Minister, 
and  any  motorists  who  may  be  inconvenienced,  should  be  subordinated  to 
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89 Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW), s 22 (emphasis added) 
90 Summary Offences Act 1988, s 23 (1) states inter alia: 
(c) the notice contains the following particulars: 
i.  the date on which it is proposed to hold the public assembly, 
ii.  if the proposed public assembly is not a procession, a statement specifying the time and 
place  at  which  it  is  intended  that  persons  gather  to  participate  in  the  proposed  public 
assembly, 
iii.  if the proposed public assembly is a procession, a statement specifying the time at which it 
is intended that the procession commence and the proposed route of the procession and, if 
it is intended that the procession should stop at places along that route for the purpose of 
enabling persons participating in the procession to be addressed or for any other purpose, a 
statement specifying those places, 
iv.  The purpose for which the proposed public assembly is to be held, 
v.  Such other particulars as may be prescribed, and 
(d) The notice specifies the number of persons who are expected to be participants in the 
proposed public assembly. 
91 As defined in Summary Offences Act 1988, s 22 
92 Summary Offences Act 1988, s 26 
93 Summary Offence Act 1988, s 24 states: 
If an authorized public assembly is held substantially in accordance with the particulars 
furnished with respect to it under section 23 (1) (c) or, if those particulars are amended by 
agreement between the Commissioner and the organizer, in accordance with those 
particulars as amended and in accordance with any prescribed requirements, a person is 
not, by reason of any thing done or omitted to be done by the person for the purpose only 
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freedom  of  expression  and  assembly
94 .  Simpson  J  pointed  out  that  the 
authorization of the protest granted only limited protection and the immunity from 
prosecution would not apply where there was any violence or criminal damage
95. 
 
In conclusion, the Australian regulatory experience is one of gradual evolution and 
to  some  degree  built  on  a  consensus  surrounding  the  need  for  protest  and 
demonstrations, despite the absence of a constitutionally guaranteed right. Where 
the States impose relatively onerous notification requirements  (as in Tasmania), 
there is little case law to suggest that there are any problems with the practical 
application of this regulation
96. At the other end of the spectrum, the voluntary 
systems seem to function adequately, providing an equitable framework based 
around consultation with all of those who have an interest in peaceful protest
97.  
 
When  considering  the  four  States  employing  modern  permission  systems, 
Douglas notes that these are generally regarded as operating well
98. This is in 
spite of the inherently cumbersome nature of regulatory systems, especially when 
faced with spontaneous protests. Yet, there is no case law to suggest any real 
difficulty. The acceptance of the English common law powers to deal with breach 
of the peace and powers to disperse a demonstration where serious disorder is 
threatened mean that there are provisions to deal with protestors short of arrest
99.  
The disharmony of the American experiences does not appear to be reflected in 
Australia despite the piecemeal and indeed often arbitrary nature of regulation. 
Regulation in England: Part 2 of the Public Order Act 
1986 
 
The English legal system employs a hybrid mixture of statute and common law to 
provide the regulatory atmosphere in which protest and low-level public order co-
exist. Whether one accepts that there was a stand alone right to protest before 
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1998,
100 there  is  little  doubt  that  the  combination  of  Articles  10  and  11  of  the 
ECHR as given further effect by the Human Rights Act 1998 means that “there is 
now a fully fledged right to protest” within English law
101. This means that any low-
level public order legislation needs not only to comply with the terms of Articles 10 
and 11 but also the certainty requirements of Article 7 of the ECHR. 
 
Although  not  necessarily  recognized  as  a  free  standing  right,  there  is  a  rich 
tradition of protest cases within English legal history
102 as Denning LJ stated: 
 
“(It is the) undoubted right of Englishmen to assemble together for the purpose of 
deliberating upon public grievances. Such is the right of assembly. So also is the 
right  to  meet  together,  to  go  in  procession,  to  demonstrate  and  to  protest  on 
matters of public concern. As long as all is done peaceably and in good order, 
without  threats  or  incitement  to  violence  or  obstruction  to  traffic,  it  is  not 
prohibited.”
103 
 
Processions  and  assemblies  are  seen  as  “important  manifestations  of  free 
expression”
104. Prior to the enactment of Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986, the 
power to control and regulate protest in England and Wales was governed by a 
series of disparate common law decisions. Indeed, Lord Bingham described the 
state  of  the  English  common  law  regulating  protest  as  being  “hesitant  and 
negative, permitting that which was not prohibited”
105. 
 
There are a number of key differences between the English regulatory approach 
and that of the other jurisdictions. Throughout the Twentieth Century, the English 
legal system was unencumbered by restrictive “freedom of speech” constitutional 
constraints. Therefore, the common law rules that evolved did so on a case-by-
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case basis
106. Bingham and Denning LJJ separately indicated that a protest would 
only be lawful providing it did not infringe any other law
107.  
 
It may appear somewhat extraneous to reflect upon the common law history of 
protest regulation whilst considering the impact of the ECHR. Nevertheless, the 
development of the common law heavily informed the current regulatory structure. 
The way in which the law relating to the regulation of protest evolved will be briefly 
examined. This will encompass developments under the common law and the 
administrative provisions found within Part 2 of the 1986 Act. This is a key area of 
significance as, although many of the offences for non-compliance are summary 
only  (and  therefore  relatively  minor  in  nature),  the  imposition  of  onerous 
conditions can reduce or neutralize a procession in the way that arresting those 
who behave in a disorderly fashion does not
108. 
 
The  current  regulation  of  protest  draws  a  distinction  between  a  procession  (a 
mobile  demonstration)  and  an  assembly  (a  static  protest).  To  an  extent  this 
structure follows the historical track of the common law. The courts did not so 
much recognize the right to process; instead it was accepted that everyone had 
the right to pass and re-pass along the highway
109. If individuals chose to manifest 
that right with others, it would be lawful providing this did not lead to unlawful 
consequences such as an obstruction of the highway
110 or breach of the peace
111. 
 
The  position  of  assemblies  within  the  common  law  was  a  good  deal  less 
settled
112.  In  Lowdens  v  Keaveney
113,  it  was  held  that  there  was  a  marked 
distinction  between  a  moving  crowd  and  a  stationary  assembly
114.  Perhaps 
because of the religious and ceremonial connections to processions, there were 
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of low-level public order for example s.52 Metropolitan Police Act 1839 empowers the 
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nationally  applicable  provisions  empowering  police  to  control  potentially  violent 
demonstrations included in the Public Order Act 1936. Assemblies were regulated 
on  a  more  ad-hoc  basis  with  local  by-laws  and  regulations  leading  to  much 
uncertainty in both the organization and policing
115. With the coming into force of 
the  Public  Order  Act,  there  was  an  attempt  to  consolidate  the  disparate  and 
piecemeal  common  law  provisions  into  a  codified  model.  This  would  then 
encourage  protesters  and  police  to  engage  in  constructive  dialogue  whereby 
disruption and violence would be minimized
116. 
 
Given the common law background, perhaps the natural expectation would be for 
the regulatory provisions of part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 to be somewhat 
draconian in their scope.  The drafting of the Public Order Act
117, the coming into 
force of the Human Rights Act and the terrorist attacks of the early part of the 
Twenty First Century have coincided to create a turbulent and uncertain time for 
much of the English legal system. Yet despite this tumultuous background, the 
fundamental structure of Part 2 of the 1986 Act has remained largely accepted 
and unchallenged by the Courts. 
Public Processions: An entrenched framework? 
 
The first category of protests dealt with in Part 2 of the 1986 Act is that of public 
processions
118. These are processions that take place on any highway and are at 
a place to which the public or section of the public has access, whether paid for or 
not  paid  for,  as  of  right  or  by  virtue  of  express  or  implied  consent
119 . 
Paradoxically,  there  is  no  definition  within  the  1986  Act  as  to  what  actually 
constitutes  a  procession.  The  common  law  provides  some  assistance;  in 
Flockhart v Robinson
120, it was held that: 
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“A procession is not a mere body of persons; it is a body of persons moving along a 
route.”
121 
 
This was further developed in Kent v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,
122 with 
Denning LJ stating that: 
 
“A public procession is the act of a body of persons marching along in orderly succession 
– see the Oxford English Dictionary. All kinds of processions take place every day up and 
down  the  country  –  carnivals,  weddings,  funerals,  processions  to  the  Houses  of 
Parliament, marches to Trafalgar Square and so forth.”
123 
 
It can be inferred from this definition that a procession must have some sort of 
orderly route. Unlike the definition of an assembly, there is no statutory provision 
as to what will comprise a minimum number of persons on a procession. Nor is 
there any requirement for the procession to be on foot
124; hence the mass cycle 
ride known as Critical Mass falls within the definition of procession
125. 
 
Although  not  defining  the  term  “procession”,  s.11  of  the  1986  Act  imposes  a 
reporting condition, requiring the organizer of the procession to provide advanced 
written notice of most public processions
126. Both the English legal system and 
the  German  VslgG  have  this  embedded  as  a  national  statutory  requirement. 
Within English law, although the requirement is uniform, written notice must be 
submitted to the police authority exercising jurisdiction over the geographical area 
around  the  start  of  the  procession
 127 The  written  notice  must  be  delivered  by 
hand not less than 6 clear days before the date when the procession is due to 
start
128. If it is not reasonably practicable to deliver the notice 6 clear days before, 
then the notice must be delivered as soon as is reasonably practicable
129. 
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The notice requirement arises in three specific circumstances: 
 
S. 11(1)   Written  notice  shall  be  given  in  accordance  with  this  section  of  any 
proposal to hold a public procession 
 
To demonstrate support for or opposition to the views or actions of any 
person
130 or body of persons 
To publicize a cause or campaign 
To mark or commemorate an event. 
 
Where the protest does not come within this list, then there is no need to give 
written  notice.  It  was  held  in  Kay  (FC)  v  Commissioner  of  the  Police  for  the 
Metropolis
131 that s.11(1) applies only to public processions that are intended to 
demonstrate support for any of the above-mentioned reasons
132. This will apply to 
such  things  as  groups  of  school  children  walking  with  the  teacher  and  tourist 
guides
133. Ramblers are also probably excluded unless – as Thornton points out – 
they are using the ramble to make a particular point
134. 
 
S.11(2) does provide that certain types of procession can be exempt from the 
written notice requirement. Processions that are commonly or customarily held in 
the particular police area do not require written notice. Card states that the reason 
for this is that there is an expectation that the police will already know about the 
procession  and  the  planned  route  and  timing
135.    Whilst  this  may  be  true,  the 
White  Paper  prior  to  the  1986  Act
136 makes  it  clear  that  the  framers  of  the 
legislation actually intended this to apply to a limited subset of processions such 
as Remembrance Day commemoration services and other religious parades
137. 
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The early years of the Twenty First Century have seen an upsurge in large-scale 
protests against the decision of the British Government to enter the Iraq war
138. 
The wider concerns about globalization and capitalism have produced a broad 
range of protests, some of which have been held annually. It is clear from the 
decision in Kay
139 that whether a procession is commonly or customarily held will 
largely depend upon the facts of the individual case and the areas of commonality 
between the processions. 
  
Failure to complete a written notice incurs criminal liability
140, although failure to 
comply with the notice requirement will not make the protest itself unlawful
141. In 
contrast to certain Australian States, it should be noted that the case of Abdul
142 
held that the provision of notice does not legitimize the conduct of the protestors 
and provide immunity for offences of “unexceptional behaviour” and obstruction of 
the highway
143. The liability is imposed upon “each of the persons organizing” the 
public procession. By virtue of s.11(10) of the 1986 Act, failure to complete a 
notice is triable as a summary offence and therefore can be seen as a proactive 
but nonetheless distinctly identifiable low-level public order offence.  
 
There are two distinct offences provided within s.11 which are: 
 
S. 11(7)  Where a public procession is held, each of the persons organizing it is 
guilty of an offence if – 
 
The requirements of this section as to notice have not been satisfied, or 
The date when it is held, the time when it starts, or its route, differs from 
the date, time or route specified in the notice.
144 
 
The actus reus of this offence is that the accused is an organizer of the public 
procession and in respect of that public procession either no notice has been 
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given or the procession differs from the notified route. The offence is unusual in 
two distinct respects. The first point to note is that “no act or omission at the 
material  time  on  the  part  of  the  accused  need  be  proved”
145.  Therefore  an 
administrative  oversight,  or  an  error  on  the  part  of  someone  to  whom  the 
responsibility for notification has been delegated will not provide a defence
146.  
 
There are two defences available to a charge under s.11(7). The first requires the 
accused to prove either that he did not know of and neither suspected nor had 
reason to suspect that the notice requirements had not been satisfied or that the 
date differed from the notice
147. The alternate defence
148 is that the accused must 
prove that the differences in the actual date, time and route were either due to 
circumstances  beyond  his  control  or  were  done  with  the  agreement  or  at  the 
behest of the police. Both of these defences are reverse onus provisions
149 and 
there is no case law discussing their specific operation. Indeed it should be noted 
that there is no record of any prosecution occurring under s.11(7)
150. 
Regulating Processions: Conditions and Prohibitions  
 
In addition to the notification requirement, Part 2 of the 1986 Act codified some of 
the  earlier  statutory
151 and  common  law
152 powers  regarding  the  imposition  of 
conditions on a procession and, if circumstances warrant it, an outright prohibition 
of all processions within a geographical area.  The power to impose conditions 
stems from s.12 of the 1986 Act and these conditions can be imposed by “the 
senior police officer”
153, which may mean the most senior officer present at the 
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procession
154. If the conditions are being imposed before the procession then the 
duty is conferred on the chief officer of police
155.  
 
The granting of conditions is dependent on the senior police officer reasonably 
believing that the procession may result in serious disorder, serious damage to 
property, serious disruption to the life of the community
156 or it is the purpose of 
the organizers to effect the intimidation of others with a view to compelling them to 
not do an act they have a right to do or not do one they have a right not to
157. The 
first  condition  is  a  relic  of  the  previous  Public  Order  Act
158 and  the  second 
condition is the logical corollary of the first.  
 
The  third  condition  of  serious  disruption  has  been  the  subject  of  significant 
academic criticism since the inception of the 1986 Act
159, and it remains an area 
of controversy
160. It has been argued that the third condition is vague and over-
broad: 
 
“It  extends  the  basis  for  imposing  a  condition  beyond  the  demands  of  ‘public 
order’…it seems to be based on the preservation of an orderly society, which is a 
different thing.”
161  
 
Therefore, by failing to provide any criteria by which serious disruption can be 
balanced  against  the  rights  of  the  protestors,  the  test  is  broadly  drawn,  as  it 
requires that:  
 
“the senior police officer reasonably believes that “something” may result from the 
procession,  “which  will  seriously  disrupt  the  life  of  community  where  serious 
disruption is being judged according to the standard of a reasonable person.”
162 
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The  notion  of  “serious  disruption  to  the  community”  is  a  concept  that  has  a 
number of definitional black holes. The use of the word ‘community’ is especially 
ill defined:  
 
“How  large  is  a  community  –  if  it  is  too  large,  we  come  dangerously  close  to 
majoritarianism – who comprises it and who decides? Is London a community? Is 
a borough? Is Oxford Street? ... Might it even mean those in the non-protesting 
community – a worrying conclusion surely?” 
163 
 
The fourth criterion is that of intimidation and is designed to deal with those who 
have a malevolent intention behind the protest. Thornton gives the example of a 
Unite Against Fascism (UAF) counter-demonstration to a properly notified English 
Defence  League  (EDL)  march.  The  UAF  march  is  being  held  “with  a  view  to 
compelling them (EDL) not to do something they have a right to do (conduct a 
procession)”
164.  There  must  be  a  reasonable  belief  that  the  purpose  of  the 
organizers is to intimidate others with a view to compelling rather than to simply 
reasonably  believe  there  may  simply  be  some  intimidation.  This  does  provide 
something  of  a  limitation  on  the  occasions  when  conditions  can  be  imposed, 
though the breadth of the third criteria might well over-ride this
165. 
 
The Act does not limit the type of conditions that can be imposed once the chief 
officer has formed the reasonable belief that one of the situations under s.12(1) is 
likely to arise, providing they appear necessary to him to prevent such situations 
arising
166.  The  test  is  a  subjective  one  based  on  the  beliefs  of  the  particular 
officer.  The  wording  of  s.12(1)  implies  that  there  must  be  some  relationship 
between the imposed conditions and the anticipated disorder, damage, disruption 
or  intimidation
167.  It  is  apparent  that  the  breadth  of  discretion  afforded  to  the 
senior police officer is broader than merely re-routing the procession. They may 
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include such things as prohibiting the wearing of masks, alteration of the start and 
finish time and the provision of stewards and first aid
168. The coming in to force of 
the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  means  that  the  imposition  of  arbitrary  and 
disproportionate  conditions  are  likely  to  be  challenged  as  over-burdensome 
restrictions on Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR. 
The Regulation of Procession: Low Level Preventative Offences 
 
There  are  three  offences  that  impose  liability  on  participants.  The  organizer 
commits an offence if he organizes a procession and knowingly fails to comply 
with a condition
169. The actus reus for this offence is for the defendant to be (i) an 
organizer (ii) of a procession where conditions under s.12(1) have been imposed 
(iii) fails to comply with a condition. “Knowingly” doing this is the mens rea for the 
offence, which encompasses actual knowledge as well as wilful blindness
170. This 
is a summary offence punishable by up to three months imprisonment and/or a 
fine
171. There is a similar offence for participating in a procession and knowingly 
fail  to  comply  with  a  condition  which,  upon  summary  conviction,  results  in  a 
fine
172.  The  final  offence  is  of  inciting  someone  knowingly  to  participate  in  a 
procession in breach of a condition. Upon summary conviction, this is punishable 
with up to three months imprisonment and/or a fine
173. It will be a defence for the 
first  two  offences  to  prove  that  non-compliance  with  the  condition  arose  from 
circumstances beyond the defendant’s control
174. 
 
In extreme circumstances, where the chief officer of police reasonably believes 
the existing powers to impose conditions will not be sufficient to prevent serious 
disorder, s.13 Public Order Act 1986 imposes a duty on him to apply for an order 
banning all processions or a class of processions within a district or part of a 
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district
175. The order is made by the local authority and is subject to the consent of 
the Home Secretary
176.  
 
The  requirement  of  serious  disorder  means  that  this  regulatory  provision  falls 
outside of the ambit of this investigation. Nonetheless, the offences for organizing, 
participating and inciting others to participate in processions in contravention of 
conditions apply mutatis mutandis to processions that have been banned
177. The 
specific defences that exist for the offences under s.12 do not apply to offences 
under s.13. These offences have a penalty upon summary conviction of up to 
three months imprisonment and/or a fine
178. Any procession that occurs having 
been banned, may well involve the commission of serious public order offences. It 
is, therefore, unsurprising that there is no recorded evidence of any convictions 
under s.13 of the 1986 Act. 
 
There is no power within English law to ban an individual procession. This is in 
keeping  with  the  American  position  but  at  variance  with  the  Australian  and 
German regulatory framework. Conditions amounting to a ban (or indeed which 
are manifestly excessive) are liable to be challenged by Judicial Review
179. The 
imposition of over-burdensome conditions may, collaterally, lead to a defence to 
criminal proceedings to offences under s.12
180. Significantly, despite challenges to 
the nature of the conditions imposed there has not been any challenge to the 
underpinning framework of regulation of processions. The ECtHR has accepted 
that  a  blanket  ban  on  all  processions  despite  being  “ill-targeted  in  nature”  is 
compatible with the Convention rights to free expression and free assembly
181. In 
CARAF  v  UK
182,  a  ban  on  marches  imposed  to  prevent  a  National  Front 
procession  also  had  the  effect  of  prohibiting  CARAF  from  marching.  The 
European  Court  held  that  that  this  was  a  necessary  measure  to  prevent 
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175 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/aug/20/english-defence-league-bradford-
ban?INTCMP=SRCH ‘March by English Defence League banned’ 20.08.2010 accessed on 
03.05.2011 
176 Public Order Act 1986, s 13(2) 
177 Public Order Act 1986, ss 13(7)–(9) 
178 Public Order Act 1986, ss 13 (11)–(13) 
179 See Hadfield “Public Order, Police Powers and Judicial Review” [1993] Crim LR 915 
180 Where there is procedural ultra vires conditions may be impugned by way of a defence see 
Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] 2 All ER 203, HL 
181 Mead (n 5) 170 
182 Christians Against Racism and Fascism (CARAF) v UK (App 8440/78) (1980) DR 138 	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disorder
183.  Similarly, the imposition of both a notification requirement
184 and the 
imposition of conditions
185 have been held to be compatible with Articles 10 & 11 
of the ECHR. 
Defining and Regulating Assemblies 
 
The disparate laws relating to public order prior to the inception of the 1986 Act 
had no provision for dealing with public assemblies. As a result of “major disorder 
associated  with  static  assemblies”,
186 s.14  of  the  Public  Order  Act  contains 
provisions for the imposition of conditions as to the location, duration and number 
of  attendees  at  the  assembly  with  punitive  punishment  for  those  who  do  not 
conform  to  the  conditions.  There  are  significant  differences  between  the 
regulation of processions and assemblies. There is no power within the statute to 
ban an assembly, although this may be obviated by the imposition of onerous 
conditions
187.  
 
Another key difference is, unlike processions, there is no notification requirement 
for assemblies. The reason for this, as Card highlights, is that at the inception of 
the  Act,  it  was  decided,  due  to  the  large  number  of  public  meetings  that  “the 
administrative burden would far outweigh the information gain”
188. This approach 
to  assemblies  contrasts  with  the  approach  of  the  German  jurisdiction
189 which, 
under §14 VslgG, requires the relevant authorities to be notified of processions 
and meetings 48 hours before their commencement
190. As can be seen from the 
American jurisprudence, the outright banning of an assembly, whilst theoretically 
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183 In Bukta v Hungary (App 25691/04) decision of 17
th July 2007 it was held by the ECtHR that 
there must be a serious danger to public disorder beyond the level of minor disturbance inevitably 
caused by an assembly in a public place 
184 Ziliberberg v Moldova (app 61821/00) decision of 24 May 2004 
185 Heikkila v Finland (app 25472/94) decision of 15 May 1996 
186 Thornton (n 16) 114 
187 The common law has permitted the banning of public meetings where a breach of the peace is 
likely to occur based on previous occurrences, Duncan v Jones [1936] 1 KB 218 although in the 
light of the influence of the Human Rights Act 1998 it is not certain whether this conclusion would 
have been reached were the case to be decided now.  
188 Review of Public Order Law (Cmnd 9510. 1985) para 5.4; in Card (n 57) 236 
189 For full details on the Versammlungsgesetz and the law regulating protest within Germany 
please see p 222 
190 See §14-15 VslgG 	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possible from a practical perspective, would almost certainly fail should any of the 
States seek to pursue such a course
191. 
 
S.16 of the 1986 does provide a definition of a public assembly. It is defined as an 
assembly of 2 or more persons
192 in a public place, which is wholly or partly open 
to the air
193. The similarities between this and the German regulatory framework 
are striking and will be discussed below
194. There has been much speculation as 
to  the  limits  of  a  public  assembly.  In  Roffey
195,  it  was  held  that  an  assembly 
means no more than a gathering of persons and one that could be stationary or in 
motion. Therefore, a protest outside an embassy where a group walk round in 
circles would be an assembly
196.  Thornton speculates that an assembly which 
takes place in a marquee with its sides up (but not down) is likely to be classed as 
a public assembly, whereas a hall with its doors open on a warm day would not 
be considered as being “at least partly open to the air”
197. 
 
It is more likely that the status of the protest will be judged on a case-specific 
basis. It was conceded in Austin that: 
 
“There  is  room  for  uncertainty  as  to  whether  a  group  is  at  any  given  time  a 
procession or an assembly, or perhaps both at once.”
198 
 
As  stated  above,  there  is  no  requirement  for  the  organizer  of  an  assembly  to 
provide notice. The power to impose conditions on an assembly is bestowed upon 
“the senior police officer”
199. This officer can impose conditions if, having regard to 
all of the circumstances of the assembly, he reasonably believes that one of the 
following  may  result:  serious  public  disorder,  serious  damage  to  property  or 
serious disruption to the life of the community
200 or the purpose of the organizers 
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191 Carroll v Princess Anne, 393 US 175 (1968) see above, p 196 
192 Originally this number was 20 however this has since been amended by Anti-Social Behaviour 
Act 2003, s 57 
193 Public Order Act 1986, s 16 
194 See p 220 onwards 
195 DPP v Roffey [1959] Crim LR 283, DC 
196 Card (n 57) 237 
197 Thornton (n 16) 114 
198 Austin v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5; [2009] 1 A.C. 564 (HL)  
199 Public Order Act 1986, s 14(1) 
200 Public Order Act 1986, s 14(1)(a) 	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is the intimidation of others with a view to compelling them to not do an act they 
have a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do
201. These very 
closely mirror the pre-requisites for imposing conditions under s.12 above. 
 
The senior officer must be present at the scene
202 and this theoretically can mean 
a police constable can exercise the power. In reality, the officer will be part of the 
“Gold”, “Silver”, “Bronze” command structure used by police when dealing with 
public order events
203. The power to impose conditions depends upon a public 
assembly in fact being held or intended. It is not sufficient for the senior officer 
present to reasonably suspect that an assembly is underway
204.  
 
Unlike the power under s.12, s.14 does not provide an unlimited scope for the 
police to impose conditions. In order to be compatible with the rights of those who 
assemble  under  the  ECHR,  the  conditions  must  be  both  necessary  for  the 
prevention  of  one  of  the  state  of  affairs  outlined  in  s.14(1)  or  s.14(2).  The 
conditions must also be “proportionate to the legitimate aim of maintaining public 
order”
205. Conditions may not be so onerous as to amount to a de facto ban on 
the procession
206. 
 
The powers to deal with low-level public order during the assembly (and this is 
also true of processions) are not dependent upon the status of the assembly, or 
upon compliance with conditions. The offence of Disorderly Conduct is capable of 
being  committed  in  either  public  or  private
207.  Nonetheless,  the  status  of  the 
assembly does have a bearing on the regulatory violations. As with those under 
ss.11 and 12 of the 1986 Act, these offences are summary only and fall within the 
ambit of low-level public order offences
208.  
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201 Public Order Act 1986, s 14(1)(b) 
202 Public Order Act 1986, s 15 
203http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/enforcement/oemsectio
ne/chapter44 accessed on 2
nd May 2011 
204 Card (n 57) 259 
205 R (on the application of Louis Brehony) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester [2005] EWHC 
640 (Admin); in Thornton (n 16) 117 
206 Thornton (n 16) 118 
207 See s.5(2) Public Order Act 1986 and the related defences in s.5(3)(a) and (b) of the 1986 Act 
208 Public Order Act 1986, ss 14(8)–14(10) 	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The offences relating to the regulation of assemblies are focused upon failing to 
comply with the conditions imposed by police. The first offence arises whereby an 
organizer “knowingly fails to comply with a condition”
209 and carries a maximum 
penalty  of  three  months  imprisonment.  The  legislation  also  provides  for  the 
offence of participating in an assembly
210 and knowingly failing to comply with a 
condition or inciting somebody knowingly to participate in an assembly in breach 
of a condition
211.  
 
As noted above, there appears to be a distinct difference between the structure, 
form and application of the regulatory offences found within Part 2 of the 1986 Act 
in comparison to those under Part 1 of the 1986 Act. The fact that the former 
offences are part of a narrowly drawn framework would appear to deter State 
action around these provisions, with the focus instead being on utilizing the more 
protean s.5 of the 1986 Act. The next part of the discussion will revisit the German 
‘Assembly Law’, providing a contrast with all of the common law jurisdictions. The 
Assembly  Law  not  only  incorporates  sanctions  for  non-compliance  of  the 
regulatory regime, but also criminal offences concerning misbehaviour during the 
protest. In seeking optimal pathways for dealing with low-level public order, it is 
suggested that such an approach has much to admire and is worthy of further 
consideration.  
Versammlungsfreiheit, Brokdorf and German regulation  
 
The  existence  of  frameworks  governing  the  regulation  of  protest  in  the  three 
common  law  jurisdictions  means  that  low-level  public  order  provisions  are 
regularly  deployed  to  counter  disorder  on  protest.  This  serves  to  broaden  the 
ambit of the legislation and add greater uncertainty to both the policing of, and 
participation  in,  a  protest.  The  German  solution  is  to  place  all  protest-related 
matters within a single law. That is not to say there are not local variations. When 
investigating the framework for protest within Germany, it is clear that there is 
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209 Public Order Act 1986, s 14(4) 
210 Public Order Act, s 14(5) with a maximum penalty on summary conviction of a level 3 fine 
provided by s 14(9) 
211 Public Order Act, s 14(6) with a maximum penalty on summary conviction of 3 months 
imprisonment and/or a fine provided by s 14(10) 	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regulation on both a regional and national level. In respect of local protests, each 
city  council  has  bespoke  police  regulations  (Polizeiverordnung
212).  These  lay 
down a layer of regulation varying from an implied regulation through to an explicit 
requirement that anyone seeking to stage an event must seek permission from 
the police
213.  
 
The  basis  of  all  regulation  of  protest  is  found  in  the  Grundgesetz
214.  When 
considering the operation of the GG, it should be noted that each Article of the 
GG offers a scope of protection (Schutzbereich), which establishes which persons 
and actions are to be protected by that right. State activity is then determined with 
reference  to  how  much  it  has  intruded  onto  a  basic  right
215.  At  this  point,  the 
constitutional justification for the State intrusion is assessed. In respect of protest, 
these justifications will be discussed below
216.  
 
The specific Grundrecht relating to the right to protest is Article 8 I GG, which 
states that: 
 
“All Germans shall have the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without 
prior notification or permission. In the case of outdoor assemblies, this right may 
be restricted by or pursuant to a law.”
217 
 
This Article is intended to safeguard freedom of assembly (Versammlungsfreiheit) 
and as such is inherently linked to freedom of communication. Article 5 I 1 GG 
provides inter alia for freedom of speech and states:  
 
“Every person shall have the right to freely express and disseminate his opinions 
in speech, writing and pictures (recht der freien Meinungsäußerung).”
218 
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212 These are actually Polizeiliche Umweltschutz-Verordnung (Police Environmental Regulations 
passed under §10(1) Police Act 1992 see Chapter 2 for further details. 
213 For example Polizeiverordnung der Stadt Wädenswi, Article 15 states that ‘events’ such as 
parades, demonstrations and meetings which occur on public land require the approval of the 
police and indeed gives the Police Board the authority to prohibit events on private land if there is 
high probability of disturbance to public order 
214  The Basic Law, herein referred to by the abbreviation GG 
215 Grundrehtseingriff, or intrusion into a basic right, at its simplest will be the state directly 
interfering and intending to interfere with that right. Nigel Foster & Satish Sule, German Legal 
System and Law (4
th edn OUP 2010) 232 
216 See below at p 231 
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This  right  applies  to  every  person  and  covers  both  statements  of  fact  and 
opinion
219. Where something is portrayed as a fact but is demonstrably false, such 
as holocaust denial, this will not enjoy protection under Article 5 I GG
220. The 
protection is in line with the American model of speech protection and covers 
speech  on  banners,  posters,  and  even  mannequins  and  other  such  physical 
representations
221.  Having  established  the  individual  right  to  free  expression, 
Article 8 I GG redefines this for a collective or group demonstration
222.  
 
This  is  not  an  unqualified  right  to  protest  and  has  two  significant  caveats. 
Accepting  that  an  unchecked  right  to  assemble  for  groups  would  pose  a 
significant  risk  of  public  disorder,  Article  8  I  limits  the  scope  to  “peaceful  and 
unarmed assembly”. This direct constitutional limitation
223 means that any armed 
assembly  or  non-peaceful  assembly  will  be  automatically  excluded  from 
protection. The exact scope of this protection is discussed below with reference to 
the various legislative provisions that operate. 
 
At this level of Basic Law, the German system does not differentiate between 
processions and assemblies
224. German Basic Law does differentiate between a 
public and a private assembly. As can be seen from the terms of Art. 8 I, there 
can  be  no  lawful  regulation  or  notification  requirement  for  private  assemblies, 
whereas  public  assemblies  can  be  “restricted  by  or  pursuant  to  a  law”  This 
reflects the position under English law whereby it is only public processions
225 that 
are subject to the notification requirements
226. 
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218 Art. 5(I) GG actually provides protection for seven different basic types of communication for 
further details    
219 Foster (n 215) 253 
220 ibid 253 
221 Winfred Brugger, “The Treatment of Hate Speech in German Constitutional Law (Pt 1)” (2003) 
4 GLJ 1, 4  
222 Foster (n 215) 258 
223 Verfassungsunmittelbare Schranken 
224 cf Public Order Act 1986. ss 11-14; It should be noted that the Versammlungsgesetz does 
however categorize protests as Assemblies and Processions, though this does not make a 
material difference 
225 Public Processions are defined under Public Order Act, s 16 
226 Public Order Act 1986, s 11(1) 	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Versammlungsgesetz: The Lawful Restriction of Public Protest 
 
The  mechanism  by  which  German  law  seeks  to  regulate  protest  is  the 
Versammlungsgesetz
227. The relevant provisions can be found in the law of the 
Federal  Assembly  (VslgG).  The  law  on  assembly  and  protest  was  one  of  the 
areas affected by Föderalismusreform
228. Some States have chosen to draft their 
own legislative provisions
229, whilst others have not and continued to apply the 
law of the Federal Assembly. This discussion will concentrate upon the generally 
applicable VslgG unless it is stated otherwise
230: 
 
“In  spite  of  its  high  rank,  freedom  of  assembly  is  not  guaranteed  without 
reservation. Art 8 GG merely guarantees the right "to assemble peacefully and 
without  weapons"  and  furthermore  makes  this  right  subject  to  the  statutory 
reservation for events in the open air. The Constitution thereby takes into account 
the fact that for the exercise of freedom of assembly in the open air there exists, 
because of the contact with the outside world, a special need for regulation on the 
one hand to create the realistic prerequisites for exercise and on the other hand to 
preserve sufficiently the conflicting interests of others.”
231 
 
The above passage, taken from the seminal Brokdorf judgment, illustrates the 
tension inherent within public order law. The VslgG seeks to ensure compliance 
with Article 8 I GG balanced against the need to ensure effective policing of any 
potential public disorder. To that effect, §20 VslgG states that the fundamental 
right of Article 8 GG is to be limited by the provisions of this piece of legislation. 
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227 ‘Versammlungsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 15. November 1978 (BGBl. I 
S. 1789), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 8. Dezember 2008 (BGBl. I S. 2366) 
geändert worden ist’ translated as ‘Assembly Act in the version published on 15 November 1978 
(Federal Law Gazette I p. 1789), which was last amended by Article 2 of the Act of 8 December 
2008 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 2366)’.  
228 Literally translated as federalism reform. This was an amendment to the Constitution of Federal 
Republic of Germany that was designed to accelerate the passage of legislation. As a result of 
this, the states within the federation were granted their own powers to legislate on Assembly 
powers. For further details see Arthur B Gunlicks, “German Federalism and Recent Reform 
Efforts” (2003) 6 GLJ 1283  
229 The Bavarian Assembly, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony and Lower Saxony have all drafted their own 
regulations appertaining to Assembly and Processions. 
230 It should be noted that the most controversial of these new State-based regulations, the 
Bavarian Assembly Act, has been made the subject of a judicial challenge 
(Verfassungsbeschwerde). This will be discussed in further detail below in context of §14 VslgG 
231 BVerfGE 69, 315 - Brokdorf Decision of the First Senate 1 BvR 233, 341/81 f Decision of 14 
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Nonetheless, §1 VslgG states that everyone has the right to hold and participate 
in public assemblies and processions.
232 This right does not extend to those who 
seek to abuse the freedoms laid down in Article 5 GG and Article 8 GG in order to 
combat the free, democratic, basic order
233. Similarly, those who participate in or 
organize terrorism-related, extreme right wing or criminally motivated protest
234 
will not be covered by §1(1) above. 
  
§14 VslgG imposes a requirement that notice of a public procession or assembly 
must be provided to the authorities. This notice should be given at least 48 hours 
before
235. This is a notification process similar to that required under s.11 of the 
Public  Order  Act  1986.  There  is  an  additional  requirement  for  every  public 
assembly and procession to specify the name of an organizer
236. This is a slight 
difference to the approach of s.11(7) of the 1986 Act, which imposes liability on 
any one who can be identified as an organizer
237, whereas §14 seeks a named 
individual.  
 
On 1
st October 2008, the Bavarian Assembly Act (BayVersG) came into force
238. 
Article 3(3), inter alia, imposed a reporting requirement similar to §14 VslgG but 
with  a  more  onerous  requirement  of  including  the  place,  time,  name  of  the 
organizer  and  the  subject  matter  of  the  demonstration.  The  organizer  of  the 
protest was also made subject to a serious of duties and obligations to provide 
significant personal information upon request from the authorities
239. Additionally, 
it became the responsibility of the organizer to ensure that the meetings do not 
become violent and the organizer is held responsible for the peaceful conduct of 
the  protest
240.  Perhaps  of  most  significance  is  the  authorization  for  police  to 
collect and retain large amounts of information about protesters in line with Article 
9 BayVersG.  
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Thirteen  interested  groups,  including  trades  unions,  political  parties  and  other 
non-governmental organizations joined together to file a constitutional complaint 
with the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht herein referred 
to as BVerfG)
241. In February 2009, the BVerfG found in favour of the applicants 
and an interim order suspended a number of provisions. The BVerfG was highly 
critical of the onerous requirements put on the organizer and also on the police 
collection of intelligence under Article 9 BayVersG
242. The swift response of the 
BVerfG  was  significant,  illustrating  that  the  Constitutional  Court  is  prompt  to 
intervene in respect of States that try to impose overbearing conditions on protest 
when Article 8 I GG issues are engaged. The protection afforded was clear and 
unambiguous, forcing the Bavarian State legislators to redraft the legislation
243. 
Exemptions, Conditions and Spontaneous Protest within VslgG 
 
As with the English legislation, §17 VslgG provides what appears to be a closed 
list  of  processions  and  assemblies  that  do  not  need  to  provide  notice.  These 
include  religious  processions,  pilgrimages,  ordinary  funerals,  trains  of  wedding 
parties and traditional folk festivals. There is provision also within VslgG for the 
posting of police officers in the procession or assembly
244. It is noticeable that tour 
guides  and  large  numbers  of  schoolchildren
245 are  not  mentioned  on  this  list, 
although  it  is  possible  to  speculate  that  those  examples  were  not  within  the 
contemplation of the legislators. From an English perspective, s.11(1) of the 1986 
Act  specifies  a  list  of  criteria  the  satisfaction  of  which  engages  the  reporting 
requirement.  §14  VslgG  has  no  such  requirement:  all  public  assemblies  and 
processions are covered
246.  
 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  basic  right  in  Article  8  GG  I,  the  implication  is  that 
meetings that are open to the public yet held in private
247 should be unfettered by 
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242 BVerfG Press Release No 17/2009 of 27 February 2009 
243 See §3 ÄndG (Amendment Act) of 22. April 2010 
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246 §17 VslgG does detail some isolated examples of when a procession may not come within the 
terms of §14 but these are very specific and largely concern religious ceremonies. 
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any State requirements for prior notification and there should not be any need for 
the  organizers  to  seek  permission.  §5  VslgG  interferes  with  this  right  by 
prohibiting  meetings  that  fall  within  the  §1(2)  exceptions  outlined  above
248. 
Meetings are also prohibited where the organizer and participants are to carry 
weapons  or  have  access  to  such  weapons
249 .  The  English  law  has  long 
recognized the right to hold public meetings
250 although the Public Order Act 1986 
provides no regulation of public meetings held indoors or in closed premises
251. 
 
§5 VslgG refers to meetings that are in private, which is a unique category across 
the jurisdictions in respect of the regulation of protest. The provisions that allow 
for the setting of conditions in relations to a protest provide clear resonance with 
the approach adopted in other jurisdictions
252. It seems to be uniformly accepted 
across  the  legal  systems  under  consideration  that  conditions
253,  which  are 
designed  to  protect  both  the  protestors  and  the  general  public,  are  wholly 
compatible with principles of free speech. §15 VslgG permits the imposition of 
conditions in order to ensure public safety or ensuring that the protest does not 
disturb public order
254. There are no conditions listed within §15, though it has 
been recognized by the BVerfG that any conditions and special measures must 
be  consistent  with  the  threat  posed  to  public  disorder
255.  Although  outside  the 
scope of low-level disorder, the range of measures can include the deployment of 
water  canons
256 in  areas  of  widespread  disorder,  something  that  has  been 
rejected by the British government as having the potential to erode the face-to-
face engagement necessary for policing protests
257.  
 
§15  does  not  only  permit  conditions  to  be  imposed;  it  does  –  in  certain 
circumstances – endow the local authorities with the power to actually prohibit the 
assembly prior to it taking place or disperse it once it is underway. This prohibition 
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250 Ex parte Lewis (1888) 21 QBD 191, 196 
251 Thornton (n 16) 119 
252 See Public Order Act 1986, s 12 
253 See for example the conditions imposed by authorities on the demonstrators in Snyder v 
Phelps. See p 250 for details 
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or dispersal of an assembly will only be lawful if a number of conditions have been 
met
258. The principal consideration will be if there is imminent danger to public 
safety  directly  attributable  to  the  procession  or  assembly  that  is  due  to  take 
place
259. Given the sensitivity of the German legal system to neo-Nazi groups
260, 
the  BVerfG  will  only  accept  the  banning  of  such  processions  where  concrete 
threats of criminal offences have been shown to exist. This decision illustrates the 
harmony  between  the  BVerfG,  GG  and  the  ECHR,  as  can  be  seen  in  the 
judgment of the ECtHR in CARAF v UK
261 where it was held: 
 
“A general ban on demonstrations can only be justified if there is a real danger of 
their resulting disorder which cannot be prevented by less stringent measures.”
 262 
 
There is no mention within the VslgG of spontaneous protests
263, but this was to 
change as a result of the Brokdorf judgment of the BVerfG. In February 1981, 
citizens’ action groups in the Brokdorf region called for demonstrations on 28
th 
February against the expansion of nuclear power and the building of an atomic 
power  station.  The  police  had  intelligence  that  50,000  demonstrators  were 
expected  and  that  some  would  use  force,  including  violently  occupying  and 
potentially damaging the construction site. The local authority issued a general 
ban on all protests within 210km of the site. When the organizers came to notify 
the authorities of the intended protest, they were informed of the general ban on 
protests within the area
264.  
 
The organizers filed a constitutional complaint with the BVerfG arguing inter alia 
that  the  blanket  ban  was  unconstitutional.  The  subsequent  judgment  of  the 
BVerfG  in  this  case  was  far  reaching  in  terms  of  the  right  to  protest  within 
Germany and indeed defines the scope of Article 8 I GG.
265 The court held that 
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the fundamental right to protest is granted by the constitution through the terms of 
Article 8 I GG and not through the overly restrictive Assembly Act. It was held that 
the right to spontaneous protest was essential to the manifestation of Article 8 I 
GG.
266 The  BVerfG  held  that  there  would  be  occasions  where  current  events 
demand  an  instantaneous  demonstration.  Prohibiting  or  dispersing  an  active 
protest would place an unnecessary burden on the freedom outlined in Article 8 I 
GG.  
 
Despite exercising great vigilance in the oversight of such bans, the BVerfG has 
not yet overturned §5 VslgG or §15 VslgG. The reasoning behind this is that the 
legislation  impinges  upon  meetings  and  procession  only  when  the  purpose  of 
these meetings conflict with other aspects of the GG
267. In respect of dealing with 
disorder, it would appear that the focus of the German system regulation protest 
has little to do with the impact of the events of September 11
th 2001 and much 
more  to  do  with  the  events  of  1945.  In  that  sense  it  is  unique  amongst  the 
jurisdictions considered within this inquiry. 
Removing Section 5 from the sphere of Protest 
 
This findings of the research contained within this chapter illustrates that there are 
alternatives to the broad ranging activity prosecuted under s.5 of the 1986 Act. 
This is achieved by means of a conceptual analysis of the way in which each 
jurisdiction  constructs  the  legal  framework  regulating  protest.  The  notion  of 
content-neutrality forming the basis of regulation was highlighted, with the First 
Amendment in America being the focal point. Such a concept is, however, by no 
means unique to that jurisdiction. The majority of the VslgG is content-neutral, as 
is Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 in England and the various permission 
systems within Australia. None of the jurisdictions draw a distinction between the 
various types of groupings who process and assemble.   
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It is recognized within the English, American and Australian jurisdictions that no 
specific powers to deal with low-level disorder on a protest exists. The English 
solution is to utilize the general powers to deal with public disorder enumerated 
within Part 1 of the 1986 Act. As has been established in the previous chapters, 
and indeed is implicit within the research hypothesis underpinning this thesis, s.5 
of  the  1986  Act  is  an  inherently  content-based  provision.  When  considered 
alongside the model of the “public order theatre” elucidated at the start of the 
chapter,  the  use  of  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  within  a  protest  confers  a  significant 
influence  upon  the  “audience”  of  the  message.  If  an  individual  is  threatened, 
abused or insulted by the speech (or placard) of a protestor and as a result feels 
harassment alarm or distress, then the offence under s.5 is complete.  
 
Australia  and  America  similarly  tend  to  utilize  the  various  disorderly  conduct 
provisions to counter low-level disorder within a protest. In America, the disorderly 
conduct provisions are subordinate to the constitutional requirement of the First 
Amendment and the courts will not uphold any arrest, which is made in regard of 
the content of the message. Germany meanwhile has the provisions of the VslgG, 
a  statute  that  deals  with  all  aspects  of  protests,  from  regulation  through  to 
prohibition. As detailed in the previous chapter, this includes bespoke, low-level 
disorder  provisions  designed  to  deal  with  disorder  at  protests.  The  offence  of 
violence on a protest as defined in §21 VslgG provides an example of how a 
bespoke public disorder protest-based offence might operate
268. 
Protecting Protestors: Adapting the German Assembly Act 
 
The regulatory offences contained within ss. 11-14A of the 1986 Act are similar in 
nature to those found in Part 4 of the VslgG in Germany
269. They are also broadly 
comparable to offences relating to the modern permission systems and permit 
regulatory  systems  within  Australian  States.  There  is  a  paucity  of  case  law 
relating to these offences, and this indicates that either no procession organizer 
has ever defied a police imposed condition (which is implausible) or that once the 
conditions  are  broken,  police  tend  to  prosecute  using  alternative  (and  more 
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flexible) public order legislation. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to confirm or 
disprove this hypothesis 
 
The regulation of protest within England under Part 2 of the 1986 Act can be 
juxtaposed against the broadly drafted offences to be found in Part 1. In Kay
270, 
Sedley  LJ  stated  that  it  was  erroneous  to  talk  about  unlawful  processions  or 
assemblies.  Instead,  the  low-level  offences  under  s.11-13  provide  criminal 
sanctions for individuals refusing to comply with the regulatory regime laid down 
in Part 2 of the 1986 Act
271.  Where persons on the procession or at the assembly 
behave  in  an  ‘unlawful’  manner,  the  police  will  resort  to  the  more  ambiguous 
provisions found in either s.5 of the 1986 Act or the utilization of the common law 
powers to deal with breach of the peace.  
 
The regulatory provisions under Part 2 of the 1986 Act serve to provide additional 
low-level powers for the police. Unlike s.5 and s.4A of the 1986 Act, however, the 
low-level  offences  have  a  narrow  focus  and  can  be  genuinely  described  as 
preventative in nature. As with the offence under s.11, it is instructive that, unlike 
s.5, there is no evidence of their widespread use. The regulation of processions 
and assemblies is not unique within the four jurisdictions. Germany has adopted 
this distinction within the VslgG
272, although unlike England, there is no practical 
difference in the manner in which the law treats processions and assemblies.  
 
Protestors in England could be protected from the excessive broadness of s.5 of 
the 1986 Act in the following ways.  The creation of an offence along the lines of 
§21  OWiG  would  create  a  content-neutral  way  of  dealing  with  those  who 
threatened to or actually did bring violence or the threat of violence to a protest. S. 
11 of the 1986 Act could then be amended to provide for immunity from s.5 for all 
protests for which notification had been received. This immunity would not stretch 
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to those offences that have an aggravated factor under the Crime and Disorder 
Act 1998
273. This echoes the approach of the New South Wales legislature
274.  
Conclusion 
 
The frameworks examined within this chapter have provided a “closed system” 
inside which the various low-level public order provisions can be deployed. The 
importance of these frameworks to the various jurisdictions is clear: a proactive 
mechanism for managing protest means that disorder will be kept to a minimum 
and the deployment of low-level public order offences will be similarly reduced. 
Such  an  approach  would  provide  the  alternative  to  criminality  suggested  by 
Simester and Sullivan in the original research hypothesis
275. 
 
The regulation of protest in Australia is one of a gradual evolution of consensus. 
The  English  framework  for  managing  protest  remains  unaltered  despite  the 
“further effect” granted to the ECHR following the passing of the Human Rights 
Act 1998. The approach of the English and Australian courts in terms of balancing 
the competing rights of different actors within the public order arena contrasts 
starkly with the robust defence of free speech within the American jurisdiction. 
Within America, all legislation operates in the shadow of the First Amendment. 
This cultural and legal attitude would be difficult to transplant into a different legal 
system not attenuated to the specific constitutional tradition of the United States. 
It is suggested, however, that the German Assembly law, VslgG is a model worthy 
of emulation with relatively little constitutional calibration necessary. The structure 
of the VslgG has elements of commonality with Part 2 of the 1986 Act within 
England. A key difference between the two regimes is that the VslgG covers the 
behaviour  of  all  protestors,  whereas  the  English  provision  provides  criminal 
sanctions against organizers, preferring instead to deploy the regular criminal law 
together with the general offences under Part 1 of the 1986 Act. 
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Chapter Seven: 
 
Public Order, Political Protest and 
The War on Terror 
 
Introduction to Chapter Seven 
 
It was stated at the start of Chapter Two
1 that a number of societal drivers had 
informed  the  current  framework  of  low-level  public  order  within  the  four 
jurisdictions under consideration.  The terrorist attacks on September 11
th 2001 in 
the US
2 and the subsequent War on Terror
3 has had a “profound impact upon civil 
liberties and civil rights”
4, specifically within England and Wales and the US. Any 
recommendations for change to the low-level public order arrangements within 
England and Wales will need to take such a significant impact into account. This 
chapter will examine the developments within the low-level public order law since 
the attacks of September 11
th 2001 and ascertain whether any causal nexus can 
be  established  between  these  events  and  any  transformation  of  either  the 
framework for protest or the actual low-level public order offences themselves.  
 
 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1 See p 31 
2 It should also be noted that there was terrorist attack on London on July 7
th 2005; however this 
was part of the ongoing state of affairs, hence the starting point for the investigation being 9/11   
3 The scope of the War on Terror was made explicit in the speech made by President George W. 
Bush on 1
st May 2003 delivered from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln in which he declared 
the military phase of the Iraq invasion had ended. In this speech he stated that overthrowing 
Saddam Hussein was “one victory in a War on terror that began on September 11
th 2001, and still 
goes on.” Quoted in Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism, (2
nd Edn, Sage 2006) 25; It was 
reported that the Obama Administration would not continue to use the phrase, (Guardian, 
25/03/2009 available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/25/obama-war-terror-overseas-
contingency-operations) however it remains a useful term to describe the period of time in which 
the respective governments enacted significant amounts of anti-terrorism and related legislation. 
4 Christopher Dunn, “Balancing the Right to Protest in the aftermath of September 11.” (2005) 40 
Harv CR-CL L Rev 327, 327 	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Countering Low-Level disorder: Broadening the Focus 
 
It is axiomatic to suggest that the principal focus of the changes within each of the 
jurisdictions will be in the area of counter-terrorism law as opposed to that of low-
level public order. Nonetheless, as has been established, societal drivers do have 
an  impact  upon  low-level  public  order.  This  discussion  will  both  highlight  and 
conceptualize those changes in respect of the jurisdictions under consideration. It 
may be that in one or more of the jurisdictions there is no palpable change, while 
other legal systems will have undergone significant transmutation.  
  
From an English perspective, there will be some broadening out of the meaning of 
low-level public order. This will necessitate evaluation of the common law powers 
to deal with breach of the peace
5. Additional offences, involving the regulation of 
protest around Parliament
6, will also be considered when building up a conceptual 
model of the contemporary operation of low-level public order within England and 
Wales.  This  will  provide  insight  into  whether  the  regulation  of  protest  is  being 
unduly influenced by the “normalization” of emergency laws to deal with issues 
specifically arising out of the War on Terror
7. 
 
The  English  jurisdictional  approach  is  heavily  rooted  in  the  criminal  law,  but 
despite the appearance of codification
8, there is, in fact a hydra of multifarious 
provisions.  The  analysis  will  look  at  the  various  legislative  and  common  law 
provisions utilized by police during a protest to deal with low-level disorder. It will 
attempt to evaluate the approach of the courts to these low-level provisions and 
examine how they have affected protest against the war on terror. 
Addressing the underlying hypothesis: Reform in Context 
 
Such an investigation will encompass the themes explored in the previous chapter 
relating  to  the  application  of  public  order  law  by  the  police  when  dealing  with 
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5 Existing as one of the oldest common law provisions within the English legal systems, Breach of 
the Peace was codified in the case of R v Howell QB 416; [1981] 3 WLR 501; [1981] 3 All ER 383; 
(1981) 73 Cr App R 31; [1981] Crim LR 697; (1981) 125 SJ 462 see p 258 
6 Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005, s 132-138 
7 For the latest discussion of the issue of the perils of normalization see PAJ Waddington, 
“Slippery Slopes and Civil Libertarian Pessimism” (2005) 15 Policing and Society 353 
8 By virtue of the Public Order Act 1986 	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protest
9. Such an examination of wider low-level powers, whilst retaining the focus 
upon the flaws within s.5 of the 1986 Act, is essential to any assessment of the 
state  of  low-level  public  order  in  England.  Within  a  broader  context,  such  a 
development  will  facilitate  further  comparative  insight  into  case  law  of  all 
provisions  that  fall  within  the  ambit  of  low-level  public  order.  The  research 
hypothesis, that s.5 is flawed, is further underpinned by the attitude of the courts 
within England and Wales in the years following the terrorist attacks. They state 
that they are eager to promote the rights of protestors
10, but this is rarely at the 
expense of challenging public order legislation
11. As much of the popular protest 
that has occurred in England and Wales has been focused on the military action 
in Iraq and the War on Terror, the attitude of the courts to cases relating to protest 
on these matters will be examined.  
 
As has been established, The Human Rights Act 1998 puts in place a specific 
duty
12 on  all  public  bodies  to  act  in  a  way  which  is  compliant  with  the  rights 
enshrined in the ECHR. As such, courts and police alike have to be ever more 
mindful  of  the  rights  provided  under  Article  10  and  Article  11.    These  Articles 
incorporate qualifications that allow the state to restrict the rights of the individual 
in the interests of national security, providing the restrictions are proportionate and 
necessary in a democratic society
13. In England, there has been something of an 
attitudinal shift amongst the judiciary. The traditional orthodoxy was that judges 
were  unwilling  to  interfere  (and  in  some  cases  even  enquire)  where  national 
security issues are raised by the state
14. The apparent threat to civil liberties after 
the commencement of the war on terror has seen the English judiciary taking a 
much more interventionist approach in respect of anti-terrorism issues
15.  
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9 See Chapters Two and Three for the application of low-level public order outside of protest 
10 See particularly the judgment of Lord Carswell in R (Laporte) v CC Gloucester Constabulary 
[2007] 2 AC 105 whereby he stated ‘in a country which prides itself on the degree of liberty 
available to all citizens the law must take this curtailment of her freedom of action seriously’  [para 
92] 
11 See the decision in Laporte and contrast with the decision in Austin v Commissioner of the 
Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKHL 5; [2009] 1 A.C. 564 (HL) 
12 Human Rights Act 1998, s 6 
13 Article 10(2) and Article 11(2) respectively 
14 See for example R v SSHD ex parte Hosenball [1977] 3 All ER 452 
15 Perhaps the apogee of this intervention can be seen in the decision of the House of Lords in A & 
Others v SSHD [2004] UKHL 56 	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Terrorist threat and low-level disorder in the USA 
 
When  considering  the  four  jurisdictions,  any  assessment  of  contemporary  low-
level public order law will necessarily require an examination of the situation within 
the US. Protest is viewed as a fundamental part of the political process with the 
First Amendment reflecting a  “profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate  on  public  issues  should  be  uninhibited,  robust,  and  wide  open”
16. 
Balanced  against  this,  however,  is  the  undeniably  profound  impact  that  the 
terrorist attacks have had upon civil liberties in the US
17. This inquiry will look at 
the way in which the relationship between public order and protest with the US 
has evolved as a result of the terrorist threat.  
 
Of specific interest will be the small, but notorious, protests that have occurred at 
the  funerals  of  US  servicemen.  The  treatment  of  these  protestors,  and  the 
subsequent reaction of the courts, will be examined as a specific example of how 
low-level public order and free expression have an almost symbiotic relationship. 
The reason behind this particular field of inquiry is two-fold. The primary reason is 
that it is a peculiarly “Post 9/11” phenomenon but also that, due to the extreme 
content  of  the  protestors  message  at  a  funeral,  “it  is  difficult  to  imagine  more 
outrageous and provocative speech”
18. This particular form of protest will test the 
outer limits of State regulation in light of the First Amendment. The thesis will then 
extrapolate from the facts of this specific example and assess how these facts 
would  compare  to  the  position  in  England,  Australia  and  Germany.  The 
mechanisms of executive interference in protest (such as proscribing the route 
and altering the time) will be set alongside the judicial checks on such activity
19. 
 
The right of an individual to protest and freely express their opinions has been 
well protected by the Supreme Court
20. There has been a range of responses to 
anti-war protest by the American legislators and judiciary both on a State and 
Federal level after the terrorist attacks. It has been stated that the terrorist attacks 
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16 New York Times Co v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964) 
17 Dunn (n 4) 327 
18 S R McAllister, “Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech” (2007) 55 U Kan L Rev 575, 575 
19 Nick Suplina, “Crowd Control: The troubling mix of First Amendment Law, Political 
Demonstrations and Terrorism.” (2005) 73 Geo Wash L Rev 395, 397 
20 See Chapter Five p 172 	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highlighted American vulnerability in a way that had never been done before. This 
vulnerability,  in  turn,  saw  radical  changes  to  law  and  policy  within  the  United 
States
21. It has been asserted that the fear of a terrorist attack provides a potent 
counter-interest to that of the right to protest. There will be an examination as to 
whether this added potency has led to courts in both England and the United 
States to adopt a more reactionary position when faced with low-level public order 
convictions
22. 
Germany and Australia: A Controlled Response 
 
It is, perhaps, inevitable that the English and American issues will overshadow 
those within the other two jurisdictions under consideration. Where relevant, both 
legislative  approaches  and  case  law  examples  from  all  jurisdictions  will  be 
imported  to  provide  a  counterpoint  to  the  English  position.  For  example,  co-
operation  between  Germany  and  the  other  jurisdictions  in  respect  of  counter 
terrorism matters has been extensive
23.  Although there has not been a successful 
terrorist attack within Germany, there have been numerous German victims of 
terrorist violence. The United States has hailed Germany as being a key partner in 
the War on Terror
24.  
 
It is also true that September 11
th 2001 may not provide a pertinent lodestar from 
which to navigate changes in the law from the German perspective. It is argued 
that the shock to the German legal system was felt much earlier, specifically in the 
years 1932 to 1945
25. Additionally, with the Baader Meinhof group and other such 
groups being fully active during the 1970s, Germany is no stranger to the threat of 
terrorism. Taking this into account means that the German position becomes a 
useful analogue to England and America. Of particular importance is the way in 
which the law regulating protests and the Grundgesetz manages to harmonize the 
position  within  Germany  and  whether  this  can  provide  any  instruction  for  the 
common law jurisdictions.  
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21 Suplina (n 19) 396 
22 Suplina (n 19) 397 
23 Francis T Miko and Christian Froehlich, Germany’s Role in Fighting Terrorism: Implications for 
U.S. policy (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2004), 1 
24 ibid 2 
25 See p 57 for details of how this has impacted upon the German Legal System 	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Germany has a limited but significant role within the War on Terror
26, and, in that 
respect, echoes the Australian position. Like Australia, Germany also has a long 
tradition of anti-war protest
27 and there have been significant protests concerning 
German  military  activity.  In  January  2011,  anti-war  protestors  demonstrated  in 
Berlin,  protesting  about  German  involvement  in  the  International  Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan
28. Indeed, since 9/11 there have been numerous 
anti-war  demonstrations  focusing,  though  not  exclusively
29,  on  the  War  on 
Terror
30.  
 
Although not a direct focus for terrorist atrocities, Australian nationals have not 
been immune to targeting. The attacks on the Indonesian island of Bali saw 88 
Australians killed
31 and many others injured. The warning of the FBI Executive 
Assistant Director of Counter Terrorism in 2004
32 was close to being realized in 
2009  when  members  of  a  group  affiliated  with  Al  Qaeda  were  arrested  after 
planning to carry out a suicide attack on an Australian military base
33. With these 
additional societal and political perspectives on the War on Terror, Australia can 
provide an additional element of criticality on the anti-terrorism, protest and low-
level public order nexus
34.  
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26 See Miko & Froelich (n 24) 
27 Thomas Adam, Germany and America: Culture, Politics and History (ABC-CLIO, Santa Barbara, 
California, 2005) at p. 1099 discussing the Vietnam War and West German student protests. 
28 http://www.presstv.ir/detail/161473.html ‘Anti-War Demos held in Germany’ Sun 23 Jan 2011 
accessed on 27/04/2011 
29 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/business/2009/g20/7969706.stm “G20 protests held in 
Germany” 28/03/2009 accessed on 27/04/2011 
30 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2898031.stm “No let up in Anti-War protests” 
29/03/2003 accessed on 27/04/2011 detailing the 2003 protests across Germany where “at least 
40,000 protestors were involved in a human chain in Germany, between the northern cities of 
Munster and Osnabrueck, 55 kms (35 miles) apart” and “About 23,000 took part in marches in 
Berlin, culminating in a rally in the Tiergarten park, and more Germans held protests in Stuttgart 
and Frankfurt, where 25 people were arrested as they tried to block the entrance to a US air base” 
31 Christian Henderson “The Bush doctrine: from theory to practice.” [2004] JC & SL 3, 10 
32 http://www.smh.com.au/news/Anti-Terror-Watch/Terrorist-attack-on-Australia-inevitable-warns-
FBI-expert/2004/03/16/1079199194943.html accessed on 09/04/2011 at 17:14 BST 
33 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32276371/ns/world_news-asia-pacific/ accessed on 09/04/2011 
at 17:16 BST 
34 For details on Australian offences see Simon Bronitt & Bernadette McSherry, Principles of 
Criminal Law (3
rd Edn, Thomson 2010) ch 15  	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Proscription and Encouragement Offences: Narrowing 
the focus 
 
The area of terrorism and free expression covers a wide range of legislation and 
academic  debate,  encompassing  both  political  and  criminological  discourse
35. 
This inquiry seeks to focus on the legislation countering terrorism within the four 
jurisdictions  as  it  interacts  with  low-level  public  order.  It  is  acknowledged  that 
there are considerable areas of overlap and mutual inclusivity between anti-terror 
legislation and the resultant tension with freedom of expression. Indeed, when 
one looks at the elements of some of the statutory provisions, the potential for the 
low-level to bleed into higher-level, more serious offences is clear. 
 
Each  of  the  jurisdictions  under  consideration  has  legislative  provisions  that 
prohibit membership of terrorist groups. These have not been deemed to offend
36 
against  the  provisions  of  Article  11  of  the  ECHR
37.  In  England  the  process  is 
known as “proscription” and the appropriate legislation is to be found in the Part 2 
of the Terrorism Act 2000
38. In America, the Secretary of State is given the power 
to designate a group as being a “terrorist group”
39. Australian law provides for the 
power to proscribe “terrorist organizations” and the related membership offence 
incorporated into the Federal Criminal Code 1995
40. Finally, within Germany, the 
Criminal  Code  (StGB)  Special  Part  (Besonderer  Teil)  contains  the  offences  of 
forming  a  criminal  organization
41 and  forming  a  Terrorist  Organization
42 with  a 
related offence of membership of these organizations
43.  
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35 Russell Hogg, “Criminology, Crime and Politics Before and After 9/11” (2007) 40 Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 83. See also Jon Moran & Mark Phythian (eds), Intelligence, 
Security and Policing Post-9/11: The UK’s response to the ‘War on Terror’ (Palgrave Macmillan 
2008) 
36 Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v Turkey (41340/98) (No.2) (2003) 37 EHRR 1; 14 BHRC.1; ECHR 
(Grand Chamber) and in an English context SSHD v Lord Alton of Liverpool [2008] EWCA Civ 
443; [2008] 1 WLR. 2341; [2008] 2 Cr App R 31; (2008) 152(21) SJLB. 30; Times, May 13, 2008 
37 Freedom of association, for full discussion on the interaction of this within the context of protest, 
see p 159 onwards 
38 Terrorism Act 2000, s 3 details the procedure by which the Secretary of State may either add or 
remove an organisation he believes commits, participates, prepares, promotes or is otherwise 
concerned in terrorism  
39 Immigration and Nationality Act 1996 states that a group may be designated by the Secretary of 
State if it is group of two or more individuals, whether related or not, which engages in terrorist-
related activities (this includes providing material support to terrorists or soliciting funds for terrorist 
organisations). 
40 See Criminal Code divs 101 (‘Terrorism’), 102 (‘Terrorist Organisations’). The Criminal Code is 
contained in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
41 §129 StGB 	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In  addition  to  the  proscription  offences,  much  controversy  was  aroused  within 
England and Wales in the area of free speech with the enactment of offences 
penalizing the making of statements which are seen to act as either directly or 
indirectly  encouraging  or  inducing  people  to  engage  in  the  commission, 
preparation  or  instigation  of  acts  of  terrorism
44 .  Unsurprisingly,  numerous 
commentators have raised grave concerns regarding the potentially chilling effect 
upon  free  speech  that  such  a  provision  might  have
45.  One  commentator  has 
stated  that  the  offences  under  the  2006  Act  criminalize  certain  types  of 
expression
46. It has also been highlighted that the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights have criticized the breadth of the offence as being too vague for a speech 
based offence
47.  
 
Possibly mindful of the restrictions upon the content of a person’s speech, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the US has no such “glorification” provision within its 
body  of  anti-terrorism  legislation.  It  has  been  postulated  that  while  the  US 
Supreme Court may uphold such a statute, it is unlikely that any such statute 
would be promulgated, as it would be contrary to the legislative and jurisprudential 
culture within the United States
48. 
 
From  an  Australian  standpoint,  in  order  to  assuage  concerns  regarding 
compatibility with the constitutionally implied freedom of political communication
49, 
the  Australian  Law  Review  Commission  did  not  propose  the  adoption  of  a 
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42 §129(1) StGB 
43 §129a(1) StGB 
44 Terrorism Act 2006, s1(1) & s 1(2) 
45 Michael C Shaughnessy, “Praising the Enemy: Could the United States criminalize the 
glorification of terror under an act similar to the UK Terrorism Act 2006” [2009] 113 Penn St L Rev 
923, 926: For an English critique see the observations by Clive Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the 
Anti Terrorism Legislation (2
nd Edn OUP 2009) 57 
46 David McKeever, “The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK: one great leap forward 
by Parliament, but are the courts able to slow the steady retreat that has followed?” [2010] PL 110, 
128 
47 “House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee of Human Rights: “Counter-Terrorism 
Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters”, Third Report of Session 2005-06, 
November 2005, para 27; At the time it was also suggested that these provisions would criminalize 
those who ‘glorified’ the armed opposition to the Apartheid regime in South Africa and, indeed, 
would criminalize comments made by the wife of the then UK Prime Minister regarding Palestine 
(see discussion in Clive Walker, “Clamping Down on Terrorism in the United Kingdom” (2006) 4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 1137)” quoted in McKeever, (n 48) 129 
48 Shaughnessy (n 45) 981 
49 See p 153 	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glorification offence
50. The reaction to the introduction of the offence of “urging the 
overthrow of the Constitution or Government by force or violence”
51 in Australia 
was every bit as critical as the English response had been to the encouragement 
offences
52.  As  part  of  this  debate,  concerns  have  again  been  expressed  that 
exceptional, emergency legislation to counter terrorism is being ‘normalized’ into 
the regular body of the criminal law
53, echoing concerns similar to those that have 
been voiced in respect of the English law
54.  
 
The German Criminal Code contains various offences of incitement
55, not only as 
they relate to terrorism, but also to general criminality. The relevant parts of the 
StGB, that might be applicable to terrorism expression, provide for the offence of 
incitement to hatred
56 and dissemination of depictions of violence
57. The case law 
surrounding both of these offences demark them as being reserved for extreme 
speech. In respect of §130 StGB the case law is almost exclusively dominated by 
holocaust denial and glorification of National Socialism
58. The case law in relation 
to §131 StGB deals with extreme pornography
59 and the infamous “Cannibal of 
Rothenberg” case
60, both of which operate at the extreme end of the free speech 
debate
61.  
 
These offences, when viewed across all of the jurisdictions under consideration, 
clearly impose a significant limitation on the individual right to free expression. 
They also provide an example of how legislators, certainly within England and 
Australia during the War on Terror, have tried to criminalize what might be viewed 
as legitimate expression. Should the individual, in a public order scenario, be seen 
to glorify terrorism or profess membership of a terrorist organization, the likelihood 
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50 Simon Bronitt & James Stellios “Sedition, Security and Human Rights: ‘Unbalanced’ Law Reform 
in the ‘War on Terror’” [2006] MULR 29 at fn 9 
51 Criminal Code, s 80.2 
52 Bronitt & Stellios, (n 50) at fn 5 
53 Bronitt & Stellios, (n 50) at fn 206 
54 Waddington (n 7)  
55 See for example §111 StGB, §126  
56 §130 StGB 
57 §131 StGB. 
58 BGH, Judgment of 15.12.2005 – 4 StR 283/05 
59 BGH, Judgment of 15.12.1999 – 2 StR 365/99 
60 BGH, Judgment of 22.04.2005 – 2 StR 310/05 
61 For further discussion on this highly controversial area within an English perspective see Clare 
McGlynn, and Erica Rackley, “Criminalizing extreme pornography: a lost opportunity.” [2009] Crim 
LR 245 	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is  that  they  may  well  attract  liability  for  the  more  serious  terrorism  offences, 
certainly within the Australian and English jurisdictions
62. 
 
As regards the relevance to this investigation, all of these offences, within the 
respective  jurisdictions,  provide  for  sizable  terms  of  imprisonment  upon 
conviction
63.  They  can  hardly  be  considered  alongside  the  low-level  offences 
mentioned in the previous chapters. What they do illustrate, however, is the scope 
of the upper limits of expressive offences, and the relative ease of travel between 
the  low-level  offences  and  their  more  serious  counterparts.  Having  eliminated 
these from the scope of this enquiry, the next stage of the analysis is to examine 
the lower level protest offences, how they interact with low-level public order and 
how they have developed since the start of the War on Terror.   
The English Parliament, Protest and The War on Terror 
 
The fundamental framework for dealing with protests is to be found in Part 2 of the 
Public Order Act 1986 and has been analyzed in the previous chapter. One of the 
more  disquieting  developments  following  the  terrorist  attacks  has  been  the 
creation of “place specific restrictions” upon protest, a phrase used by Mead
64 to 
describe legal restrictions which criminalize protest in a specific place or regulate 
that protest, requiring the protestor to obtain some form of permit to protest. A 
protestor who obstructs the highway, an offence contrary to s.137 Highways Act 
1980,  is  committing  a  place  specific  protest  offence.  Arrowsmith  v  Jenkins
65 
established that such an offence could be shown by intentional presence on the 
highway  whereby  an  obstruction  was  caused,  rather  than  intent  to  cause  an 
obstruction. The ECtHR held, in the case of Patyi v Hungary
66, that where a static 
protest does not cause an obstruction
67 then such a protest should be permitted.  
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62 For a discussion on the criminalization of homophobic speech within Hammond see p xx and for 
a discussion on the various low-level provisions relating to hate speech see p xx 
63 §129(1) StGB provides for a term of imprisonment between one and ten years, Criminal Code s 
102.3 provides for a term of imprisonment for up to 10 years for membership of a terrorist 
organization. In England, s. 11(3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that membership of 
proscribed organization is triable either way with a maximum term of imprisonment upon conviction 
on indictment of 10 years. 
64 David Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest (Hart 2010) 138 
65 Arrowsmith v Jenkins [1963] 2 QB 561 (DC) 
66 Patyi v Hungary (App 5529/05) judgment of 7
th October 2008 
67 In this case a gap of 5m allowed pedestrian access 	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One  particular  static  protest  that  has  become  a  very  public  demonstration  of 
opposition to the War on Terror was the campaign of Brian Haw
68 who occupied a 
part of Parliament Square opposite the main gates of the Houses of Parliament, in 
opposition  to  government  policy  in  Iraq  and  the  general  conduct  of  the 
government  as  regards  countering  terrorism.  Attempts  to  remove  Haw  by 
Westminster City Council were unsuccessful
69. The coming into force of ss.132-
138 of the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005, “significantly curtails the 
right to protest within a one kilometre radius of Parliament”
70. Specifically, s.133 of 
the  2005  Act  requires  that  any  person  intending  to  protest  or  organize  a 
demonstration  in  the  vicinity  of  Parliament  must  apply  to  the  police  for 
authorization to do so
71. A dedicated, low-level public order offence of organizing, 
taking part in or carrying on a demonstration in a public place in the designated 
area  if  appropriate  authorization  has  not  been  given  was  included  within  the 
statute to ensure that Haw could be arrested and removed
72.  
 
The statute means that the Commissioner of Police
73 may impose conditions
74 
that he feels are necessary to prevent hindrance to the operation of Parliament
75 
or to prevent serious disorder
76. These requirements resonate with the terms of 
the Public Order Act 1986 in relation to the general statutory provisions governing 
protests and assemblies and both of these statutory provisions can diminish or 
neutralize  the  impact  of  a  procession  or  assembly.  In  order  to  combat  the 
presence  of  existing  protestors,  including  (prior  to  his  death)  Brian  Haw,  a 
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68 Brian Haw died on the 19
th June 2011 of lung cancer, the attempts to evict him from Parliament 
Square having been unsuccessful to the end of his life. The future of the “Peace Camp” and the 
legislation governing protest around Parliament is still uncertain. The provisions of the Serious 
Organized Crime and Police Act remain in force at the time of completing final corrections to this 
thesis (19
th September 2011). 
69 Westminster CC v Haw [2002] EWHC 2073 (QB) 
70 Jon Robbins, Right to Protest: Protesting too much? (2007) LS Gaz, 18 Jan, 22 
71 Serious Organized Crime and Police Act (SOCPA) 2005, s 133(1) 
72 SOCPA 2005, s 132(1) 
73 SOCPA 2005, s 134(2) 
74 SOCPA 2005, s 134(3) 
75 This includes hindering any person wishing to enter or leave Parliament. 
76 SOCPA  2005,  s  134(3)  specifies  the  conditions  must,  in  the  Commissioner’s  reasonable 
opinion, be necessary to prevent serious public disorder, serious damage to property, disruption to 
the life of the community, a security risk in any part of the designated area or a risk to the safety of 
members of the public. 	 ﾠ 240	 ﾠ
statutory  instrument
77 was  promulgated  to  amend  the  provisions  of  s.132(1)  to 
include continuing demonstrations as well as new demonstrations.  
 
It was contended in R (Haw) v SSHD
78 that his demonstration had started before 
the 2005 Act had come into force. The High Court held that as the protest had 
been  occurring  prior  the  coming  into  force  of  the  2005  Act,  there  was  no 
requirement  for  him  to  obtain  the  authorization  of  the  Police.  The  subsequent 
hearing at the Court of Appeal
79 overturned the decision by the High Court and 
ruled that Parliament had clearly intended to regulate all demonstrations within the 
designated area no matter when they started.
80 The Court focused not upon the 
protest  itself,  nor  indeed  was  there  any  substantive  discussion  surrounding 
freedom of expression. Instead, the court looked, primarily, at the interpretative 
issues  surrounding  the  legislation.  Although  the  scale  of  his  occupation  of 
Parliament  Square  was  dramatically  curtailed
81,  Brian  Haw’s  protest  remained, 
subject to new conditions imposed by the police
82.  
 
In Tucker v DPP
83, Haw’s co-campaigner, Barbara Tucker, was convicted under 
s.132  of  the  2005  Act  for  carrying  out  an  unauthorized  protest  in  Parliament 
Square. The Administrative Court rejected her contention that Haw had invited her 
to  join  his  protest  and  therefore  she  did  not  require  additional  authority. 
Furthermore, the court held that the permit requirements of Part 4 of the 2005 Act 
were not incompatible with the provisions of Article 10 and 11 of the ECHR. The 
decision  to  prosecute  Haw  under  s.134  of  the  2005  Act  for  breach  of  the 
conditions imposed by the Commissioner was overturned by the Divisional Court 
in  the  case  of  DPP  v  Haw
84.  It  was  held  that  the  conditions  imposed  were 
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77 Article 4(2) Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005 (Commencement No 1, Transitional 
and Transitory Provisions) Order (SI 2005 No. 1521 C66). 
78 R(on the application of Brian Haw) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police Service [2005] EWHC (2061) 
79 R(on the application of Haw) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (CA (Civ Div)) Court 
of Appeal (Civil Division) [2006] EWCA Civ 532 
80 Section 132 (6) SOCPA 2005 
81 Peter Thornton, The Law of Public Order and Protest, (OUP 2010) 132 
82 The scale of the camp was reduced to 3sqm in size and many of the posters and placards were 
removed 
83 Tucker v DPP [2007] EWHC 3019 (Admin) 
84 DPP v Haw [2007] EWHC 1931 (Admin) 	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demonstrated to be unworkable
85 and, as such, were plainly not reasonable and 
did  not  satisfy  the  test  of  certainty  required  when  considering  whether  the 
restrictions on Convention rights were "according to law"
86. 
 
The definitive judgment on the provisions of the Serious Organized Crime and 
Police Act 2005 was made in relation to two separate protests. In Blum v Director 
of  Public  Prosecutions  And  Other  Appeals
87 ,  the  Divisional  Court  heard 
consolidated  appeals  following  the  conviction  of  four  protestors  for  conducting 
unauthorized protests. Stephen Blum and Aqil Shaer were part of a demonstration 
organized by the “Stop the War Coalition”, specifically against the provisions of 
ss.132-138 of the 2005 Act. Police deployed this provision during the protest of 
Milan  Rai  and  Maya  Evans,  which  occurred  in  October  2005.  Evans  stood 
opposite Whitehall and read out the names of all British soldiers who had been 
killed in Iraq whilst Rai read out the names of Iraqi citizens who had died in the 
conflict.  In  each  case,  the  demonstrators  knew  that  authorization  would  be 
required, and were given the opportunity by police to end their protest. Indeed, it 
was noted by Waller LJ that: 
 
“the  demonstrations  were  peaceful  and  good-humoured…The  demonstrations 
were  as  much  as  anything  a  demonstration  against  the  requirement  that 
authorization  should  have  been  required  to  demonstrate  in  Parliament  Square 
and/or in Whitehall.”
88 
 
The four protestors sought to argue, at first instance, that s.132 of the 2005 Act 
was not compatible with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR and, as such, the court 
should act according to s.3 of the 1998 Act and read down s.132 of the 2005 Act. 
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85 The conditions stipulated as follows: “The site associated with your demonstration (including 
banners, placards etc) will not exceed 3 metres in width, 3 metres in height and 1 metre in depth. 
The  site  should  at  no  time  prevent  pedestrian  movement  along  the  footway.  Your  property 
(including  banners,  placards  etc)  must  be  supervised  at  all  time  with  diligence  and  care,  in  a 
manner  that  ensures  that  nothing  can  be  added  to  your  protest  site  without  your  immediate 
knowledge. You must not use articles in connection with your demonstration that can conceal or 
contain other items. You must maintain your site in a manner that allows any person present to tell 
at a glance that no suspicious items are present. If members involved in your demonstration are to 
exceed 20 in total you must give six clear days notice to the operations officer at Charing Cross 
Police  Station.  If  requested  by  a  police  officer  in  uniform  you  must  confirm  whether  persons 
present are part of your demonstration or not.” 
86 DPP v Haw [2007] EWHC 1931 (Admin) [para 45] 
87 [2006] EWHC 3209 (Admin) 
88 Ibid [9] 	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It was also argued that under s.6(1) of the 1998 Act, it would be unlawful for the 
court to convict the appellants. In each case, this argument was rejected, with the 
court finding that the relevant sections of the 2005 Act were indeed compliant with 
the  Convention.  In  the  subsequent  appeal  the  protestors  changed  tack.  They 
argued that all public bodies have to justify whether, at each stage of the criminal 
process,  the  decision  to  arrest,  charge  and  convict  was  necessary  and 
proportionate given that in each case the demonstrations had been both peaceful 
and good humoured.  
 
The appellants argued that the state, in its various public authority guises, should 
have looked not only at the failure to obtain the requisite authorization, but also at 
the conduct of the demonstrators. This line of reasoning was rejected and the 
appeal  was  dismissed.  The  court  held  that  once  it  is  accepted  that  the 
authorization  procedures  within  the  2005  Act  are  compatible  with  Convention 
rights, it is not legitimate to ask the court to look at the unauthorized conduct
89. 
Similarly,  Parliament  must  be  entitled  to  impose  sanctions  for  not  seeking 
authorization otherwise the finding that the sections are compatible is illusory
90. 
 
The  adoption  of  place-specific  restrictions  is  not  unique  to  the  English  legal 
system.  §15  para  2  VslgG  prohibits  protest  on  or  around  the  Memorial  to  the 
Murdered  Jews  of  Europe  in  Berlin.  Such  a  restriction  is  in  place  due  to  the 
historic importance of the memorial and a fear that it may become a rallying point 
for  pro-Nazi  right  wing  groups  or  indeed  be  a  locus  for  disrespect  by  the 
aforementioned extreme right wing groups. 
Protest within the UK and The War on Terror  
 
The findings of the research within this thesis emphasize that it is within the realm 
of public order law that the principal legislative tools engaged by the state to deal 
with undesirable expression are to be found. Implicit in the research hypothesis 
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89 The European Court in Ziliberberg v Moldova (Application no. 61821/00) held that States do 
have a right to require authorization for demonstrations to ensure effective policing 
90 Blum v Director of Public Prosecutions and other appeals [2006] EWHC 3209 (Admin) [at para 
29] 	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was recognition that s.5 of the 1986 Act, although a relatively minor offence
91, 
could have a significant chilling effect on protest and expression
92. Underpinning 
the research questions was the related hypothesis that s.5 of the 1986 Act was 
originally  intended  to  counter  behaviour  such  as  groups  of  youths  persistently 
shouting abuse or obscenities
93 and low-level football hooliganism
94 and should 
not be deployed to deal with disorder on protests. 
 
Even before the events of September 11
th 2001, it was within the terms of the 
legislation for a police officer to decide that an essentially peaceful protest falls 
within  the  ambit  of  s.5,  due  to  the  potential  for  that  protest  to  be  threatening, 
abusive  or  insulting  and  likely  to  cause  harassment,  alarm  or  distress.  That 
protestor can then be arrested and her or his participation within that protest can 
be  ended
95.  The  breadth  of  interpretation  available  to  the  courts  in  relation  to 
these terms provides for a broad range of behaviour that may be prohibited under 
s.5.  
 
When considering the considerable spectrum of opinion and the depth of feeling 
that exists surrounding the War on Terror, this can potentially render an individual 
liable to arrest for promulgating his or her own deeply held expressions, beliefs 
and opinions
96. The dilemma caused by individual dissenters is not the primary 
mischief that s.5 of the 1986 Act was designed to counter. It just happens that a 
particularly  vocal  dissenter  is  able  to  fall  within  the  general  area  of  anti-social 
behaviour
97.  In order to express the depth of feeling, and indeed to make an 
impact  with  the  protest,  it  may  be  necessary  to  use  language  that  offends  or 
distresses
98. Sedley LJ crystallized this issue when he stated: 
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91 According to Public Order Act 1986, s 5(6), the offence is punishable summarily with a fine not 
exceeding level 3.   
92 ATH Smith, Offences against Public Order (Sweet & Maxwell 1987) 124 
93 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 31 provides for racially aggravated public order offences. See p 
91 for further details.  
94 Mark James, Sports Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) Chapter 10, ‘Crowd Disorder and Football 
Hooliganism’ 
95 Smith (n 92) 116 
96 Hammond v DPP [2005] EWHC 69 (Admin) Crim. L.R. [2004] 851  
97 Andrew Geddis, “Free speech martyrs or unreasonable threats to social peace? - "Insulting" 
expression and section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986” [2004] PL 853, 873 
98 Barry McDonald, “Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to protecting the 
Freedom of Expression” (2006) 81 Notre Dame L Rev 1347 states that this is the reason why First 
Amendment protection is so strong in the USA, to promote rigorous debate 	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“Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, 
the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does 
not tend to provoke violence. Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth 
having.”
99 
 
It is true to say that such concerns are not limited to the protests regarding the 
war on terror and related military commitments
100. When looking at the view taken 
by the English courts in matters relating  to  the  rights  of  protest,  the case  law 
before the September 11
th attacks seemed to suggest that political protest would 
enjoy the protection of the courts. In Percy v DPP
101, the group being insulted was 
comprised  of  American  citizens  working  on  a  US  Air  Force  Base,  and  the 
individual  was  protesting  against  the  Star  Wars  Missile  Defence  programme. 
Although  the  reasoning  in  this  case  represented  a  very  narrow  finding  by  the 
Divisional  Court,  it  was  nonetheless  held  that  a  criminal  conviction  was  a 
disproportionate way of dealing with the circumstances of that case
102.   
 
The  previously  discussed
103 decisions  in  Norwood  v  DPP
104,  and  also  Abdul  v 
DPP
105, showed that, after the terrorist attacks, the English judiciary was prepared 
to  delineate  between  political  opinion  and  speech  that  they  felt  crossed  the 
boundaries  of  legitimate  protest.  In  many  ways  these  protestors,  although 
diametrically opposed, were illustrative of the intolerance of the courts to those 
who sought to promulgate extreme positions in respect of the war on terror. In 
Norwood, the appellant was convicted of racially aggravated disorderly conduct
106 
for displaying posters showing the Twin Towers in flames with the words “Islam 
Out”
107 and protesting about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism. In Abdul
108, the 
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99 Redmond-Bate v DPP [2000] HRLR 249 
100 Geddis (n 97) 853-874 
101 [2001] EWHC Admin 1125 
102 David Ormerod “Public Order: appellant defacing American flag at American air base - 
appellant convicted of using behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress” [2002] Crim 
LR 835, 835-837 
103 See p 163-171 
104 [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin) 
105 [2011] EWHC 247  
106 Section 31 (1) (c) of the 1998 Act creates a new racially aggravated public order offence which 
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protestors were objecting to the UK military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and, 
despite complying with police directions, were arrested and convicted of disorderly 
conduct whilst shouting, "British soldiers burn in hell", and carrying signs calling 
the soldiers “murderers, rapists and baby-killers”
109. Norwood’s defence was that 
his conduct was reasonable. Auld LJ found that it was not and that, on the facts of 
the case, s.5 was itself a statute that could protect the rights of others and/or to 
prevent crime and disorder, specifically the rights of the Muslim community not to 
be vilified
110. In Abdul, the Court held that compliance with the police was not 
enough to provide legitimacy for words that fell within the ambit of s.5
111.  
 
Individual protest cases, such as Norwood and Percy, demonstrate that within 
England and Wales, it is also the regular low-level public order offences which 
threaten to dissipate the rights of those who seek to offer contrary opinions “post 
9/11”.  One  of  the  fundamental  challenges  facing  the  English  legal  system 
emanates  from  the  utilization,  by  the  state,  of  existing  legislation  to  suppress 
speech and opinions. This, of course, is not a problem unique to issues relating to 
the actions of terrorist groups and the wider conduct of the War on Terror by the 
government
112.  
 
The reaction to government policy surrounding the War on Terror has encouraged 
individual and collective protest that, at times, has encompassed the entire range 
of reactions mentioned by Sedley LJ in Redmond-Bate
113. This poses a particular 
challenge  for  the  policing  of  such  protest.  Police  officers  are  imbued  with  the 
same legislative guardianship role on Convention rights as the judiciary
114. Yet, 
they are required to make decisions regarding free expression and liberty within 
society,  whilst  at  the  same  time  remaining  mindful  of  their  duties  to  keep  the 
peace and protect the safety of themselves and members of the public.  
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108 see p 159 for further discussion of this case in the context of Article 10 ECHR 
109 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247, [paras 13-17] 
110 Norwood v DPP [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin) 
111 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 [para 33] 
112 See for example Dehal v CPS  [2005] EWHC 2154 as examples of some of the issues faced by 
the courts when dealing with balancing an individual’s right to free expression against another 
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This  dilemma  is  not  unique  to  the  English  legal  system.  In  relation  to  the 
protection of protest in the US, Dunn stated that:  
 
“In reality a person’s ability to protest has little to do with nine justices in black 
robes;  it  instead  is  governed  by  police  officers  standing  on  the  street  with 
handcuffs, guns, and only the most oblique understanding of or interest in legal 
niceties.”
115  
 
This  serves  to  underline  at  least  part  of  the  reason  behind  limited  amount  of 
judicial consideration given to low-level public order disputes, and is a problem 
common across all four jurisdictions. Much of the regular maintenance of public 
order is done at such a low level that no real records are kept and a true picture of 
the attitudes of those who actually police and administer low-level public order is 
simply unattainable
116. 
Funeral Protests in the USA: “Post 9/11” Paradigm Shift 
 
The two English cases of Norwood and Abdul provide an illuminating comparator 
to a form of protest which has emerged in the United States, and in particular, with 
the  recent  decision  in  the  case  of  Snyder  v  Phelps
117.  This  case,  which  has 
attracted  considerable  notoriety  on  both  a  national  and  international  level
118, 
concerned  the  activities  of  the  Westboro  Baptist  Church  and  the  “fire  and 
brimstone” preaching of First Minister, Fred W. Phelps. Phelps and some of his 
parishioners (who were, in fact, other family members) picketed the funeral of 
Marine Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder, carrying placards stating “Thank God for 
Dead Soldiers”, “Fags Doom Nations” and “You’re Going to Hell”
119.  
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116 This difficulty also bleeds in to the collation of meaningful statistics on public order arrests, 
prosecutions and disposals. At the time of writing, there is no meaningful statistics to compare 
across the jurisdictions. 
117 Snyder v Phelps 562 US __(2011) 
118 See for example http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-12924568 ‘Louis Theroux 
returns to America’s most hated family’ 01/04/2011 
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The protest conformed to local ordinances in respect of protests at funerals
120, 
and the family of Snyder confirmed that the service was not disrupted. The protest 
only came to the attention of Snyder’s father a few weeks after the funeral when, 
in searching for his son’s name on the Internet, he came upon a description of the 
protest by the Westboro Baptist Church which expressed the view that Snyder’s 
family “raised him for the devil”, and “taught him that God was a liar”
121. 
 
Snyder’s  family  filed  a  civil  action  alleging,  inter  alia,  tort  claims  of  intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court, by a majority of eight to one
122 
overturned the original finding of liability by a Maryland jury and instead held that 
First  Amendment  provides  protection  from  tort  liability  for  those  who  stage  a 
peaceful  protest  on  a  matter  of  public  concern  near  the  funeral  of  a  military 
service member
123. Roberts CJ stated: 
 
“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy 
and sorrow, and—as it did here— inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we 
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a 
different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that 
we do not stifle public debate.”
124 
 
It is, perhaps, unsurprising that a majority of State legislatures have chosen to 
enact  statutory  provisions  that  “mute  and  conceal  from  mourners’  sight  the 
protestors and their provocative messages”
125. Many of these are so called “time, 
place and manner” restrictions, which create a buffer zone around the locations of 
the  funeral  service
126.  Some  States,  however,  such  as  Florida  have  chosen 
instead  to  enact  specific  criminal  sanctions,  whereby  it  will  be  a  crime  for  a 
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on public land that was 1000 feet from the church. (VIII App 2282-85) Respondents stood where 
the police directed them.” 
121 Amicus Brief (n 120) 4 
122 Roberts CJ delivered the opinion of the Court with Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsberg, Breyer, 
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defendant to wilfully interrupt or disturb an assembly of people meeting for the 
purpose of acknowledging the death of an individual who was a member of the 
armed forces of the United States
127. The State of Virginia goes one step further 
and  incorporates  “disrupting  any  funeral,  memorial  service…  if  the  disruption 
prevents or interferes with the orderly conduct of the funeral”, into the general 
disorderly conduct provision
128. 
 
Despite  these  criminal  statutes,  the  decision  in  Snyder  represents  a  civil  law 
solution, which may not be pursued within the other jurisdictions; therefore the 
focus  would  switch  from  the  individual  seeking  punitive  damages  to  the  state 
seeking  to  impose  criminal  sanctions  upon  the  protestors  from  the  Westboro 
Baptist Church. The English legal system has no bespoke legislation, either in the 
Public Order Act 1986, or in any other statutory provision, to deal with disruption 
at a funeral service. The power to regulate demonstrations comes from Part 2 of 
the  Public  Order  Act  1986,  but  this  only  gives  punitive  powers  where  the 
defendants violate the terms of any conditions imposed by the police. In the case 
of  Snyder,  the  protestors  clearly  complied  with  the  pre-emptive  restrictions 
imposed by the police, and they did not disrupt the funeral so they would not have 
fallen within the terms of the Virginian or Florida statutes. 
 
It  is  almost  inconceivable  that,  had  the  incident  occurred  in  England,  the 
protestors in Snyder would have escaped criminal prosecution under s.5 of the 
1986  Act.  In  considering  the  prohibited  actus  reus  elements  required  for  an 
offence under s.5, and following the finding of the court in Hammond
129, the words 
and visible representations used within the protest may well have been viewed by 
the  court  as  being  threatening,  abusive  or  insulting
130.  Unless  the  protest  had 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
127 Fla Stat §871.01 
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or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof… B. Willfully or being intoxicated, whether willfully or 
not, and whether such intoxication results from self-administered alcohol or other drug of whatever 
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gone completely unnoticed then the behaviour of the protestors, although away 
from the main funeral protest, was still within the presence of someone who is 
liable to be caused harassment, alarm or distress
131. The case of S v DPP
132 
shows that English courts are quite willing to prosecute using s.4A and s.5 if the 
conduct is witnessed at all, even if this is via the Internet some time later. Having 
established that the conduct was indeed threatening, abusive or insulting, for an 
offence to occur under s.4A, all that would need to be demonstrated was the Mr. 
Snyder Senior had been caused harassment, alarm or distress for the offence to 
be complete
133.  
 
Undoubtedly, the defendants in Snyder would have tried to invoke the specific 
defence  under  s.5(3)(c)  of  the  1986  Act  and  claim  that  their  behaviour  was 
reasonable,  probably  with  reference  to  the  rights  of  freedom  of  thought, 
conscience  and  religion  under  Article  9  of  the  ECHR
134 and  the  freedom  of 
expression under Article 10 of the ECHR
135. This, again, highlights one of the key 
difficulties with low-level English public order law. It is likely that an English court 
will decide, as they did in Hammond and Abdul, that the activities of Westboro 
Baptists go beyond legitimate protest and uphold a conviction.  
 
That the courts may reach such a decision is troubling from two perspectives. The 
first area of concern, as alluded to in Hammond, is that it may be that there is no 
effective  way  in  England  for  Phelps  and  his  like  to  express  their  beliefs,  as 
distasteful as these beliefs might be
136. A second but wholly interrelated issue is in 
respect of the actual difficulties any legal adviser would face in advising Phelps. It 
is for the legal adviser to decide whether to try and persuade the court that the 
content of the message was reasonable, or instead focus not upon the message 
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behaviour need only be threatening, abusive or insulting); in terms of the interpretation of the 
meaning of these phrases, see earlier discussion on the test laid down in Brutus v Cozens [1972] 
2 All ER 1297, HL 
131 Holloway v DPP [2004] All ER (D) 278 (Oct); [2004] EWHC 2621 
132 [2008] EWHC 438 (Admin) 
133 No evidence of violence or threat of violence is necessary under s.4A or s.5 merely the 
requirement that the behaviour causes harassment, alarm or distress. 
134 Article 9 states that everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes the freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
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but instead highlight the reasonableness of the conduct in delivering the message. 
This uncertainty, considered at length in Chapter Four
137, serves only to underpin 
the central research hypothesis once again; that low-level public order provisions 
(especially s.5) in England grants capricious power to the decision makers. This, 
in turn, sees arbitrary decisions being made by the courts based on an ad-hoc 
balancing of rights and circumstances instead of having the requisite certainty that 
is essential for criminal liability
138. 
 
When  considering  the  case  of  Snyder  from  a  German  perspective,  there  is 
provision within the StGB in Chapter Eleven, the offences related to religion and 
ideology, to deal with such difficulties. The specific offence is to be found in §167a 
StGB and states: 
 
“Whosoever  intentionally  or  knowingly  disturbs  a  funeral  shall  be  liable  to 
imprisonment of not more than three years or a fine.”
139 
 
The elements of this deceptively simple offence would appear to fit in with the 
activities of the Westbro Baptist Church. When the facts of Snyder are set against 
this bespoke legislation, it becomes clear that liability will hinge around whether or 
not Phelps and his associates could be argued to have disturbed the funeral of 
Snyder. The facts of the case would suggest that this would not have been the 
case;  given  the  Snyder  family  only  became  aware  of  the  protest  some  time 
afterwards.  
 
By  comparison,  the  various  criminal  codes  of  the  Australian  States
140 have  no 
substantive provision dealing with the regulation of funeral services other than the 
regular  provisions  to  control  demonstrations.  This  situation  is  in  tune  with  the 
English approach. The various pieces of public order legislation in Australia
141 are 
based  on  anti-vagrancy  legislation  and  tend  to  require  either  an  immediacy  of 
conduct  or  require  that  the  contested  behaviour  interfere  with  the  peaceful 
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138 See chapter three for the discussion on the requirements of certainty. 
139 §167a StGB Disturbing a Funeral 
140 See pp 48-51 for further details of these provisions 
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 ﾠ 251	 ﾠ
passage through, or enjoyment of a public place by a member of the public
142. 
Again, on the facts of Snyder, given the temporal distance between the activities 
of the Westboro Baptists and the family discovering and becoming distressed, a 
conviction would appear unlikely. 
Free Speech Zones: Content Neutral Controversy 
 
The importance of the case of Snyder is that it provides an important illustration 
as to the way in which low-level public order issues in America are dealt with in a 
“post-9/11” legal landscape. An essential aspect of the defence in Snyder was 
that  the  protest  had  complied  with  the  pre-emptive  ordinances  that  governed 
protest at funerals
143. The comparison with the English case of Abdul is clear, in 
which  the  protestors  complied  with  police  directions  and  yet  the  protest  still 
attracted criminal liability. The majority of States are content to employ time, place 
and manner restrictions to deal with funeral protests. These controls retain a link 
to low-level public order in so far as any breach of such a restriction will likely to 
result  in  the  individual  protestor  being  arrested  and  charged  with  disorderly 
conduct
144. Absolutist civil libertarian arguments aside, few people would object to 
the restrictions placed on the members of the Westboro Baptist Church in order to 
facilitate  a  peaceful  funeral  service.  Funerals  are  not  alone  in  attracting  time, 
place and manner restrictions. Perhaps the most controversial and contested of 
these restrictions are the so called free speech zones which received widespread 
public attention due to their use after September 11
th 2001 where the President of 
the United States, George W. Bush had attracted significant domestic criticism for 
his policies in relation to the War on Terror
145.  
 
Free  speech  zones  have  played  a  prominent  role  within  academic  debate 
surrounding  the  chilling  effects  of  government  restrictions  resulting  from  the 
terrorist attacks. The concept of free speech zones was actually a product of the 
student protests of the 1960s, where student protest was very much a campus-
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based phenomenon
146. The case law is, however, relatively recent, reflecting the 
wider  use  of  these  zones  in  the  aftermath  of  the  War  on  Terror.  The  lawful 
authority  for  the  establishment  of  these  zones  comes  from  §1752  of  the  US 
Code
147, which gives the Secret Service the authority to create restricted access 
zones preceding presidential visits
148. Violation of these zones is punishable by 
either a fine of not more than $1000 or a period of imprisonment for not more than 
a year
149. This puts it within the realm of other low-level public order offences and 
yet, as a federal offence with one-year imprisonment, it is at the more serious end 
of the low-level spectrum. 
 
First Amendment doctrinal issues have already been the subject of analysis
150 
and this inquiry will now examine these issues within the context of free speech 
zones and why they are proving so controversial. The first concern is that they are 
actually not concerned with Presidential security and instead they are seeking to 
keep protestors away from Presidential appearances and photo opportunities
151. 
Coupled with this, it has been argued that the nature of the restrictions imposed 
by the Secret Service very often pose a significant danger to those who are within 
the designated zones. In Service Employee International Union
152, it was held by 
the  court  that  the  government  had  a  duty  to  protect  all  persons  at  political 
conventions and not merely the delegates. This duty extended to all protestors
153. 
 
Therefore,  while  the  provisions  of  §1752  have  not  been  found  to  be 
unconstitutional per se, there have been significant limits places by the Courts as 
to the nature of the zoning that the Secret Service can impose. In Stauber v City 
of New York
154, it was held that anything amounting to a caged area (an enclosed 
pen etc.) would be an unacceptable imposition or as one commentator stated, 
somewhat  pejoratively:  “Cages  are  a  means  of  punishment,  not  a  means  to 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
146 Herrold (n 145) 956 
147 18 USC §1752(a)(1)(ii) 
148 Elizabeth Craig, “Protecting the President from Protest: Using the Secret Service’s zone of 
protection to prosecute protestors.” (2006) 9 J Gender Race & Just. 665, 666 
149 18 USC §3056(d) (2004) 
150 See above p 192 
151 Craig (above n 148) 670 
152 Service Employee International Union Local 660 v City of Los Angeles, 114 F. Supp. 2d 966, 
970-972 (C.D. Cal. 2000), [971] 
153 Dunn (n 4) 350  
154 3 Civ 9162, 9163, 9164, (2004) WL 1593870 	 ﾠ 253	 ﾠ
regulate the public discourse of a democratic society”
155. This case involved a 
wheelchair bound demonstrator not being allowed to leave a four-sided enclosed 
pen for protestors, despite complaining of illness and needing to use the toilet
156.  
 
Although the physical limitations are significant, they tie in with a potentially more 
sinister  aspect  of  free  speech  zones.  There  appears  to  be  a  growing  implicit 
acceptance that protestors criticizing the government policy during the “war on 
terror” pose a threat to the security of the President. This, in turn, leads to an 
implicit alignment of those who protest with those who pose a terrorist threat
157. 
Sitting alongside this are concerns that, despite appearing to be a content-neutral, 
time, place and manner restriction, free speech zones that are so far removed 
from  the  appearance  of  the  President  serves,  effectively,  to  silence  the 
communication of protestors
158.  
 
An example where the use of protest zones was not upheld is to be found in the 
case  of  Goldhamer  v  Nagode
159.  The  defendants  were  holding  a  peaceful 
demonstration outside a military recruitment stand in Chicago. They were handing 
out  leaflets  and  speaking  to  passers-by  in  opposition  to  military  recruitment. 
Officers from the police department formed a line between the protesters and the 
booth, and ordered the defendants to move to a designated zone or be arrested 
pursuant to city disorderly conduct ordinance. They refused to do so, insisting that 
they  were  exercising  a  peaceful  protest.  They  maintained  that  moving  to  the 
dedicated  protest  zone  would  diminish  the  impact  of  their  protest  and  were 
arrested. Upon appearance at the State Court, the charges against the defendant 
were dismissed.  
 
Despite this example of judicial activism in respect of over-burdensome regulation 
of protest, the concerns regarding restrictions on the grounds of national security 
remain  genuine.  As  with  the  situation  in  England,  as  evidenced  by  Abdul  and 
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SSHD v Lord Alton of Liverpool
160, the predilection of the higher courts in respect 
of low-level protest and public order is to yield to the persuasive power of the 
terrorism-prevention arguments of the state
161. However, as one commentator has 
pointed out in respect of America,  
 
“Persistent challenges by activist groups have led to bad law on the books...It is 
crucial  that  activist  groups  realize  for  the  time  being,  courts  are  not  a  friendly 
forum for their permit-denial.” 
162  
 
Given the instability of the law regarding low-level public order in England, this 
difficulty is clearly common to both jurisdictions, although the protection afforded 
to speech by the First Amendment clearly shields protestors in the US to a much 
greater degree. As has been established in Abdul and Hammond, the only way a 
protestor  in  England  and  Wales  will  find  out  if  his  or  her  conduct  has  been 
reasonable is by a challenge at court, by which time the chance for protest may 
have passed. 
Breach of the Peace: A “Sui Generis” Public Order 
Phenomenon 
 
The thesis has, thus far, examined the low-level ‘pro-active’ offences designed to 
ensure that processions and assemblies can be managed so as to prevent both 
serious and low-levels of public disorder. The previous chapters have examined 
the  basic,  disorderly  conduct  offences  under  s.4A  and  s.5  of  the  1986  Act. 
However, these provide only a partial picture of the way in which public order law 
is deployed to ensure that protest does not cross from being the legitimate airing 
of a grievance to threatening or actually causing disorder. In order to gain a full 
picture of low-level public order law, it is also necessary to examine the provisions 
found within common law.  
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According to A.T.H Smith, ‘at the very centre of our public order law sits the sui 
generis phenomenon of “the breach of the peace”’
163. Lord Bingham in Laporte 
stated that: 
 
“Every constable, and also every citizen, enjoys the power and is subject to a duty 
to seek to prevent, by arrest or other action short of arrest, any breach of the 
peace  occurring  in  his  presence,  or  any  breach  of  the  peace  which  (having 
occurred) is likely to be renewed, or any breach of the peace which is likely to 
occur.”
164   
 
Breach of the peace is woven into the fabric of English public order law and is the 
“genesis particle” of the English legal system’s approach to regulating low-level 
criminality
165. It must be emphasized that this provision is by no means limited to 
dealing with protest. The case law will demonstrate that it is used in a wide variety 
of circumstances and is every bit as protean as the disorderly conduct provision 
under s.5 of the 1986 Act yet deployment of this provision by police does not 
attract criminal liability. 
 
The  scope  and  powers  of  this  common  law  provision  has  been  visited  and 
revivified numerous times by the judiciary
166 and over the years codification has 
occurred  to  such  an  extent  that  breach  of  the  peace  has  been  found  to  be 
sufficiently clear to be accepted as being prescribed by law for the purposes of the 
ECHR
167. It should also be noted that the concept of police action to deal with 
breaches of the peace have been used within the Australian legal system as well 
as the English
168.  
 
In Laporte, the House of Lords concluded that the essence of breach of the peace 
was  to  be  found  in  violence  or  threatened  violence
169.  An  arrest  to  prevent  a 
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breach of the peace is not, of itself, an arrest for a criminal offence
170, merely a 
preventative  measure  designed  to  remove  the  individual  using  or  threatening 
violence. The most widely accepted definition of what constitutes a breach of the 
peace, and the one that is still in current usage, was elucidated by Watkins LJ in 
Howell: 
 
“There is a breach of the peace whenever harm is actually done or is likely to be 
done to a person or in his presence to his property or a person is in fear of being 
so  harmed  through  an  assault,  an  affray,  a  riot,  unlawful  assembly  or  other 
disturbance.” 
171 
 
Thornton,  extrapolating  generic  principles  from  the  judgment  of  Carswell  LJ  in 
Laporte, has identified three distinct categories of event where the power to use 
breach of the peace would be appropriate
172. The first occasion would be where 
an individual is committing or about to commit a breach of the peace
173. The next 
set of circumstances would be where individuals are engaged in lawful activities 
but are likely to provoke others into committing a breach of the peace
174.  
 
It is the third of Carswell LJ’s categories that is most relevant to the regulation of 
protest. These are occasions where there is a ‘confluence of demonstrations’
175, 
that is where a lawful protest and a lawful counter protest would likely lead to a 
breach  of  the  peace.  In  addition  to  these  three  distinct  occasions,  Howell
176 
clarified that action may be taken to prevent a breach, when a breach is occurring 
and when a breach has occurred and there is likely to be a renewal
177. The power 
to act when there is a renewal is limited to those occasions where the officer 
making the decision to detain an individual has an honest held belief that it is 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
170 Smith Protecting Protest (n 163) 253 
171 R v Howell [1982] QB 416; [1981] 3 All ER 383; [1981] 3 WLR 501, CA, [427] 
172 Thornton (n 81) 256 
173 Moss v McLachlan (1985) 149 JP 167, DC a case involving striking miners being stopped from 
travelling to confront working miners 
174 Humphries v Connor (1864) 17 ICRL 1 whereby the wearing of sectarian emblems whilst on a 
lawful parade through a Catholic area of Belfast was liable to provoke a violent response. 
175 R (on the application of Laporte) v CC of Gloucestershire Constabulary [2007] 2 AC 105, HL, 
[para 98] 
176 R v Howell [1982] QB 416; [1981] 3 All ER 383; [1981] 3 WLR 501, CA, [427] 
177 Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546 	 ﾠ 257	 ﾠ
necessary to prevent a breach of the peace and there is objective, reasonable 
grounds for that belief
178.  
 
In Albert v Lavin,
179 Diplock LJ identified that there was a wide range of action 
available to police and citizens to deal with a breach or potential breach of the 
peace. This might include removing an inflammatory emblem or icon that a person 
was wearing
180, or detaining a queue jumper whose activities would provoke a 
violent response from others waiting in the queue
181. This type of activity is exactly 
the  type  of  low-level  public  order  disturbance  that  may  escalate  into  a  violent 
response.  Without  the  appropriate  lawful  authority,  the  actions  outlined  would 
constitute common assault and battery contrary to s.39 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988
182. The existence of a pre-emptory power, falling short of an actual arrest, to 
prevent an escalation would seem to be a core requirement of any low-level public 
order framework. It is the very flexibility of the common law that makes this an 
attractive  tool  for  police  when  dealing  with  actual  or  apprehended  public 
disorder
183. 
 
It is the power of arrest, however, which gives the breach of the peace provision 
its real potency as a tool for dealing with low-level disorder. Again, the codification 
in Howell
184 can still be regarded as representing the current state of the law: 
 
“There is a power to arrest for breach of the peace where (1) a breach of the 
peace is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest, or (2) the 
arrestor  reasonably  believes  that  such  a  breach  will  be  committed  in  the 
immediate future by the person arrested although he has not yet committed any 
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breach, or (3) where a breach has been committed and it is reasonably believed 
that a renewal of it is threatened.” 
185 
 
Thornton  states  that  that  the  police  have  the  authority  to  arrest  to  prevent  a 
breach of the peace but that arrest should be the last resort when there is no 
other  way  of  averting  a  breach  of  the  peace.  Beldam  LJ  in  Foulkes  v  Chief 
Constable of Merseyside Police
186 asserted that: 
   
“There must be a sufficiently serious or imminent threat to the peace to justify the 
extreme step of depriving of his liberty a citizen who is not at the time acting 
unlawfully.”
187  
Laporte: Action short of arrest revisited  
 
It is germane at this point to discuss the impact of the Laporte case upon the 
ambit of the preventative aspect of breach of the peace. The case is especially 
relevant to this thesis as it was a protest that was born of the War on Terror but 
developed as part of the wider campaign against government policy.  
 
Laporte was a protestor on a coach travelling to an airforce base to protest about 
military action in Iraq. The police stopped the coach before arriving at the base 
and found a number of items such as masks, spray paint and a smoke bomb. 
Additionally,  there  was  police  intelligence  that  members  of  an  anarchist  group 
called the WOMBLES
188 were travelling with the group and seeking to radicalize 
the demonstration. The police concluded that a breach of the peace would occur 
when the protestors arrived at the RAF base. Instead of waiting until a breach of 
the  peace  was  imminent,  and  arresting  the  protestors,  the  police  turned  the 
coaches  around  and  escorted  them  back  to  London.  Neither  Laporte  nor  her 
fellow passengers were permitted to leave the coach until it arrived in London.  
 
A judicial review was sought regarding the legality of the police action. In stopping 
the vehicle, the police had taken action short of arrest. They did not draw on any 
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statutory provisions for this; instead they relied upon the common law authorities 
which  accepted  that  a  police  officer  can  take  reasonable  steps  to  restrain  an 
imminent breach of the peace
189. In light of this, the Court of Appeal
190 held that 
the police had acted lawfully in preventing the passengers reaching the airfield 
where they had apprehended a breach of the peace. They determined that, as the 
breach was no longer imminent, the police had acted unlawfully by escorting the 
coaches back to London. 
 
The  subsequent  appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords  in  Laporte  was  of  major 
significance in respect of both low-level public order and the policing of protest. 
That the police action was a direct interference by the state upon the rights of the 
individual under Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR was not contested by either of 
the parties.  The House of Lords found that all of the police action was unlawful; 
with Lord Mance describing the police action as being neither “reasonable nor 
proportionate”
191. Instead his Lordship found that police action had been “general 
and indiscriminate”
192.  The police had not focused upon the potential anarchists 
who may have sought to disrupt the protest. Instead, by treating every protestor 
as a potential threat to public order, they had interfered with the right to protest of 
those individuals who had acted lawfully by seeking to take part in a peaceful 
assembly.  
 
In pursuing their course of action, the police believed they had sufficient legal 
powers to deal with any trouble that might have arisen
193. Instead of dealing with 
those who might have caused the trouble, the police took action that suppressed 
the  entire  protest  and  infringed  on  the  Article  10  and  11  rights  of  the 
demonstrators. Ironically, the court recognized that it would have been possible 
for the police to apply for a banning order under s.13 of the 1986 Act, which would 
have been equally as indiscriminate in suppressing the peaceful protest
194. 
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The judgments of their Lordships in Laporte placed a limit on the action short of 
arrest that the police may take. Lord Bingham stated that there is: 
 
“Nothing in domestic authority to support the proposition that action short of arrest 
may  be  taken  when  a  breach  of  the  peace  is  not  so  imminent  as  would  be 
necessary to justify an arrest.”
195  
 
The test of when the police (or indeed any citizen) may intervene is at the point 
when  the  anticipatory  breach  is  reasonably  proximate  in  time  to  the  point  of 
intervention
196. 
Low-Level Lessons from The War on Terror 
 
This chapter has analyzed the changes amongst the four jurisdictions to low-level 
public order following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. More specifically, the investigation 
sought to establish the existence of a causal relationship between the changes to 
low-level provisions and frameworks and the proliferation of measures relating to 
national security. Such an inquiry necessarily included a broadening out of the 
term “low-level public order” to encompass those low-level offences that had been 
enacted after the terrorist attacks of September 11
th 2001. In respect of Germany 
and Australia, there is no evidence to suggest that either of these jurisdictions has 
significantly altered the regulation of protest or, indeed any aspect of dealing with 
low-level public order in response to the subsequent War on Terror. 
 
In  respect  of  the  English  judicial  approach  to  defending  free  expression  and 
popular protest, any evaluation would classify the position as being indeterminate. 
At first sight, the cases of Laporte and Moos provide “a rare cause for celebration 
for civil libertarians”
197. Indeed, this should be doubly so because it was accepted 
by  all  parties  in  Laporte  that  there  was  sufficient  legislation  in  place  for  the 
authorities to have simply banned the demonstration at Fairford. Yet the police 
tried to work within the existing public order framework to facilitate the protest. 
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This optimism should be set against the concerns raised in Abdul. The assertion 
made by Lord Hoffmann
198 - in another notable protest case, that of Jones
199 - 
that  it  is  a  mark  of  a  civilized  community  to  accommodate  protest  and  civil 
disobedience seems somewhat dissonant when balanced against cases such as 
Haw, Blum and Tucker.  
 
In  seeking  to  establish  a  conceptual  post  9/11  framework  to  the  regulation  of 
protest and low-level public order, it is can be said that the main locus of change 
will centre around the English and American jurisdictions. It is tempting to view the 
respective government’s legislative attempts to deal with anti-war demonstrations 
in the early years of the 21
st century as an attempt to politicize the policing of 
protests.  It  is  in  no  way  novel  to  accuse  a  government  of  using  the  police  to 
enforce an unpopular political agenda and, in England, there has been a constant 
criticism of the Public Order Act
200. The concern is of an insidious challenge to 
political protests. The principal concern, highlighted throughout this thesis, is the 
utilization  of  seemingly  innocuous,  low-level  public  legislation  to  suppress 
legitimate protest.  
England and USA: Systemic Incompatibility 
 
In  advocating  more  robust  defence  of  free  expression,  the  research  is  almost 
irresistibly drawn to the protection afforded to speech within the US by virtue of 
the  First  Amendment.  Every  chapter  has  indicated  how  the  US  constitution 
provides an effective shield from the worst excesses of overly vague legislation. 
Unfortunately,  however  desirable  it  might  be  to  attempt  to  transplant  First 
Amendment jurisprudence into the English legal system there are fundamental 
differences  in  approach  between  the  two  jurisdictions.  There  was  no  criminal 
prosecution in Snyder, instead the court was asked to decide on whether to award 
damages to the party. The whole thrust of the inquiry was, therefore, different to 
that of a criminal investigation. It is possible to speculate that a prosecution in an 
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English  court,  with  similar  facts  to  the  case  of  Snyder,  would  likely  result  in 
conviction on that grounds that the activity of funeral disruption strays beyond 
legitimate protest
201.  
 
Yet, despite the powerful protection afforded to speech within the US Constitution, 
it is settled law that the First Amendment does not grant a protestor the right to 
protest anywhere they desire and at any time. The government is entitled to place 
certain restrictions regarding the time, place and manner of any such protest.
202 
The  American  solution  is  to  utilize  disorderly  conduct  provisions  where 
appropriate, whilst the ‘victims’ of extreme protest seek redress through the civil 
courts.
203  
Breach of the Peace: A Non-Criminal alternative 
 
The  fourth  research  question  was  directed  towards  exploring  non-criminal 
alternative  methods  of  managing  disorder  in  order  to  displace  the  criminal 
hegemony within low-level public order law. Intriguingly, one of the key findings of 
this chapter is that it is the enduring appeal of the preventative powers predating 
the  War  on  Terror  that  provides  opportunities  for  a  non-criminal  approach  to 
managing  low-level  disorder.  As  has  already  been  highlighted,  Simester  and 
Sullivan have articulated the principle that if some other form of state intervention 
that falls short of criminalization may be effective to regulate disorderly conduct 
“then that alternative should be preferred.”
204  
 
Within England and Wales, the common law breach of the peace powers
205 have 
been  demonstrated  to  provide  police  with  a  range  of  options
206,  up  to  and 
including arrest. The scope of these powers may have been both restricted
207 and 
expanded
208 in equal measure. Nonetheless this common law provision has been 
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accepted
209 as satisfying the certainty requirements of Article 7 of the ECHR and 
still remains “at the heart of English public order law”
210. It is contended that the 
flexibility of breach of the peace, with the ability to focus on conduct that threatens 
violence  against  people  or  property  or  causes  people  to  be  fearful  that  such 
violence would occur
211, would achieve the same practical ends as those often 
sought by employing s.5 but without the attendant stigma of criminality attached. If 
the hypothesis, that s.5 is flawed and not fit for purpose then the corollary of that 
statement is that it needs to be either repealed or radically reshaped. The powers 
available to any citizen, up to and including arrest, to prevent a breach of the 
peace means that a non-criminal alternative for disorder management is readily 
available, with the advantage of significant case law support including, approval 
by the ECtHR. 
Conclusion 
 
Examining the impact of 9/11 on the various jurisdictions reveals that there are, 
unsurprisingly, varying degrees to which the War on Terror has impacted upon 
low-level public order. In the case of Germany and Australia, the answer is very 
little. The War on Terror also happened to coincide with the coming into force of 
the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. Amongst other changes, it enabled 
superior courts to make declarations of incompatibility if that court feels that the 
legislation offends against any of the rights enshrined in the ECHR
212.  Whilst the 
judiciary  do  have  a  guardianship  role  in  relation  to  Convention  rights
213,  they 
appear presently to be acting merely as overseers in respect of the laws that have 
been passed
214. It is to the legislature and the executive in the Post-September 
11
th world that one must look for the promulgation of such laws.  
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It has been a constant theme of this inquiry that provisions to deal with low-level 
disorder, within England and Wales, tend to give very broad powers to the police 
which in turn can be used to suppress what may be legitimate protest concerning 
the War on Terror
215. The findings of this chapter have helped to illustrate that the 
regulatory  paradigm  has  much  to  offer  the  management  of  low-level  disorder, 
especially  within  the  context  of  protest.  There  is  no  need  for  the  continued 
existence of s.5 to regulate low-level disorder given that the lowest level activity, 
which threatens to lead to violence, can be dealt with by the application of the 
equally versatile, but non-criminal, common law power to deal with a breach of the 
peace.  
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
215 Robbins (n 70) 23  	 ﾠ 265	 ﾠ
Chapter Eight: 
 
Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this research has been to examine the hypothesis that the current 
method  of  dealing  with  low-level  public  order  within  the  English  legal  system, 
specifically, the offence under s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 is flawed and in 
need of reform
1. It has been illustrated that s.5 is a blunt legislative instrument that 
is drafted too widely and bestows too much interpretive responsibility to those 
charged with investigating, prosecuting and judging the offence in question. In 
order to test this hypothesis, a number of research questions were posed. These 
questions  viewed  low-level  public  order  law  through  a  comparative  lens  and 
highlighted  the  standardizations  and  areas  of  commonality  in  respect  of  the 
approach within each of the legal systems. 
 
Exploring the role of s.5 as a tool of protest management has been fundamental 
to understanding the extreme scope of s.5. The use of s.5 in criminalizing conduct 
which  occurs  as  part  of  a  protest  exceeds  the  ambit  of  other,  comparable 
legislative provisions from the other jurisdictions and further emphasizes the need 
for reform of this provision
2. The impact of the Human Rights Act, far from acting 
as  a  check  upon  the  arbitrary  excesses  of  injudicious  policing,  has  served  to 
muddy the waters of low-level public order law, and forcing the police, prosecutors 
and courts to indulge in an “ad-hoc” balancing of rights that serves to make the 
actual boundaries of criminality more rather then less opaque.  
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The  research  conducted  within  this  thesis  supports  the  hypothesis  that  s.5 
criminalizes too broad a range of conduct and does this without requiring a victim 
for that conduct. Furthermore, it does not satisfy the requirements for certainty 
within any of the jurisdictions under consideration. It will be argued that s.5 should 
be repealed in its base form, requiring the police to either arrest and prosecute an 
individual for a specific criminal offence
3 or to utilize common law powers short of 
arrest to manage the disorder. In relation to the specific issue of protest and low 
level public order, the regulation of protest in the German jurisdiction provides the 
template for the regulation of minor disorder fashion where the emphasis is on the 
management of low-level public order rather than criminalizing a vast, ill-defined 
and amorphous range of conduct. 
The Undiscovered Country: The Fault Lines of Section 5 
 
The  first  research  question  sought  to  identify  how  low-level  public  order  was 
managed across the four jurisdictions. The findings of this investigation lead to the 
conclusion that the offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act does indeed have the widest 
scope of behaviour of the four jurisdictions. One of the key concerns with the 
offence  under  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  is  the  requirement  that  behaviour  that  is 
threatening, abusive, insulting and also disorderly
4. Not only do these terms lack 
the public aspect of behaviour required within the other jurisdictions, the lower 
end of the terms (insulting and disorderly) criminalize conduct that ought not to be 
criminalized.  
 
The  first  research  question  confirmed  that  the  English,  Australian  and  US 
jurisdictions deal with low-level public order under the main criminal law, but to 
varying degrees. The Australian legislation tends to focus upon behaviour that 
has the potential to annoy the reasonable person
5. There is also an inherently 
public  context  within  the  legislation  that  would  exclude  the  offensive  and 
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disorderly conduct offence being used to combat stalking and Internet bullying
6, 
(although it was established that bespoke legislation exists in all jurisdictions with 
regards to stalking). Therefore, the Australian disorderly conduct provisions are 
moderated by the location requirements that clearly place a “public” aspect to the 
requisite  conduct.  The  Australian  legislation
7 provides  for  a  public  nuisance 
offence if a person behaves in a disorderly, offensive or violent manner, (terms 
that are employed within s.5 of the 1986 Act in England) and could be classed as 
being  potentially  overbroad.  The  result  the  offence  requires  to  arise  from  that 
conduct
8, however, limits the scope of criminality, by concentrating on behaviour 
only where it interferes with, or is likely to interfere with, activities in a public place. 
 
Within  the  US,  responsibility  for  low-level  public  order  lies  with  the  individual 
states. The states utilize a wide variety of statutory provisions, although a number 
of the states base their provisions around those outlined in §250.2 of the MPC. 
Some states, such as Texas and Illinois, have incorporated detailed enumerated 
lists of prohibited conduct within the statute, whereas others, such as New York, 
employ more broadly drawn provisions. From a comparative perspective, no US, 
low-level  public  order  provision  is  as  wide  ranging  in  the  scope  of  proscribed 
activity  as  s.5  of  the  1986  Act  or  the  §118  OWiG  German  provision.  The 
incorporation of the definition of "public" within MPC §250.2 (1) means that US 
disorderly  conduct  provisions  are  similarly  focused  upon  the  maintenance  of 
“public order”
9, though not to the same degree as the Australian provisions
10. 
The English Patient: German lessons for Non Criminal Regulation 
 
The research undertaken to support this thesis supports the theory that such low-
level misconduct can be managed without the need for recourse to the criminal 
law. The German solution to dealing with the lowest-level public order is to treat 
such activity as an administrative infraction both by means of §118 OWiG (and 
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the various city-based police ordinances based around this provision). This is an 
administrative  offence,  which  state  that  anyone  who  engages  in  a  “grossly 
improper  activity”,  which  results  in  the  endangerment  of  or  disruption  to  the 
general  public  or  interferes  with  public  order,  shall  commit  an  OWiG  offence. 
Whilst permitting a broad range of conduct to fall within §118 OWiG and allowing 
such activity to be regulated, the German system falls short of criminalizing the 
activity, instead empowering local officials to issue a fine. 
 
It has been illustrated that the English provisions under ss.4, 4A and 5 of the 1986 
Act have been subjected to significant case law analysis, but despite appeals to 
individual convictions, the fundamental structure for dealing with low-level public 
order offences remains unchallenged. It is not clear why this is the case (and 
there  is  no  evidence  pointing  to  a  particular  reason)  although  it  is  possible  to 
speculate  that  legal  advisers  adopt  a  pragmatic  approach  when  advising  their 
clients and are reluctant to challenge a regime as deeply embedded as that of s.5, 
preferring instead to take their chances with the individual eccentricities of the 
case.  Nonetheless,  concerns  remain  about  the  breadth  of  activity  punishable, 
under s.5. Amongst the jurisdictions under consideration, s.5 represents the most 
broadly drafted and lowest level provision that gives rise to a criminal conviction.  
Uncertain & Vague: Section 5 through a Comparative 
Prism 
 
The second research question sought to examine the various physical elements 
of the provisions within respective jurisdictions to establish whether the breadth of 
activity covered by s.5 was representative. The range of behaviour proscribed 
under the lower reaches of the Public Order Act was explored, with the offences 
under s.5 spanning a considerable gamut of activity. The German provision was 
also drafted to cover a wide range of low-level anti social behaviour. The English 
disorderly  conduct  provision
11,  whilst  originally  intending  to  do  this  has  far 
exceeded the scope of §118 OWiG and is no longer directly comparable to that 
provision. The infractions dealt with under the German administrative provision 
were limited to minor elements of anti social behaviour such as urinating in the 
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street and minor examples of graffiti. S.5 of the 1986 Act does encompass these 
elements, but also has been used to deal with brawling, homophobic behaviour 
and, perhaps of most concern, individuals who are protesting.  
Section 5 and the Protest Paradigm: HRA Compliance and Ad hoc 
decisions 
 
Whilst the breadth of activity potentially criminalized by s.5 is a cause for concern, 
arguably the most contentious conduct covered by English low-level public order 
law is conduct that may occur within the context of a protest. When accused of an 
offence under s.5 (or indeed s.4A), such a protestor would claim that his conduct 
was reasonable and aver his rights to freedom of expression and assembly under 
Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, invoking the judicial duty to read legislation in a 
way  compatible  with  his  convention  rights
12.  Such  an  approach  is  problematic 
when the protestor is, as in the cases of Hammond
13 and Abdul
14, promulgating 
beliefs that conflict with the Convention Rights of others. The conduct of individual 
protestors  is  not  the  primary  mischief  that  s.5  is  aimed  at  regulating.  Yet  the 
breadth of s.5 means that the conduct of vitriolic dissenters has been assimilated 
within this provision
15. The difficulties regarding certainty and the operation of the 
defence of reasonable excuse are amplified when the intricate balancing of rights 
as required by the Human Rights Act 1998 is considered. Given the uncertainty 
outlined  previously
16,  the  operation  of  s.5  within  the  English  legal  system  in 
respect of the individual dissenter appears ever more ad hoc and arbitrary. 
 
In  both  Hammond  and  Abdul,  as  discussed  within  this  thesis
17,  the  protestors 
were eliciting a violent reaction from the audience by the content of their words. In 
the case of Abdul, the protestors had tried to engage with the police to ensure 
their protest was lawful. In both cases the so-called “Heckler’s Veto” (otherwise 
known as a hostile audience) rendered their protest unlawful. The common law 
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14 Abdul v DPP [2011] EWHC 247 (Admin) 
15 Andrew Geddis, “Free speech martyrs or unreasonable threats to social peace? – “Insulting” 
expression and section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986” [2004] PL 853, 873 
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provides  only  peripheral  assistance  as  to  which  protagonist  the  law  should 
penalize,  with  conflicting  judgments  supporting  both  the  protestor
18 and  the 
removal of the protestor for causing violence
19. The current orthodoxy errs on the 
side of preventing violence rather than an outright defence of free speech. The 
courts are acknowledging the existence of Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR yet 
maintaining  a  line  of  judicial  reasoning  that  can  be  traced  back  through  the 
English common law to Duncan v Jones
20. 
The US Response: Robust Judicial Guardianship 
 
In The US, the behaviour element concentrates on countering low-level violence 
and disorder. The adoption by most states of the MPC provision for disorderly 
conduct means that the actus reus of US disorderly conduct provisions deals with 
offences such as fighting, “environmentally unfriendly behaviour” such as letting 
off  stink  bombs,  and  “strewing  garbage”
21.
 The  US  provisions  do  not  limit  the 
conduct to violence, but there is a restriction on the words that can be prohibited 
by virtue of the First Amendment. The use of abusive words has been sanctioned, 
although  the  Courts  have  held  that  “mere  speech”  is  unlikely  to  constitute 
disorderly  conduct
22.    Barendt  states  that  the  courts  in  the  United  States  give 
particularly strong protection to political speech
23 due to their role as guarantors of 
the First Amendment. 
 
The US legal tradition ensures both constitutional and judicial vigilance against 
state  and  federal  laws  that  impinge  on  free  speech,  even  at  the  expense  of 
civility
24.  US  Courts  are  more  restrictive  of  the  protection  when  that  speech 
threatens violence, but only to the point where violence is threatened. The First 
Amendment  provides  significant  protection  for  the  passionate  protester  and 
whereas the attitude of the English courts is one of tolerance for protest only so 
far as it does not infringe the statute, the US jurisdiction tolerates the statute only 
as far as it does not infringe the protest. Therein lies a key difficulty with importing 
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solutions from the United States: any attempt to model solutions to s.5 around the 
US model will carry with it a requirement for social and cultural attenuation to the 
First Amendment. Such attenuation will be required to such an extent that would 
make any projected solution impractical without a tectonic shift in the English legal 
system’s approach to protest. 
 
As the police employ the low-level provisions in a wide variety of circumstances 
they can be characterized as "dragnet offence(s) designed to catch all types of 
low-level anti-social behaviour."
25 Yet Australia, Germany and The US limit the 
application  of  these  offences  to  situations  where  there  is  an  overtly  public 
dimension  to  the  behaviour,  together  with  robust  judicial  activity  to  defend 
constitutional guarantees in respect of freedom of expression. The findings of the 
research within this thesis indicate that it is extremely unlikely that the cases of 
Hammond and Abdul would ever be prosecuted in an American or German court 
and if they ever were, it is extremely unlikely that a prosecution would result in 
conviction.  
Uncertainty, Section 5 and Convention Rights 
 
One of the key areas of the hypothesis underpinning the thesis, and one of the 
central defects with s.5 as a statutory provision is the apparent lack of certainty: 
 
“Offence definitions should not be unduly vague. A citizen is not given fair warning 
of the criminality of his actions if, using the standard procedures for discovering 
the law (such as the canons of statutory interpretation) a reasonably intelligent 
person would be left unsure as to whether the relevant conduct was proscribed or 
not.”
26 
 
There  are  three  key  areas  that  make  s.5  problematic  in  respect  of  the  above 
requirement  which  have  been  highlighted.  The  first  area  of  uncertainty  for  a 
defendant  is  whether  his  conduct  will  be  likely  to  be  viewed  as  threatening, 
abusive or insulting. As stated above, this will be determined by the finder of fact 
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with reference to the test outlined in Brutus v Cozens
27. The finder of fact at trial is 
similarly left to determine whether the outcome of the behaviour is likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress
28. The cumulative effect of this is that all of the key 
behavioural elements of the offence under s.5 are established at the trial. Indeed, 
the accusation that s.5 is uncertain is not a novel one. Mead has stated that: 
 
“We might well question whether (disorderly conduct) - with its connotations of 
what  right  thinking,  properly  conducted  people  would  (not)  do  –  sets  out  with 
sufficient clarity to allow protestors (and in fact anyone) to know what is and what 
is not permitted. If so, charges and prosecutions of protestors would then fall foul 
of the ‘prescribed by law’ test in Article 11(2)” 
29 
 
The US disorderly conduct statutes, in order to avoid falling foul of the void for 
vagueness doctrine based on the MPC will contain a list of proscribed conduct, 
further limiting arbitrary and capricious prosecutions. The German legal system 
accepts that within regulatory provisions, such as §118 OWiG, there can be a 
degree of broadness providing the statutory provision has a consistent body of 
jurisprudence
30.  This  approach  further  re-emphasizes  the  strength  of  adopting 
non-criminal  approaches  to  managing  low-level  disorder  instead  of  retaining  a 
statutory provision that “gives little warning to citizens about the type of conduct 
that may be prohibited with the threat of criminal conviction”
31. 
 
Despite s.5 of the 1986 Act appearing to raise concerns in respect of certainty, 
the case law from the English legal system indicates that there have been no 
challenges solely on the grounds of Article 7 of the ECHR The "triptych" of protest 
cases
32 that were considered in Chapter Four, those of Percy
33, Norwood
34 and 
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Hammond
35 show s.5 arriving at different results, for different reasons, despite the 
defendants engaging in broadly the same actions
36.  
 
The third key area of concern, which sees the ambiguities of s.5 amplified even 
further,  is  when  the  defence  of  reasonableness  is  introduced
37.  This  defence 
provides for acquittal if the accused can show that his actions were reasonable. 
With the term itself not defined within the statute, it has fallen to the courts to 
decide whether the conduct of the defendant was reasonable, based on all of the 
circumstances. The inevitable corollary of this is that the courts make an ad-hoc 
determination  of  what  constitutes  an  acceptable  excuse
38.  With  the  physical 
elements of the offence also determined as a question of fact, this further adds to 
the uncertainty surrounding the offence of s.5.  
 
In  the  other  jurisdictions  under  consideration  it  has  been  shown  that  the 
reasonableness  of  conduct  is  a  central  element  of  the  offence  rather  than  a 
separate defence that has to be proved by the accused. It is hard to argue that, in 
actuality, this is also not the case also under s.5(3)(c). In both circumstances, a 
finding of reasonableness by the court means that there is no criminal sanction 
attached to the conduct
39. If the reasonableness of the behaviour, therefore, is 
determinative of conviction and the reasonableness of the conduct is a central 
element  of  the  offence,  Thornton  has  speculated  that  this  may  well  place  it 
beyond the boundaries of ECHR compliance in relation to the reverse onus nature 
of  the  defence
40.  He  goes  on  to  suggest  that  an  objective  assessment  of 
reasonableness  is  not  within  the  defendant’s  knowledge,  and  that  it  would  be 
more logical to have the prosecution prove unreasonableness beyond reasonable 
doubt in all of the circumstances
41. This would be a welcome step towards adding 
certainty,  although  it  does  not  address  the  underlying  difficulties  of  certainty 
inherent in the actus reus element per se. 
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Low-Level Public Order and the need for a victim 
 
The above findings highlight the manifold problems that exist with s.5 of the 1986 
Act. The unparalleled breadth of activity covered, the illusory nature of compliance 
with the ECHR resulting in the devolution of the balancing of key convention rights 
to both the courts (and more worryingly) the police. The absence of the “public 
place”  limitation  that  is  present  in  each  of  the  other  jurisdictions  is  similarly 
egregious. These problems are further compounded by the anomalous lack of a 
tangible, identifiable victim within the terms of s.5. Such a problem goes to the 
heart of criminal jurisprudence as to the limits of criminalization as identified at the 
outset of this study.
42 Wilson states; 
 
“(Using Anti Social Behaviour Orders) has been criticized for its tendency to suck 
into the apparatus of state coercion those, particularly the young, who are rowdy, 
loud  and  disruptive  without,  however,  harming  in  any  defined  and  substantial 
fashion the interests of others.”
43 
 
The conceptual analyses of the requisite behavioural elements for the disorderly 
conduct offences suggest areas of cohesion amongst the jurisdictions. With the 
exception of s.5
44, there appears to be a generally accepted requirement that the 
proscribed conduct has some impact on another person. Simester and Sullivan 
highlight racial insults as being paradigm of this class of case: “they tend to both 
cause affront in the audience and to do so by communicating contempt for that 
audience”
45. It is, therefore, unsurprising that an additional area of consensus is 
the  establishment  of  sanctions  for  low-level  behaviour  aggravated  by  a  racial 
element
46.  
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Simester and Sullivan state that even if one accepts the need to criminalize low 
level, expressive actions
47 such cases should be criminalized sparingly because 
of the importance of free expression
48. This assertion has particular resonance 
with the approach adopted by the judiciary within the US legal system where the 
First Amendment is deeply engrained within both the constitutional framework and 
also  the  cultural  fabric  of  the  US  legal  system.  Writing  in  respect  of  the 
relationship between s.5 and protest, Geddis states that: 
 
“Applying s.5 to the individual dissenter…forces us to confront the extent to which 
the general public should be required to tolerate the “harm” of being offended in 
the name of free expression. There is, of course no magical algorithm available to 
determine this matter; the decision depends heavily on the matrix of political and 
social variables that dominate a given society.” 
49 
 
It  is  contended  that  an  essential  part  of  the  political  and  social  make-up  of 
England and Wales is the personal and cultural diversity that needs diverse and 
inconsistent forms of public expression
50. In stifling this, s.5 is seeking to prevent 
nebulous  harm  that  is  likely  (not  actually)  to  be  suffered  by  someone  who 
witnesses threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour and this is discordant with 
the approach of the other jurisdictions. The lack of a victim is not terminal to the 
survival of s.5 as a statutory provision. There are numerous crimes that seek to 
prevent remote harms by criminalizing harmless acts, such as the buying of a 
handgun
51. There are also crimes seeking to prevent conduct that is offensive, 
such as engaging in sexual intercourse in a public place
52. The lack of the victim 
becomes significant when examining the offence of s.5 holistically. It criminalizes 
activity on an arbitrary basis to be decided upon by the agents of the state based 
largely  on  their  individual  distaste  for  the  conduct  yet  this  conduct  need  not 
actually  cause  harm  to  anyone.  This  combines  with  the  other  issues,  outlined 
above, means that s.5 is not fit for purpose and not only does it not act as a 
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deterrent, it can be used in a more sinister fashion to impose the norms of the 
individual state agent upon citizens who are engaged upon an otherwise entirely 
lawful activity. 
Public Order Management: Alternatives to 
Criminalization 
 
At the outset of the study it was identified that a presumption underpinned the 
research hypothesis. The operating premise was that all of the jurisdictions under 
consideration would have some form of criminal framework for dealing with low-
level  public  order  akin  to  the  role  played  by  s.5  in  England  and  Wales.  The 
research demonstrated that this presumption was correct. Each of the four legal 
systems recognizes the need for some state intervention in respect of low-level 
disorder.  It  was  established  that  the  three  common  law  jurisdictions  employ 
predominantly criminal sanctions.  
American Constitutionalism: The Immovable Object 
 
When dealing with low-level public order legislation, the US jurisdiction requires a 
list  of  enumerated  behaviour  detailing  the  prohibited  conduct  in  order  for  the 
statute to be constitutional. It has been stated that the watchful role played by the 
US courts in respect of unconstitutionally vague laws extends to low-level public 
order statutes. This oversight role would appear to be an optimal way of ensuring 
certainty  within  low-level  public  order,  especially  when  “judicial  resolution  of 
residual uncertainty in the meaning of penal statues be biased in favor (sic) of the 
accused”.
53  
 
The research conducted within the thesis illustrates that the English framework for 
managing protest under Part 2 of the 1986 Act
54 remains unaltered despite the 
further effect granted to the ECHR following the passing of the Human Rights Act 
1998. Yet whilst the regulatory framework remains unaltered, the problems posed 
by the extreme protestor linger. The approach of the English and Australian courts 
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in terms of the ad-hoc balancing of competing rights of different actors within the 
public order arena contrasts starkly with the robust defence of free speech within 
the US jurisdiction. Within the US, all legislation operates in the shadow of the 
First Amendment. This cultural and legal attitude would be difficult to transplant 
into a different legal system not attenuated to the specific constitutional tradition of 
the United States.  
 
The requirements of the First Amendment, while providing significant protection to 
protest and protestors, are as much embedded within the US culture as it is within 
the  legal  system
55 .  To  suggest  transplanting  such  an  idea  into  an  alien 
environment  such  as  the  English  legal  system  is  unrealistic  and  indeed 
unrealizable.  Instead,  it  is  the  perspectives  of  the  German  legal  system  upon 
which recommendations for change have been modelled. Whilst the legal tradition 
may  differ,  the  German  legislative  approach  represents  a  logical  and  portable 
solution to the difficulties outlined in respect of England and Wales as well as 
Australia. It is suggested, however, that the German Assembly law, VslgG is a 
model worthy of emulation with relatively little constitutional calibration necessary. 
Towards a German Model: Regulation not Criminalization 
 
The German solution provides that disorderly conduct is not a criminal offence. 
Instead  an  administrative,  regulatory  approach  was  favoured  with  low-level 
disorder  attracting  non-criminal  disposals  and  dealing  with  it  by  means  of  a 
“regulatory  mechanism”
56.  This  approach,  although  unusual  in  its  widespread 
application, is not unique to the German jurisdiction
57. The German legal system 
accepts that within regulatory provisions, such as §118 OWiG, there can be a 
degree of broadness providing the statutory provision has a consistent body of 
jurisprudence
58.  Finally,  although,  to  a  lesser  degree  than  Australia,  offences 
under §118 have a distinctly “public” requirement – even if the behaviour occurs in 
a place that may private. This contrasts with the requirement of s.5 of the 1986 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
55 For details of the difficulty associated with introducing American solutions without the necessary 
constitutional culture see Ian Loveland (ed), Importing the First Amendment (Hart 1998)  
56 An approach endorsed by Simester (n 45) 652 
57 Some US states, whereby the lowest level disorderly conduct offence is considered to be a 
violation, has adopted this more regulatory approach. 
58 BGH 3 StR 506/95 - Decision of 15 March 1996 (OLG Dusseldorf) 	 ﾠ 278	 ﾠ
Act whereby, providing the conduct is not in a dwelling
59 and there is a witness
60, 
there does not need to be any additional public element.  
 
As  highlighted  above,  the  offence  itself  prohibits  “grossly  improper  activity” 
resulting in the endangerment of or disruption to the general public or interferes 
with  public  order.  By  treating  such  activity  and  conduct  as  an  administrative 
infraction by means of the low level, §118 OWiG
61, endows police with a widely 
drafted  “catch  all”  provision  but  not  impose  criminal  liability.  Furthermore,  and 
notwithstanding  the  broad  circumstances  that  may  be  captured  by  the  term 
“grossly improper activity”, it should be noted that political speech and protest 
would not fall within the ambit of §118. The crime of “insult” under §185 StGB may 
encompass  some  political  activity,  but  the  courts  are  careful  to  read  §185  in 
concert with the defence of fair comment under §193 as well as being mindful of 
the  requirements  of  free  expression
62 and  freedom  to  demonstrate
63 under  the 
Basic Law. 
Reforming Low-Level Public Order in England and Wales 
 
The  most  broadly  drawn  and  lowest  entry  point  for  criminality  amongst  the 
jurisdictions can be found within the English legal system by virtue of s.5 of the 
1986 Act. As it currently stands, the term “insulting” is too subjective to provide 
any effective guidance as to the entire scope of the behaviour that is prohibited. 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights in 2009 recommended removing the word 
insulting from s.5 of the 1986 Act to lessen the chilling effect on free expression
64. 
Such  a  recommendation,  however,  illustrates  the  problem  with  an  exclusively 
rights-based analysis of s.5. While removing insulting may lessen (not eliminate) 
the chilling effect on expression, it may not be sufficient to remove the inherent 
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59 Public Order Act 1986 s 5 (3) (b) provides a defence if the accused can prove that he was inside 
a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or behaviour used, or the writing, sign or 
other visible representation displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside that or any 
other dwelling.  
60 Public Order Act 1986 s 5 (3) (a) requires a person who is likely to be caused harassment, 
alarm or distress to be present otherwise the accused has a potential defence to prosecution. 
61 Also including the various city-based police ordinances 
62 Art 5 I GG 
63 Art 8 I GG 
64 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights? (2008-9, HL 141, HC 
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ambiguity from within the core of the offence. The word abusive is, ultimately, 
defined in relation to insulting. Consequently, removal of insulting from s.5 may 
alleviate  the  liability  in  some  circumstances,  but  it  may  be  that  definitional 
difficulties are simply transferred from insulting to abusive. Removal of both terms, 
leaving  the  offence  of  “threatening  or  disorderly  behaviour”,  still  does  not 
overcome  the  difficulties  in  respect  of  the  vagueness  of  harassment,  alarm  or 
distress,  nor  the  confusion  as  to  the  operation  of  the  defence  of  reasonable 
excuse under s.5 (3)(c) of the 1986 Act. 
 
There  is  sufficient  legislation  passed  by  Parliament  to  suggest  that  when  it  is 
perceived necessary to prohibit a certain type of speech or activity, the lawmakers 
will intervene and proscribe it. In the jurisdictional ambit of England and Wales 
there is legislation prohibiting speech that is offensively racially motivated,
65 stirs 
up  racial  and  religious  hatred;
66 that  contains  official  secrets;
67 and  obscene 
expression.
68 There is nothing to suggest that Parliament has any reluctance to 
proscribe expression that it does not believe to be in the best interests of society. 
Had  the  terms  of  the  Crime  and  Disorder  Act  1998  covered  homophobia,  the 
defendant in Hammond would have been left in little doubt that his actions would 
be viewed as criminal. Low-level public order legislation, as well as acting as a 
“catch all” provision, is also operating as a palliative in cases where the speech or 
expression is undesirable but not yet proscribed
69.  
Repeal of the base offence under s.5 and reform of s.4A 
 
The analysis of the scope of the activity covered in both regular criminal law and 
within  the  context  of  protest,  illustrates  that  the  best  way  to  remove  the 
ambiguities is to repeal the base offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act. The offence of 
racially aggravated harassment, alarm or distress, together with an augmented 
provision to deal with aggravation on the grounds of sexual orientation should be 
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66 Serious Organized Crime and Police Act 2005 
67 Official Secrets Act 1911 & 1989 
68 Obscene Publications Act 1959 
69 In this case, the decisions of the court in Hammond and Abdul as opposed to Dehal v DPP 
[2005] All ER (D) 152 	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retained,  on  the  ground  articulated  by  Simester  and  Sullivan  that  racially 
aggravated insults cause affront to the wider audience of society
70.  
 
The provision of Intentional harassment, alarm or distress or disorderly conduct, 
under  s.4A  of  the  1986  Act  would  remain  part  of  the  low-level  public  order 
legislative arsenal and become the lowest level public order offence. S. 6 (4) of 
the 1986 Act, would be amended to provide coverage for s.4A in relation to the 
formation  of  mens  rea  when  intoxicated.  The  offence  under  s.4A  requires  the 
accused to intend to cause harassment, alarm or distress and for the conduct to 
subsequently result in a person being so affected. This requirement will provide a 
tangible victim who can attest to the negative consequences of the conduct. 
 
The defences under s.5(3) (a) and (b) would remain. The defence under s.5 (3) 
(c) would be removed. Instead the actus reus of the remaining provisions of s.5 
(i.e. those aggravated by race and sexual orientation) together with s.4A would be 
altered mutates mutandis to state: 
 
A person is guilty of an offence if he –  
 
uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour 
which is unreasonable with regard to all of the circumstances or 
 
displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, 
abusive or insulting and is unreasonable with regard to all of the 
circumstances  
 
This would address the concerns previously highlighted by Thornton in respect of 
the  difficulty  of  the  accused  providing  an  objective  assessment  of 
reasonableness. This augmented provision requires that the prosecution prove 
unreasonableness beyond reasonable doubt in all of the circumstances.
71 
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Filling the Void: The ECHR Compliance of Breach of the Peace 
 
The common law powers to deal with breach of the peace will provide sufficient 
coverage to deal with elements of anti social behaviour not encompassed by the 
offence under s.4A of the 1986 Act. It has been shown that breach of the peace 
powers are used in a wide variety of circumstances and are every bit as flexible 
as s.5. The key difference between breach of the peace powers and those under 
s.5 is that powers to deal with a breach of the peace are not criminal sanctions, 
and while broad in scope, are merely preventative tools for the police and not the 
entry point to criminality. It is accepted that the repeal of s.5 may result in the 
displacement of prosecutions to other offences which may also be regarded as 
vague or have other deficiencies. Such a consideration should not interfere with 
the need to repeal this offence that employs a flawed matrix of uncertainty, over-
broadness and locational flexibility without the need for the behaviour to affect any 
victim. 
 
The repeal of s.5 and the use of preventative powers would bring the English 
legal system into closer harmony with the prevailing attitude to public order in the 
other jurisdictions, reflecting the non-criminal nature of §118 OWiG and the more 
public/violence based scope of the US and Australian approaches. The retention 
of the augmented powers under s.28 Crime and Disorder Act, together with the 
intentional  offence  under  s.4A  of  the  1986  Act,  maintains  protection  for  the 
particular  individual  to  whom  abusive  speech  is  directed.  These  align  with  the 
provisions found in both §185 StGB and also the use of offensive speech under 
the “obscene” language provision found in §250.2 of the MPC. 
Protest and Public Order: Towards Management rather 
than Criminalization 
 
The law regulating protest in England is currently a mixture of statutory regulation 
combined with the application of common law provisions and excessively broad 
low-level public order legislation. Although freedom of expression is recognized 
within the English legal system (by virtue of Article 10 of the ECHR) it is culturally 	 ﾠ 282	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and constitutionally problematic to embed values such as those upheld by the US 
courts in relation to the First Amendment.  
 
Mead, writing solely in respect of the English legal system, has talked of the need 
for a “Protest Act” and has outlined some of the general principles such an Act 
might  embrace  including  a  statutory  right  to  protest
72.  It  is  contended  that  the 
German approach of treating protest holistically, by virtue of the VslgG, rather 
than using piecemeal provisions of the general criminal law represents an optimal 
solution to this dilemma. 
 
It is recommended that Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 should be repealed 
and replaced by a unified law on Assembly modeled extensively on the German 
VslgG. Rather than housing the regulation of protest within the Public Order Act, 
the requisite public order provisions should be drafted within the broader context 
of facilitating protest. As with §1 VslgG, the first provision of the Assembly statute 
should be a statement that everyone has the right to protest
73. This right may 
need qualifying
74 but the existence of such an explicit provision within the statute 
will emphasize a shift in focus, away from merely tolerating protest to actively 
enabling it.  
Use or Threat of Violence at a Notified Protest 
 
The first ‘new’ offence proposed is modelled directly on the provisions found in 
§21 VslgG: 
 
An offence will occur if a person commits or threatens acts of violence with the 
intention of preventing or of disrupting protests, of which the police have received 
full notification
75.  
 
Such an offence would deal with the problem posed by the so-called “Heckler’s 
Veto” and encourage those organizing a protest to notify the police and thereby 
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73 For a new definition of protest see p 283 
74 For example, a demonstration expressing support for groups proscribed under Terrorism Act 
2000, s 3 may well not be permitted to exercise this right. 
75 Full notification would, in this provision refer to a notification period as currently provided for by 
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prevent  violence.  Had  this  been  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  Hammond  case, 
Hammond’s protest would only be protected from the hostile crowd if the police 
had received the appropriate notification. Upon receiving notification, the police 
may well have imposed a condition preventing the disturbance that ensued. The 
problem  of  the  vituperative  and  vitriolic  protestor  leading  to  violence  could  be 
countered by the creation of an additional offence: 
 
An offence will be committed whereby any person, present as part of a protest, 
threatens any another person, or causes disorder by: 
 
Damaging or threatening to damage Property or 
Failing to comply with a reasonable instruction from a police officer in relation to 
that protest. 
 
It would be for the prosecution to prove that the person was present as part of a 
protest (whether the defendant maintained he was or not). It would, crucially, be 
for  the  prosecution  to  show  that  the  instruction  from  the  police  officer  was 
reasonable. This would re-emphasize the duty of the police to act in a way that is 
compliant with the right to freedom of expression and association and require any 
such interference to be proportionate and necessary. 
Redefining Protest 
 
The definition of the term protest would be modelled on that found within s. 11 of 
the 1986 Act: 
 
Protest shall include processions and meetings or other gathering of one or more 
persons, in a place to which the public have access, to demonstrate support for or 
opposition to the views or actions of any person, body of persons, company or 
government, to publicize a cause or campaign or to mark or commemorate an 
event. 
 
The case of Norwood presents something of a dilemma. The above definition of 
protest means that displaying something in a window, whilst visible to the public is 
not  a  procession,  meeting  or  other  such  gathering.  Yet  Norwood  undoubtedly 
would classify himself as a protestor and the placing of posters in the window of 	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houses is a long established method of political campaigning. Although Norwood 
would not have been liable for prosecution under the proposed Assembly law, the 
actions still may come within the provisions of racially aggravated s.5 of the 1986 
Act.  The  proposed  change  to  the  actus  reus  of  racially  aggravated  s.5  would 
provide greater protection to free expression, and a clearer focus for the court by 
placing  the  reasonableness  of  the  activity  within  the  central  elements  of  the 
defence rather than a provision for the defendant to disprove. 
 
Acting in congruence, these provisions would create a content-neutral
76 way of 
dealing with those who threatened to or actually did bring violence or the threat of 
violence to a protest. It would also ensure that the activity of protestors, such as in 
Hammond  and  Abdul,  would  not  be  dealt  with  under  legislation  designed  to 
counter  low-level  anti  social  behaviour.  Instead,  they  would  be  considered 
alongside all other protestors and their protest could be regulated and effectively 
policed. In the case of Hammond, a reasonable instruction from a police officer 
might have been to relocate his protest to a different area. In the case of Abdul, 
such  a  law  would  possibly  have  given  them  protection  from  prosecution  and 
placed the onus on the police to ensure that the demonstration, of which they 
were fully aware, did not result in violence.  
Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis has sought to address the deficiencies of the approach to low-level 
public order law within the English legal system by exploring and critiquing the 
boundaries of disorder punishable across four distinct legal systems. This has 
resulted  in  the  constructing  of  a  conceptual  edifice  from  the  elements  of  the 
individual  low-level  offences.  The  analysis  and  critique  has  highlighted  the 
standardizations within the jurisdictions and exposed weaknesses on a systemic 
level, finally suggesting proposed reforms to the low-level public order regime, 
specifically the repeal of s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986 and the creation of a 
“Protest  Act”  to  deal  with  some  of  the  low-level  disorder  that  may  arise  from 
protest. 
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Although the recommendations have tended to focus upon the problems identified 
within  the  English  Legal  System,  these  recommendations  are  also  offered  as 
optimal pathways for dealing with protest within the Australian jurisdiction should 
the structural integrity of the state-based scheme be affected by events in the 
future. Certainly, within England and Wales, the existence of a protest law, with a 
free standing right to protest and protection for demonstrators at its core, should 
contribute to a much needed attitudinal shift in those enforcing and interpreting 
the law towards encouraging protest. 
 
The benefit of conducting this comparative study of low-level public order as it 
applies in general is clear. It has been shown, across all jurisdictions, that some 
vagueness is inherent in provisions designed to deal with low-level disorder. That 
ambiguity  should  not,  however,  provide  legislators  with  an  excuse  to  deploy 
broadly drafted, uncertain laws in the hope of catching a wide range of hitherto 
unconsidered activities. The detailed critique of the different statutory provisions 
has  demonstrated  that  there  are  optimal  solutions  and  that  the  entry  point  to 
criminality does not need to be as fluid and uncertain as Justice Stewart’s famous 
aphorism “I know it when I see it”
77. Instead, as Aristotle stated, “Law is order, 
good  law  is  good  order”
78,  and  it  is  folly  to  neglect  fundamental  principles  of 
criminal doctrine in search of pragmatism however low level the offence might be. 
The proposals arising from this thesis will ensure that order is achieved by virtue 
of the law and not at the expense of it. 
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